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ABSTRACT
Despite its lack of membership and vague organizational 
structure, the Southern Christian leadership Conference 
was the most effective of the various groups which 
composed the Southern civil rights movement: the SCLC's 
campaigns in Birmingham and Selma furnished the impetus 
for the passage of both the 1964 Civil Rights Act and 
the 1965 Voting Rights Act. In both campaigns the SCLC 
extricated the civil rights movement from a tactical 
impasse, provided it with fresh momentum, and allied it 
with new sources of white support.
The effectiveness of the SCLC had a number of 
causes. Almost entirely made up of ministers, the 
Conference was uniquely equipped to draw upon the 
spiritual and material resources of the black church; 
its religious roots also gave immense popularity and 
personal authority to Martin Luther King, Jr., and 
accorded the tactics of nonviolent direct action an 
unassailable moral legitimacy. In its application of 
nonviolent direct action the SCLC exhibited a tactical 
skill and political sophistication which enabled it 
to defeat the forces of white supremacy by exposing 
their violence to the hostile glare of national and 
international publicity. Aware that a reform of the 
South required the assent of the white majority, the 
SCLC solved the dilemma of black powerlessness by 
Ly-passing the established political and judicial
institutions, and appealing directly to Northern 
public opinion. Possessed of a keen sense of political 
realism, King and his lieutenants maintained a subtle 
balance between pressure and persuasion in their use 
of nonviolent direct action.
The SCLC failed to repeat its success in the 
North because, its demands bitterly opposed by the 
white majority, it could no longer command significant 
white support; in Chicago, the federal government 
was no longer a sympathetic ally. In addition, urban 
riots, the emergence of Black Power and the war in 
Vietnam exacerbated both the "white backlash" and the 
internal disarray of the civil rights movement. After 
the failure of the Chicago campaign, the principal 
achievements of the SCLC were the strengthening of the 
peace movement, the development of the idea of "Poor 
People*s Power" and the consolidation of the gains 
won in the South.
The bankruptcy of black separatism, and the 
steady growth of integration and black political power 
in the South, indicate that the accomplishment of the 
SCLC and the nonviolent civil rights movement should 
not be lightly dismissed.
PREFACE
This study has four aims: to re-evaluate the career 
of Martin Luther King, Jr.; to assess the contribution 
of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference to the 
civil rights movement; and to weigh the achievements, 
and account for the failures, of the civil rights 
movement as a whole.
It is not the purpose of this study to make 
extravagant claims on behalf of Martin Luther King: 
Watts, Newark and Detroit— and the election of Richard 
Nixon— have long since illuminated the limitations of 
his philosophy and technique of social change. Before 
his death, King observed that his Dream was turning 
into a nightmare; after his death, that nightmare 
cast a dark shadow over his historical reputation.
It is, nevertheless, paradoxical that although 
professional historians and black radicals have 
tended to downgrade King's achievements, his position 
among ordinary blacks as a popular hero, legend and 
inspirational symbol has become solidly entrenched.
And— a consequence of the increasing political 
influence of Southern blacks— King is now being 
accorded a degree of symbolic recognition by whites 
that no other black historical figure has enjoyed.
The first and most influential assessments of 
Martin Luther King appeared at a time when, under the 
repressive Nixon regime, it appeared that the civil
rights movement accomplished very little, and that the 
United States was entering a period of quasi-fascism. 
King, they agreed, had placed too much faith in liberal 
democracy, underestimated the oppressiveness of 
American society, and proposed strategies and sol­
utions that were woefully lacking in radicalism.
The passage of time dictates a revision of this 
viewpoint. Although the last decade has seen no 
important new victories by blacks, the ground won by 
the civil rights movement has been held and extended.
At the same time, the strategies of violence and sep­
aratism advocated by many of King's critics have shown 
themselves to be misguided and ineffective. From this 
vantage point, it is possible to realize that the 
religious, idealistic and "moderate" elements in King's 
thought were counterbalanced by a robust realism and 
radicalism.
The second theme of this study is the Southern 
Christian leadership Conference as an organization. 
Although the SCLC was the organizational extension of 
a single man, it was also more than that. King's 
lieutenants were gifted and forceful personalities, 
their specific, individual contributions merit 
study. The importance of the SCLC cannot, however, be 
understood solely in organizational terms. Its ability 
to draw upon the spiritual and material resources of 
the black church, its capacity to attract sympathetic
publicity and white support, and the skill and pol­
itical acuity with which it applied the tactics of 
nonviolent direct action gave the SCLC a unique 
influence in the civil rights movement, moulding its 
basic direction, and imparting to it a clear set of 
philosophical assumptions, strategic objectives and 
tactical methods. Of all the civil organizations, the 
SCLO most precisely embodied the spirit of the non­
violent movement.
The major campaigns of the SC1C have already 
been described in detail elsewhere. The accounts of 
them given here attempt to cover new ground by high­
lighting their intricate tactics, their overall 
strategy, and their exact impact on the civil rights 
movement. Accounts of the SCLC's lesser known camp­
aigns are included to illustrate the popular roots of 
the civil rights movement, to emphasize the importance 
of local circumstances and local leaders, and to put 
the larger campaigns in their proper perspective.
Only by studying both types of campaigns is it possible 
to dispel the myth that the SCLC's victories were 
"easy." The civil rights movement was not pushing 
against an open door: it had to batter that door down.
A question which haunts the history of the civil 
rights movement is: why did SNCC and CORE repudiate 
King's leadership? Why did the movement collapse so 
rapidly and completely after 1965? Others have argued,
convincingly, that the civil rights movement was ill- 
equipped for the task of political organization that 
the Voting Rights Act demanded, and that, being a 
Southern movement, it had neither the resources, the 
tactics nor the programmes to cope with the problems 
of racism in the North.
Although all these internal factors are care­
fully considered, a central assertion of this thesis 
is that the civil rights movement, rather than dying 
by its own hand, was the casualty of a white racism it 
could not overcome. Moreover, in common with many 
other American social movements, the civil rights move­
ment tended to substitue idealism for ideology, flaring 
brilliantly for a short period, only to burn itself out 
when its task was only half completed.
Because he was the individual most closely iden­
tified with the triumphs of the movement, it was inev­
itable that King should be blamed for its failures.
Tet the defeats which followed Selma did not, as SNCC 
claimed, invalidate that which the civil rights move­
ment had achieved, nor the means by which it had been 
achieved. The failure of SNCC's alternative strategy 
of Black Power indicated that no strategy, violent or 
nonviolent, interracial or separatist, existed which 
could persuade or pressure the white majority to 
accord blacks de facto equality.
That the civil rights movement failed to attain 
goals that would have entailed basic alterations in 
the structure and ideology of the American political 
economy is hardly surprising. What is more remarkable 
is that the movement, guided by King and the SCLC, 
evolved a philosophy, strategy and method of social 
change which accomplished in a decade that for which 
blacks in the South had been unsuccessfully struggling 
for the better part of a century. The abolition of de 
.jure segregation, the ending of routine white violence 
against blacks, access to the political system, and 
the elimination of racist demagoguery: this collective 
achievement can only be deemed a failure if set against 
the SCLC's higher goal "To Save the Soul of America."
In addition to a multitude of secondary works, 
the reports of the Southern Regional Council and the 
observations of the press, this work is based upon 
primary sources relating to Martin Luther King, the 
SCLC, SNCC, and other civil rights organizations. It 
could not have been written without the help of many 
institutions and individuals. Ms. Minnie Clayton of 
the Martin Luther King, Jr., Memorial Library was of 
great assistance,- as were Ms. Janet Smith of the 
Southern Regional Council, and the staffs of Boston 
University's Mugar Library and Dillard University's 
Amistad Collection. Little of this research would 
have been carried out had not Dr. Charles Crowe
invited me to spend a year at the University of 
Georgia, where he is a Professor of History. Dr.
Crowe, a veteran of the civil rights movement, also 
taught me much about the character of racism in the 
United States. I would also like to express my 
gratitude to Dr. Duncan Macleod, of St. Catherine's 
College, Oxford, who gave me the opportunity to 
expose my ideas to public criticism; and to Dr. Mary 
Ellison, my thesis supervisor at the University of 
Keele, who gave me three years of friendship and 
encouragement. Finally, Pat Benard made the completion 
of this thesis much less tedious than it would other­
wise have been.
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CHAPTER I
THE ORIGINS OP THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 
AND THE NONVIOLENT CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
In 1966, Martin Luther King, Jr. recalled, with a genuine
sense of awe, the decade-old event that many deemed the
hirth of the civil rights movement:
One day . . .  a lady by the name of Rosa Parks decided that she wasn't going to take it any longer.
She stayed on a bus seat. . . .  It was the beginning 
of a movement where fifty thousand black men and women 
refused— absolutely— to ride the city buses. And we 
walked together for three hundred and eighty-one days. 
. . .  We stuck together. We sent out the call: no 
Negro rode the buses. It was one of the most amazing things I've ever seen in my life. 1
Although King liked to discern the hand of God in
the Montgomery bus boycott, he admitted that it had been
p"the culmination of a slowly developing process." During 
the previous two decades, the legal and economic foundations 
of white supremacy had been subject to a gradual erosion.
The outlawing of the white primary in 1944 had paved the 
way for the re-emergence of a black electorate in the South, 
while the 1954- Brown decision of the Supreme Court had struck 
at the heart of de .jure segregation. After the Second 
World War, the spirit of resistance among Southern blacks 
perceptibly quickened, as testified to by the rapid expan­
sion of the NAACP— and the violent reactions of Southern 
whites.^ In the Deep South, the struggle for racial 
equality took on the aspect of a war, as local NAACP 
leaders were bombed, assassinated, or driven out. As yet,
2however, the nascent civil rights movement was characterized 
by fragmented and scattered leadership, lack of Northern 
support, and an absence of strong community involvement.
The Montgomery bus boycott— not an unusual event in 
itself— gave the movement a focus, an inspirational symbol, 
a practical technique of social action, and a new source 
of leadership.
I. THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MONTGOMERY BUS 
BOYCOTT
The Maintenance of Black Unity
"There is an amazing lack of fear on the part of the 
Negro community," wrote King in September 1956. "They are 
determined never to return to jim crow b u s e s . F r o m  the 
first day of the boycott to the last, an almost unanimous 
unity infused Montgomery's black community, despite 
economic coercion, physical and psychological harassment, 
legal guerilla warfare, bombings, and mass arrests.
The achievement of unity was all the more surprising 
in view of the passivity and factionalism that had afflicted 
Montgomery's black population before the protest. "If you 
had asked me the day before our protest began," admitted 
King in 1957, "whether any action could or would have 
been taken by the Negroes, I'd have said no." Such a 
conclusion would not have been unduly pessimistic. "An 
appalling lack of unity" existed within the black leadership, 
which was divided into half a dozen civic and political 
organizations, "each at loggerheads with the other."^ An
3.
attempt to coordinate these groups had only recently 
foundered on the shoals of community apathy. Apathy, in 
fact, was a second principal harrier to effective blade 
action. It extended through every social class, and was 
attributable less to fear of white reprisal than to the 
"corroding sense of inferiority" caused by segregation.
This state of affairs, wrote King "had almost persuaded 
me that no lasting social reform could ever be achieved in
OMontgomery." But by April 1956, five months into the
boycott, King proudly claimed that "We now know that we
qcan stick together."^
Although blacks accounted for 70 per cent of those 
who travelled on Montgomery's buses, they included only 
a small proportion of the black middle-class, most of 
whom owned at least one car.^ The boycott, however, 
became a symbolic issue that cut across class lines, 
involving the whole community. "The Negro leaders," wrote 
Norman Walton in 1957» "have finally caught up with the 
masses."'1''1' The actual organization of the boycott re­
inforced this feeling of unity. The task, of providing an
alternative transport system brought the black middle-class
12into direct contact with their less well-off brothers. 
Blacks of all classes rode in the cars provided by the 
pool» regardless of class, education or status. The boy­
cott was conducted according to a strategy of total 
community involvement; it was militantly egalitarian in 
spirit.
4.
The involvement of the black church
Black ministers were in the forefront of the 
Montgomery protest. This was remarkable. King's pre­
decessor at Dexter Avenue Baptist Church, the Rev. Vernon 
Johns, had, for years, lashed out against racial injustice, 
and tried to "rock the complacency of his refined, middle- 
class congregation"^ In 1953» Johns had openly defied the 
city's bus segregation law, challenging others to do like­
wise, but he had met with no response from his black
14fellow-passengers. His congregation was glad to see
him go* Johns was altogether atypical of Montgomery's
black clergymen, most of whom, according to King, "remained
aloof from the area of social responsibility," preaching an
other-wordly gospel that conformed to Marx's description
of religion as "an opiate of the people."1^
Martin lather King represented a new type of black
clergyman. Highly-educated and racially-conscious, King
was already convinced that it was the duty of a minister
to concern himself with the social, political and economic
problems of his congregation, as well as those of the
16surrounding community. Immediately after assuming his
pastorate in Montgomery, he had established a Social and
Political Action Committee, which supported the NAACP,
promoted community awareness of social issues and, most
17important of all, stimulated voter registration. '
The Montgomery Improvement Association was largely 
run and led by black ministers. They made up four of its
5ten original officers, and almost half of its executive 
18hoard. "Our church is becoming militant," wrote King in 
April 1956, and was finally providing the driving-force 
behind a movement for social change.^ Because the church 
was the primary social institution in the black community, 
and because many of its ministers were financially 
independent of the white community, this clerical leader­
ship proved highly effective. "Prom the beginning," 
wrote Lerone Bennett, "the Montgomery movement assumed a 
missionary character,"'infusing its participants with 
courage, self-confidence and optimism. The weekly mass 
meetings of the MIA not only harnessed the religious 
fervour of Montgomery's blacks to the boycott, but also 
provided the movement with an essentially democractic
forum, in which "the PhD's and the no 'D's' were bound
21together in a common venture."
Montgomery's example of ministerial leadership 
was emulated in numerous other Southern cities, and it 
eventually became the dominant type of leadership in the 
civil rights movement. Black ministers would be in the 
vanguard of the struggle for social justice during the 
next decade. The Montgomery boycott demonstrated that 
"the Negro religious tradition contained enormous reser- 
voirs of psychic and social strength." And the founding 
of the Southern Christian leadership Conference was an 
attempt to maximize that strength by giving it structure, 
leadership, and direction.
6The psychological Rains of Montgomery
Six years after the Montgomery protest, black author 
Louis Lomax wondered how "such a deep-rooted movement had 
resulted in nothing more than the integration of the 
buses."2^ Such a relatively insignificant achievement 
did nothing to alter the appalling conditions of life in 
which the majority of the city's blacks were forced to 
live. Moreover, Montgomery's schools and public 
accommodations remained segregated until the passage of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.2^
Montgomery's true significance was symbolic. It 
demonstrated that Southern blacks could successfully 
stand up against racial injustice. It improved the self 
image, and increased the self-respect and self-confidence 
of blacks across the nation. The MIA had conducted the 
boycott with an intelligence and tactical skill that was 
in sharp contrast to the stupidity and heavy-handed 
brutality displayed by the city's white leaders. Time and 
time again, the latter were outmanoeuvred by the leaders 
of the movement. The city's obstinate refusal to accede 
to the movement's modest request for fair treatment led 
the MIA to escalate its demands. Originally seeking merely 
"the right, under segregation, to seat ourselves from the 
rear forward on a first come, first served basis," the 
city's attitude left the MIA no alternative but tò 
challenge the legality of Montgomery's bus segregation law 
in the federal courts.2^ As the Eev. Thomas B. Thrasher
7pointed out at the time, this was "a far broader challenge 
than had been posed by the boycott'itself," but the city'had 
stupidly convicted Hosa Parks for violating the bus segre­
gation law, thereby exposing that statute to attack in the 
26federal courts. Moreover, in its own legal proceedings, 
the city exhibited a tactical ineptitude. It delayed, for 
example, enjoining the MIA's car pool until the legal 
struggle, thanks to the Supreme Court, was all but over.^ 
When it attempted to freeze the MIA's assets, the movement 
simply deposited its funds in banks located outside 
Alabama. "At every turn," observed Time, "King out-
p Qgeneraled Montgomery's white officials."
The city's efforts to divide and'intimidate the 
black community also backfired. "Because the Mayor and 
city authorities cannot admit to themselves that we have 
changed," King wrote in April 1956, "every move they have 
made had'inadvertently increased the protest and united 
the Negro community." The "get-tough" policy, adopted by 
the city at the end of January 1956, failed to break the 
movement's resolve, and the -harassment and arrest of 
MIA leaders merely increased their stature by demonstra­
ting their courage, and illustrating that they would not 
"sell-out" their followers.^ Similarly, the arrest of 
ninety-three people, including twenty-four ministers, was 
turned into a psychological victory for the movement. 
"Montgomery's hymn-singing Negro bus-boycotters last night 
vowed by thundering, stamping applause that the indictment
8of 115 "boycott leaders would not halt their movement,"
-50wrote the Montgomery Advertiser. Rather than await 
their being taken into custody, many of those indicted 
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities.^ "A once 
fear-ridden people had been transformed," wrote "King.
"Those who had previously trembled before the law were 
now proud to be arrested for the cause of freedom.
It was the defiance and fearlessness exhibited by 
Montgomery's black population, its refusal to be divided, 
cowed, or intimidated, that most clearly defined the 
significance of the bus boycott. It was a psychological 
victory of large dimensions. Many observers wrote about 
the emergence of a "New Negro” in Montgomery, using the 
metaphor of a transition from'adolescence to adulthood.
"We now know that the Southern Negro has come of age," 
wrote Martin Luther King.^ The apathy and submissive' 
acquiescence that had previously characterized Montgomery’s 
blacks were dispelled. No longer would they quietly accept 
the daily injustices and humiliations inflicted by segre­
gation; "they would never again be the old, subservient,
3 4fearful appeasers."-'
The failure of Montgomery’s white leaders to
recognize this inner transformation accounted for the
seeming stupidity of their tactics. Such tactics had
always worked in the past, but "something happened to the
3 5Negro" to diminish their effectiveness.^ As a professor 
at Alabama State College put it: "This complicated matters
9for the white man; he knew how to deal with the hoy hut 
could not handle the man."^ The illustration, moreover, 
that white brutality increased black unity had a profound 
impact upon the future tactics of the civil rights 
movement. Montgomery's lesson was not lost upon King and 
other black leaders: white violence cemented solidarity 
in the black community and discredited its perpetrators. 
Thus the SCIC deemed it more advantageous to confront the 
coarse brutality of a Bull Connor or a Jim Clark than face 
the more refined repression of a Laurie. Pritchett or a 
Ma^or Daley.
Martin Luther King, Jr,, and the Theory of Nonviolent esistance
A few months after the beginning of the protest, it had 
become clear that the Bev. Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., 
was a man of unusual courage, eloquence and spiritual 
depth. His courage had been demonstrated on numerous 
occasions. .Harassed and arrested by the police, indicted 
by the city authorities, subjected to a stream of abusive 
and threatening telephone calls, and the victim of a bomb 
attack, King's proclaimed willingness to die on behalf of 
the protest inspired the black community. ^  He was a 
model of charismatic leadership; as Time observed, "Martin 
Luther King, Jr. is, in fact, what many a Negro . . . would 
like to be." ^
But his contribution was far greater than this:
King interpreted the Montgomery protest in terms that gave
10
it a universal application. Tlie "boycott, lie claimed, was an 
example of nonviolent resistance, a method of social change 
which, by means of Christian love, sought not only to end 
oppression, but also to bring ahout reconciliation, 
redemption of the oppressor, and the creation of a "beloved 
community."^ it was King's insistence upon "a spiritual
and moral movement with love as the guiding light" that
, 4 0accorded Montgomery its transcendent significance.
King's theory of nonviolent resistance grew 
naturally out of the doctrine of Christian love that had 
guided the Montgomery protest from its earliest days; "We 
are using the weapon of love," said King in February 1950. 
"That is all we have."^1 The evolution of a coherent 
philosophical theory of nonviolence was stimulated by a 
variety of factors: casual comparisons between the boycott 
and. Gandhi's salt march; the influence of advisors from 
the Fellowship of Reconciliation (a pacifist organization 
dedicated to Gandhian nonviolence); and King's own latent 
interest in the applicability of nonviolent resistance to 
the oppressed condition of American blacks. When the
boycott was over, King bound these together into a coherent
42theoiy.
The theory contained three basic elements: practical 
nonviolence, philosophical nonviolence, and direct action. 
Nonviolence was a practical and realistic method of conduct­
ing a protest such as the Montgomery bus boycott. Armed 
struggle was impractical: it merely "encourages the
11
opposition to threaten and resort to force," and blacks 
were both physically outnumbered and politically impotent.^ 
Nonviolence minimized the danger of repression by mitiga- 
ting the fears of the white community. Moreover, 
unless men eliminated violence from their thinking and 
their behaviour, the world would be transformed into "an 
inferno such as even the mind of Dante could not imagine."^ 
The existence of nuclear weapons decreed a choice between 
nonviolence or nonexistence.
Philosophical nonviolence, the ethical dimension,
was based on the Christian imperative of "love your
enemies," and the Gandhian concept of Satyagraha, or "soul-
force." Gandhi's great achievement, said King, had been
to evolve a method of applying Christian morality to the
task of social change; he had made love "a powerful
instrument for social and collective transformation."^
Nonviolent resistance possessed the supreme advantage of
making possible an ultimate reconciliation between the
oppressor and the oppressed; its strength lay in the
capacity of love to win over the oppressor, and convert
48Trim into a friend. By demonstrating a willingness to
suffer, and by maintaining a love for those who inflicted
suffering, nonviolent resistance awakened "a sense of
shame within the oppressor," which would eventually be
transmuted into genuine brotherhood:
To our most bitter opponents we say, 'We shall match your capacity to inflxct suffering by our capacity to 
endure suffering. We shall meet your physical force 
with soul force. . • . But be ye assured that we will
/Continued
12
wear you down by our capacity to stiffer. One day we 
shall win freedom, hut not only for ourselves. We 
shall so appeal to your heart and conscience that 
we shall win you in the process, and our victory will 
he a double victory. 49
Direct action was the third element of nonviolent
resistance. Nonviolence, insisted King, was a method of
active opposition to evil, a fact which the phrase "passive
resistance" tended to obscure.^® It embodied an ethical
imperative to disobey unjust laws, "because non-co-operation
with evil is as much a moral obligation as co-operation
with good.M> Nonviolent resistance achieved a healthy
synthesis between acquiescence and violence; it was a
middle way between the parallel negative evils of bitterness
52and passivity.~ In concrete terms, nonviolence enabled 
blacks to "take direct action against injustice without 
waiting for the government to act, or a majority to agree 
with him, or a court to rule in his favor. Such a tactic 
provided a positive, dynamic role for Southern blacks. 
Instead of being the inactive objects of court decisions 
and legislative enactments, their own actions could consti­
tute a powerful force for social change. By taking direct 
action against segregation, blacks could "speed up the 
coming of the inevitable." 54
II. IKE EMERGENCE OR .DIRECT ACTION
The failure of school integration
"A methodology of revolution is neither b o m  nor 
accepted overnight," wrote King in 1963.^ The oldest,
13
largest, and most powerful civil rights organization, the 
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, 
was loathe to adopt direct action in order to extend the 
struggle for integration into areas other than public 
education. It had sound tactical reasons for this. Firstly, 
like Virginius Dabney, the NAACP believed that school 
segregation was "the keystone in the arch and that if it 
should be knocked out the whole segregated structure 
would collapse;" therefore "The principal task before 
any community is the abolition of the segregated school."*^ 
Secondly, white resistance to integration was focused 
upon the Brown decision; it was logical for the civil 
rights movement to concentrate its efforts in a campaign to 
overcome this resistance. Finally, blacks claimed, with 
absolute truth, that they had the weight of the law on 
their side in this momentous issue: all they were seeking 
was compliance with a decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States. In defying Brown with constitutionally dis­
credited doctrines of Massive Resistance, nullification, and 
interposition, the South was in clear violation of federal 
law. If blacks themselves broke the lav^  even unconstitu­
tional segregation laws, the legal issues would become less 
clear-cut, and white support for integration might well 
decrease.
By I960, however, these arguments were losing force. 
Despite the defeat of Massive Resistance, the NAACP had 
little to show for its Herculean labours in the legal
14-
struggle for the integration of Southern schools. "In the 
Spring of I960," reported the Southern Regional Council, 
"desegregation in the Old Confederacy meant that 
approximately 4-,200 Negro children were in school with 
white students." The exclusion of Texas and Florida 
reduced that figure to 4-00; and in Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Alabama, Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia segregation 
was intact.^ 7 Even where the banner of Massive Resistance 
had been taken down, there was no immediate prospect of 
genuine integration, for by approving Alabama's Pupil 
Placement Act, the Supreme Court made a mockery of its own 
1955 order that "all deliberate speed" be employed in 
implementing Brown. This decision, wrote Human V. Bartley, 
"legitimized a tightly-controlled tokenism . . .  bringing 
almost anything short of Massive Resistance within the 
bounds of the Brown decision."^®
Disillusionment with the NAACP
The school integration struggle revealed another 
weakness in the legal strategy of the NAACP: by its very 
nature, it allowed little room for popular participation. 
"When legal contests were the sole foi® of activity," wrote 
King, "the ordinary Negro was involved as a passive 
spectator. His interests were stirred, but his energies were 
unemployed.Disappointment with the results of Brown. 
end consequent disillusionment with the NAACP, were major 
factors in the emergence, in I960, of direct action move­
ments throughout the South. The nation's failure to
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implement Brown, "caused the slow ebb of the Negro's faith
in litigation as the dominant method to achieve his 
60freedom."
In I960, black students consciously departed from 
the legalism of the NAACP. The sit-ins, wrote Glenford 
E. Mitchell, a student leader in Raleigh, North Carolina, 
were a reaction against the "slowness and conservatism
of many persons and organizations which claim to be
61fighters for civil rights." Michael Walzer, after 
talking to many who took part in the Raleigh movement, 
reported that although they respected the NAACP, they were 
no longer willing to await court decisions, regarding 
direct action as more important.D<1 Others were more 
blunt, "This movement is not only against segregation," 
claimed James Lawson of the Nashville movement. "It's 
against Uncle Tom Negroes, against the NAACP's over­
reliance on the courts, and against the futile middle- 
class technique of sending letters to the centers of 
p o w e r . I t  was not surprising that the students should 
have been skeptical of legalism: as Lewis Killian and 
Charles Grigg pointed out, the "law" had proved more
64-effective in preventing integration than in furthering it.
The attempt to suppress the NAACP
The appeal of direct action was also enhanced by 
the Southwide persecution of the NAACP. Beginning in 1956, 
every Southern state enacted laws designed to destroy the 
effectiveness of the Association's work. The assault was
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a multifaceted one. Jive states passed laws that prevented 
the NAACP from bringing suits against segregation} thus 
making it impossible to implement Brown without federal 
action; four states brought the NAACP within corporation 
laws, thus making it liable to pay taxes and file member­
ship lists; five states prohibited state employees from 
membership in the NAACP &imed primarily at black teachers); 
and seven states set up legislative committees, or state 
commissions, to harass and intimidate the Association.^ 
Alabama, Texas, and Arkansas temporarily drove the NAACP 
from their territories; in Alabama, the Association 
ceased to exist between 1956 and 1963. ^
The most obvious effect of this repression was a 
decline in the Southern membership of the NAACP. A more 
serious consequence was that precious time, energy, and 
resources, which the NAACP could have used to further 
integration, were wasted in lengthy legal proceedings merely 
to establish its right to exist; it was kept pinned down 
by legal guerrilla warfare, so that it was unable to 
implement the momentous court decisions it had helped bring 
about.^ Finally (most important of all), the campaign 
against the NAACP encouraged the growth of groups that 
were less committed to legalism and more inclined towardsr odirect action. In Alabama, where the NAACP was suppressed 
completely, leadership of the civil rights movement in 
that state fell upon the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference. In Birmingham, the Alabama Christian Movement
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for Human Rights was formed, led by the Rev. Fred. L. 
Shuttiesworth; the ACMHR became the SCLC's strongest and 
most active affiliate.^
The attack on the HAACP was but one aspect of what 
was not only a concerted effort to avoid compliance with 
Brown, but also a determined campaign to stifle every 
expression of black or integrationist opinion. The activi­
ties of the White Citizens' Councils paralleled the 
legislative enactments and judicial decisions of the states. 
The Councils, wrote Human V. Bartley, "closely resembled 
vigilante committees," employing economic coercion and 
physical intimidation.*^ Then there was the KuKlux Elan, 
which, despite a small membership and the disapproval of 
"respectable" whites, constituted "a real and ever-present 
threat to anyone who became publicly identified with 
dissident behaviour or thought.
The intensification of white efforts to crush civil 
rights groups imparted a new sense of urgency to many 
black leaders, more and more of whom were becoming receptive 
to the idea of nonviolent direct action. As the second half 
of the decade slipped by with integration barely nearer, 
King's words became increasingly relevant: "Without per­
sistent effort, time itself becomes an ally of the insurgent 
and primitive forces of irrational emotionalism and social 
destruction."^ It was not enough for blacks to passively 
await the implementation of federal court decisions. The 
legal manoeuvres of the South, King argued, would not only
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delay compliance with. Brown, hut also advance the real goal 
of the segregationists: the complete nullification of that 
d e c i s i o n . T h e  time had come for blacks to supplement 
their legal and moral pressure with pressure from a "mass 
movement of militant quality." There was nothing more 
powerful than the "socially organized masses on the march."^ 
As the 1950's expired, a crucial shift in tactics was 
taking place within the black community, born of the reali­
zation that without an escalation of pressure, the drive for 
integration would be utterly defeated. Direct action was 
the product of a head-on collision between rising black 
expectations and increasing white repression.
The political isolation of Southern blacks
Direct action was also encouraged by the political 
isolation of Southern blacks. As the writings of C. Vann, 
Woodward, Carl Degler, and T. Harry Williams have shown, 
there has been more to Southern politics than racism. ^
Prom time to time the politics of race have been challenged 
by the politics of class. In the 1890's, Populism had
rpr
offered a tentative political alliance to blacks. Even 
in Alabama, in the middle of the 1950's, Governor James 
Folsom resolutely spumed race-baiting. Folsom prevented 
the passage of segregationist legislation and vetoed 
measures that attacked the NAACP.^ He even offered drinks 
to Adam Clayton Powell, a gesture of hospitality which had 
disastrous consequences for him.'7® "For the past twenty 
years", said Folsom in January 1955» "politicians who went
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around preaching hate didn't get anywhere in politics. 
Unfortunately, the career of his most famous successor,
George Wallace, showed this belief to be tragically false.
In reality, every attempt to forge a political 
alliance between working-class whites and blacks had 
broken upon the insuperable barrier of white racism. As 
Charles Crowe has shown, the efforts of the Populists to 
secure black support in the 1890's were, like those of the 
Bourbons, half-hearted and motivated by political expediency. 
The most famous Populist advocate of black-white alliance,
Tom Watson, was an unashamed white supremacist. His record 
as a state legislator was consistently anti-Negro, and in 
his later life he came to symbolize the most extreme pre-
QAjudices of race and religion. The flame of inter­
racial alliance that was ignited by the Populists flickered 
briefly, only to be snuffed out by the Negrophobia unleashed 
by the cry of "black domination."
The sequel to Populism— disfranchisement, mala- 
portionment, one-party politics, and the white primary—  
ensured that Southern political life was dominated by a 
small oligarchy of planters and industrialists, who main­
tained their control by exploiting the racism of the white 
masses.®^ If whites divided, they argued, the blacks 
would take over. Theodore G. Bilba, Eugene Talmadge, and 
Cole Blease were far more representative of Southern 
politics than Huey long. These men united virulent racism 
with a picturesque "common-man" style, and policies of
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economic conservatism. Describing Southern politics after 
the end of the Second World War, V. 0. Key found that 
throughout the region, with the possible exceptions of 
Alabama, Louisiana, and North Carolina, "the politics of 
the have-nots is quenched by contemplation of its hearing 
on race." That issue gave the planter-mill-owner oli­
garchy a weapon that it used "to destroy all semblance of
83rational politics." And, if political racism proved 
ineffective, the instruments of physical repression were 
always ready and waiting. The case of the Southern Tenant 
Farmer's Union was a grim reminder of the fate in store for 
those who dared to challenge the prevailing norms of cast© 
and class.
Southern Populism has always struggled against over­
whelming odds; as Human V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham 
pointed out, it has been "historically outweighed" by the
D / iforces of conservatism and racism. Populism was an 
important, but nonetheless secondary, theme in Southern 
politics. "The central theme," argued U. B. Phillips 
earlier in the century, was thè maintenance of white su­
premacy by whatever means necessary.®^ To blacks in the 
second half of the twentieth century, the strategy of inter­
racial populism had a theoretical logic, but as King wrote 
in 1963, its rationale "wilted under the heat of fact." D
Another strategy theoretically open to Southern blacks 
was to ally with the white upper and middle-class. It was 
a strategy historically rooted in the political support
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accorded "by blacks to the Bourbon regimes of the post- 
Reconstruction era. Booker T. Washington became the fore­
most advocate of "cultivating friendly relations" with 
the ruling white elite.®*7 Support for the Bourbons, however, 
had failed to prevent disfranchisement, the intensification 
of segregation, and the escalation of racist violence.
Blacks could not ally with white middle-class 
liberalism because, as a political force, it hardly existed.
Its nearest equivalent, Progressivism, was, as C. Vann
88Woodward put it, "for whites only." Many of the most 
famous Southern Progressives made white supremacy a central 
political issue, sometimes with tragic consequences, as in 
1906, when Hoke Smith's racist campaign for the governor­
ship of Georgia sparked off the Atlanta race riot.®^ Smith's 
contemporary, James E. Vardaman of Mississippi, combined a 
hatred of economic privilege with a Negrophobia which 
rivalled that of Tom Watson.^® Josephus Daniels of North 
Carolina was, after Vardaman, perhaps the most famous of 
the Southern Progressives; he too was an outspoken racist, 
and had been one of the driving forces behind disfranchise­
ment in his native s t a t e . W h i l e  it may be true, as Dewey 
Grantham asserted, that there was more to Southern politics 
in this period than "the Ku Klux Elan, prohibition, and Bible
Belt fundamentalism," middle-class Progressivism had nothing
qpto offer Southern blacks.7
The New Deal provided apolitical climate in which the 
seeds of a genuine liberalism finally began to germinate.
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Unfortunately, the growths were stunted and unable to survive 
because, as Human Bartley wrote, "The South simply lacked an 
adequate institutional foundation for a viable liberalism.^ 
Heither the Wagner Act nor the out-lawing of the white 
primary had a significant impact on the social structure of 
the South. In spite of the fonner, the CIO's post-war 
organizing drive (Operation Dixie) failed completely; the 
latter had little effect because the vast majority of 
Southern blacks were still disfranchised.^ The one-party 
system, rural overrepresentation, and— most important of 
all— the continued political exclusion of the black popula­
tion ensured that the "neobourbons" of the Black Belt still 
dominated the politics of the South.^ A resurgence of 
political racism was already stifling Southern liberalism 
before the Brown decision, as witnessed by the Dixiecrat 
bolt of 1943» and the 1950 defeats of Prank Graham and Claude
qgPepper, two outstanding examples of non-racist liberals.7 
The defeat of Graham seemed to show that, as Samuel Lubell 
put it, "the cry of 'Nigger' could inflame even the well- 
educatedi well-to-do middle-class."^
Gunnar Myrdal, writing in the 194-0's, concluded that 
liberalism was a weak and ineffective force in Southern 
politics. It was handicapped by an absence of popular 
support which consigned it to political impotence.7 To 
retain even a marginal influence, liberals were forced to 
develop "the tactics of evading principles, of being very 
indirect in attacking problems, of cajoling, coaxing, and
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luring the public into giving in on minor issues."^ This 
dependence on persuasion rather than power severely handi­
capped the ability of the liberals to bring about change. 
Those who adopted a more militant and outspoken stance 
violated Southern norms to such an extent that they were 
ostracized by the white community, becoming exiles within 
their own land.100 Thus, until recently, the histo­
rical form of Southern liberalism was that of a long line 
of individual dissenters who, while inspiring and symbo­
lically important, did not constitute a significant 
political force.
It may well have been true, as King claimed in
1958» that "there are in the white South millions of
people of good will" but, as he admitted, through fear,
lack of leadership and the absence of an adequate means
of political expression, they failed to rally in support
101of the Brown decision. A moderate "third force" did
not emerge. The overwhelming majority of Southern whites
remained adamantly opposed to any form of integration.
This harsh fact gave a powerful impetus to the adoption
of direct action. "Negroes," wrote King, "were . . .
forced to face the fact that in the South, they must
102move without allies."
III. KING'S INFLUENCE ON THE STUDENT SIT-IN MOVEMENT'
The Spread of Direct Action in the Late 1950*s
As the 1950's expired, there was a mushrooming of
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direct action movements in the South» As noted above, bus 
boycotts were launched in Atlanta, Mobile, Tallahassee, and 
Birmingham. Blaclc students were in the forefront of the 
Tallahassee protest, and in Orangeburg, South Carolina, 
students at the State Teachers' College boycotted their 
classes after attempts were made to intimidate faculty who 
belonged to the N A A C P . T h e  most portentious occurrence 
took place in 1958» when youth units of the NAACP staged 
lunch-counter sit-ins in Oklahoma City and Wichita, Kansas, 
leading to the desegregation of fifty-eight eating places.
It was becoming clear that blacks in the South, students 
in particular, were increasingly willing to engage in 
direct action.
Aware of this new mood, King moved to Atlanta in
1959» so that he could devote more time to the work of the
SCIC. The time had come, he wrote, for:
A full-scale assault . . . upon discrimination and 
segregation in all forms. We must train our youth and 
adult leaders in the techniques of social change through 
non-violent resistance. We must employ new methods of 
struggle, involving the masses of the people. 105
The SCIC's new programme included the training of non­
violent direct action teams by James L a w s o n . " T h e  mass 
boycott, sit-down protests and strikes, sit-ins, refusal 
to pay fines and bail for unjust arrests," and mass marches 
were some of the techniques King proposed for the new phase 
of the struggle.^7 But before the SCIC's programme could 
be implemented, the black students of the South acted by 
themselves.
25.
The Impact of King's Ideas on the Student Sit-in Movement
la February I960, the student sit-in movement burst
upon the world. Spreading with wildfire rapidity from
Greensboro, North Carolina, to one hundred cities in twenty
states, an estimated 70,000 people participated in the
i nftmovement, 3,600 of whom were arrested. Within a year, 
lunch-counters in eighty-five cities had been integrated.
It was, said Time, a "nonviolent protest the likes of which 
the U.S. had never seen."1^®
"Montgomery," wrote Coretta King, "was the soul in 
which the seed of a new theory of social action took root," 
and the student sit-ins appeared to be a concrete applica­
tion of that t h e o r y . I t  can be argued, however, that 
the influence of King and the SCIC upon the sit-in movement 
has been exaggerated. Direct action, as August Meier and 
Elliott Kudwick have shown, was nothing new in the annals of 
black protest. The boycott, in particular, was often the 
only weapon available to a people denied political power.
In the 1870's, blacks had boycotted, sometimes successfully, 
segregated streetcars in Iouisville, Savannah, and several 
other Southern cities. When segregation laws became, after 
the mid-1890's, increasingly oppressive, a second wave of
boycotts broke out, but this time they were universally un-
112successful. Neverthiess, the boycott could be a devasta­
ting weapon, as Martin Luther King's grandfather demonstrated, 
when he organized one to put out of business a particularly 
racist Atlanta newspaper. Other types of direct action,
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including demonstrations, sit-ins and "freedom rides" had 
also been utilized by blacks in their quest for equal 
treatment. The Congress of Eacial Equality, founded in 
194-2, had pioneered in the use of the sit-in and the 
freedom ride and had, moreover, based its tactics on 
Gandhi an ideas.
Nevertheless, it was to Montgomery that the students 
looked for inspiration in I960. The four who sat-down at 
the Woolworth's lunch-counter in Greensboro, on February 1, 
I960, had consumed countless hours discussing the lesson 
of the Montgomery m o v e m e n t . M i c h a e l  Walzer, a participant- 
observer in the Shaw-St. Augustine Student Movement in 
Ealeigh, reported that "it had been the Montgomery bus boy­
cott . . .  that had been the decisive event" in preparing
116the students for direct action.
King himself was a powerful symbol to the students.
One of the Greensboro four recalled hearing King at the 
time of the boycott: "He was speaking the truth. He kind 
of made you: feel as normal people would have to do something 
to better conditions."'*'^ In their study of the original 
sit-in, Frederic Solomon and Jacob E. Fishman found that
118King provided "a new kind of ego ideal for young Negroes." 
Although King and the SCIC played an important part in the 
sit-in movement, especially in the founding of the Student 
Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, it was nonetheless, a 
secondary and supportive one. It was King's symbolic role, 
wrote William Eobert Miller, that was supreme; "At the
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height of the sit-ins, his authority was large and immediate 
The students drew more than just inspiration from 
Montgomery. "They felt it was a lesson," wrote Solomon and 
Fishman, "in the practical and emotional advantages of 
direct action in expressing legitimate Negro discontent."120 
3h their writings and utterances the students constantly 
referred, in distinctly King-like terms, to the theory of 
nonviolent resistance (nonviolent direct action). That 
theory served two profoundly important functions in I960. 
Nonviolence gave the students a code of behaviour which they 
consciously adopted to shatter white racist stereotypes. 
Charles McLew (who became SHCC's second chairman) pointed 
out that instead of showing ignorance, those who sat-in 
"display a level of intelligence" that few of their white 
adversaries could match; rather than being "slovenly, 
unkempt, and boorish," the students "march . . .  well- 
groomed and in quiet dignity."121 If the sit-ins were 
observed with an unjaundiced eye, wrote Glenford Mitchell 
of the Raleigh movement, "we should be credited with some 
degree of intelligence and personal dignity."122 Secondly, 
in its philosophical sense, nonviolence provided the 
students with a cogent moral ¿Justification for the THr^ 0f 
civil disobedience that direct action entailed. Active 
resistance to unjust laws, said King, was not only a right, 
but a moral duty. The sit-ins were justified "because their 
ends are humanitarian, constructive and moral."12^ The 
students described their lawbreaking in the highest ethical
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terms. Many, it is true, viewed nonviolence merely as a 
tactic, and appealed to traditional American values to 
¿justify their actions. Others, however, cited the theory 
of nonviolent direct action, thus grounding their protest 
not only on self-interest, hut on Christian morality.
The Nashville Student Movement
The Nashville movement was especially receptive to
King's ideas, largely because one of the most dedicated
disciples of nonviolence resided there. In James Lawson,
an older stream of pacifism mingled with King's theory of
direct action. Lawson was a committed pacifist and, like
Bayard Bus tin, had been ¿jailed as a conscientious obijector.
He had also been attracted (independently of King) to the
philosophy of Gandhi, and spent three years in India as a 
124missionary.
In 1958, militant black leadership in Nashville became 
institutionalized with the founding of the Nashville 
Christian Leadership Conference (an affiliate of the SCLC, 
headed by the Rev. Kelly Miller Smith), and with the opening 
of a regional office of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. 
(There were close ties between the SCLC and the FOR. Martin 
Luther King, Ralph Abernathy, and James Lawson were members 
of both organizations.)12^ The NCLC began to hold mass 
meetings in 1958, and formulated a desegregation plan which 
called for lunch-counter and restroom integration, the 
establishment of fair employment practices, and the up- 
grading of black policemen. A year later, James Lawson
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inaugurated, under the auspices of the NCIC and FOE, 
workshops on nonviolent resistance. Here, Iawson and 
other students explored the philosophy of nonviolence and 
pondered its concrete applications. At the end of the 
year they felt ready for actic>n,snl two lunch-counter sit-ins 
•were held.^^ A host of future "black activists attended 
law son's workshops and, through their contact with him, 
they were fully exposed to the theory of nonviolent direct
12 Qaction, which they embraced with enthusiasm.
The ideas of King and Lawson were clearly evident 
in the conduct of the Nashville sit-in movement. "Don't 
strike back or curse if abused," instructed the Nashville 
Negro Students' Code. "Remember love and nonviolence."^^ 
The leaders of the Nashville movement described their 
activities in distinctly King-like terms. "This is not a 
boycott to club men down," said Dr. Vivian Henderson. "This 
is an economic withdrawal against evil."^® The Eev. Kelly 
Miller Smith, chairman of the NCIC, similarly denied that 
the boycott was an aggressive weapon aimed at striking 
back at the white community. "Our ground for the boycott 
was simply that it is morally indefensible . . .  to co-
171operate with a system we consider evil." •3
Nonviolent Direct Action as an Ideology of Revolt
A white journalist who closely observed the Nashville 
movement wrote that the theory of nonviolence provided that 
city's black community with a concept which, "in their eyes,
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threw the cloak of morality around their most powerful 
weapon," direct action."*-^  The fact,, moreover, that 
ministers were in the forefront of the movement gave it "a 
solid moral basis in the eyes of the Negro."
For four years, King had been warning blacks that 
"integration is not some lavish dish that the federal 
government or the white liberal will pass out on a silver 
platter;" for four years he had urged that blacks them­
selves speed up integration by resisting segregation— a 
doctrine which, as Lerone Bennett observed, had "revolu­
tionary implications." Now, in I960, the fruits of
King's labours in the years after Montgomery were apparent: 
large numbers of people were, at last, "peacefully, openly 
and nonviolently disobeying unjust laws."^^ He had 
provided Southern blacks with an ideology of revolt.
King's achievement, however, consisted of more than 
activation and inspiration: he also furnished a legitimation 
of the revolt he had helped to set In motion. Blacks were 
not fighting people, but evil and injustice; they were not 
seeking "victories" over whites, but winning their 
"friendship and understanding;" they did not oppose 
segregation only for themselves, but also for white s.^^
The students, King wrote, were "seeking to save the soul 
of .America. . . .  In sitting down at the lunch counters, 
they are really standing up for the best in the American 
d r e a m . B y  describing the civil rights movement in 
such terms as these, philosophic nonviolence furnished a
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powerful moral ¿Justification for civil disobedience; as 
one writer put it, it was "a way of legitimating direct 
action in a society that doubted the Negro's claim to 
equality."1 *^7 While it may be doubtful that nonviolence 
directly changed the heart of the oppressor, it nonetheless 
involved an unprecedented number of whites in the struggle 
for equality. White students, especially, both North and 
South, "stirred into action and formed an alliance that 
aroused the conscience of the nation."*^® And, as Ebony 
observed, the moral issue was presented in such clear-cut 
terms that "church groups, politicians and public figures 
climbed on the sit-in bandwagon.
King had endowed the movement with an ideology that 
both mobilized white liberals and reassured white conserva­
tives. By clothing the civil rights movement in what 
Lerone Bennett called "the comforting garb of love and 
forgiveness," he had ingeniously, although unconsciously,
disguised the fact that the movement was, in fact, a social
140and political uprising of grand dimensions.
The Effect of the Sit-ins on the Shape of the Civil 
Rights Movement :
What had already happened in Montgomery, Tallahassee, 
a-nfl Birmingham, the student sit-in movement of I960 made 
happen across the South: the emergence of a militant black 
leadership, committed to the complete destruction of 
segregation, and wedded to direct action as a means to that 
end. As King correctly perceived, the sit-in movement
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speeded up the shift "from the slow court process to direct
action in the form of bus protests, economic boycotts,
141mass marches . . .  and demonstrations.” The students 
were declaring, moreover, that they would no longer 
concentrate their energies solely upon the drive for 
school integration; their protests were not aimed to win 
gradual, piecemeal concessions ("tokenism”), but consti-
1 ¿iptuted "a revolt against the whole system of Jim Crow."
The spirit of the sit-ins was eloquently stated by 
Charles McDew, future chairman of the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee: "I can promise you, in the name 
of the militant Negro students of the South, that we 
shall not be satisfied until eveiy vestige of racial 
segregation and discrimination are /~sic 7  erased from 
the face of the earth.
The sit-ins breathed new life into organizations 
like the Nashville Christian Leadership Council, the 
Alabama Christian Movement for Human Eights, the Mont­
gomery Improvement Association, the Raleigh Citizens' 
Association, and the Tallahassee Inter-Civic Council.
Such groups had been formed in the wake of the Montgomery 
bus boycott; they were committed to direct action, and 
enthusiastically supported the student sit-ins. "These 
associations," wrote William H. Peace of the Raleigh 
student movement, "working in close conjunction with the 
Negro church, became the backbone of the student move­
ment."1^  Because these groups— often SCLC affiliates—
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came to the students' aid with such alacrity and boldness, 
providing legal aid, hail money and, through the economic 
boycott, the support of the adult black community, their 
power and prestige was considerably enhanced. As Louis 
Lomax observed at the time, by becoming the determined 
initiators of social change, the students had "reversed the 
power flow within the Negro community. This was an un­
even process, for in the Deep South, especially, "accommo­
dating" black leadership constituted a formidable‘barrier 
to successful direct action. Nevertheless, what was happening 
was unmistakeable: conservative leadership (exemplified by 
such college administrators as Felton G. Clark, H. Councill 
Trenholm, and Dr. Rufus B. Atwood) was discredited in the 
eyes of the black community. As Elaine Burgess observed, 
in a study of leadership changes at precisely this time, 
such men "have long since lost the right to speak for the 
Negro.wlZl"6
But the change wrought by the sit-ins went further 
than this: they brought to bear weighty pressure upon 
"liberal" or "protest" black leadership (typified by the 
NAACP) to intensify and escalate its efforts to tear down 
the wall of segregation. Many observers (among them Louis 
Lomax, Leslie Dunbar, Lewis Killian, Charles Grigg, and—  
privately— Martin Lather King) noted that the sit-in 
movement was "an indictment of the NAACP for 'going too 
s i o w . - W  Such observations were only partially true: 
many NAACP branches were committed to militant direct
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action and, as E.C. Ladd wrote, "In many parts of the South 
the NAACP remains the only organized protest movement and 
as such has a monopoly on militancy." Where the NAACP
wholeheartedly supported the students, its position was 
strengthened. However, where it attempted to prevaricate 
and compromise, as in Savannah and Nashville, it lost 
influence to SCIC-affiliated groups.Throughout the 
South, a new, "radical" hlach leadership was emerging which, 
although often somewhat younger, followed in the footsteps 
of men like King, Pred Shuttteworth, and O.K. Steele. "Many" 
wrote Elaine Burgess, "are young ministers just out of 
divinity school— Martin Lather King is their ideal. . . .
They want an end to segregation in all areas of life 
immediately. They are angry young men who prefer boycott 
and mass demonstration to. . . arbitration and litigation. 
. . .  Their appeal to youth is based on their extremely 
militant stand. They identify with the suppressed masses."^® 
The Montgomery bus boycott and the student sit-in 
movement together defined the shape of the civil rights 
movement. Students and young people made up the front-line 
"foot-soldiers," and militant adult leadership, often mini­
sterial, rallied community support. The former were 
represented by SNCC and COKE, the latter by the SCIC and, 
on occasions, the NAACP. SNCC and the SCIC were to spearhead 
the civil rights movement in the South, between I960 and
1965. Eventually, in 1966, their informal alliance came 
to an end, with disastrous consequences for the movement.
35
But for five years, the combination of SNCC's uncompromising 
radicalism with the tactical brilliance and political skill 
of the SCIC, set into motion a social revolution the re­
percussions of which are still being felt.
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CHAPTER II
THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE;
THE EARLY YEARS
I. MARTIN LUTHER KING AND THE SCIC, 1955-1960
King's Rnergen.ee as a Leader
The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee elected 
to become an independent group because, as Julian Bond 
recalled, "it was heady stuff for young people 17 and 18 
years old to be running their own political organization."*^*
Tn addition, many of the students felt that King's leadership 
had proved itself to be too cautious, even conservative.
It was James Lawson who had impressed them most at the 
Raleigh conference, for he had stressed direct action as a
2political weapon, rather than nonviolence as a philosophy. 
Lawson was "a great hero to the students," remembered 
Cleveland Sellers. "Some of them even referred to him as 
•the young people’s Martin Luther King'."^ Moreover, the 
SCIC's own Ella Baker advised the students to stay independent, 
urging them to construct an organization based not on a¿j.single leader, but on a "group=oentered leadership." Baker 
doubted that the SCIC would be an effective structure for 
the students' radicalism, and she had become disenchanted 
with King. The trouble was, she later said, that he 
"preached rather than dealt with."^
Martin Luther King was a naturally cautious man, and 
he could be, at times, extremely indecisive. The exercise
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of, leadership did not come easily to Mm; it was a skill 
he had to gradually acquire. The circumstances of his 
emergence as a leader throw light onto this point. Although 
the national and international press had spotlighted lHng 
as the dominant figure behind the Montgomery bus boycott, 
that protest was directed by a collective leadership.
Neither the initiative for the boycott, nor the idea for
ftthe Montgomery Improvement Association had been his. The 
fame that accrued to King was, in a sense, ironic, because 
as President of the MIA, he was originally intended to be 
little more than a figurehead. E.D. Nixon could have had 
the position had he chosen, but King, a newcomer to the 
city, "was not identified with any faction of the bitterly- 
divided leadership group;" in other words, King had made 
fewer enemies than any of "the other prominent black leaders, 
and would thus help to unify the movement.?, (Being an 
outsider also had another advantage. If the protest failed, 
it would be easier for King to leave the city.) "We were 
looking for another Booker T. Washington,” said Ealph 
Abernathy years later, in a humorous, but'illuminating, 
comment.^ Lawrence D. Eeddick (a participant in the boycott 
and the "official" SCIC historian) wrote that Abernathy,
E.D. Nixón, and the Eev. Solomon S. Seay dominated the 
movement in its early days.10 Abernathy, especially, "had 
a boldness that King lacked."11 The strength and succéss 
of the Montgomery protest was thus due not only to King's 
leadership, but also to the combined talents and energies
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of the many men and women who ran the MIA.
The Southern Christian Leadership Conference. 1957-1960
The Montgomery bus boycott sparked off similar
protests in Mobile, Tallahassee, and Birmingham, and the
leaders of these movements, together with King, formed the
12nucleus of the SCLC. On New Tear's Day, 1957» C.K. Steele,
Fred L. Shuttlesworth, and Martin Luther King invited
Southern civil rights leaders to meet in Atlanta, and on
January 10-11, sixty ministers and local NAAOP officials
voted to establish the Southern Negro Leadership Conference
on Transportation and Nonviolent Integration.^ At its
first convention, at Montgomery in August 1957» it became
the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.^ The
purpose of the new organization was to "delve deeper into
the struggle" by urging "all Negroes to resist all segregation."
Nonviolence and Christian love were to be the guiding
principles in the fight for racial equality; while vowing
to carry on "even in the face of death," the conferees
promised that "not one hair of one head of one white person"
15would be harmed in this ¿just cause. ^
Luring its first five years, the SCLC was little more 
than a "paper" organization, and King, its president, 
seemed lost in his new role. He had little aptitude for 
attending to the day-to-day responsibilities of the SCIC.
"I really don't have a great interest in administration," 
he admitted.^ The structure of the SCLC was worked out
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by Ella Baker, Stanley Levison, and Bayard Rust in, and 
continued to rely on them in matters of organization, 
administration, and fund-raising.1? Although a central 
office was set up in Atlanta, in December 1957, by I960 
the SCIC had only three permanent staff, and a budget of
-I Q
only £60,000. "For a time," wrote Claude Sitton, "it 
seemed doubtful that the conference would amount to much 
. . .  the SCIG showed a weakness for issuing statements, 
conducting conferences, and scheduling dramatic but in­
effective demonstrations."^
From the outset, there was confusion and uncertainty 
as to the precise role of the SCIC in the fight for equal 
rights. Having been founded to dramatize and propagate 
nonviolent direct action, the SCIC decided to concentrate 
its resources on voter registration. "Give us the ballot," 
King promised at the 1957 Prayer Pilgrimage, and blacks 
•would frame righteous laws, elect men of goodwill and 
wisdom, implement the Brown decision, and "transform the- . . 
misdeeds of the bloodthirsty mobs into the'calculated good 
deeds of the ordinary citizens."20
The SCLC' s first major programme was the Crusade for 
Citizenship.' It set itself an ambitious objective: to 
double black voter registration in the South within five 
years. To achieve this, the SCIC planned to set up local 
voter registration committees throughout the South. These 
would bold voting clinics, and furnish the SCIC’s central 
office with concrete evidence of discrimination. Then,
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in co-operation with the KAACP, the Justice Department, 
the Civil Rights Commission, and liberals in Congress, 
the SCIC would use such evidence to "arouse the conscience 
of the nation" and bring about legislative relief in the 
field of voting rights.2^ In addition, intensive registra­
tion drives would be conducted in ten selected areas.
It soon became clear that the SCIC was ill-equipped
to carry out this type of programme. Registration drives
required extensive local organization. The RAACP, which
had hundreds of local chapters scattered throughout the
South, excelled at voter registration; the SCIC, on the
other hand, lacked both the resources and the organizational
structure to implement its registration programme. It was
handicapped not only by a limited budget, but also by its
lack of membership; the Conference consisted of a number
of autonomous local affiliates, each of which represented
o uone or several Baptist churches. ^ Whilst the Crusade 
sponsored successful rallies in twenty-one cities in 
February, 1958» the SCIC simply did not possess the 
structure to channel the ensuing enthusiasm into effective 
registration drives.2^ The plan to establish local voter 
registration committees never got off the ground, and 
merely brought the SCIC into conflict with the HAACP. To 
the Association, it appeared that the SCIC was usurping its 
own function; local registration committees, organized 
and financed by the SCIC, would be in direct competition 
with NAACP chapters. In reality, it was never King's
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intention that the Conference should supplant the NAACP. 
Only where the Association had been suppressed would the 
SCLC seek to create a "mass organization," and King was
always at pains to emphasize that direct action would
26supplement, not replace legalism. Yet, inevitably, the 
rise of Martin Luther King and the SCLC provoked jealousy, 
and King privately complained that "seeds of dissension" 
were being sown "by persons in the top echelons of the 
NAACP,"27
By the time of the SCLC's third annual convention, 
King was convinced of the need for a change in direction. 
"We have hardly scratched the surface," he admitted. The 
SCLC would have to develop a "positive, dynamic, and 
dramatic programme," which would deal with more than voter
poregistration. King's sense of urgency was prompted, at 
least in part, by the criticisms of Ella Baker, the SCLC(s 
Associate Director. Baker complained that the Conference 
was taking its name too literally: it was holding too many 
meetings, too close together; there was never any time for 
"reflective thinking and planning."2^ Had the SCLC, she 
asked, "really come to grips with the job" for which it 
had been organized?^® Given its miniscule staff, limited 
financial resources, and lack of membership, it would have 
to establish its own, separate identity; it would have to 
do something different from all the other civil rights
31organizations.
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II. THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SC 10
Because of the inadequacies of the SCIO's structure, King's 
role in the student sit-in movement could he little more 
than an inspirational, hut marginal one.^ The circumstances 
of King's emergence in Montgomery, and the record of the 
SCIC between 1957 and I960, show that King's leadership was 
ineffective in the absence of others whose talents compensa­
ted for his own deficiencies, and whose shills he could 
draw upon and utilize. Primarily a strategist, he needed 
tacticians; first and foremost a thinher and philosopher, 
he required others to cope with administrative detail.
Only when the SCIC acquired such people did it become a 
living, breathing and dynamic organization. Gradually,
King learned to develop and exercise a "talent for attract­
ing and using the shills and ideas of brilliant aides and 
administrators."^ While the SCIC gave much to the sit-ins 
and Freedom Sides, it gained even more, for in addition to 
extending and refining the tactics of nonviolent direct 
adtion, they provided the SCIC with an important source of 
recruitment. During I960 and 1961, a group of dedicated, 
capable, and imaginative men and women ¿Joined the staff of 
the Conference and, as William Robert Miller wrote, "they 
made all the difference to the future of the SCIC as a
«'54-dynamic action group.
King's Ideutenants: The Rev. James L. Bevel
Of all the student movements, Nashville's was the
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most rigorously trained and disciplined.55 As a result, 
Nashville’s lunch-counters were desegregated before those 
of any other Southern city outside Texas.56 And not only 
did the Nashville Student Movement provide many of SNCC's 
early leaders, but it was also prominent in the Freedom 
Rides. When CORE's original Freedom Ride was halted by 
white violence in Alabama, Nashville's student leaders 
immediately launched a second one and, throughout the 
summer of 1961, they sent dozens of integrated buses to 
Alabama and Mississippi.5’7
Among the first of Nashville's Freedom Riders were 
James Xawson, Bernard Lafayette, James Bevel, Diane Nash, 
and C.T. Vivian, all of whom became associated with SNCC,
3Qthe SCLC, or both.-' Lawson was already the SCLC's
Proijects Director; he later became its Director of Non-
■zqviolent Education. The Rev. C.T. Vivian ¿joined the staff
of the SCIC shortly after the Freedom Rides, eventually
occupying the post of Director of Affiliates. Vivian was
in the forefront of the St. Augustine and- Selma campaigns.^
Bernard Lafayette, after working with SNCC and the American
Friends Service Committee, became, in 1967, the SCLC's
41Program Director. But, without a doubt, the most 
important of the SCIC's recruits from Nashville was James 
Bevel.
When he ¿joined the staff of the SCLC in early 1962, 
James Luther Bevel was already a movement veteran, having 
participated in the sit-ins, the Freedom Rides, and the
Bevel soon became one ofJackson (Mississippi) Movement.^
the most important members of the Conference, influencing
the strategy and tactics of its campaigns from Birmingham
onwards. A passionate devotee of philosophical nonviolence,
Bevel was also a spell-binding orator and a tactician of
brilliance and originality.^ It was during the Birmingham
campaign that his talent for inventive nonviolent direct
action became apparent, for it was Bevel's idea to utilize
young children in the demonstrations, a universally-
acknowledged turning-point in that struggle.^ Later, as
the SCIC's Director of Direct Action, he masteiminded the
Selma campaign; the idea of a march from Selma to Montgomery 
45was his. y
Bevel was more than a brilliant practitioner of non­
violent direct action, however, he was also an incisive »nfl 
original thinker. His peculiar mixture of theology 
politics, as well as his appearance (he wore a Jewish 
Yaimulke and later grew a beard), led many to label him a 
mystic. "I'm very Jewish in my thinking . . he once 
said. "All of my heroes.. . . were the Jewish prophets.
Bevel'3 political ideas consisted less of systematic 
ahalyses than penetrating insights that flashed in the dark. 
"President Johnson has signed the civil rights movement 
out of existence," he said after the passage of Voting/|QEights kct. It was an observation which caused consider­
able confusion and consternation at the time. Yet Bevel 
had correctly sensed that one phase of the movement had
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ended, and another was about to begin. Only later would 
the prophetic nature of his statement become apparent.
Although his roots were in the Black Belt of Mississ­
ippi, Bevel was chosen by King to head the SCIC's first 
Northern campaign, in Chicago. There, his advance team 
pioneered in slum organizing, a completely new technique 
for the SCIC. Equally important, Bevel and his staff 
analysed Northern fiacism and the economic and political 
institutions sustaining it. He came to define the urban 
ghetto as an internal colony, based upon economic 
exploitation rather than environmentally-caused poverty 
or an historically-anachronistic racism.^ It was not 
an original analogy— Kenneth Clark had employed it in 
Dark Ghetto— but Bevel went on to extract from it the 
strategy and tactics of a campaign, and King readily 
acknowledged his intellectual debt to him.^®
Bevel's greatest impact upon SCIC policy occurred, 
ironically, when he took a leave of absence. Bevel's 
decision to devote his energies to organizing the Spring 
Mobilization Against the War in Vietnam went a long way 
toward convincing King that he could no longer escape the 
obligation to take a firm and unequivocal position on the 
immorality of that war.-51
The Rev. Watt Tee Walker
Early in I960, the post of Executive Director of the 
SCIC was assumed by the Rev. Wyatt T. Walker, of Petersburg, 
Virgina. Walker brought badly-needed skills to that position.
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Unlike King, he was an able and experienced administrator.
He had headed the Petersburg Improvement Association (one 
of the groups inspired by the Montgomery bus boycott), 
and for five years was an MAACP branch president,
(«reputedly one of the best branches in the nation," said 
Walker, who was not a man to underrate his own abilities).^
In 1961» ¿journalist Iouis Lomax wrote that "as I studied 
the SCIC office . . .  I got the impression that the 
movement was being run in King's name but by somebody else."^ 
This was an exaggeration; nevertheless, Walker presided 
over a period of rapid expansion for the SCIC. Under his 
direction, the organization's budget soared from 63,000 
in I960, to nearly jSl million four years later; its staff 
grew from five to sixty-one.^
Walker's second great talent was for aggressive, 
militant nonviolent direct action. In 1959 ancL I960 he 
had organized mass demonstrations against the closing of 
the public schools in Prince Edward County, Virginia; 
he was arrested on a Freedom Ride; he helped to direct 
the Albany (Georgia) Movement.^ His greatest and most 
personal triumph, however, was the Birmingham campaign, 
the tactics and logistics of which he mapped out, with 
Fred Shuttlesworth, five months in advance.^ But 
Walker's skill in nonviolent direct action was not simply 
a matter of organization and planning, it also lay in 
his conception of the purpose of direct action. Walker 
talked less of love, nonviolence, and Satyagrapha than of
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crisis, confrontation, and disruption. "You've got to 
have a crisis to bargain ■with," he said. "To take a moderate 
approach hoping to get white support doesn't work."^ 
Birmingham had created exactly such a crisis and, shortly 
afterwards, Walker proposed a nationwide work stoppage, 
a boycott of Christmas, and a campaign of mass direct action 
that would "literally immobilize the Nation."^® Nothing 
came of this plan. At the end of 1964, however, Walker 
drew up a "¡Battle Plan to Totally, Desegregate the City of 
Atlanta," and had it been adopted, "Atlanta would have been 
turned upside down."^
Walker's skills perfectly complemented those of 
King; "He has had a real impact on the total struggle in
fiGthe South," the latter said of him in 1964-.
The Rev. Andrew J. Young
In contrast to Bevel, Walker and most of the SCLC's 
other top staff, Andrew Young did not join the Conference 
via a local movement, the sit-ins, or the Freedom Hides. 
Educated at Dillard and Howard Universities, and Hartford 
Theological Seminary, Young (unlike most of his colleagues 
in the SCIC, who were Baptists) was ordained in the largely 
white Congregational church. After pastorates in Georgia 
and Alabama, he became the National Council of Churches' 
director of youth work. It was through this position 
that Young was chosen to direct a foundation grant of 
#100,000 for voter registration and citizenship training. 
Nearly half of the money went to the SCIC and, with the
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aid of Wyatt Walker, Dorothy Cotten, and Septima Clark,
Young organized and directed a Citizenship Education 
Program for the Conference.^*
Andrew Young was a man of many talents. David Lewis 
wrote that he possessed "a wordliness in matters of finance 
and organizational techniques . . spoke the
language of the Eastern foundations as well as the patois 
of the uneducated Southern black?^ Young had neither the 
mysticism of James Bevel, nor the blunt, personal aggressive­
ness of Hosea Williams; he was not known as a fieiy and 
emotional preacher. Rather, as John Osborne noted, he was 
a "cool manager" who was "crisp and efficient" in carrying 
out his organizational duties, a man of considerable admini­
strative s k i l l . T h i s  was why Young rarely went to jail: 
it was his task to take over the day-to-day direction of 
campaigns in the absence of King and Abernathy.^
In 1964, Young took over the job of Executive Director 
upon Walker's departure, a post that required the ability 
to impart some kind of order and efficiency to the loosely- 
structured and spontaneous SCIC.^ It also demanded the 
quiet but firm hand of a diplomat; as Ebony put it, Young 
had to see that "the coordinators" of the SCLC's various 
programmes were "themselves coordinated," and this was no 
easy task given the constantly shifting demands on the 
Conference's time and resources, not to mention the
assertive personalities of those who directed these 
68programmes.
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Young, observed the Norfolk Journal and Guide« was
"one of the 'moderates' in the King organization."^
Young's "moderation." was rooted in a firm sense of
political realism. He was not given to flights of mystical
fancy, nor to the kamikaze radicalism that affected many
SNCC workers, for he knew that, ultimately, the civil
rights movement depended upon the President and the Congress.
Young's statements were characterized by pragmatic common-
sense, a quality that did nothing, however, to compromise
his political idealism. He became one of the SCIjC's most
skilful and persuasive negotiators:
The veiy day in Birmingham they put the dogs and the 
firehoses on us, Dr. King told me to start talking.
I took off my blue jeans and put on my suit . . . and 
sat down with the people from the Birmingham board 
of trade, and they understood that if we could not 
be free, they could not be free. 70
Hosea Williams
Newsweek once described Hosea Williams as "A chunky, 
cocky man who does not doubt his own organizing talents.
Having led one of the most successful local movements in 
the South, his self-confidence was not unjustified. A 
graduate of Atlanta University, and a World War Two veteran,
72,in the 1950's Williams was a stalwart of the Savannah NAACP.
It was in the area of voter registration that he excelled. 
Working through the Southeastern Georgia Crusade for 
Voters (organized in I960 to cover the eighteen counties 
that comprised the state's First Congressional District), 
Willia“13 set up registration projects in seven counties,
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which swiftly added 5»000 names to the voting rolls.^ Most 
of his work was concentrated in Savannah, where the 
Chatham County Crusade for Voters was "the most effective 
county organization in Georgia," as well as a "disciplined 
political machine" which, as early as I960, wielded 
considerable influence in the city’s elections.^ Led by 
Williams, the CCCV staged a series of spectacular demon­
strations in the summer of 1963, which succeeded in de­
segregating Savannah's public accommodations a year before 
the Civil Rights Bill became law.^
When, in 1964, Williams was promoted to the SCLC's 
Director of Voter Registration and Political Education, he 
assumed one of the most important positions in the 
Conference. It became Williams's task to breathe life into 
the Voting Rights Act, passed in the Simmer of 1965. This 
measure had, at last, provided black access to the ballot. 
The full potential of black political power could only be 
fulfilled, however, with patient and persistent effort 
from civil rights groups such as the SCIC. The movement 
had established the legal right; it now had to do something 
with it. Voter Registration and political education thus 
became the mainstay of the SCIC1 s Southern programme and, 
concentrated mainly in the Black Belt sections of Alabama, 
Georgia, North Carolina and Virginia, it made a vital 
contribution to the political acculturation of people for 
whom politics had always been, but for the brief period of 
Reconstruction, "white folks’ business."
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For Williams, direct action was an integral part of 
political education and, with James Bevel and C.T. Vivian, 
lie was a master in the use of the demonstration. One of his 
innovations in the Savannah campaign was the night march, 
a dangerous tactic, but one which heightened the "creative 
tension" necessary for successful direct action.*^ The 
night march became a standard part of the SCLC'S direct 
action repertoire, and was employed in the St. Augustine, 
Selma, and Grenada campaigns.?? Having demonstrated his 
capacity for leadership in Savannah JS Williams could be 
relied on to impart discipline, enthusiasm and effectiveness 
to a local movement, and the day-to-day direction of both 
the St. Augustine and the Grenada movements fell to him.^® 
Williams was a public speaker of consumate skill, 
whose fire-brand oratoiy could literally set the feet of 
his listeners marching. "He whips them into a kind of 
patriotic fervor," observed the Charleston News and Courier; 
yet, with equal ease, "he can ¿just as quickly cool their
n o  iardour by . . . calling for a word of prayer."'7 Williams’s 
oratorical style was a reflection of his personality. "I 
was violent by nature," headmitted, and he remained "a very 
high-tempered man." Unlike King, Abernathy, Bevel, or 
Lawson, Williams had little time for the soothing ethic of 
philosophical nonviolence: "I became the SCLC’s Castro.
I became the tough guy, the nervy guy." Yet* although 
outwardly aggressive, with not a cautious bone in his body, 
he possessed an ingrained sense of political realism. He
accepted nonviolence as a practical necessity because,
having been "reared on a white man's plantation" in the
Deep South, he was all too aware of the brutal nature of 
82white power.
The Rev. Ralph David Abernathy
The evening before his death, Martin Luther King 
referred to Ralph Abernathy as "the best friend I have in 
the w o r l d . F o r  a.’1 crowded thirteen years Abernathy was 
at King's side; they did everything, including going to 
jail, together. Abernathy provided King with unstinting 
gmfl unselfish support, informed advice and criticism, and 
warm personal friendship. It is no exaggeration to say 
that every major SCLCJ decision was the product of a joint 
effort between these two men. It is a measure of King's 
reliance on Abernathy that the latter accompanied him to 
"summit" meetings of black leaders, as well as to audiences 
with the President, the Pope, and various heads of state. 
"King saw something in Abernathy that he didn't see in the 
rest of us," recalled A1 Sampson, an ex.-SCIG staffer. 
"Abernathy has a rare blend of humility, patience, and 
integrity . . .  King once told us that no man knew his 
philosopky better, or had the stability to hold the staff 
together as Abernathy did. Most of us agreed."
In addition to being King's closest friend and 
associate, and the SCIC's Vice-President and Secretary- 
Treasurer, Abernathy was one of the most effective speakers 
in the civil rights movement. In an organization composed
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of preachers, Abernathy was pre-eminent. He and King
presented a contrast in styles. King's eloquence was
studied, polished and, at times, highly intellectual in
content. He dwelt upon the difference between eros, philia,
and agape, and quoted from Thomas Carlyle, James Russell
lowell, and William Cullen Biyant. Abernathy, on the
other hand, made little or no pretense to intellectual
sophistication; his speeches and sermons were characterized
by an earthiness and humour which he deftly used to
convulse his audience and at the same time puncture and
deflate the white man's pretensions to superiority:
We don't want to be
The white man's brother-in-law.
Nowhere will you find it 
Where we have sought to be that.
That's not our aim 
Whatsoever.
All we want to be 
Is his brother.
And it appears to us
As we look around this audience
Tonight
That it is he o-
Who has triecT to be our brother-in-law.
Abernathy had an instinctive under standing of the blacks 
of rural Alabama who made up the rank-and-file of the civil 
rights movement for, unlike King (who was brought up among 
the affluent middle-class of Atlanta), he was one of them.
He expressed as much as King (although in a different way) 
the religious fervour and spontaneity of the Southern move­
ment: "When you are called upon to witness, you can't always
know, can't always analyze what might happen. You just
«87have to go.
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The addition of these people to the staff of the 
SCIC— along -with many others, including the Rev. Bernard 
S. Lee, Dorothy Cotten, and Leon Hall— rmeant that by 1961 
the Conference was "honed to a fine fighting edge" capable, 
at last, of mounting a determined and aggressive assault 
upon the edifice of Southern segregation.88
III. DIRECT ACTION AND POLICE POWER; THE CRISIS 
OP THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT.
The failure of the sit-in movement in the Deep South
The sit-in movement of I960 fuelled the civil rights 
movement with a new dynamism, and imparted to it a new 
self-confidence. Black students had flexed their muscles; 
black communities had exercised their economic pqwer. It 
was an intoxicating experience. There seemed to be no 
limits to the power of nonviolent direct action. James 
Bevel envisaged a nonviolent student movement of inter­
national dimensions; and James Lawson called for the 
recruitment of a "nonviolent army" to bring about "non­
violent revolution" and, if necessary, a "world-wide 
crisis."8^ However, when the first wave of sit-ins had 
ended, a sober examination of their total effect revealed 
that despite all the lunch-counters that had been integrated, 
nonviolent direct action, unaided, was severely limited in 
its power to eradicate segregation.
The integration victories of the sit-in movement were 
confined to the Upper South and the Border States. As late 
as September 1961, apart from Atlanta and Savannah, in the
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five Deep South states segregation In public accommodations 
90was intact. In Alabama, Mississippi, ^Louisiana, Georgia^ 
and South Carolina, sit-ins had been ruthlessly crushed 
by police repression and mob violence. The examples of 
Orangeburg, South Carolina, Montgomery, Alabama, and 
Jacksonville, Florida, were typical.
After a year of sitting-in, picketing, demonstrating,
and going to 3ai-1» not a single lunch-counter had been
integrated in Orangeburg; the city even refused to set up
a bi-racial commission. Orangeburg had achieved this feat
by the liberal use of fire-hoses, tear-gas, and rçass 
91arrests.
On February 25, I960, thirty-five students from 
Alabama State College sat-in at the cafeteria of the 
Montgomery County Courthouse; Governor Patterson immediate­
ly ordered their expulsion. The next day, Ralph 
Abernathy led 1,200 in a protest march to the steps of the 
state capitol, and announced that they would return for 
a prayer meeting on March 6.^ The Mayor of Montgomery 
reacted with a threat and a warning: ttI feel that I must 
warn the Negro people of this community that the tempers 
of the white community . . .  is £ ”sic_7 being pushed 
beyond their power to control."^ This blatant invitation 
to mob violence had the desired effect: when Abernathy 
pnri a thousand others attempted to march, they found 
themselves confronted by : five thousand hostile white 
onlookers, and six hundred p o l i c e m e n . O n l y  when the
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mob had forced the marchers to take refuge in Dexter 
Avenue Church did the police intervene to prevent a 
massacre.7 The black community was thus thoroughly in­
timidated. The students of Alabama State College held two 
more marches, hut when three hundred of them were expelled 
the protests came to an end.^ Lawrence Reddick (a faculty 
member who was dismissed for leading one of the marches) 
wrote that "the experience of Alabama has shown that state 
power can break up a student campaign against Jim Crow."^ 
Moreover, as a report of the Southern Regional Council 
demonstrated, Montgomery was not an isolated examples it 
represented "a type of Southern city that is openly, candidly,
and consciously willing to accept chaos— to preserve the
mqqracial status quo. y
In Jacksonville, the police let white vigilante groups
do virtually all their work for them. When the forces of
law and order by their negligence made it plain that black
demonstrators could expect no protection, mobs of white
bystanders became larger and more threatening until, on
August 27, I960, 350 aimed white men set about a group
of sit-inners. When black youths began to retaliate, the
NAACP called off the protests, and the Jacksonville
innmovement collapsed. "Here was a case," wrote Martin 
Oppenheimer, "where the whole community seemed to be 
united to preserve segregation, and prepared to permit 
violence to achieve that goal."101
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The waning of student activism in the Upper South
If the sit-in movement failed completely in the Deep 
South, its achievements in the Upper South turned out to be, 
upon close examination, disappointing. Firstly, although it 
was true that in several cities students broadened their 
attack on segregation to other public accommodations, inte­
gration victories were for the most part confined to lunch- 
counters. Even here, white resistance, except for Texas, 
had been everywhere intense. w It was not until the end 
of May I960— after nearly four months of struggle— that the 
sit-in movement gained its first victory.10^ If it took 
this long merely to integrate lunch-counters, how long 
would it take to integrate all the other public 
accommodations?
But it was not simply a question of time, of moving
from one target to the next: the physical and psychological
energy expended in ending a single, minor aspect of
segregation left most local movements exhausted. True, there
was a second wave of student-inspired nonviolent direct
action aimed at cinemas, libraries, concert-halls, andloaparks, in early 1961. It was, however, considerably 
smaller in geographic scope than the movement of the previous 
year, confined to Atlanta and about a dozen cities in the 
Upper South and Border States..*®-* It was also true that 
the Freedom Rides had to a certain extent sustained the 
momentum of the civil rights movement but, by their very 
nature, they had directly involved relatively few people.
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By the second half of 1961, in most cities the energy of
the sit-in movement was spent. In January 1962, Time
noted an overall decline in movement activity in the
S o u t h . A s  King wrote in March of that year:
It is not practical to integrate buses, and then over an 
extended period of time expect to add another gain, and 
then another and another. Unfortunately, resistance 
stiffens after each limited victory; inertia sets in, 
and the forward movement not only slows down, hut is 
often reversed entirely.107
The Albany Movement
The fate of the Albany Movement was a tragic proof of
the correctness of King's analysis. The chronology of that
campaign is a list of defeats. On November 1, 1961, eleven
were forcibly ejected from the waiting-room of the Trailways
108bus station; on November 20, five were arrested there. In 
December, a Freedom Bide organized by SNCC ended with the 
jailing of the eleven participants.^^ These arrests united 
the black community in support of the Albany Movement, and 
on December 12 the city witnessed its first mass demonstra­
tion; it was the first of many.^® The city replied to 
them with mass arrests; nearly five hundred were jailed in 
the first two marches.
These arrests were the beginning of a pattern which, 
despite the entiy of King and the SCIG into the struggle, 
eventually broke the back of the Albany Movement. By July 
1962, when King and Abernathy went back to jail in an 
attempt to inspire a new wave of demonstrations, they found 
that the black community was losing its faith in the tactics
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of nonviolent direct action. The city* s steadfast refusal
to negotiate, together with its policy of mass arrests and
the delaying of trials, sapped the energy and willpower of
the movement, mating King's threat to "turn Albany upside
112down" an idle one. As one Southern newspaper observed,
"it is now beginning to loot as if the hard core of those
willing to go to ¿jail have been arrested already. Few
seem willing to follow them now. . . .  The Negroes of
Albany appear to he tired of demonstrations which result
in arrest."11-* A few gains were chalted up, such as
integration of the public library, and the rail and bus
station waiting rooms but, as one of the movement leaders
observed, they were "negligible and hardly worth mentioning;"
the bitter taste of the larger defeat had left the black
114-population "disillusioned,frightened and bitter." Visit­
ing the city in July 1964-, two years after the heyday of 
the movement, Reese Cleghorn found that Albany was still 
"a monument to white supremacy.n11-*
The Achievements of the Albany Campaign
Like the crushing of the sit-in movement in the Deep 
South, the defeat of the Albany Movement appeared to 
illustrate the impotence of nonviolent direct action. It 
was one to threaten to "fill the ¿jails," but it was
another thing altogether to do it: as Cleghorn put it,
"the Albany city ¿jail . . . proved a bottomless pit."116 
Going to ¿jail was not, of course, an end in itself: its 
purpose was to exert pressure upon the white community to
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enter into good-faith negotiations. But what if that 
community was prepared, with complete equanimity, to 
imprison "every man, woman and child who dared protest"?1^
If such tactics were emulated throughout the South, the 
civil rights movement would he totally crushed.
In several ways, however, the Albany defeat was a 
blessing in disguise. It dispelled some of the more ingenuous 
and over-optimistic thinking about the power of nonviolent 
direct action; it highlighted the necessity for clear 
goals, careful planning, and co-ordinated tactics; and it 
demonstrated the disastrous effects of divided leadership.
Most important of all was the way Albany focused attention 
on the larger strategic problems of the civil rights 
movement: the problems of police power and federal inter­
vention.
King and his aides insisted that the Albany Movement 
represented an important refinement and extension of 
nonviolent direct action. It was, wrote Wyatt Walker, "a 
milepost in the early stage of the nonviolent movement" 
because the whole black community had united behind the 
c a m p a i g n . T h e  brainchild of SNCC workers Charles 
Sherrod and Cordell Reagon, the Albany Movement was organized 
to bring together the faction-ridden leadership of the 
black community. It embraced the NAACP, the NAACP Youth 
Council (previously often at odds with its parent organization), 
the Ministerial Alliance, and SRCC.1^  King, recalling 
Montgomery, was impressed by this manifestation of unity.
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He had never intended to commit the SCIG to the Albany
struggle, but had accepted an invitation to speak there.120
When, however, he got up to address the thousand people who
packed the Shiloh Baptist Church, the congregation nso
caught Dr. King in their fervor that he could not leave 
121them.” King was moved by the unity and determination 
he saw:
The Albany Movement is a great movement. And I think one 
of the things that makes it great is its universal 
quality. It equates all class lines— the lower, the 
middle and the upper classes all together. It breaks 
all academic lines. The PhD's and the Ho-D's have 
¿joined together. It breaks all denominational 
lines. . . • It's a movement of people of all ages 
from eight to eighty. So this is something remarkable 
in our struggle for racial ¿justice. 122
The tactics employed by the Albany Movement also 
made it an escalation of nonviolent direct action. As 
Andrew Toung saw it, nonviolence in Montgomery had been 
passive in character, a mere withdrawal of support from 
one aspect of segregation. The student sit-ins had, in a 
more aggressive manner, challenged another aspect of 
segregation. In Albany something new and exciting had 
taken place: an entire black community attacked segregation 
in its every manifestation.12^ It had utilized, moreover, 
a wide variety of tactics, including voter registration, 
boycotts, freedom rides, sit-ins, and mass marches. Albany 
had witnessed another highly slgnificant tactical development: 
it was in Albany that King made his first appeal for 
clerical involvement in direct action, and seventy-five 
clergymen responded to his call by going to ¿jail on labor
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Day, 1962.
The Failure of the Albany Campaign
Given the power, unity, and tactical diversity of the
Albany Movement, why then did it fail? The causes of the
Albany defeat fell into two categories: those that were
internal to the movement (its own mistakes and errors),
and those that were external to it (the hostility of the
federal courts and the "neutrality" of the federal government).
The leaders of the Albany Movement made a series of
tactical blunders. They failed, for example, to employ
legal action against the city's segregation, laws until the
summer of 1962, by which time the movement was already
125losing momentum. ^
Another mistake had been the bus boycott, which soon 
put the city's bus company out of business. Ironically, 
the bus company agreed to the Movement's demands, but King
refused to accept the settlement without the official
126endorsement of the Mayor and the City Council. In 
hindsight "Martin thought it would have been better to 
have temporarily accepted these gains," Coretta King later 
wrote}27
It was not that the Albany Movement lacked a diversity 
of tactics but rather that, as Howard Zinn wrote, there 
was "a tendency simply to repeat old actions under new 
circumstances."128 The Movement's quasi-religious faith 
in the power of demonstrations was another weakness. "When 
we speak of- filling the jails," King wrote in 1963, "we
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are talking of a tactic to be flexibly applied. . . .
Leaders indulge in bombast if they do not take all the
circumstances into account before calling upon their
people to make a maximum sacrifice."^^ Unfortunately,
the leaders of the Albany Movement were not blameless in
this respect. The very phrase "filling the ¿jails" was
an exercise in hyperbole which both underestimated white
Albany’s willingness to inflict mass incarceration, and
black Albany's capacity to endure it. The belief that
the Movement could literally fill up the ¿jails was a
nalvetl b o m  of inexperience. "Pritchett ^ Albany's chief
of police^ was hep to the fact that we couldn’t," said
Bill Hansen of SUCG. "We ran out of people before he ran
out of ¿jails." ^ 0  Many of these tactical mistakes resulted
from the lack of a clear-cut, overall plan. "There wasn't
any real strategy in Albany," Andrew Young later recalled.
"I remember being around and not knowing what to do."^^
Reflecting the religious fervour of the rank-and-file, the
Movement’s leaders tended to substitute spontaneity f0r
planning, "spirit" for strategy. The militancy of the
black community, instead of being directed against a few,
carefully-chosen targets for maximum effect, was squandered
in a diffuse attack upon segregation as a whole. "One
of the principal mistakes we had made there was to scatter
1^^our efforts too widely," admitted King.
The tactical errors of the Albany Movement were 
compounded by serious divisions within its leadership.
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Although King's participation was warmly welcomed by Dr.'
V.G. Anderson, the Movement's president, it aroused 
jealousy and resentment in some of the other leaders.
They reacted against what they deemed the imperious 
behaviour of some of King's subordinates, notably Ralph 
Abernathy and Wyatt Walker. According to Louis Lomax's 
1962 account, "Walker began to issue organizational orders 
and commands. Local Negroes got mad."^^ Marion Page, 
who had been the Albany Movement's executive secretary, 
stated in more general terms that "People who had done 
the fighting felt they were being given a back seat."1^
Such complaints had some justification. Walker, 
for example, later admitted the accuracy of Lomax's 
unflattering account of his role in Albany.^“7 Tet it 
would be a gross exaggeration to pose the leadership 
conflict in teims of a simple dichotomy between outside 
direction and local control, or between the moderation of 
the SCIC on the one hand, and the determined militancy of 
SNCC and the Albany Movement on the other. Explaining 
why the SCLC had failed to make the impact expected of it, 
Lomax observed that while the leaders of local movements 
welcomed support from King as an inspirational symbol,
138they had no wish to relinquish their own personal control. 
This was certainly true of some of the leaders of the 
Albany Movement (including many of the SNCC workers), whose 
hostility to the SCLC was in large part motivated by 
simple jealousy. An understanding of these feelings helps
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to account for the agreement that was negotiated with the
city on December 18, 1961. It was a puzzling truce for
two reasons. Firstly it was engineered by SNCC and the
Albany Movement without the knowledge or consent of either
King or Anderson who, with Ralph Abernathy, were in jail
at the time, having vowed to remain there over Christmas,
and having invited "thousands" of others to join them,^^
Secondly the terms of the agreement were so unsatisfactory
when compared with the stated goals of the Movement, that
the New York Herald Tribune called it "one of the most
stunning defeats" of King's career.^® David lewis, in
his scrupulously fair account of the campaign, concluded
that the leaders of the Movement agreed to an inconclusive
and unsatisfactory truce in order to get King out of jail
gnrl out of town; the pact was "confused and ulteriorly
motivated."1^1 King had little choice but to leave jail
pnfl proclaim a victory, but he later told Time "I'm sorry
I was bailed out. . . .  We thought that the victory had
been won. When we got out, we discovered it was all a
hoax."^^ He accepted, he said, "a share of the*
responsibility" for the campaign's failure, and there
seems no reason to doubt that the SCIC had been insensitive
143to the feelings and opinions of the local leadership.
On the other hand, Iouis Lomax's indictment of the SCIC 
was "hugely exaggerated.n1^  In David Lewis's view the 
fatal flaw in the Albany campaign was "not that Martin 
monopolized and moderated its strength away," but rather
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that "he completely failed . . .  to enforce unity upon an 
essentially anarchic and querulous mosaic of inexperienced 
groups. "^5
IV. THE CIVTL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENTS THE FAILURES OF THE KENNEDY 
ADMINISTRATION
Pat Watters interviewed the surviving leaders of the 
Albany Movement nearly a decade after the campaign. Chastened 
and hitter, they ¿exuded little of the spirit that had 
characterized the early days of the movement. In light of 
the opposition, hatred, and brutality they had encountered 
in the white community, the ethic of philosophic nonviolence 
appeared, in hindsight, grotesquely inappropriate. How 
could nonviolence touch the heart and conscience of the 
white community when, as the Rev. Samuel Wells put it, "the
1 Zl£white community was without a heart, without a conscience"?
The mass meetings of the movement, in which the black 
community was enjoined to display love for its oppressors, 
"seem in retrospect almost a burlesque," said C.B.King.^?
Being the Deep South,' the uncompromisingly hostile 
attitude of white Albany was perhaps only to be expected.
Even King was realistic enough to know that love and non­
violence did not immediately convert the oppressor to 
the cause of justice: "Men are not easily moved from . . .  
their prejudiced and irrational feelings;" in Montgomery, and 
across the South, "the initial white reaction to Negro1 / jQresistance has been bitter." But neither King nor the
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other leaders of the Albany Movement had been prepared for 
their almost complete failure to evoke a sympathetic 
response from the federal government.
Civil Rights and the Kennedy Administration
Civil rights leaders had greeted the election of 
John E, Kennedy -with great hope. Even if he had not inter­
vened to get King out of a DeKalb County, Georgia, ¿jail, 
he would have little difficulty in improving upon the civil 
rights record of the previous administration; as John A.
Williams put it, "no one could be as stolid or as unmoved 
by the cresting tide of black frustration as the Republicans."^*^ 
Kennedy did not make extravagant promises; no new civil 
rights legislation would be introduced in the near future. 
However, he vowed to utilize the full power of the Executive 
to eliminate discrimination in housing, the federal
150government itself, and in contracts of the federal government. ^
In addition, the Justice Department would initiate litigation
to strike down poll taxes & literacy tests, thus removing .
151the obstacles to black voting. y
Black leaders like Roy Wilkins and Martin Luther King 
were not unsympathetic to the Kennedy strategy; they were 
aware of bis narrow electoral majority and consequent 
dependence upon Southern support in the Congress. They 
loaew moreover, that Kennedy was correct in his claim that 
much could be done without new legislation, and they were 
quick to point out the specific areas in which discrimination
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could "be eliminated by Executive action. The Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights urged the federal government to
put its own house in order first, and then use the federal
power of the purse to enforce non-discrimination in state
piogcams that received federal aid.1-52 King, too, was happy
to show the new President exactly where he could act. If
the Executive recognized its inherent power and utilized
it to the full, it could "wipe out every vestige of federal
153
support and sponsorship of discrimination." Eor example, 
the President could, by an Executive Order, put an "immediate 
end to all discriminations in any housing accommodations 
financed with federal aid."1'’21’ Above all, the Executive 
effort should be coordinated, thorough, and informed by a 
"recognition by the government of its moral obligation to 
solve the problem.
Rare is the politician who fulfills his campaign 
promises, especially according to the declared schedule; 
even rarer is the civil rights leader who fails to criticize, 
in strident terms, the politician's performance. Kennedy's 
performance was better than any of his predecessors', but 
black disappointment with his civil rights programme was not 
contrived or ritualistic, but real and deep. The President's 
Executive actions were limited in scope and weak in enforce­
ment. His Housing Order covered only a fifth of all new 
housing, and no legal action was taken to enforce it. The 
Executive Order on Employment was even more anaemic: as 
late as 1965, not a single contract had been cancelled for 
its violation. Segregation in federal programmes continued
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as ever, and in 1963 the President refused the recommenda­
tion of the Civil Eights Commission that federal grants- 
in-aid to Mississippi he terminated; he even refused 
permission for the Commission to hold hearings in that 
state.
Two critiques of the Kennedy civil rights record 
appeared in March 1962. Prom the Southern Regional Council 
came a report which, although a cautious mixture of praise 
and blame, raised serious doubts as to the basic feasi­
bility of the Administration's strategy, especially with 
regard to education and voting rights.1^  Moreover, in 
the sphere of Executive action there was a distressing 
tendency for "activity and energy" to "become a substitute 
for r e s u l t s . Por example, the trouble-shooting 
activities of the Justice Department, while conveying an 
impression of government concern and involvement, often 
disguised the fact that all that was being sought was the 
maintenance of public order or, at the most, "token 
compliance with the law." ^ 9  The highly-publicized inter­
ventions of the Justice Department were "lid-keeping 
operations," said John Nolan. "We weren't trying to solve
the civil rights problems of the USA. We were just trying
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to keep people from getting hurt." Martin Luther King 
offered a similar assessment, couched in considerably 
blunter language. The Kennedy record, he wrote, was 
characterized by a narrowing of goals and a decline in
and interest. "As the year 1961 unfolded, Executiveenergy
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initiative "became increasingly feeble, and the chilling 
prospect emerged of a general Administration retreat.”'1'61 
Priority was being accorded to the Administration’s 
general legislative programme— which did not include a civil 
rights bill. It was in this discouraging context
that the Albany campaign tooh place.
The Federal Government and the Albany Campaign
The SCIO's involvement in Albany was unplanned,
spontaneous and, according to Coretta King, something of
a diversion for "Martin . . .  did not feel that it was the
time for our strength to be diffused in local confrontations
which might better be settled by national action."16^ Yet
the Albany campaign, by its very failure, brought into
focus the impelling need for oust such national action.
"Prom the beginning," wrote Fred Powledge, "Albany
was a city that non-violent demonstration was not going 
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to change." Nevertheless, if nonviolence failed to move 
the white community, the leaders of the Albany Movement 
looked expectantly and hopefully to a measure of aid and 
intervention from the federal government. While non­
violence might not immediately convert the oppressor, it 
at least dramatized and publicized the oppression, so 
that an aroused nation could put pressure upon its 
government to act.16^ The government, however, did not 
act in Albany, except to file an amicus curiae brief in
support of the Movement's suit to deny the city a permanent
166injunction against demonstrations. Only when King was
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in jail did the Justice Department display a measure of 
energy— to get him out.16? On July 13, 1962— their third 
day in ¿Jail— "we were summoned to Pritchett's office, only 
to discover that we had been tricked out of ¿jail"; a 
"stranger", commonly believed to have been a representative 
of the Justice Department, had paid King and Abernathy's 
fine. Later, when they were contemplating returning to 
prison, Robert Kennedy urged King not to do so, advising 
him to "close up" his campaign in Albany.16^
The federal government's inactivity, and its eager­
ness to end what it perceived as a political embarrassment, 
were profoundly disillusioning for the leaders of the Albany 
Movement. "Promise after promise and nothing would happen," 
recalled Marion Page.1?® Disenchantment with the federal 
government affected even the most unsophisticated and 
believing, said C.B. King, like the old black woman who 
said, "Son, I done found out that even the government is a 
white man."1?1 In private, Martin Luther King was angry at 
the Administration's role in Albany: "They ¿Just don't know 
what we're up against," he told Coretta.1?2 At the same 
time however, although'painful, Albany was a valuable 
political education for King. Firstly, although King 
believed that order could not be expected to co-exist with 
injustice, the government was clearly prepared to tolerate 
a considerable measure of the latter to ensure the preser­
vation of the former. Albany demonstrated that a white 
Southern community was free to crush nonviolent direct action
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as long as it avoided tlie kind of overt brutality that could 
be spotlighted in the glare of national and international 
publicity. Only when whites unashamedly utilized open and— more 
especially— private violence, would the federal government 
intervene. King always took great pains to distinguish between 
the use of moral means for moral ends, and the use of moral 
means for immoral ends. It was a simple distinction but it 
was nonetheless lost upon Robert Kennedy and such organs of 
liberal opinion as the New York limes and the Atlanta 
Constitution« all of whom praised Albany police chief Laurie 
Pritchett for using "nonviolence."'^'7^  But as the Georgia 
Council on Human Relations pointed out, Pritchett had used 
nonviolence to throttle free expression and turn Albany into 
a police s t a t e . ( " N o w  It’s Passive Resistance by Whites," 
proclaimed US News and World Report.) ^75
Secondly, although King's faith in the Kennedy 
Administration had not been completely undermined, he was 
learning that, as Howard Zinn put it, "the government . . .  
has a hierarchy of values, in which political self-interest 
is at the top."’1''7^  A cynic, wrote King, would hold that the 
inadeguacies of government civil rights policy were the 
inevitable result of attempting to please both blacks and 
segregationists: the government "wants the vote of both and
is paralyzed by the conflicting needs of: each."^'7? King 
refused to ascribe such hypocritical motives to the 
Administration; he preferred to believe that it had made 
a genuine mistake, having "misunderstood the forces at play"
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in the South. Nevertheless, Albany had made one thing 
crystal-dears if the civil rights movement was left to 
the mercies of the Laurie Pritchetts of the South, it 
would everywhere go down to defeat. Indeed, this was 
already happening. "The idea whose time had come moved 
on," wrote King in August 1962. "Over the rubble left by 
the violence of mobsters, many communities resumed their
179normal activities on a new basis of partial integration."
The abolition of segregation would require a 
federal commitrment, a reordering of governmental priori­
ties. The SCLCJ's next campaign would be attended by such 
shocking police brutality that civil rights, from an 
issue of secondary political importance, would be trans­
formed into one of overriding national urgency; it would 
create a crisis of such proportions that the government 
could not, as John Kennedy put it, "prudently choose to 
ignore" the cry for equality.
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CHAPTER III
THE BIRMINGHAM CAMPAIGN AND THE TRIUMPH OP NONVIOLENT
DIRECT ACTION
I. THE RODE OP THE SCIC IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
The civil rights movement was a "push from below," 
intensely local, spontaneous, and independent in 
character.1 The principal task of the direct action 
civil rights organizations was to support these local 
struggles, furnishing them with expertise, legal aid, 
publicity, and moral inspiration. The SCIC, when it was 
not engaged in one of its major campaigns, was lending 
support to the many lesser-known fights that were being 
waged by its various affiliates in cities across the 
South.
The SCIC was frequently criticized for talcing un­
deserved credit for the work of other organizations. While 
SNCC, CORE, and the NAACP carried out most of the direct 
action and voter registration in the South, the Conference 
tended to "specialize in a few showy projects," bringing 
it immense publicity, and leading whites to erroneously 
identify King as the "leader" of the civil rights movement.^ 
Although often prompted by the intense rivalry and compe­
tition for funds that existed among the different civil 
rights organizations, these criticisms contained an element 
of truth. With a much smaller budget, SNCC maintained a 
considerably larger field staff and, in addition to carrying
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out most of the voter registration work in Mississippi,
SNCC originated several of the movements (including
Albany, Danville, Selma, and Americus) that were
subsequently taken over and made famous by the SCIC.
The importance of COKE's work, especially in Forth
Carolina, Xouisiana, and Florida, has been amply
documented by August Meier and Elliott Rudwick.^
The SCIC's importance in the civil rights movement
was greater, however, than a mere enumeration of its
campaigns would lead one to believe. Firstly, its major
campaigns were "direction-turning events" which promoted
national legislation and provided momentum for the whole
of the civil rights movement; secondly, King's philosophy
of nonviolence was profoundly influential in both SNCC
g-nfl CORE; thirdly, King possessed a unique role in the
civil rights movement as its focus, its inspirational
leader, and its most widely-recognized spokesman; finally,
the SCIG was singularly close to the heart of the black
4community, the church.
The SCIC's Operational Technique
In 1964, King claimed that "the SCIC was, in large 
measure, responsible for the beginning of a new day* for 
Southern blacks.^ Between 1963 and 1965» the Conference 
developed an operational technique of devastating 
effectiveness. Perfected in Birmingham and repeated in 
Selma, it called for a concentration of the SCIC's resources 
in a single city, one which epitomized intransigent racism.
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Slowly and inexorably, a gradually escalating campaign of 
nonviolent direct action would paralyze and disrupt the 
city's normal life. Ensuing mass arrests and police 
brutality were deftly exploited to discredit the forces of 
segregation. These campaigns had a triple impact. Aided 
by federal intervention, they achieved a breach in the 
wall of the city's rigid segregation. In addition, because 
of the dramatic way. in which they were conducted, they gave 
focus and inspiration to the whole of the civil rights 
movement, sparking off new waves of direct action across 
the South. Thirdly, they pressured, embarrassed, and 
cajoled the federal government into introducing national 
legislation, and the moral indignation they unleashed 
provided the momentum for its passage through Congress.
"What lobbying and imploring could not do in legislative 
halls," wrote King, "marching feet accomplished a thousand 
miles away.Mt7
Some observers complained that the SCIC was guilty
of coldly "exploiting the bravery and spirit of local 
7movements." There was truth in the charge. The Conference 
mounted demonstrations in the knowledge that their parti­
cipants would be gassed, beaten, or Jailed. Often, moreover, 
such demonstrations achieved nothing, lien Holt, who took 
¿art in the SCIC' s Danville campaign, denounced "the tactic 
of massive, blockbuster, blunderbuss marching of black 
bodies down hot Southern streets" in the naive hope that 
their suffering would somehow persuade the oppressor to 
mend his ways.
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Nevertheless, there was method in this apparent 
madness,. Individual campaigns might not lead to an 
immediate change in local conditions, hut, by keeping the 
South in rebellious feiment, dozens of such campaigns 
would demonstrate that segregation could no longer be 
supported but by methods that were unacceptable to the non- 
South. The SCIC's greatest strength observed Pat Watters, 
was its "sound grasp of the American socio-political
Qreality.n' King and his associates addressed their 
campaigns to white Northerners, liberals in particular, 
because only they had the power to effect the kinds of re­
forms that the movement desired. The SCIC "dramatized" 
injustice in a literal fashion, presenting white Northerners 
with "a great televised morality play, white hats and 
black bats; lift up the black hat and there would be the 
white face of Bull Connor; lift up the white hat and there 
would be the solemn black face of Martin Luther King 
shouting love."”1'®
The SCIC recognized that Southern white violence was 
the most powerful ally of the civil rights movement. Thus, 
paradoxically, while King abhorred violence, the tactics 
of the SCIC were geared to "securing publicity through . . .  
precipitating violence from white hoodlums and law enforce­
ment officers."11 King vigorously denied that the SCIC 
"provoked" white violence. As Andrew Young explained:
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The movement did not 'cause' problems in Selma . . .
It ¿just brought them to the surface where they could 
be dealt with. Sheriff Clark has been beating black 
heads in the back of the ¿jail for years, and we're 
only saying to him that if he still wants to beat 
black heads, he'll have to do it on Main Street, at 
noon, in-jfront of CBS, NBC, and ABC television 
cameras.
The typical SCIC campaign was a series of carefully-timed 
manoeuvres, each designed to attract the maximum amount 
of publicity: the slow beginning, followed by the gradual, 
tense, escalation; the dramatic confrontation between 
demonstrators and police; the courageous defiance of the 
injunction, with King going to jail and addressing an 
impassioned open letter to the nation; the importation of 
prominent white supporters; and the orchestrated outcry 
of moral indignation from white liberals in Congress and 
across the country.
"The entire racial panorama," complained a Florida 
newspaper Japropos the St. Augustine campaign, "was staged 
using the Nation's Oldest City as the theater, and world­
wide television and news media readers as the audience."^ 
The genius of the SCIC was its ability to defeat the 
forces of segregation by turning their own violence against 
them; they were now forced to commit their brutality
"openly— in the light of day— with the rest of the world 
14looking on." Every time a Southern sheriff clubbed a 
nonviolent demonstrator, he was putting one more nail in 
the coffin of segregation. The crude, stupid repression 
of Bull Connor and Jim Clark was no match for the subtle 
nonviolence of Martin Luther King. They were simply
outwitted.
79.
TTinp; as the Symbolic Leader of the Civil Rights ¡Movement
"Like Paul," wrote King from the Birmingham City 
¿jail, "I must constantly respond to the Macedonian call 
for help."1^ The analogy was entirely appropriate. In
1962, Louis Lomax had thought of the parallel, writing,
"Mot only does he go from town to town inspiring Negroes 
to take action, hut he returns to suffer with them in 
their time of trouble."15 When King was not writing, fund­
raising, or conducting major campaigns, he was travelling 
the length and breadth of the South, several times each 
year, speaking and preaching at innumerable churches and 
meeting-places, encouraging blacks in their struggles.
His unique prestige was recorded by Newsweek in
1963, when it found that he was far and away the most res­
pected black leader, in the North, the South, and 
among1 other black leaders.1*'7 A more concrete indication—  
fmri application— of King's popularity was his capacity to 
attract audiences and swell the ranks of demonstrations.
"King packs them in," admitted the national church secretary 
of the NAACP. His presence could revive a flagging 
campaign, or spark off a new one; wherever he went, whether 
it was Albany, Georgia, Danville, Virginia, or Detroit, 
Michigan, King persuaded unprecedented numbers to take part 
in the struggle for civil rights.
What is the explanation for King's immense popularity? 
Although he could provide local movements with only a 
limited amount of help, he could impart to his audiences
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inspiration, a sense of their own worth and power, and 
a renewed faith in the future. Direct action demanded 
of the participant an unusually high degree of physical 
bravery. Economic repisal, police brutality, incarcera­
tion, and possible death were ever-present threats to 
those who, in the Deep South, dared to inarch, sit-in, 
or register.to vote. In the unreported struggles of 
countless Southern towns, there was little to inhibit 
the violence of public officials and private vigilantes. 
King, in his thousands of speeches and sermons, asked 
blacksto rise to that degree of courage:
How we're ¿just gonae march. If you're hit, don't 
hit back. They may curse you; don't curse back.
They may beat, you and push you around, but just 
keep goin'. They may even try to kill you, but 
¿just develop that quiet courage to die if 
necessary, without killing— and ¿just keep on 
marchin' .19
This was King's constant message, and its appeal was 
strengthened by the fact that, he so obviously embodied 
the quality of courage. His own sacrifices tended, as 
William Robert Miller, no ted, "to magnify his sense of a 
literal disciple ship of the cross," and many of his. 
speeches appeared egotistic. _ The story of the 1959 
attempt on his life, accounts of the threatening 
telephone calls he received, and affirmations of his 
willingness to suffer death recurred in his speeches and 
sermons.^ Xet King tried to consciously avoid 
"developing a martyr complex and • . ,. seeking sympathy " 
and, through his own personal example, he sought to
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impart courage to others.
King also imbued his listeners with a sense of 
their own power and worth. Blacks themselves, he 
insisted, .had the power to mould their own future.
Freedom would never come from the federal government, 
the Supreme Court, or the Congress: "The salvation of 
the Negro, . . .  is in the hands and soul of the Negro 
himself blacks would never work out their own
salvation unless they believed that they.were, in fact, 
the equals of whites. long before the doctrine of 
Black Power was enunciated, King was urging blacks to 
"straighten their backs up," and replace "self-pity 
with self-respect, and self-deprecation with dignity." ^ 
Direct action was a way of achieving this: the very 
act of defiance brought about an inner transformation; 
even if it did not bring about immediate, tangible gains, 
it was an essential pre-condition for their eventual 
attainment. Through direct action, "the Negro dissolved 
the stereotype of the grinning, submissive Uncle Tom.
He name out of his struggle. integrated only slightly in 
the external society, but powerfully integrated within.
25This was a victory that had to precede all other gains."
Faith in the future and a confident expectation of 
eventual victory were the spiritual dynamics of the 
cj[vil rights movement. It was expressed in its anthem:
"We Shall Overcome." Fear of retribution and reprisal 
could only itself be overcome by hope, and King, "better
22
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than anyone else . . .  articulates the aspirations of
Negroes who respond to the cadence of his addresses,
his religious phraseology, and the vision of his dream
26for them and America." By describing this dream in 
simple but eloquent terms, King convinced his listeners 
that the marching, the failings, and the beatings would 
not be in vain:
There is nothing in this world more powerful than the 
power of the human soul, and if we mobilize this soul . 
force . . .  we will be able to transform this 
community, and we will see something new and powerful. 
And we'll be eating where we couldn't eat before.
We will be marching where we couldn't march before.
We will be doing things that we couldn't be doing 
before.27
To a movement besieged by violence and repression, King
offered the sustaining hope that one day "¿justice will
28be a reality for all." Cleveland Sellers, one of King's 
critics in SNCC, marched alongside him through Mississ­
ippi during the Meredith March, and later tried to 
analyze what he meant to the poor blacks of the South:
It's difficult to explain . . . He was a symbol of all 
their hopes for a better life. By being there and 
showing that he really cared, he was helping to 
destroy barriers of fear and insecurity. . . . They 
trusted him. Most important, he made it possible 
for them to believe that they could overcome.29
The SCIC and the black church in the civil rights 
movement
"Who is it,” asked King, "who is supposed to 
articulate the longings and aspirations of the people more 
than the preacher?"^0 No account 0f the part played 
by the SCIC in the civil rights movement would be
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complete without reference to its relationship to the 
black church.
The church was "the oldest and— in membership— by 
far the strongest of all Negro organizations."^ By 
virtue of its existence as a totally segregated insti­
tution, the black church was virtually the only social 
entity that was "actually owned and completely 
controlled" by blacks themselves.^ The black 
minister, financially independent from the white community, 
occupied a unique position because, as Benjamin Mays 
Anri Joseph W. Nicholson pointed out in the 1930's, his 
independence made him the freest man in the black 
community, and hence a.natural focus of leadership.^
The black church, moreover, served not only a religious 
function: as. the solitary black-controlled institution, 
a variety of other, purely social functions accrued to 
it. Wrote Charles S. Johnson in 1941:
Among rural Negroes.the church is still the only 
institution which provides an effective organization 
of the.group, an approved and tolerated place for 
social activities, a forum for expression on many 
issues, an outlet for emotional repressions, and a 
plan for social living. It is a complex institu­
tion meeting a wide variety of needs. 34
Pew who knew the black church denied its immense 
power, nor its potential as a force for.social change.
"It has.the Negro masses organized," wrote Ifyrdal,
"and • . • could line up the Negroes behind a program" if 
it so chose.^ Yet the church was the despair of 
black leaders who sought to improve the lot of their
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people. r^ yrdal admitted that there were no signs of 
social or political involvement by the church, and noted 
that black ministers displayed an almost total lack 
of m i l i t a n c y . T h e  traditional complaint was that 
the church provided blacks with an emotional catharsis 
that merely served to reinforce their passivity and 
acceptance of the status quo; it furnished a haven and 
a refuge, but did.nothing to sensitize blacks to their 
everyday problems, let alone provide positive leader­
ship. Even Booker T. Washington.had complained that 
the black church was too other-worldly and, half a 
century later, King was making the same criticism:
"too many Negro churches . . .  are so absorbed in a 
future good 'over yonder' that they condition their 
members to adjust to the present evils over here."^ 
Even those churches that managed to escape this kind 
of fervid emotionalism, tended to be afflicted with 
middle-class.exclusivism, and .a desire to dis­
associate from the black lower-class, Both, types of 
black church divorced religion from reality, and the. 
faiths they practiced made for "a dangerously irrelevant 
church where people assemble to hear only pious 
platitudes."^8
The SCIC was founded in the belief that black 
ministers were ready to assume the leadership of the 
emerging civil rights movement, and it was an assumption 
that did not go entirely unfulfilled. By the early
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1960's, the traditional passivity and other-worldly 
escapism of the church had given way to an unprecedented 
degree of social and political involvement; the church 
became the black's "weapon of protest, his protective 
fortress behind which he seeks to withstand the assaults 
of a hostile world and within which he plans his 
strategies of defiance, harassment, and, at times, his 
frontal attacks against racial barriers. sqjc 
was the most religious of all the various civil rights 
organizations, consisting of (as Andrew Young put it)
"a bunch of Baptist p r e a c h e r s . I t  was the SCIC's 
relationship to the black church— the very heart of the 
black community— that gave it a prestige and influence 
within the civil rights movement that SNCC and CORE were 
unable to match. .
The most practical contribution of the black church
was to provide a basic structure of local organization
for the movement. As Wyatt Walker pointed out:
it's the most organized thing in the Negro's life. 
Whatever you want to do in the Negro community . . .  
you've got to do it through the Negro church, or 
it doesn't get done. The church today is central 
to the movement. If a Negro's going to have a 
meeting, where's he going to have it? . . .  if 
there had been no Negro church, there would have 
been no civil rights movement today.4-1
The church was also an obvious source of leadership.
Ministers were the backbone of the black middle-class,
especially in the Deep South, where black doctors,
lawyers, and businessmen were few and far between.
Teachers, numerically the largest element of the black
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middle-class, were inhibited from assuming movement 
leadership because of their financial dependence on 
the white community. Economic independence was the 
sine que non of black leadership and, for this veiy 
reason, more than a third of the black political and 
civil rights leaders in the South were ministers.2*"2 A 
fifth, of the NAACP* s local branches were headed by 
clergymen, and over a half of .the SCIjC's local affilia­
tes were church organizations.2*-^
Only a few of the black clergy actively partici­
pated in the civil rights movement; they were, in fact, 
a small minority. Vyatt Walker estimated that only 
about twenty of the 250 black ministers in Birmingham 
had been active in the SCIO's campaign there, and in 
many communities there was an almost total absence of 
militant clerical leadership.2*^*" In view of the minority 
status of the activist black clergy, some have 
wondered whether the black church inhibited rather than 
promoted the civil rights movement; whether, as Gary I. 
Marx asked, religion was an “opiate" rather than an 
” inspiration.
In. discussing the general passivity of the church, 
Gunnar rtTTdal pointed out that “the Negro church funda­
mentally is an expression of the Negro community itself.
. . . If the preachers have been timid and pussyfooting, 
it is because Negroes in general have condoned such a 
policy and would have feared radical l e a d e r s . T h i s
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observation was still pertinent two decades later: 
general black participation in the civil rights 
movement was confined to a relatively small minority.^
The contribution of the black church must "be judged 
in terms of the activism of the committed minority, 
rather than the passivity of the apathetic majority.
The.new leadership role of the black church, or
a section of it, was a reflection of changes within
the larger black community. In the 1940's, ifyrdal
had noted that black ministers were perceptibly losing
influence "because they are not changing as fast as
the rest of the Negro community." leadership was
shifting to other middle-class elements, to "professionals,
businessmen, politicians, and labor union officials."
Yet, rtyrdal continued, this, process of change was a
circular one: the rising political consciousness.of
their congregations, and the increasing competition from
other elements of the black middle-class would compel
black clergymen "to try to do something positive for
48the Negro community." The emergence of militant 
clerical leadership in the civil rights movement was 
not so much a conscious attempt by the black church to 
"catch up" with.its members, but denoted the rise of a 
new generation of clergymen who were affected by the 
same educational and attitudinal changes as the black 
middle-class as a whole. King, Andrew Young, Ralph 
Abernathy, Vyatt Walker, James Bevel and the other
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preachers who made up the leadership of the SCIC 
represented a new type 0f black minister: college- 
educated and seminary-trained, race-conscious, and poli­
tically aware, they were willing, indeed eager, to pick 
up the mantle of leadership.
The militant clergy, although only a minority, 
exerted a disproportionate influence in the black community. 
In his study of the black ministry in Detroit, Donald 1. 
Johnstone found that the militants had considerably 
larger congregations, sought to influence their members' 
votes, and were active in far more political and civil
¿1 qrights organizations. 7 Moreover, as many studies,:: have 
demonstrated, conservative black leaders who refused to 
challenge the racial status quo had, by the early 1960's, 
lost the authority t0 speak for the majority of blacks 
on political and civil rights issues.^ While black
ministers of this type might retain respect and 
affection within the walls of their churches, their 
congregations looked to the militants to provide leader­
ship outside them.
The Religious Mode of Thinking in the Civil Rights 
' Movement" !
E. Franklin Frazier was convinced that the Gandhian 
philosophy of nonviolence was something quite alien to 
American blacks; it was "a way of life . . . that has 
nothing in common with the social heritage of the 
Negro."*51 Black psychologist Kenneth B. Clark went even
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further, terming nonviolence as "pathological" in that it
demanded an unrealistic, and therefore mentally harmful
response from the victims of oppression.^2 Others, on the
other hand, attributed King's success to his ability to
attune the philosophy of nonviolence to the religious
beliefs of M s  followers. "Redemptive love came naturally
to Negro Southerners," insisted John Lewis of SNCC.
Ralph Ellison, refuting Clark's criticisms, argued that
"Martin Luther King isn't working out of yesterday or the
day before yesterday. He is working out of a long history
of Negro tradition and wisdom."^
Even King's critics agreed that nonviolence was
a soundly practical method of social protest, in view
of the actual position of Southern blacks. "Nonviolence
was the only possibility," admitted Stokely Carmichael
in 1970.^ let the dividing line between pragmatic and
philosopMc nonviolence was far from clear: the two
categories tended to merge into each other. Blacks in
the South had always been forced to accept "nonviolence"
as a matter of phsyical survival. In addition, although
oppressed throughout their histoiy, blacks had displayed
remarkably little bitterness and hatred. Ralph Ellison
saw these two facts as connected:
Southern Negroes learned about violence in a very 
tough school. Ihey have known for a long time that 
they can take a lot of head-whipping and survive and 
go on working toward their own goals • . . So today 
•we sacrifice, as tie sacrificed yesterdayx the pleasure of personal retaliation in the interest of 
the common good.56
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The knowledge, moreover, that the history 0f blacks and 
whites in the South had, for hundreds of years, been 
intertwined, and would continue to be so— even more 
closely— in the future, gave philosophic nonviolence a 
certain practical aspect. "Here in America? said Aaron 
Henry of the Mississippi NAACP, "our white brother and 
our black brother are going to be still right here. 
Therefore, it has to be this symbiotic kind of response 
and respect, one for the other."^7 Even those who were 
intellectually skeptical of philosophic nonviolence 
recognized this need. Practical and spiritual nonviolence 
merged because, as Robert Moses of SNCC put it, "in the 
end everybody has to live together." Moses, who rejected 
King's brand of nonviolence (love for the oppressor), 
nonetheless recognized the necessity to preserve "Humani­
tarian values," and to avoid, in the process of liberating 
black people, the subjugation— even the mental subjugation—  
of others. Bitterness was something to be avoided because 
"the less overlay of bitterness, the more possible to 
work out a reconciliation."-*®
Whether or not nonviolence was alien to black 
culture, the civil rights movement had a strongly religious 
orientation. "As Hegro students . . .  sing their gospel 
songs in response to violence," wrote E. Prahklin Prazier, 
"they are behaving in accordance with the religious 
heritage of the Negro. Apart from the brief period of 
Beconstruction, most Southern blacks had never participated
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in the political process, and religion, since slavery 
days, as well as providing a spiritual refuge from 
secular oppression, also furnished a language in which 
to express the ever-present desire for freedom and 
equality. In the civil rights movement, religion was a 
common mode of expression for political ideas; "People 
saw the mass meetings as an extension of the Sunday 
services;" recalled John Lewis.60 King, and the ministers 
who emulated him,"translated Christianity into a hard- 
headed—  if nonviolent— fight in the streets for equal 
rights."61 They did not distinguish between religion 
and politics, and used simple religious concepts to 
propound the principle of social and political equality: 
"We are saying that we are God's children, and we don't 
have to live as we are forced to live."6^ The Christian 
doctrine of the equality of all before God had radical 
implications in a society founded and perpetuated on 
racism. Religion became a substitute for political 
ideology:
I don't care what hind of injunction the city attorney 
seeks to get, he cannot enjoin God. This is God's 
movement. . . .  There can be no injunction against 
God. Because Albany does notHETelong to Democratic 
party of the state of Georgia. . . .  Albany does 
not belong to the white people of the state of Georgia. All-benny belongs to God. 63
A political scientist might fault the logic of Ralph
Abernathy's assertions; few among his black audience
would deny their profound truth.
92
II. THE BIRMINGHAM CAMPAIGN
Fred L. Shuttlesworth and the ACHER
Ever since the NAACP had been outlawed by the 
state of Alabama in 1956, the Rev. Fred L. Shuttlesworth 
had fought an almost single-handed battle against the 
forces of white supremacy in Birmingham. His organiza­
tion, the Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights, 
inspired by the Montgomery Improvement Association, 
filed suits to integrate the city's government, schools, 
and buses, but the city responded by repealing the 
appropriate segregation laws while maintaining an unyield­
ing policy of de facto segregation.6^ Shuttlesworth 
and his supporters found themselves subjected to a 
campaign of intimidation, harassment, and physical 
violence. Shuttlesworth had his bed blown up from 
under him, and he was stabbed while attempting to 
personally integrate one of the city's schools.6^ False 
fire alarms were sounded during ACMHR meetings, end 
participants found their cars had parking-tickets 
attached to them.66 The Rev. Charles Billups, one of 
Shuttlesworth's lieutenants, was chain-whipped; another 
black man was castrated by the Eu Klux Elan.6'7 Bomb 
attacks against black churches and the homes of black 
leaders were commonplace.66
The ACMHR met this repression with an escalation 
of its struggle. A bus boycott was launched, and during 
I960 and 1961, a batteiy of suits was filed to integrate
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the city's public accommodations. 7 However, in December 
1961 the city closed its parks, playgrounds, and golf- 
courses, rather than comply with a federal court order to 
integrate them.?® Once again, the ACMHR widened its attack 
and, in March 1962, it was given a powerful boost when 
the students of Miles College initiated a boycott of 
Birmingham's white shops. The students were seeking 
integrated lunch-counters, toilets and drinking-fountains; 
the employment of black clerks and salesmen; and the 
general upgrading of black employees.( The boycott was 
effective; it reduced the level of business of some white 
stores by as much as forty per cent and, although there 
were no immediate gains, it involved the whole of the 
black community in the movement.^
Still, however, the city refused to negotiate, and 
the merchants were afraid to act without the support of 
Birmingham's political leaders. The latter, for their 
part, simply replied to the boycott tit for tat. In 
relinquishing Birmingham's share in the federal food 
surplus programme, said Mayor Arthur Hanes, the city was 
"demonstrating to the Negro community who their real 
friends and benefactors are." If the black population 
continued to support the likes of Shuttlesworth, "let these 
leaders feed them."^ After more than five years of 
campaigning, the ACMHR had barely dented the city's 
monolithic structure of segregation; Birmingham remained 
"the worst city in the world besides Johannesburg, South 
Africa.
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Planning "Project C."
It was audacious of the SCIC to stage a campaign
of mass nonviolent direct action in Birmingham. In 1961,
the Civil Eights Commission had warned that "Eacial
prejudices are incredibly tense in Birmingham. Until
local leaders make a concerted effort to control these
feelings, the slightest provocation can be expected to
unleash acts of violence." Three weeks after the writing
of this report, the Freedom Eiders were mobbed and
beaten.iy But the danger of violence was not only from
the white community. The black population, having known
nothing but white repression, would find it difficult
to accept and understand nonviolence. "Birmingham was
not a nonviolent city,” Andrew Young remembered.
Birmingham was probably the most violent city in 
America, and every black family had an arsenal.
To talk in terns of nonviolence . . . folks would 
look at you like you were crazy because they had 
been bombing black homes. They had been beating 
up black people and the blacks thought that there 
was no alternative for them but to kill or be killed. 76
In choosing Birmingham, the SGXC was taking the risk of 
uncontrollable violence; months of patient work would 
be needed to persuade the black population that violence 
was tactically unwise.
At a three-day strategy session at the Dorchester 
Institute in September 1962, the SCIG analyzed the 
failures of the Albany campaign, and mapped the tactics 
of the Birmingham s t r u g g l e . T h e y  made three important
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tactical decisions, firstly, they made contingency plans. 
The possible reactions of the federal, state, and city 
governments, as well as those of the white business 
community had to be anticipated. Secondly, the SCLC 
decided to delineate limited but attainable goals at the 
very outset of the campaign. Given the character of the 
city's white politicians, and given the effectiveness of 
the existing economic boycott, it was decided to look for 
concessions from, first and foremost, the business 
community. The indefinite withdrawal of #4- million of 
business each week would be a powerful incentive for 
white shops to desegregate their lunch-counters, toilets, 
and drinking-fountains; and for the white business 
community as a whole to hire and upgrade black employees 
on a non-discriminatoiy basis.
The third tactical decision made by the SCIC staff
concerned the legal stance of the civil rights movement.
King and his aides realized that they would probably be
confronted with police repression and legal obstruction
in Birmingham. These obstacles had destroyed the Albany
campaign. However, it was decided that nothing would be
allowed to halt the momentum of the Birmingham campaign
once it had got underway. King realized that it was not
literally possible to "fill the ¿ails;" the mass
demonstration was a weapon that had to be used sparingly,
79anfl with the utmost care.r 7 If utilized too soon, the 
ensuing mass arrests would break (as they had done in
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Albany) the morale of the movement's supporters, and 
thus torpedo the campaign before it had had time to 
"build up steam." The giant demonstration was a 
tactic to be used at exactly the right psychological 
moment, when an atmosphere of crisis and tension had 
been slowly fomented. The Birmingham campaign would 
begin with small sit-ins. Gradually, as police 
repression solidified the support of the black 
community, demonstrations would become larger and 
more frequent. The slow build-up was important: "By 
rationing our energies in this manner, we would
80help toward the . . .  drama of a growing campaign."
The skilful and carefully-timed use of a set of 
differentiated tactics would be oné of the keys to a 
success in Birmingham.
Fred Shuttlesworth liked to say that it was an
unwritten rule in Alabama that "if the mobs don't stop
you, the police can; and if thè police don't, then
the courts will." The court injunction was one of
the most effective weapons in the segregationists'
arsenal, a "pseudo-legal way of breaking the back
82of legitimate moral protest." It was little comfort
to know that the Supreme Court would probably nullify 
a local court order enjoining peaceful demonstrations: 
it might take years for such a case to reach the 
highest judicial tribunal in the land. The state of 
Alabama, moreover, was notorious for delaying action
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on civil rights c a s e s . I t s  ban on the NAACE, for
example, issued in 1956, was not overturned until 1965.
Meanwhile an injunction of a state court— even if
blatantly unconstitutional— was subject to contempt of
court.^ Nor was the problem confined to local courts:
in Albany it had been a federal judge (a segregationist
appointee of President Kennedy) who had enjoined the
movement there. King, to his bitter regret, decided to
obey the injunction, and the Albany movement subsequently 
85collapsed. ^
The problem of court injunctions presented the
SCIC, and King in particular, with a difficult dilemma.
As Andrew Young explained: "Dr. King felt that the
federal courts were our only real ally nationally. . . .
Breaking a federal court injunction in Albany was a
slap in the face of the federal courts that he couldn't
bring himself to make." Nevertheless, during the
planning for the Birmingham campaign, it was decided that
the SC1C would refuse to comply with a hostile injunction-
87even a federal one. '
Apart from these tactical considerations, the 
mobilizing of financial, legal, and political support was 
a crucial aspect of the planning for Birmingham. A
battery of civil rights lawyers began preparing for the
88court battles ahead. In New York, Harry Belafonte 
spent a hectic three weeks raising hail money, as well 
as cultivating general support for the forthcoming
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campaign.®^ King himself collected funds, extracted 
pledges of support from the major civil rights organizations, 
and toured the country explaining the nature of the 
crisis confronting the civil rights movement and the 
nation.
Meanwhile, in Birmingham itself, King, Ralph 
Abernathy, and Wyatt T. Walker met with Bred Shuttiesworth 
to plan the campaign, and endeavoured to win the support 
of the more skeptical members of the ACMHR board.^ It 
was decided to commence the campaign at the beginning 
of March 1983» six weeks before the busy Easter shopping 
season. In January, a team of SCIC field workers led 
by Wyatt Walker began making detailed plans for the 
demonstrations. Familiarizing himself with the geography 
of the downtown business section, as well as the layout 
of particular shops, Walker was able to map out 
alternative routes for demonstrations, and ascertain
92the most vulnerable targets for sit-ins and boycotts.'
"By January," Walker recalled, "we had a thick file 
and a day-by-day plan of action."^ "Project C" (as 
the Birmingham struggle was designated) was the most 
thoroughly planned campaign in the history of the civil 
rights movement.
Stage I: April 3 April 10
On April 3» 1963, "Twenty well-dressed Negroes, 
their timing apparently synchronized, staged sit-in 
demonstrations at downtown Birmingham stores. Pour were
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arrested."^" Such, was the quiet and undramatic 
beginning of the campaign, A full month was to pass, 
however, before King and the SC IS were able to stage 
mass demonstrations. This slow start was partly 
deliberate, but it also reflected the apathy and dis­
unity of the city's black population. Although the 
SCIjC had been invited to Birmingham by Shuttlesworth 
and the ACMHR, King and his aides were extremely 
sensitive to the charge that they were interfering 
"Outsiders". For this reason, they delayed the campaign 
twice during the political turmoil of the mayoralty 
election; first for the election of March 5» and then 
for the runoff on April 2 between Albert Boutwell and 
Eugene T. "Bull" Connor. Mot wishing to provide Connor 
with racist propoganda, all of the SCIC staff left the
QCcity until the runoff election had been completed.
These delays weakened the opening stage of the 
campaign. The SCIC lost contact with the cadre of 250 vol 
unteers who had been recruited by Walker in January and 
February: when the SCIC returned to the city, only 
sixty-five came forward.^ Worse still, there was 
considerable opposition within the black community to a 
direct action campaign and, as Walker explained, "We 
had no opportunity to come in and meet with local 
groups, for fear of influencing the election. We had 
to start cold."^ That there was hostility toward 
the SCIC was later admitted by King, and it was apparent
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in tlie paucity of volunteers for demonstrations: after
the first week of the campaign, only 150 had been
arrested.7 Several prominent blade leaders, including
Dr. J.L. Ware (President of the Baptist Ministers
Conference), A.G. Gaston (Birmingham's richest and
most influential black businessman), and Lucius H. Pitts
(President of Miles College) opposed the timing of the
SCIC's campaign on the grounds that the incoming
Boutwell administration should be given a fair chance
99to act.77 Other black leaders resented not having been 
informed of the SCIC's plans. The black newspaper The 
Birmingham World, made no secret of its anger at the 
"hon-responsible, the non-attached, and the non- 
program 'leader."* Direct action, claimed the 
World, was "both wasteful and worthless;" it was time 
for the responsible "hometown leadership" to reassert 
itself. 101
Paced with such opposition, King delayed going
to jail, and embarked upon "a whirlwind campaign . . .
to mobilize every key person and group behind our 
102movement." Many of the arguments later used in 
Letter Prom Birmingham City Jail (and directed at 
whites), were rehearsed in these talks for blacks: 
the absurdity of labelling the SCIC "outsiders," the 
importance of black unity, the necessity for nonviolent 
pressure and, above all, the need for a socially 
relevant ministry:
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There are some preachers in Birmingham who are not 
with this movement. I'm tired of preachers riding 
around in big cars, living in fine homes, but not 
willing to take part in the fight. . . .  If you 
can't stand up with your people, you are not fit 
to be a preacher. 103
Dividing his time between students, businessmen,
ministers, and ordinary citizens, King managed to
"transform the fears and misunderstanding .v. . into
loafaith and enthusiasm." ^  The first stage of the 
campaign was over; a massive escalation was soon to 
begin.
Stage II: The Critical Period: April 12 to May 1
On April 10, the City of Birmingham was granted 
a temporary restraining order by a state circuit court. 
It enjoined King and 137 others from taking part in 
demonstrations or other forms of public protest. Two 
days later, King and Ralph Abernathy were arrested 
while leading a march} they spent eight days in the 
Birmingham city jail.10^
King's decision to defy the injunction prevented 
the movement from collapse. It did not, however, solve 
any of its larger tactical problems. Negotiations with 
the white business community (represented by a sub­
committee of the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce) 
commenced on April 25; informal contact had been 
established soon after King's arrests through the good 
offices of the Alabama Commission on Human Relations.’*"®^  
But, after three weeks of demonstrations, "we were still
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beating our beads against the brick wall of the city 
official stubborn resolve to maintain the status quo," 
wrote King.10? Moreover, King's jailing had done nothing 
to overcome the passivity of the federal government: 
Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshal, aware that 
King was attempting to exert pressure, insisted that 
the Justice Department was powerless to intervene. w 
The government's determination to preserve its "neutrality" 
boded ill for the movement. As the Chicago Defender 
pointed out, "the federal government also remained out 
of the Albany'situation where . . .  the only tangible 
gain Negroes made was desegregation of the public 
library. The demonstrations had also thus far
failed to gain sympathetic support from the national 
press. Time, Newsweek, and the Washington Post all 
strongly criticized the timing of King's campaign: by 
going in before the Boutwell administration had had a 
chance to act, King was making "Bull" Connor seem indis­
pensable.^^ "The words ; 'bad timing' came to be ghosts 
haunting our every move in Birmingham," wrote King.^-
Prom the time of King's arrest,'to the day of his 
trial on April 26, no large demonstrations were held, 
nnri the movement turned its energies to sit-ins, kneel-
112ins, and a voter registration drive led by James Bevel.
Out of jail, King recognized that the stalemate could 
only be overcome by an escalation of pressure: now was 
the time to fill the jails. Since the start of the
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campaign, an SCIG Leadership Training Committee (which 
included James Bevel, Andrew Young, James lawson,
Diane Nash Bevel, and Dorothy Cotton) had been recruiting 
and training volunteers for demonstrating and going 
to jail.^^ But there never seemed to be enough of 
them, and there was an increasing reliance on children 
for demonstrations. At the end of April, the staff of 
the SCIC began visiting Birmingham's black colleges 
and high schools to recruit young people in greater 
numbers. Yet King was reluctant to use children on a 
large scale. It was a tactic fraught with danger, and 
was certain to attract strong outside criticism. "Martin 
was about the most indecisive man I've ever seen," 
recalled civil rights lawyer William Kunstler. His 
dilemma was only solved when James Bevel "just went 
out and organized the .kids into a demonstration.
The tactics of nonviolent direct action were now 
developed to a new, higher level. "I don't play," Bevel 
warned, "and when I say I'm going to fill up the 3ails,
I mean I'm going to fill up the j a i l s . W i t h  the 
help of the lev. Charles Billups of the ACMHR, and 
Isaac Reynolds of CORE, Bevel was able to cariy out 
that threat, thereby bringing about the kind of com-
116frontation that the SCLC had been seeking for a month.
stage III: "D-Dav" and the Rnergence of a Settlement
As April turned into May, thousands of black 
school-children received a pamphlet advising them that
"Thursday, May 2, is D-Day." The recipients of this 
cryptic message already knew what it meant and, on the 
appointed day, nearly one thousand children, many not 
yet in their teens, were arrested on a demonstration 
that "obviously had been planned down to the last detail."11'7 
During the next five days, the demonstrations grew in 
size and intensity until, by May 7, the total number of 
arrests numbered three thousand.11®
Despite Eobert Kennedy's assertion that "an injured, 
maimed, or dead child is a price that none of us can 
afford to pay," the use of the children was the turning- 
point of the campaign.11^ Unable to arrest all of the 
demonstrators, Connor began, on May 3, to disperse them 
with dogs and fire-hoses.120 This escalation of police 
repression did not work. Not only did it arouse moral 
indignation throughout the North (and the rest of the 
world outside southern Africa), it also provoked a 
black response that bordered on the edge of violence, 
thus increasing the atmosphere of tension and crisis in 
Birmingham itself. Pressure for a settlement was 
increased from both within and without; both types of 
pressure were essential if a successful accord were to 
be reached.
Dogs and fire-hoses failed to stop the demonstra­
tions. Blacks continued to march and, on May 5» when 
the Eev. Charles Billups led 2,000 on a prayer pilgrimage 
to the city jail, the police made no attempt to stop 
them. The Chicago Defender considered this march "the
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closest thing to a victory the Negro community had
won;" for Zing it was "one of the most fantastic
events of the Birmingham story," with a touch of the
121miraculous about it. The sagging morale of the police 
was further highlighted by the climatic demonstrations 
of May 6 and 7* On the first day, one thousand blacks, 
mostly children, marched— almost danced— out of the 
Sixteenth Street Baptist Church straight into police
1 ??paddy-wagons, which then took them straight to jail.
On the morning of May 7» six hundred students created 
chaos in the Birmingham Police Department by breaking 
through the police cordon and marching downtown, where 
they "turned the busy noon rush hour into a complete 
state'of confusion. Driven hack to the church,
they were joined by'at least three thousand others in 
Zelley-Ingram park, where they were surrounded by the 
police and knocked down by fire-hoses. The police, 
however, failed to intimidate the demonstrators. Only 
fifty arrests were made, and some blacks (especially 
bystanders who had merged in with the demonstration) 
retaliated by throwing bricks and bottles.1^
The events of May 7 were profoundly disturbing 
to the white businessmen. As their negotiators broke 
up for lunch, "an extraordinary sight met their eyes" 
as they stepped into the street: they saw "Negroes on 
the sidewalks, in the streets, standing, sitting in 
the aisles of downtown stores," all the while singing
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freedom songs. It was little wonder that when Sheriff 
Melvin Bailey told the white negotiators that the local 
police force was "strained to the utmost of capacity," 
their attitude toward the talks was "warmer than at 
any previous session.
The only alternative to a settlement was a massive 
increase in police repression. But Connor's use of 
dogs and fire-hoses had already Backfired. It had united 
the "black community as never before; early doubters 
such as A.G. Gaston now recognized that "the demonstra­
tions gave us a wedge we never had before to use at the
1 PSbargaining table." . Just as important, the police 
violence had mobilized liberal opinion and increased the 
pressure for federal intervention. On May 4, Bobert 
Kennedy dispatched Assistant Attorney General Burke 
Marshall to Birmingham in order to facilitate the 
negotiations, and senior members of the Kennedy administra 
tion worked to persuade the white businessmen to accept 
the movement's minimum d e m a n d s . T h e  chairman of 
United States Steel instructed the head of the Tennessee 
Iron and Coal Company (the biggest of Birmingham's "Big 
Mules") to push more energetically for a settlements^®
At last, the combination of internal and external 
pressure was beginning to pay off. The white businessmen 
were left with no way out. Increased repression would 
mean martial law, enforced by the Alabama National 
Guard, under the direct command of Governor George
126
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Wallace. Six hundred state troopers had already been 
sent to the city, at the request of the outgoing Mayor.
They were commanded by Albert J. lingo, a close 
associate of both George Wallace and "Bull" Connor.
He was also a man who believed in the traditional Southern 
way of dealing with blacks: crude, brutal repression.
Even Birmingham’s police chief found lingo's methods 
extreme; to hand over law enforcement in Birmingham 
to the state troopers would simply hasten federal 
intervention.
With this possibility in mind, the Senior 
Citizens’ Committee came to an agreement. On May 10, 
announcing the terms, King voiced his hope that "this 
metropolis will truly become a magic city again,‘this 
time filled with the beautiful magic of a new brother^- 
hood where men are free to know, respect and love each 
other.w1^2
The Significance of the Birmingham Campaign.
King's hope was not to be fulfilled. The May 10 
accord represented a major de-escalation of the movement's 
d e m a n d s . E v e n  so, the Senior Citizens' Committee 
could not bring itself to honour it. Its'version of the 
agreement provided for the desegregation of only five 
lunch-counters, and the hiring of a single black 
c l e r k . T h e  city refused to appoint a black police-
and only a handful of lunch-counters were integrated.135man.
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By autumn, wrote King, "the small "beginnings of good will
seemed to whither.” At the SCIC's annual conference,
King threatened a new campaign and, in October, the ACMHR
resumed demonstrations, regarding the May 10 accord as
having been broken. These demonstrations lasted for a
year, but it was only with the passage of the 1954 Civil
Eights Act that Birmingham's public accommodations were 
13 6desegregated. ^
King admitted that the immediate results of the 
Birmingham campaign were disappointing. Yet, he 
insisted, these results were a "towering achievement" 
considering the character of B i r m i n g h a m . T h e  real 
significance of the campaign, however, was located else­
where; in the development of the SCIC and the maturation 
of nonviolent direct action; in its inspirational effect 
upon the rest of the civil rights movement; and in its 
influence in changing the civil rights policy of the 
federal government.
The techniques pioneered in Albany were perfected 
in Birmingham; there, the SCIC learned "how to mobilize 
the people in masses."^® Meticulous planning, flexible 
tactics, and a determination to literally "fill the 
jails" raised nonviolent direct action "to a measurable 
maturity we had not seen b e f o r e . 3 h  the opinion of 
one observer, the Birmingham campaign was "the best- 
organized and most highly-disciplined action ever 
mounted by Negroes."1^  For the first time, the SCIC
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staff functioned effectively as a team, each member 
•with his or her own function. James Bevel, Bernard 
Lee, and Dorothy Cotten organized students and child­
ren; Andrew Young acted as the SCLC's chief negotiator; 
and Wyatt Walker served as a behind-the-scenes planner 
and director. As Andrew Young pointed out, Birmingham 
was no miracle, "it was a lot of hard work."^^
"When the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
went into Birmingham," wrote King, "it was determined to
142change that city." ' The campaign'was planned and 
conducted with a degree of militancy that was new to 
the SCLC. Confrontation (as expressed in the campaign1 s 
code name, "Project C") was the modus operand!; the 
expressed purpose was'to create a "crisis-packed" 
situation and, to reach that circumstance, King was 
willing to take Birmingham "to the edge of total social 
d i s o r d e r . T h e  overall strategy of the campaign 
was equally audacious. King's refusal to postpone 
the demonstrations for a fourth time was based on more 
than the reason he gave to Robert Kennedy ("Negroes 
had been waiting for 200 years and didn't want to wait 
any longer"). The timing of the campaign, much 
criticized^ was deliberate. After the April 2 mayoralty 
runoff election, Birmingham was between two admini­
strations. By commencing the demonstrations while 
"Bull" Connor was still Commissioner of Public Safety,
the SCLC, far from making Connor appear indispensable, 
drew out police violence which, as well as providing
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the movement with valuable propaganda, further exacerbated
the division within the white leadership. The following
conversation between Birmingham Police Chief Jamie Moore
and Albert J. Xingo of the Alabama National Guard
(recorded by Michael Dorman on the night of May 12),
graphically illustrated this division:
Moore urged lingo . . .  to withdraw, "If you'd 
leave, Mr. Lingo, I'd appreciate it," he said.Lingo snapped: "I'm not going to leave. I've 
been sent here by the Governor, and I'm going 
to stay." Moore appealed: "Those guns are not 
needed. Will you please put them up? Some­
body' s going to get killed." "You're damned 
right it'll get somebody killed," Lingo boomed.145
As Vincent Harding, one of the SCLC's negotiators,
pointed out, "A better time for the demonstrations could
not have been'chosen.” With the city's politicians
bitterly divided, "there was no government to hide
behind, and the economic and civic leaders were simply
forced to move forward."
Even those who were skeptical about the immediate, 
local achievements of the campaign, recognized 
Birmingham's enormous impact upon the civil rights move­
ment as a whole. "With hew hope born of Birmingham,
Negroes exploded into the streets of America," wrote
147Lerone Bennett. Segregation had been cracked, however 
slightly, in a rnao’or Deep South city. The effect was 
profound: flagging campaigns were revived, and new ones 
were sparked off. By the end of 1963» the South had 
experienced 930 demonstrations in 115 cities, with over 
20,000 arrests; and some measure of desegregation was
Ill
achieved in 186 exties. "Perhaps all this . . .
might have come about even if there had not been a
Birmingham crisis,” wrote Michael Dorman. ”But, as
things worked out, the Birmingham crisis seemed to have
been the catalyst that sent the tide of integration
activities sweeping across the land."'*'^
The impact of Birmingham could also be seen in
other ways. A movement's single demand was replaced by
several; a piecemeal approach to desegregation gave
way to a frontal assault against its every manifestation.
As one official of COKE admitted, "Birmingham brought a
drastic revision in our thinking. You can nibble away
at the surface for a thousand years and not get
anywhere."^® Across-the-board integration became the
new goal and, as in Birmingham, economic demands, such
as the hiring and upgrading of black employees, became
151a prominent feature of the ”package deal” ^
One hundred years after Bnancipation, "Negroes 
are still seeking an effective alliance with the Federal 
government to make their freedom a reality," wrote King 
in 1962.^^ The federal government had refused to 
intervene in the Albany crisis and, at a meeting in 
January 1963, the Kennedys told King that they had no 
plans for proposing major civil rights legislation in 
the immediate future. "Martin was very disappointed," 
Coretta remembered, and"he frankly told the President 
that he was expecting federal support in the forth­
coming campaign.1^
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The role of the federal government in procuring 
a settlement in Birmingham was crucial and, just as 
important, the government assumed the role of the agree­
ment's guarantor. After the bombings of May 12, when 
it appeared that Wallace would use the ensuing blaclc riot 
as an excuse to impose martial law and destroy the pact, 
Kennedy affirmed that "the Birmingham agreement was and 
is a just accord," and*that, if necessary, the federal 
government would assume direct responsibility for policing 
the city by federalizing the Alabama National Guard.
A month later, Kennedy appeared on television to announce 
his intention, to introduce a civil rights bills
The events of Birmingham and elsewhere have so increased 
the desires for equality that no city or state or 
legislative body can prudently, choose to ignore 
them. . . .  We face, therefore, a moral crisis as 
a country and a people. It cannot be met by repress­
ive police action. . . .  It is a time to act in 
the Congress, in your state and local legislative 
body and, above all, in all of our daily lives.155
Tn Birmingham, the SCIC had transformed nonviolent direct
action, from a naive and unrealistic appeal to the
conscience of the oppressor, into an effective instrument
of power.
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CHAPTER IV
THE ASSAUIT ON WHITE SUPREMACY: THE SCIC PROM
SAVANNAH TO SEIMA
I. THE MINOR CAMPAIGNS
The Supportive Role of the SCIC
The surge of direct action that occurred after
Birmingham was unforeseen and unplanned. Nevertheless,
as Wyatt Walker put it, "Finally we opened our eyes and
the white man all over the South is catching hell."1
During the summer of 1963» King an!the SCIC led, fomented,
or merely encouraged half a dozen local movements that
had sprung up in the wake of Birmingham. Always, the
message was the same: march, demonstrate, stay in the
2streets, "go down there and fill the jail." Even though 
"we hear . . . from the lips of some of thè highest 
officials in the land that we ought to stop," King would 
say, constant pressure was the only way to convince 
whites that segregation had had its day.^
Many of the 1963 campaigns achieved little in 
terms of immediate results. In Danville, Virginia, and 
Gadsden, Alabama, where demonstrations were answered with 
unalloyed repression, King admitted that "these engage­
ments were . . .  defeats for the movement." Even the 
more successful movements, such as Savannah, represented 
only partial victories.^ Even so, King insisted that the 
crushing defeats and token victories had a total impact
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that defied precise quantification! "Seen in perspective, 
the summer of 1963 was historic because it witnessed the 
first offensive in history launched by Negroes along a 
broad front."'*
The overall achievement of the direct action campaigns 
could not be measured merely in terms of the number of 
public accommodations that were integrated. Clearly, 
nonviolent demonstrations lacked sufficient coercive 
power to bring about significant change by themselves.
Their real importance was that they hastened federal inter­
vention and national civil rights legislation by "the 
successful dramatization, before a national audience,
6of the injustice and inhumanity of the Jim Crow system."
The Savannah Campaign
The Savannah campaign, conducted by the Chatham 
County Crusade for Voters, led by Hosea Williams, was 
the most successful application of Birmingham-style 
tactics. The failure of early negotiations pinpointed 
the problem with a piecemeal approach toward integrations 
"certain restaurants refused to desegregate because of 
their competition," said Williams. "The hotels refused 
because of the restaurants. The motels refused because 
of the hotels. The theaters refused to go it alone."7 
As a result, the CCCV demanded complete, across-the- 
board desegregation; and the strategy of its campaign 
was unrelenting direct action because, as Andrew Young 
put it, "the white folks don't pay any attention to us
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gunless we're on the streets.”
Savannah already possessed one of the South's most 
successful civil rights movements. The city was the first 
in Georgia to integrate its lunch-counters. By the time 
of the Birmingham campaign, the tbuses, toilets, public 
libraries, and water-fountains had been desegregated; 
blacks had been appointed to all of the city's boards; 
the number of black policemen was increased from seven­
teen to thirty; and the city had agreed to hire black
qfiremen and bus drivers.' Meanwhile, the CCCV had con­
ducted one of the most productive voter registration drives 
in the Deep South.
These gains were impressive, but they did not 
destroy the deep-seated white resistance to complete de­
segregation. Many whites still harboured the illusion 
that Savannah's black population was basically content: as 
Judge Victor Mailings told Hosea Williams, "If you study 
the history of Georgia, you'll find that • . • Savannah 
has had very little racial strife. • • .Both races, by 
a-n^ large, have got along through the years.1,11 The 
Savannah campaign, launched in June 1963, after three 
white cinemas had reneged on a desegregation agreement, 
was intended to destroy this illusion once and for all, 
ar\f\ to demonstrate that the races could only "get along" 
in the future if the white business and political 
community made a conscious, collective decision to sweep 
away eveiy form of segregation.
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The influence of the Birmingham campaign was clearly
reflected in the use of the mass demonstration, aufl in
the belief that chronic social disorder was the only way
to induce the white authorities to come to terms. The
Savannah demonstrations matched those of Birmingham in
scale. Within four days of the campaign's commencement,
12more than two hundred blacks had been arrested. By 
June 11, demonstrations were being held in both the 
afternoon and the evening, attracting approximately 1,000 
and 3,000 people. During the next month, such demon­
strations were staged each day, with the afternoon crowds
assembled by Ben Van Clarke and addressed by Hbsea
14Williams during his lunch hour.
After two weeks of marches, the city resorted to
more violent methods. On June 19, reinforced by fifty
Georgia state troopers, the police used tear-gas and mass
16arrests to disperse a midnight demonstration. ^ Such 
tactics, however, only served to unify the black leader­
ship, solidify popular support for the movement, and 
provoke the demonstrators into increasingly violent 
reactions. As the Savannah Morning News noted, in a 
classic understatement, "the mood of the demonstrators 
was getting more serious^" Having failed to forcibly 
suppress the marches, the*city then made a tactical 
blunder of the first magnitude by arresting Ho sea Williams
under an obscure "good behaviour" warrant— a law that had
17last been used in*slavery days. r Blacks were incensed
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by this move, and their anger was exacerbated when 
they learnt that Williams's bond was set at #30,000, and 
then upped to #70,000.^
The events that followed William^!, arrest, Newsweek
observed, showed "what happens when an angry rank-and-
file loses the restraints of Negro leadership."1^ The
detention of Williams not only invigorated the nightly
marches, but also strained the nonviolent discipline of
the marchers. On July 10, they submitted to tear-gas
and fire-hoses; the following day they responded to the
same treatment by stoning cars, breaking windows, and 
20lighting fires. As in Birmingham, and in the same way, 
a "crisis-packed" situation had been reached.
After the minor riot of July 11, James Bevel, 
announcing a temporary cessation of the demonstrations, 
admonished his listeners that "When a Negro throws a
21bottle in Savannah, he endangers the whole movement."
Tet, as David Lewis observed of Birmingham's May 7 riot, 
such violence, while "deplorable from the optic of non­
violent passive resistance . . .  was probably indispensable" 
for pressuring white leaders to give way to the movement's 
demands. Massive demonstrations, the favourite weapon 
of the SCIG, had an inherent risk of violence. The night 
march, the heavy reliance upon untrained juveniles, and 
the willingness to bring about a confrontation with the 
forces of "law and order" increased the likelihood of a 
violent white reaction, and a similar black counter- 
reaction.
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It was a hallmark of the SCLC that it was prepared
to take this risk, knowing that negotiations without
demonstrations ("pressureless persuasion") were time-
wasting and ineffective. "We made two mistakes," said
Williams after the collapse of some early talks. "We
made a mistake each time we stopped the demonstrations."^
The NAACP, on the other hand, opposed the use of night
marches, and deplored William's "babble-rousing" style of
oratoiy: although they attracted thousands who would
not otherwise have participated in the movement, the
larger the demonstration, the more difficult to maintain
24nonviolent discipline. Nevertheless, although the
CCCV's tactics engendered heated opposition from the
more conservative black leaders, the violence of the
police, and the incarceration of Williams rallied the
black community around the goals of the campaign. Williams's
rival in the NAACP, W.W. Law, protested the presence of
the state troopers; and the conservative black ministry,
the Negro Interdenominational Ministers' Alliance,
called for "total integration^L-even as it was trying to
prevent King from speaking by'denying him the use of a
church.^ In the tense atmosphere following the violence
of mid-July, a comprehensive desegregation agreement
emerged, with a group of white clergymen playing a major
26role in the negotiations.
In Birmingham, the SCLC had eclipsed the local 
organization, the ACMHR, but in Savannah it fulfilled a 
secondary, supportive function. The Conference imported
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demonstrators from Birmingham; sent Dorothy Cotten to 
teach nonviolence; and provided bail money and funds 
for voter registration.When Ho sea Williams was jailed, 
Andrew Young, James Bevel, and John Gibson filled the 
resulting leadership vacuum, as well as taking a leading 
role in the talks that led to the desegregation agree-
OQment. Although King had little to do with the Savannah 
campaign, the SCIG, as an organization, proved capable of 
making a valuable contribution.
The Danville Campaign
In 1962, impatient with the caution of the NAACP,
a group of black leaders foimed the Danville Christian
Progressive Association, and affiliated it with the
SCIG. In October, the DCPA filed an omnibus integration
suit with the U.S. District Court and, after Birmingham,
29inaugurated a direct action campaign to back it up.
The white authorities answered with a multi-faceted 
counter-campaign which included the violent dispersal 
of demonstrations; ordinances and court injunctions 
forbidding direct action; indictment of the movement's 
leaders; and an adamant refusal to negotiate.
After a week of peaceful marches, further demon­
strations were enjoined, and the leaders of the DCPA 
were charged by a local (all-white) grand jury with 
«contributing to the delinquency of minors."^ The 
police now had tacit permission to employ more forceful 
methods and, on June 10, reinforced by the Virginia State
120.
Police, they broke up a prayer vigil with "hoses, tear- 
gas, and sawed-off baseball bats." All but*three of the 
demonstrators needed medical treatment. On an earlier 
march, thirty-eight had been arrested, the remainder 
dispersed with fire-hoses.^ That such police violence 
was not merely a temporary aberration but a deliberate 
policy; was made clear three days later, when similar 
treatment was meted out to a group that staged a sit-in 
at city hall.^
During the next month and a half, the city endeavour­
ed to break the movement with blunderbuss legal repression. 
Two new city ordinances were passed, one banning marches, 
the other limiting picketing to six people; and on 
August 2, a federal judge made the city's injunction 
permanent.^ On June 21, the movement's entire leadership, 
which included workers from SNCC, COPE, and the SC 10, 
was indicted, under Virginia's 1859 "John Brown" statute, 
for inciting blacks "to acts of violence and war against 
the white population;"^ Three of those indicted were
dragged from a Baptist church, where they had sought
35refuge. ^
On June 17» the trial of those charged with violating 
the injunction against demonstrations began. The presiding 
judge not only "fcimmed the courtroom with forty armed 
troopers and police," but also wore (as did nearly every
•2fl
city official), "conspicuous side arms."-' The trial—  
even by Southern*standards— was a travesty of justice.
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"The lawyers had no information which case would he 
brought to trial when," wrote Sally Belfrage, "and were 
racing against the inevitable time of their own arrest 
as well."^ (Civil rights lawyer len Holt was indicted 
three days later.)^8 Confronted by this legal offensive 
(which, apart from the legal expenses, cost #200,000 
in bail money), the Danville movement crumbled. "The 
police terror'was so complete," wrote len Holt, "that 
people could no longer be brought to demonstrated
When SC1C affiliates embarked on direct action 
campaigns, they often provoked opposition from more 
moderate and conservative black leaders. In Danville, 
this split was especially acute, and it was deftly exploited 
by the white authorities. Disunity stemmed not only 
from the NAACP's disapproval of demonstrations, but also 
from a division within the DCPA itself over the merits of 
direct action, with its president, the Eev. l.W.Chase, 
siding with the HAACP.^ The city lost no opportunity 
to take advantage of Chase's disagreements with the other 
officers of the DCPA. Chase was excepted from the June 
6 injunction and, when he led a demonstration five days 
later, the police did not interfere.^ These tactics 
failed to induce a permanent split within the ranks of 
the DCPA (the police violence of June 10 "solidified 
the fragmented Negro leadership"), but thè NAACP con­
tinued to oppose the demonstrations, and deplored what
it considered to be unwarranted interference by outside
42civil rights organizations. When whites were united
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in their determination to preserve the status quo, this 
kind of "black disunity was crippling.
The SC1C1s role in the Danville campaign was 
ambiguous and -unsatisfactory. On the one hand, there 
was "unlimited confidence in King. . . .  he was the 
unseen ghost in every conference; he was the giver of 
all solutions;" on the other hand, King never became 
intimately involved in the Danville struggle.^ In May, 
he spoke to a meeting of 2,500, and urged them to take
)\t\to the streets. However, although he promised to 
return on July 3, Pred Shuttlesworth was sent in his steadt^ 
King's reluctance to assume the overall leadership of the 
campaign was due, in part, to his ambiguous attitude 
toward court injunctions. While he was perfectly willing 
to break state or local restraining orders, he was loathe 
to violate a federal court order. Thus when he returned 
to Danville on July 11, and encouraged the demonstra­
tions by saying "I have so many injunctions that I don't 
even look at them anymore," he did not take part in the
A Cnext day's march. Similarly, a month later, while
proclaiming that "I was enjoined when I was born a Hegro,"
47he regretted that'he was unable to. stay in Danville. ' 
Although the SCIC played its part in the campaign, sending 
Milton Reid, Herbert Coulton, and Wyatt Walker, the 
principal source of outside help was SNCC, which had up 
to fifteen field workers in Danville, prominent among 
whom were Bob Zellner, Daniel Boss, and Avon Rollins.7*"8
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As with so many of its campaigns, SNCC, unlike 
the SCLC, was unable to focus national attention upon 
the situation in Danville and, without King's presence, 
its effort to revive demonstrations in July quickly failed.^ 
In June, King had promised to send a "nonviolent task 
force" "to the city; the promise was repeated in October 
and November. King returned twice to Danville in November, 
vowing that "We mean business."^® The-threatened on­
slaught of direct action, however, failed to materialize. 
With a staff of only sixty, and with half a dozen other 
local situations to contend with, it was inevitable that 
the SCLC spread itself too thinly. Nevertheless, as 
William Eobert Miller pointed out, although
Danville's expectations . . .  testified to an undue 
dependence on the charismatic figure of King . . .  
neither King nor his Atlanta staff did anything 
to counter these expectations. . . . When local 
movements built themselves around King, they let 
themselves in for a powerful vacuum in his absence.51
The campaign was by no means an unmitigated 
failure. In November, most of the City Council met the 
leaders of the DCPA and the NAACP, and agreed to write a 
city fair hiring policy.^2 By early 1964, Danville had 
hired one black policeman and two social workers, and 
passed a fair employment law (the first in the South).
In addition, the two segregated textile unions were 
merged; a dozen lunch-counters were opened to blacks; and 
the black electorate was doubled, after a voter registra­
tion campaign conducted with the help of the SCLC's
124-
Herb ert Coulton.^ Integration in Danville was purely 
token tut, in a city that had removed all the chairs from 
its public library in order to maintain "separation" 
of tbe races, it was no small victory.
The St. Aupnstine Campaign and the problem of 
White Vigilantism
St. Augustine was the SCLC's "last great demonstra­
tion campaign against legally supported segregation of 
public accommodations ."^ It had all the usual elements.
The demand was the now*standard "package": fair employment 
in city government; the integration of public accommo­
dations; the dropping of charges against arrested demonstra­
tors; and the establishment of a bi-racial commission.^
The white response to these demands was also routine: 
refusal to negotiate; complaints about "outside agitators"; 
pnd mass arrests coupled with court injunctions against 
demonstrations. St. Augustine’s first taste of direct 
action was a sit-in campaign in the summer of 1963.
Eighty arrests were made; sit-inners were ejected by 
police with dogs and electric cattle-prods; and four 
juveniles were sent to reform school for six months.^
Such treatment was not unusual in the Deep South. 
What set St. Augustine apart was not the severity with 
which the civil rights movement was crushed, but the 
prominent role of white vigilantes in maintaining white 
supremacy. On July 1, 1963, the home of Dr. Robert 
Hay ling, branch president of the NAACP, was blasted by
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shotgun fire, and the next month it was b o m b e d . I n  
September, Hayling and three companions were beaten 
during a Ku Klux Klan rally, which they had unwisely 
attempted t0 observe. Early in 1964, Hay ling's home was 
again shot at. By this time, white attacks had become 
common, and Hayling and his companions made no secret 
of their readiness to retaliate.^®
When his life was first threatened, Hayling sought 
protection from the F.B.I. : "I was new to the civil rights 
movement, and you can imaginé my shock when they referred 
me to the local police!"^ He might well have indulged 
in an ironic laugh. Thè local sheriff, 1.0. Davis, was 
famous for confining arrested demonstrators in an open 
stockade that was dubbed "the sweat-box." Several of 
his deputies were members‘of the Ancient "City Gun Club, 
a Klan-type organization that ran armed motor patrols.
The Ancient City Gun Club was headed by Hblstead "Boss" 
Manucey, who was not coy about describing the club's 
purpose: boys are here to fight niggers." Manucay
was also a "deputy sheriff.^
Brazen vigilantism, openly aided and abetted by 
the police, and silently tolerated by the white politicians 
presented an especially difficult challenge to the SCIC.
In Birmingham, white businessmen had been the SCIC ' s 
main target and, tinder duress, they had nudged the city 
toward desegregation. In St. Augustine, on the other 
hand, the owners of hotels, motels, and restaurants (the
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potential "moderates") were "literally, physically afraid." 
They would not defy "Manucey's raiders" unless the two 
most influential businessmen, banker H.E. Wolfe and 
Dr. Haygood Norris, set an example. But they did 
little or nothing to restrain the vigilantes. Wolfe 
turned down a request from President Johnson (delivered 
by Senator George Sraathers) to serve as a "federal 
mediator." The most that he and the other businessmen 
would do was promise compliance with the Civil Rights 
Bill, when it was finally passed.6^ With Manucey’s men 
on the loose, such a promise was worthless.
The St. Augustine campaign was intended to 
provide continuing pressure for the passage of the Bill, 
as well as a test of its enforcement. Demonstrations, 
argued King, would "unearth the corrupt police state, 
methods" that threatened the reality of reform.^" The 
strategy of the SCIC was to induce the federal govern­
ment to apply economic sanctions against the city and, 
if this failed, to employ federal marshals, as President 
Kennedy had done in Oxford, Mississippi. St. Augustine 
was to receive a federal grant of #350,000 for its 
quadricentennial celebrations; the SCIC intended to 
make that grant a political embarrassment for the 
Johnson administration. Such a grant, wrote King, 
showed how "hatred, violence and ignorance . . .  
reached subtly into the White House." A national 
campaign was launched to block the grant.^ Pour days
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of demonstrations, resulting in 288 arrests, took place
during Easter, when thousands of tourists swelled St.
66Augustine. Among those arrested was Mrs. Malcolm 
Peabody, mother of the Governor of Massachussetts.
In spite of the publicity caused by Mrs. Peabody's 
incarceration, the ripples brought about by the Easter 
demonstrations soon faded away and, as the New York 
Times observed, St. Augustine "regained its placid, se­
gregated way of life." When nightly marches to the
Old Slave Market were staged at the end of May, and 
throughout June, they were attacked by white mobs. On 
the night of June 9, 300 marchers were assaulted while 
"the police were present as bystanders." 68 Two weeks 
later, a march led by Pred Shuttlesworth was attacked 
by a white mob double its size, with forty-five 
casualties. 7 Groups who later attempted "wade-ins" 
at "white" beaches were subjected to similar treatment. 
The* level’of violence was such that a number of SCIC 
officials were beaten or shot at: Andrew Young and 
Dorothy Cotten were clubbed while leading demonstrations; 
Hariy Boyte was knocked unconscious, and fired upon 
while sitting in a car; and the SCIC headquarters was 
sprayed with bullets.^
In this atmosphere, sheer physical protection 
became the movement's main objective. St. Augustine 
was in a state of racist anarchy, with the police 
ignoring a federal court order to protect civil rights 
marches. Unless such violence was curbed, wrote King,
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"and the Ku Klux Klan driven out of positions of
power,” the Civil Eights Bill would change virtually
nothing. Ultimately, "Executive action determines
what force and effect legislation will have."*^ The
brutal suppression of many civil rights campaigns
during the summer of 1963 highlighted the imperative
need for federal intervention in the South. Wrote King:
so Shameless are the mores of the feudal South that 
eveh in the presence of millions of witnesses police still employ such barbaric weapons as the cattle 
prod and the high-pressure hose. • • . as Negroes 
have marshaled extraordinary courage to employ 
nonviolent direct action, they have been left— by 
the most powerful government in the world— almost 
solely to their own resources to face a massively equipped army.
The proper and essential task of the federal govern­
ment, King argued, was to protect nonviolent demonstra­
tors, using federal marshals if necessary.*^
The St. Augustine campaign came to an inconclusive
end when Governor Parris Bryant appointed a bi-racial 
74-commission. President Johnson's refusal to send 
the federal marshals that King requested meant that 
the campaign's central purpose went unrealized.*^ The 
enlightened actions of Pederal Judge Bryan Simpson, ■ 
however, did something to partially offset the vicious 
power of white racism in St. Augustine. On June 9» 
Simpson ordered the city to permit marches at any 
time. He also reduced the bail of arrested demonstra­
tors, and forbade Sheriff L.O. Davis to keep pdsoners 
in the "sweat-box?' Simpson enjoined the police from 
interfering with demonstrations, and cited the Governor
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of Florida for contempt of court, after he slapped 
a ban on night marches. ^  Later, Simpson held public 
hearings that exposed the collusion between the St. 
John's County Sheriff's Department, and white racist 
groups such as the Ancient City Gun Club, ordering 
a deputy sheriff to turn in his badge, and commanding 
"Hoss” Manucey to divulge the Club's membership. But 
for Simpson, the Civil Eights Act would have been a 
dead letter in St. Augustine. Senator Strom Thurmond's 
charge of "¿judicial dictatorship" was a tribute to 
the effectiveness of Simpson's interventions.^®
A basic weakness of the St. Augustine campaign, 
was the SCIC's inability to arouse strong, active 
local support, and its consequent reliance upon out­
side volunteers. The Easter demonstrations were spear­
headed by white college students and ministers from 
Massachussetts.When Hosea Williams arrived to take 
charge of the campaign, he was dismayed by the difficulty 
in recruiting volunteers for marches, and it was a 
month before effective demonstrations could be staged.
In private, the SCLC staff confessed that their 
campaign was hampered by lack of support, and demonstra­
tors had to be imported from other cities.®® King, who 
always found it difficult to refuse an appeal for aid, 
allowed himself to become involved in a campaign which 
he had little part in planning, and where the SCLC were 
ignorant of the local conditions. "We're ¿just'over-
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programmed," admitted Andrew Young, "and everybody's 
tired."82
II. WINNING THE EIGHT TO VOTE
The State of the Civil Eights Movement in Alabama
Although Alabama was the scene of some of the 
most celebrated struggles of the civil rights movement, 
it still remained, with Mississippi, a defiant bastion 
of white supremacy. Its governor, George C. Wallace, 
had been elected in 1962 on the platform of "segrega­
tion today, segregation tomorrow, and segregation for­
ever" and, even after Birmingham and the integration 
of the University of Alabama, was waging a single-minded 
defense of the state's racial status quo.
Although the Birmingham campaign had produced a 
desegregation agreement, and a modicum of federal inter­
vention, elsewhere in the state demonstrations were 
crushed with ruthless efficiency. The Gadsden campaign 
was typical. The Gadsden Freedom Movement was formed 
in May 1962, with the help of workers from SNCC, COEE, 
and the SCLC. The following month, after the five days 
of demonstrations, the city obtained an injunction, 
and the police began making large-scale arrests. On 
June 18, 450 marchers were arrested; the following day 
they were all jailed, and 300 who gathered in protest
outside the court house were driven away by Alabama
84.state troopers who wielded clubs and cattle-prods.0^
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Although King and James Parmer (national director of 
CORE) visited Gadsden to urge a continuation of the 
marches, the city's policy of mass arrests blunted the 
effectiveness of this strategy.®^ The denouement 
came on August 3, -when 685 were arrested on a march
led by Bernard Lee, Marvin Robinson, and Joseph
86Faulkner. Apart from desegregation of the city buses, 
the Gadsden movement failed completely. ^
The use of the cattle-prod in Gadsden highlighted 
the role of the Alabama state troopers in crushing civil 
rights demonstrations. A contingent of fifty troopers 
under the command of Colonel Albert J. Lingo roamed the 
state as an anti-demonstration force. Often they were 
accompanied by a mobile posse headed by Sheriff James G. 
Clark. Wherever blacks took to the streets— in
Birmingham, Gadsden, Tuscaloosa, and Selma— Clark and
88lingo rushed to the scene. It was in Selma, Balias 
County, where Clark and his men were based, that 
Alabama's style of repression was most severe and 
c;oraple'ke«
Bernard and Colia Lafayette of SHCC first went to 
Selma in the autumn of 1962. The following February, they 
began a voter registration drive, which SRCC decided to 
expand into a major project.®^ The influx of SNCC 
workers, and the inauguration of sit-ins, marches, and 
picketing drew a vicious response from Jim Clark. Re­
inforced by Lingo's state troopers, he replied with mass
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arrests, and the harassment, incarceration, and assault 
of SNCC workers. On June 12, Bernard Lafayette, the 
outgoing SNCC project director, was beaten up. 3h July, 
three other SNCC workers were beaten in jail, and Worth 
Long, the incoming project director, received the same 
treatment in September. SNCC-owned cars were periodically 
towed away, and state troopers made a habit of surround­
ing the church where mass meetings took p l a c e . T h e  
combined forces of Clark and Lingo overwhelmed SNCC, which 
vainly appealed to the Justice Department for protection. 
Clark's dictatorial methods were exemplified by his 
seizure of SNCC's records, after a federal judge had 
ref used, to subpoena them.^ SNCC's attempt to revive the 
campaign in July 1964 was quickly snuffed out when 
Federal Circuit Judge James A. Hare issued an order that 
virtually legalized the police state that Clark had 
established. Hare prohibited public meetings of more 
than three people; proscribed fourteen organizations and
forty-one individuals; and authorized "any sheriff in
qpAlabama" to enforce the injunction.?
The SCIC's Abortive 1964 Alabama Campaign
Thanks to SNCC, wrote James Forman, the civil 
rights movement "had established a firm beach-head in the 
heart of Alabama's Black Belt."93 Selma remained, however, 
an isolated and embattled outpost, as SNCC concentrated 
its resources in Mississippi, for the massive 1964 Summer 
Project. Alabama badly needed a structure like the Council
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of Federated Organizations (COFO) which, in Mississippi,
co-ordinated a statewide campaign, pooled legal aid «nd
organizing expertise, and linked all the areas of move- 
04ment activity.-^
In July 1963, Ealph Abernathy had promised the 
SNCC workers in Selma that "We are behind you, with you, 
and even in front of you every step of the way." In 1964, 
the SCIC intended to fulfill that promise by mounting a 
statewide voter registration drive, in conjunction with 
SNCC, to parallel the Mississippi Summer Project.^ The 
SCIC's plan, an all-out attack on segregation in Alabama, 
was approved by 215 of the state's black leaders on 
March 14, 1964. The heart of the plan was to be a 
"statewide co-ordination of the masses" to achieve the 
right to vote. local registration drives would be accom­
panied by demonstrations, and an appeal to Congress to 
reduce Alabama's representation (under the Fourteenth 
Amendment) until blacks could freely register and vote.^ 
The campaign was put under the direction of the lev. 
Nelson Smith, head of the Alabama state conference of 
the SCIC.^ James Bevel was in charge of direct action
(always the centre-piece of an SCIC campaign) and, by May, 
he was busy organizing a "freedom aimy" in twelve cities. 
On national television, King promised that "we definitely 
plan to have massive demonstrations in . . *. Alabama 
this year. . . .  In fact, we are now recruiting students 
by the hundreds and thousands to join what we refer to
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as our nonviolent army."9s
The much-heralded campaign, however, was still­
born. The Tuscaloosa campaign, instead of becoming the 
spearhead of direct action movements throughout the state, 
met the same fate as the Gadsden campaign of the previous 
year. In April, The Tuscaloosa Citizens for Action 
Committee (an SCIC affiliate) voted to hold demonstra­
tions in protest against the opening of a new, segragated
QQcourt house.^ A group of SCIC workers, led by James 
Bevel, arrived in the city to aid the campaign. The 
demonstrations, however, faltered under the familiar 
combination of police violence, mass arrests, and an 
absence of federal intervention. On June 9, 700 marchers 
were tear-gassed and driven back to the church whence 
they came. Two days later, Bevel and two other SCIC 
workers were arrested as they emerged from a church to 
lead a demonstration, along with 300 others.100 Direct 
action came to a halt when a federal District Judge 
refused to issue an injunction against police interfer­
ence with demonstrations.101
Other factors conspired to defeat the Alabama 
project. The SCIC had hoped that Montgomery would 
provide a focus for the campaign, but the conservatism of 
the city's black leaders proved a formidable obstacle. 
Ralph Hines and James E. Pierce noted in 1965 that King's 
departure from Montgomery had "left a vacuum in the 
leadership pyramid which . . .'has never been filled."102
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The mass participation that characterized the bus boycott
had disappeared, and leadership passed by default to a
group that spumed direct action. In December 1963, King
complained to the MIA that Montgomery was living in the
past; there was "a powerful struggle one hundred miles
from here— maybe it is time we had the struggle here,
where Governor Wallace will understand.
failed to respond to his entreaties, and its president,
the Rev. S.S. Seay, was conspicuous in his lack of
104-enthusiasm for the SCIS campaign.
King's decision to commit the SCIG to a campaign in 
St. Augustine, Florida, further weakened the Alabama 
project and, after riots erupted in the North, James 
Bevel and his staff were sent to Rochester, New York.
The riots, coming only a few months before the presidential 
election, led the SCIC to postpone its plans for Alabama, 
suspend further direct action, and concentrate on 
registering voters for Iyndon Johnson.1®'*
The Decline of Direct Action and the Problem of 
------- Voter Registration
After the tumultuous summer of 1963» there was a 
decline in direct action in the South. Police brutality, 
imprisonment, and economic reprisals had eroded will­
ingness to go to Jail. There was also a growing feeling 
in the civil rights movement that demonstrations which 
resulted in mass arrests served dittle purpose. In 
Jackson, Danville, Plaquemines and elsewhere local
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movements had turned to boycotts and voter registration 
drives after the failure of demonstrations. Charles 
Evers, head of the NAACP in Mississippi, summed up the 
new mood: "stay out of jail, heep your money in your 
pockets,' and regiater every voter you can get your hands 
on.»106
Evers' view was shared by an increasing number of 
black leaders, of many different political persuasions.
The NAACP had traditionally preferred legal action, 
lobbying, and voter registration to direct action. Bayard 
Rustin, leading theoretician of the civil rights move­
ment, and adviser to Dr. King, argued that direct action 
should now give way to political action. Unemployment, 
slum housing, and unemployment, he argued, were not 
susceptible to direct action: they could only be solved 
by government action, brought about through political 
alliances with white groups such as the labour movement.10? 
Similarly, COEE, increasingly concerned with the problems 
of the Northern ghettos, began to shift away from direct 
action toward community organization. SNCC had already 
moved in this direction. The integration of public 
accommodations had become a secondary goal. Many agreed 
with Dick Gregory that "some of these Dixie towns ain't 
worth integrating."10^ 'By 1964, voter registration was 
SNCC's chief activity.
Tn the Deep South, however, voter registration 
drives failed to achieve significant increases in the
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"black electorate. In Selma, for example, between May 
1962 and August 1964, only 93 of the 795 blacks who 
applied to register were enrolled.110 In Mississippi 
the results were even more disappointing. After two 
years of SNCC activity, Robert Moses admitted that the 
only tangible gain was that some whites were beginning 
to use courtesy titles when addressing blacks. Vithout 
the ballot, community organization was an impotent 
strategy.
Civil rights legislation had so far failed to 
guarantee the right to vote. The I960 Act had empowered 
the federal courts to appoint federal voting registrars. 
By 1963, however, the Civil Rights Commission had con­
cluded that "case-by-case proceedings . . .  have not
provided a prompt or adequate remedy for widespread
112discriminatory denials of the right to vote." And, 
as with school desegregation, Southern legal obstruct­
ionism, allied with segregationist federal ¿judges 
succeeded in fighting the twenty civil rights lawyers 
of the Justice Department to a virtual standstill. The 
1964 Civil Rights Act had made little difference. In 
Dallas County, for example, applicants still had to 
reproduce, and answer questions about sections of the 
U.S. and Alabama constitutions.11^ Such tests were 
difficult even for the well-educated; "think of trying to 
teach a man something about double jeopardy, who probably 
doesn't even know how to read," James Borman wrote.11Zi-
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Education, however, was not the answer. In Terrell 
County, Georgia, five college graduates "failed" 
the literacy test.^^
Equal voting rights could only he achieved if the 
federal government had the authority to appoint its own 
registrars. Moreover, the procedure of working through 
the federal courts on a county-by-county basis was too 
slow, and too fallible. National legislation was required 
to enable the government to appoint registrars without 
first having to prove discrimination, in each county, in 
the federal courts. And only a determined direct action 
campaign, Martin Luther King believed, could bring about 
the passage of such legislation.
Selma: Setting the Tran
Selma, Alabama, was the perfect setting for a
voting rights campaign. Selma and Dallas County had a
black population of 57 per cent, but the electorate was
11699 per cent white. In the adjacent counties of
Lowndes and Wilcox, there were no black voters at all,
although their black population was double the white.
The SCLC had sent John Love and James Orange to Selma
118in June 1964-, anticipating a campaign there.
Selma was an inviting target for another reason; 
its white leadership was divided over how best to deal 
with demonstrating blacks. Dallas County Sheriff James 
Clark espoused the "Bull Connor" approach: blanket 
repression with the'liberal use'of violence. Selma's
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younger businessmen, anxious to avoid a repeat of 
Biimingham, favoured the methods successfully employed by 
Iaurie Pritchett in Albany: avoid arrests if possible and, 
at all costs, prevent police violence (at least in 
public). They were equally concerned with preserving 
white supremacy, but feared that Claris's brutal antics 
would only provoke an unwelcome intrusion from the 
federal courts that would force the city to register 
black voters. SNCC had already got Clark into a legal 
bind: his violent tactics had attracted four Justice 
Department suits.11^ Meanwhile, a voting rights suit, 
filed as far back as 1961, was slowly working its way
I P Othrough the courts.
If King and the SCIC were subjected to the same 
treatment as SKCC, they would have a chance to spring 
the legal trap. To undercut Clark's power, the "non­
violent" segregationists had the Mayor appoint Wilson 
Baker the city's Director of Public Safety. Baker advised 
Selma's whites to swallow their pride and restrain their 
immediate inclination to cheer Clerk as he chased King 
¡anrt his men out of town. "We're going to have to walk 
in the mud a little," he said. "I'd rather walk in the 
mud of my own initiative . . .  than have some federal
121court force my face down into the mud without dignity."
The editor of the Selma Times-Joumal expressed the same
sentiment more bluntly: "If we can only get the bastards
out of town without getting them arrested, we'll have 'em 
122whipped."
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The SCLC, however, intended to expose Clarlc's
methods to the glare of the national and international
news media. Its chances of doing so were good. Although
Wilson Baker controlled Selma's police force, the voter
registration office was located in the Dallas court
house, which came under Clark's jurisdiction. Moreover,
Baker's authority was weakened hy the lack of firm
support from Mayor Joseph T. Saitherman, a close friend
of Governor George W a l l a c e . T h e  SCIC's Operation
Dialog, a team of whites headed by Hariy Boyte, analyzed
the attitudes of Selma's white citizens, and concluded
124that the potential for racist violence was immense. ^
Phase I: Billing the Jails
On January 2, 1965, Martin Luther King addressed 
700 blacks in Selma:
We are going to start a march on the ballot boxes 
by the thousands. We must be willing to go to 
jail by the thousands. We are not on our knees 
begging for the ballot. We are demanding the 
ballot.125
During the next two weeks, King's staff recruited volun­
teers for a "Freedom Day," when blacks would apply to 
register en masse. 0 On‘January 18, King and John Lewis 
led 400 to the court house, where they waited all day 
in a vain attempt to register. Because there were no 
arrests, Newsweek thought it a tactical victory for Wilson 
B a k e r . I t  was a premature verdict: the following day, 
Clark refused to go along with Baker's tactics, and 
arrested 67 applicants, who refused to line up in a side
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alley. How, having brought conflict between Claris «rift 
Baker out into the open,the SCIC decided to escalate the 
campaign and "fill the jails."'
For two weeks, the SCIC had obeyed a ban on marching 
without a parade peimit from the city. On February 1, King 
defied the ban, and was arrested with 770 others. It was 
a deliberate act: the SCIC wanted Baker to be the arresting 
officer, thus destroying his image as a mild-mannered man 
of reason.”*“^  Within five days, 3,500 had been arrested, 
including 700 in nearby Marion, Perry County.1^0 Time 
felt that "Alabama's remarkably stupid law enforcement 
officials . . .  fell hook, line and sinker for his King's 
bait."^^ Yet Baker was pursuing the same policy employed 
by Laurie Pritchett in Albany. Indeed, he had no choice 
but to arrest the marchers. Such was the nature of white 
supremacy in Alabama that to allow blacks to demonstrate 
at will would be tantamount to permitting open rebellion. 
From his prison cell, King wrote: "There are more Negroes 
in jail with me than there are on the voting rolls.
On February 4, the campaign achieved its first 
objective when Federal Judge Daniel H. Thomas ordered 
Dallas County to register all those who were eligible 
by July 1. He also voided the county's 20-page consti­
tution interpretation test, and commanded the board of 
registrars to process at least twenty applicants each 
day. Thomas's injunction was, however, a case of too 
little, too late. Firstly, his stipulation that the
128
142.
registrars meet "more often” than once a fortnight meant 
that, at the most, only 400 applicants could he registered 
each month. Secondly, a decision covering Dallas County 
did not affect the hundreds of other Southern counties 
where similar discrimination occurred. The SCIC was 
seeking legislation that would guarantee the right to 
vote everywhere.
King's radical critics often assumed that the 
SCIC's strategy in Selma had been "carefully worked out 
with high Administration liberals."1^  Johnson, however, 
had no plans for introducing a voting bill in 1965. 
According to Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, he "had 
hoped that the 1964 Civil Rights Act would be thè last 
word in such legislation for several years to come,” pmd 
expressed ”deep resentment” over King's campaign.
Johnson only introduced thè sought-after bill when public 
opinion compelled him to do so. As Vice President 
Humphrey told King on February 9» a voting rights bill 
would only succeed "if the pressure was unrelenting."^^ 
The SCIC's task in the second phase of the Selma 
campaign was to generate unrelenting pressure.
Phage II: Discrediting the Opposition
Journalists frequently expressed surprise that Jim 
Clark failed to perceive the tactical stupidity of 
police violence. Sometimes it appeared as if he were 
the movement's ally. As Newsweek commented, after Clark 
and his men had surrounded 165 children with cars and
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vans; and chased them three miles out of the city, "the
resourceful sheriff paid his symbolic civil rights dues
a g a i n . N o r  did Clark confine his violence to the
rank-and-file. James Bevel was clubbed, arrested, and
then chained to a hospital bed.^^ On February 16,
C.T. Vivian was assaulted by Clark himself. After
punching Vivian in the mouth, Clark told reporters:
"If I hit him, I don't know it. One of the first things
I ever learned was not to hit a nigger with your fist
because his head is too hard."^^
Clark's adeptness at presenting himself as "the
perfect public villain” did not stem from his support of
voting rights legislation. While it was true that, as
Time observed, Clark unwittingly rescued King's campaign
whenever it seemed in danger of flagging, his violence
was entirely predictable.^® De .jure segregation could
not be maintained without force and repression. The
SCIC wrote King, merely brought it to the surface:
The brutality with which officials would have 
quelled the black individual became impotent 
when it could not be pursued with stealth and 
remain unobserved. It was caught . . .  in gigantic 
circling spotlights, It was imprisoned in a luminous 
glare revealing the naked truth' to the whole 
world.141
The experience of Albany and Birmingham had shown that a 
campaign's success depended on "racists unleashing 
violence" against nonviolent demonstrators. Only then 
¿Lid "Americans of conscience . . .  demand federal intern- 
vention and legislation." This stage had not yet been
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reached in Selma. The second phase of the campaign saw 
the SCIC adopting tactics of an increasingly dangerous 
nature, making an explosion of white violence all hut 
inevitable. For a month, the SCIC experimented with 
different types of direct action. The voter registration 
drive was expanded into Lowndes, Perry, and Wilcox 
counties and, on February 15, marches were held in Selma, 
Marion and Camden. Then the movement turned to
night marches, an audacious tactic that had been employed 
in Savannah and St. Augustine. In Marion, on February 
18, 400 blacks marched out into the night to be attacked 
by Clark's posse, fifty state troopers, and an inde­
terminate number of white vigilantes. One of the marchers,
Jimmie Lee Jackson, was shot by a trooper, and then
144beaten unconscious. Eight days later he died. However, 
Jackson's fatal wounding failed to command the attention 
of the press, and, because of a ban by Governor Wallace, 
night marches had to be abandoned. The appropriate 
tactic had yet to be found.^
One of the difficulties of the Selma campaign was 
the absence of black support in Montgomery. In late 
1964, James Bevel and James Orange had helped organize 
youth groups there, but black Montgomery remained silent 
during the momentous struggle that was being stzgcd fifty 
miles away.^1"^  King had attempted to lead a mass 
march in Montgomery on February 9» tut barely 200 people 
Ixad turned out.1^  Then, when the Selma campaign was
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approaching stalemate, James Bevel had an idea: why not 
take the movement to Montgomery? A march from Selma to 
Montgomery would not only dramatize the issue of voting 
rights in a unique fashion, it would also provide the 
SCLC with a powerful lever for bringing about federal 
intervention, for such a march would require extensive 
protection. Bevel "could hardly sleep for excitement at
T / i Qhis inspiration," wrote Charles Pager. Announcing the 
march, King vowed:
I can't promise you that it won't get you beaten. I 
can't promise you that it won't get your house bombed. 
I can't promise you won't get scarred up a bit.
But we must stand up for what is right. 149
The Pettus Bridge Attack and the Emergence of the 
V o t in g  K g n t s  B i l l
On Sunday, March 7» as they set out to march from 
Selma to Montgomery, 525 blacks and a handful of whites 
were attacked on the Edmund Pettus bridge, on the out­
skirts of Selma. Using tear-gas, clubs, and whips, A1 
Lingo's state troopers and Jim Clark's possemen injured
seventy-eight of the marchers, including John Lewis,
150who suffered a fractured skull.
"Barely in history," wrote Time."has public 
opinion'reacted so spontaneously and with such fury."
Ten thousand marched in sympathy in Detroit, fifteen 
thousand in Washington, and twenty-five thousand in 
Boston; SKCC staged sit-ins at the Justice Department and 
the White House; and Iyndon Johnson was inundated with
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demands for federal intervention. «Every politician who 
could get a reporter to listen to him,« wrote Charles 
Eager, with only a little exaggeration, urged the Presi­
dent to bring the Southern racists to heel.1^1
The most influential voice was the church's. Re­
sponding to an appeal from King, clergymen of all ranks and 
denominations streamed to Selma. They included Episcopal 
Bishop James A. Pike of California; the Rev. David R. 
Hunter, deputy director of the Rational Council of 
Churches; John Wesley Lord, Methodist Bishop of Washington, 
D.C.; and Archbishop Iakovos of the Greek Orthodox Church. 
Especially significant was the number of Roman Catholics 
who, for the first time, were actively supporting the 
civil rights movement. All told, more than four hundred 
clergymen arrived in Selma in the week after March 7.^2 
Ramparts magazine considered that Iyndon Johnson 
made a gigantic political miscalculation in under­
estimating "the speed and intensity of the nation's re­
action to Selma.” Yet, displaying a political agility 
that confounded his opponents and impressed his friends, 
Johnson turned the crisis to his own advantage. A voting 
bill would increase the number of Democratic voters; he 
had nothing to fear from George Wallace, his political 
base being secure; and the enfranchisement of Alabama's 
blacks might even topple the Governor from power. It 
was, moreover, a popular cause, and the murder of the 
Eev. James Reeb, and the obtuse defiance of Wallace further
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increased its popularity. Johnson, wrote Eowland Evans 
and Eobert Eovak, "began to view the Selma crisis as a 
rare opportunity for personal leadership."1^  Begazdless 
of the President's motives, the Voting Eights Bill he 
submitted to the Congress on March 17 represented a 
massive breakthrough for the civil rights movement in the 
South, and a stunning triumph for King flTid the SCIC.
The Pettus Bridge Compromise
Although James Forman and others in SNCC were 
highly critical of King's decision not to lead the March 7 
march, King's absence was understandable. Few had anti­
cipated an attack, let alone one of such severity. In an 
"agony of conscience for not having been there, however,
King vowed to personally lead another march two days 
154later. ^  It was a decision that placed K-ing; in ^  
unenviable dilemma, for-when the SCIC's lawyers filed suit 
to void Governor Wallace's march ban, Federal District 
Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., told them to postpone the 
march until hearings were held on March 11. ^ 5  Pressure 
for a march, however, was building up. A host of clergy­
men had arrived in Selma and, as one of them put it, "Ve 
didn't come from all over the country just to stand around.w1^  
SBCC, reinforced by twenty-five field workers from Jackson, 
Mississippi, was determined to march.1^7 Andrew Young 
recailed1
(There just had to be a march. . . .  (This was not the
NAACP, and as we looked around the room at the
/Continued
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bandages and bruises, we knew we had to do somethin?
We knew that whatever we did, the SUCC people . . . were 
going to be on that bridge, and the real question 
was, 'Who would lead the people, and in what?'158
But the March 9 march was essentially a charade. After
leading 2,000 blacks and whites to the Pettus bridge,
King led them back after a song and a prayer.1^  Many
of the marchers were confused and frustrated; a few felt
betrayed.
King's curtailment of the march was entirely con­
sistent with his beliefs. One of the basic justifications 
of nonviolent direct action was that de jure segregation 
contradicted national law. In violating state and local 
laws, King argued, the civil rights movement was seeking 
to uphold national law as defined by the Congress, the 
Supreme Court, and the Constitution.. King thus dis­
tinguished nonviolent direct action from civil disobedience: 
the latter, which the SCIC had not employed, "involves 
defiance of fundamental national law."160 Thè federal 
courts were the enforcers and interpreters of national 
law and, for this reason, King never defied a federal 
injunction, even if it was flagrantly unjust. "It was 
often very confusing— and frustrating— to his followers," 
said Bayard Bus tin, "but that was Martin's faith, and he 
was always the leader."161 King believed that to disobey 
a federal injunction, however unjust, would blur the 
crucial issue: that it was the segregationists who defied the 
Constitution, and the civil rights movement that sought 
to uphold it. It was this consideration that determined
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King*s decision, not the intense pressure directed at 
him from the Justice Department and the White House.
It was less King's decision that drew such 
criticism as the way he made it, and the manner in which 
he subsequently justified it. There was a striking 
parallel between King's confrontation with the state 
troopers on the Edmund Pettus bridge, «nd George Wallace's 
confrontation with the federal marshals at the University 
of Alabama. Both King and Wallace tacitly agreed to 
obey a federal court order, but felt compelled to go 
through the motions of defiance, in order to satisfy a 
previous pledge to their supporters. Like Wallace, King 
denied that there had been any kind of prior "deal".
2h fact, King had agreed to a last-minute compromise 
worked out by Governor Leroy Collins of the federal 
Community Relations Service to march only as far as the 
b r i d g e . " L i k e  characters in a play," wrote Andrew 
Kopkind, "King and Cloud £ commander of the state 
troopers_7 spoke their lines and went through their 
motions. If it was not rehearsed, it could have been."^^"
The Rift With SUCC
After March 9» the rift between SNCC and the 
SCLC was an open secret. James Forman, who had left a 
three-hour strategy session the previous evening expecting 
the march to take place, regarded the Pettus bridge 
compromise as a breach of faith. It was yet another 
example, he felt, of King ignoring the wishes of the rank-
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and-file, failing to consult other civil rights leaders, 
and acting in collusion with the federal government.16^ 
Disenchantment with King's leadership had been 
growing in SNCC for some time. Many SNCC workers were 
repelled by the emotionalism and religiosity of the 
SCIC's style. Observed Newsweek in 1965: "The singing, 
marching Negro, a bit ragged and funky, isn't the image 
they care to evoke these days." Pforeover, the SCIC's 
policy of depicting King as an all-powerful "Moses" 
was considered both naive and pernicious, for it 
hampered the growth of * indigenous, local leadership, and 
the development of "participatory democracy." The 
policy of SNCC, explained Cordell Reagan, was to "try 
to be with local leadership, and try to serve in some 
sort of advisory capacity."166 By 1964, SNCC had 
acquired a positive distrust of the concept of leader­
ship itself. Robert Moses even changed his name to 
avoid a leadership cult developing around him.16'7 This 
hostility to leadership contributed to SITCC's growing 
aversion to King and the SCIC.
SNCC believed that the fears of the black 
community could only be overcome if civil rights workers 
convinced it that they would not depart when white 
repression intensified. This involved living in a 
community for months, even years, patiently endeavouring 
to earn its trust and respect. The significance of 
SNCC's work in Albany, recalled Cordell Reagan, was
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that "we went into that community, we stayed, there, 
we "became a part of that community." The SCIC,
SNCC charged, would descend upon a community with a 
maximum of fanfare, cause dissension and ¿jealousy among 
the local leadership, and then depart with most of the 
prestige (and the lion's share of the financial wind­
fall from white sympathizers). Moreover, in Albany, 
Danville, and Selma it had been SNCC that had put in 
all the unglamorous but vital community organizing, 
long before the SCIC arrived with a camp-following of 
reporters and television cameras. The SCIC, wrote 
Cleveland Sellers, "would organize dramatic demonstra­
tions calculated to get the attention of the nation. 
After getting that attention. . . .  SCIC would submit 
a list of demands to the local power structure, win 
minor concessions, proclaim a great moral victory and
1£Qleave town." 7 Whereas SNCC community organizing 
was a method far empowering blacks to challenge the 
established political order, SCIC demonstrations, wrote 
James Forman, were a "safety-’yalve for the American 
system."^®
It would be wrong to place undue emphasis on 
the role of the Pettus bridge compromise in accentua­
ting SNCC's alienation from King's leadership. SNCC's 
policy toward the Selma-Montgomexy march was so in­
consistent as to make co-operation with the SCIC almost 
impossible. Its original position was to withhold
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active support to demonstrations in Selma. It had 
opposed the first Selma-Montgomeiy march, although John 
Xewis, Bob Mants, and Vilson Brown believed the SCIC's 
plan to be sound, and insisted on participating as 
individuals.171 After the March 7 attack, however, SNCC 
reversed its position, demanding that a second march be 
held.172 Finally, SNCC declined t0 "officially" endorse 
the third (successful) march, although it did, in fact, 
participate•17^
SNCC's tactical differences with the SC IS were 
merely the surface manifestations of a profound philo­
sophical and political split. The SC IS was still 
informally allied with the federal government and the 
national Democractic party; its aim was the integration 
of blacks into the existing structure of society. SNCC, 
by contrast, was becoming a revolutionary group. Its 
experiences in Mississippi had eroded its commitment to 
nonviolence and destroyed its faith in reforming the 
existing society. "They say they want us to sit down 
at the table ¿"of democracy^," cried James Forman, "but 
I want to kick the fucking legs off the table.
IH. SCIC THE ORGANIZATION
The Structure of the SCIC
The Southern Christian leadership Conference was 
an amorphous and, at times, chaotic organization. Like 
SNCC, it prided itself on spontaneity; it was, said
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Ealph Abernathy, "a faith operation," relying upon 
religious fervour’rather than bureaucratic efficiency.1^  
As a result, one newspaper observed, "Mass meetings are 
sometimes kept singing and praying for hours . . .
Travel schedules are made and broken and plans at times 
are changed on the spur of the moment.wl?6
In its early years, the absence of an adequate 
organizational structure impeded the development 0f an 
effective programme. Unlike the HAACP, the SCIC had 
no individual membership; it consisted of a fluctua­
ting number of local affiliates. King originally 
conceived of his role as a supportive one, with his 
Atlanta office assisting local direct action and voter 
registration campaigns by providing "staff, educational 
and financial resources."1?? But this proved an un­
satisfactory arrangement. Until 1961, the SCIC simply 
lacked the resources to provide such aid. King, moreover, 
was uncertain as to whether the SCIC should confine 
itself to providing second-level assistance to local 
campaigns, or whether it should play a more dynamic 
role, initiating its own campaigns. Albany illustrated 
what happened when the SCIC tried to do both.
At its I960 annual conference, an effort was made 
to give a more precise definition to the SCIC's vague 
structure. In the future, it was decided, the state 
conferences would work in liaison with the Atlanta 
office to implement both a state programme and a "general
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programme" of the SCIC.1?3 The adoption of this scheme 
did not clarify the organizational confusion. When a 
mass rally, planned by the Virginia Christian Leader­
ship Conference, had to be cancelled because King 
objected to a state unit directly requesting the 
sponsorship of other national organizations, the presi­
dent of the VCIC asked King some pointed questions 
about the SCIC's structure.1^  Here was a case of an 
imaginative local initiative being stifled by the central 
office.
In the end, the SCIC only acquired an effective 
programme when it began to initiate and conduct its 
own campaigns. 3h Birmingham, St. Augustine, and Selma 
the SCIC assumed the overall direction of local cam­
paigns and massively escalated them. This type of 
strategy required a cadre of field organizers to train 
volunteers, plan and execute demonstrations, and carry 
out the day-to-day details of the campaign. The 
development of mass nonviolent direct action until it 
actively involved several thousand people, led to a 
rapid expansion of the SCIC's full-time staff which, 
as in SNCCj became the heart of the organization.
As the central staff grew, so did the SCIC's 
influence in the South. This was reflected in the 
growing number of SCIC affiliatess sixty-five in 1962, 
eighty-five in 1963 » 217 in 1964, and 270 in 1967.
These increases measured the enormous impact of the
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Birmingham and Selma campaigns, which not only breathed 
new life into existing affiliates, but also broadened 
the popularity of direct action throughout the South.
The SCIC concentrated most of its work in Alabama and 
Georgia but, after Birmingham, its activités and 
influence spread to other states: by 196A, in addition 
to Alabama, there were state conferences in Virginia,
l O lTennessee, and Florida.
The Executive Staff
"Martin was a genius at surrounding himself with 
talents that could become truly experts in their 
different fields," remembered Hosea Williams.King's 
lieutenants, the SCIC's executive staff, had all demon­
strated their talents before joining the Conference. 
Because it was King's "own" organization, the SCIC had 
a loose, non-bureaucratic structure that was particularly 
receptive to people who could lead and innovate. Direct 
action-orientated leaders often felt constrained by 
the structure of the NAACP. As Wyatt Walker put it, 
"wherever within the . . .  NAACP energetic and/or 
ambitious leadership begins to develop, you. go to the
T Û 7guillotine." The SCIC, on the other hand, encouraged 
this type of leadership, and recruited it at every 
level.
King dominated his organization as few leaders 
are able to. In theory, SCIC policy was determined at 
twice-yearly meetings of the Executive Board; in
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practice, King presented already-determined policies
I Q hfor the Board's approval. Barely were these policies 
opposed, and there is no record of any attempt to re­
place King's leadership. Nevertheless, Joanna Grant's 
charge that King "held the organization under his thumb" 
was far from the truth.18^ It was understandable that' 
many should believe this, for it was the SCIC's 
deliberate policy to build its public image around the 
personality of Martin Luther King. This was partly 
for fundraising purposes: in 1964, said Wyatt Walker, 
the SCIC translated King's unique symbolism into 
"meaningful support for his organization" to the tune 
of $400,000.^88 The SCIC's "cult of personality" also
endowed King with almost super-human powers so that 
even though he lacked an organized following, he had a 
unique popularity among ordinary blacks, both North 
and South.
The SCIC, however, was far from being a "one-man" 
organization. Nor were the men around him self-serving' 
sycophants. "Bach one of these guys is terribly ego­
centric," said Andrew Young in 1969. "They didn't like 
to follow directions from anybody— still, they did 
follow the directions from Dr. King. It looked like he 
called the s h o t s . " S C I C  policy was not imposed from 
above by King: it was hammered out by the executive 
staff at weekly meetings and occasional retreats. These 
strategy sessions were heated affairs, and each partici­
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pant stated his views forcefully, cogently, anr| per­
sistently. Tempers would flare and, as Hosea Williams 
recalled, "Indy Young, myself, and others got so frus­
trated trying to thrash out problems that we used to
lOOthrow chairs and tables." Ealph Abernathy claimed 
that "the only time I have ever been hit is by a staff 
member."^^ Educated, dedicated, and opinionated, the 
executive staff— especially Ealph Abernathy, Andrew 
Young, James Bevel, Hbsea Williams, and Wyatt Walker 
(until he left in 1964)— influenced and stimulated 
King's own thinking, and provided an environment from 
which, through interplay of personalities and intellects, 
policies of increasing tactical and political sophis­
tication could emerge.
His staff was not King's only source of informa­
tion and advice: a variety of friends outside the 
SCIC kept him in touch with the church, the labour 
movement, and the political world of Washington. Because 
King was a Southerner, he relied heavily on friends in 
Washington, Chicago, and Hew York. One of his most 
influential and trusted advisors was Bayard Bustin.
Eastin had helped to found the SCIC in 1957, and he 
remained King's close associate over the next ten years. 
Eustin and his friends in the democratic left were an 
important stimulus to King's intellectual development. 
Hiey made up an informal policy discussion group which 
TT-ing drew upon to test new ideas and p l a n s . K i n g s
general political orientation, as well as his thinking 
on specific issues such as poverty and government 
spending reflected the influence of this group. Rastin 
was also a valuable ally. With a wealth of friends 
and "contacts" in the Socialist Party, the labour 
movement, the'pacifist groups, and the liberal wing of 
the Democratic party, Rustin was adept at mobilizing 
broad support for particular causes, as illustrated by 
his work in organizing the March on Washington, the 
first Mew York school boycott, and mass demonstrations 
in support of the Birmingham and Selma campaigns.1^1 
Rustin was only one of a group of friends whom 
he invariably consulted before making important decisions. 
During the Chicago campaign, and in the North generally, 
King relied upon the knowledge and expertise of Bill 
Beriy, head of the Chicago branch of the National Urban 
League. The Rev. Walter Fauntroy, director of the 
SCIC’s Washington office, provided King with political 
support from Congress, and acted as his liaison with 
Capitol Hill.^^ Stanley Levison, a white New York 
attorney, not only represented the SCIO in court and 
helped manage its financial affairs, but had been, with 
Bayard Rustin, ons of King's earliest advisors. Dr. 
Benjamin E. Mays, president of King's alma mater. 
Morehouse College, was a lifelong source of spiritual and
1Q2intellectual guidance. King rarely imposed policy 
in an authoritarian manner. To a considerable extent he
158.
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delegated his authority, a tendency encouraged "by his 
distaste for administration. Decision-making in the 
SC I/O tended to he diffuse, rather than highly- 
centralized. This diffuseness even became a threat to 
the SCIC's organizational discipline} to such an extent 
that a "last say" Steering Committee was set up in late 
1967» in order to a greater firmness and clarity to
nn/ipolicy-making. ~  To the executive staff, however,
King continued to give the utmost freedom, only impos­
ing his will when disputes and rivalries threatened to 
get out of hand. "King understood us, was sympathetic 
with our shortcomings, was able to change things that 
could be changed, and could accept our deficiencies that 
could not be changed," said Hosea Williams. "But at 
the same time, King demanded that we give SCIC top 
priority.
The Field Staff
The SCIC was sometimes criticized for being "top- 
heavy with self-perpetuating administrators."*^ There 
was a degree of truth in the charge. In June 1963» the 
SCIC was operating on a budget of $4-75,000, employing 
a staff of forty-three. SECC, by contrast, fielded 
126 field workers and summer volunteers on a budget 
one quarter the size. ^ 7  Then again, a large propor­
tion of the SCIC’s staff was made up of administrators, 
secretaries, and executives. In 1964, for example, only 
twenty-seven of the SCIC's sixty-two staff were field
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organizers, whereas SNCC had a hundred full-time field 
workers, and only about a dozen secretaries »nd
administrators.
This imbalance was mitigated by the fact that 
most of the executive staff of the SCIC were in the front 
line of direct action campaigns. Hosea Williams, James 
Bevel, and Andrew Young were all jailed and beaten and 
were, in reality, field organizers writ large. In 
addition, as the SCIC expanded, so did its field staffs 
from three in I960, to forty in early 1963, sixty-two 
in 1964, and 150 in 1966, an increasing proportion of 
whom were field w o r k e r s . I f  the executive staff 
were King's lieutenants, the field organizers were his
1.0.0.'s. The work of the more experienced of them 
was as significant as that of the executive staff. The 
Rev. James Orange participated in every major SCIC campaign 
from Birmingham onward; his special skill was organi­
zing youths. Willie Bolden, Ben Van Clarke, and Lester 
Eankerson joined the SCIC with Hosea Williams, from 
Savannah; they were skilled, experienced organizers.
Leon Hall was with the SCIC from the time of the 
student sit-ins until after King's death; he was a main­
stay of the Conference's work in Alabama, The state 
secretaries, Herbert Coulton and Milton Reid in 
Virginia, and Golden Frinks in North Carolina, were 
also outstanding members of the SCIC.200 The field 
staff were the SCIC's roving "trouble-makers" and
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"outside agitators," travelling from one trouble-spot to 
the next, encouraging communities in their resistance to 
white supremacy. Is the SCIC widened its activities, the 
smaller campaigns were frequently left to their direction. 
However, resources and staff tended to be shifted from one 
city to another on the spur of the moment. Hosea Williams 
promised that Americus, Georgia, would be the "next Selma," 
but when a breathless aide reported that a civil rights 
march had been tear-gassed in Greensboro, Alabama, Williams 
added: "Maybe I spoke too soon. Maybe therext Selma is 
going to be Greensboro." Such spontaneity was, in
many respects, an asset, enabling the SCIC to come to the 
aid of a beleaguered movement at a moment's notice. Often, 
however, there were complaints from the field staff that 
it was impossible to plan a coherent, long-term strategy, 
let alone get to know a particular community. As the 
SCIC began to work in the North, conducting half a dozen 
projects simultaneously, the field organizers also com­
plained of an overall lack of liaison and consultation by 
the executive staff} that they were left in the dark, 
unaware of important policy decisions until they had already 
been taken.
Although the structural reform of late 1967 was an 
attempt to deal with these problems, King viewed them as, 
to a large extent, inevitable. "So often things are just 
wrong and we don't know why," he said during an evaluation 
session. Crises, frustrations and quarrels were the un-
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avoidable by-product of "the existential situation in which 
we find ourselves, day in and day out." The failures of 
the executive staff stemmed from the same source, because 
it was "impossible for people to live with as much tension 
as we live with every day." King tended to endorse Kalph 
Abernathy's view of the SCIC as a "faith operation," and 
believed that its internal problems would only be diminish­
ed, or made easier to live with, if each staff member 
approached his task with "spiritual undergirdings."202
The Citizenship Education Program and Operation Breadbasket
The SCIC's Citizenship Education Program was 
designed to develop second-level community leadership or, 
as Andrew Young put it: "to comb the South for those PhD 
minds which have been wasted in the cotton field."2®^ The 
CEP was modelled on a programme pioneered by the High­
lander Polk School (located ih Mbnteagle, Tennessee) during 
the 1950's, which taught blacks and poor whites literacy, 
politics, and citizenship rights. Septima Clark, a veteran
of Highlander, and the founder of citizenship schools on
204the South Carolina sea-islands directed the CEP.
An important feature of the CEP was its teacher 
training program, supervised by Dorothy Cotten. Its purpose 
was to train new leaders who would return to their communi­
ties equipped to face such tasks as voter registration, 
participation in local government, and the building of 
political organizations.2®^ The CEP school, housed in the
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Dorchester Center in McIntosh, Georgia, thus hastened the 
emergence of local black leadership. Those who partici­
pated in the teacher training program could cariy the 
Highlander concept back to their communities by organizing 
local citizenship schools. By 1963, some 600 people had 
been through the Dorchester Center; four years later, its
staff had grown to eight, and it was teaching 500 people
, 206 each year.
Although he believed that only massive government
intervention could eliminate poverty, King firmly believed
in the value of economic self-help*
How, we are poor people individually. We are poor when 
you compare us with white society in America. We are 
poor. Never stop and forget that collectively . • . 
we are richer than all the nations in the world, with 
the exception of nine. . . .  We have an annual income 
of more than thirty billion dollars a year. . . .
That's power right there, if we know how to pool it.207
Operation Breadbasket was an attempt to harness that
collective power by using consumer boycotts to bring about
fair employment.
The idea behind Operation Breadbasket was an old 
one, but its immediate inspiration was the work of the Eev. 
Leon Sullivan in Philadelphia. Sullivan had organized 400 
ministers to lead consumer boycotts and, between 1959 and 
1962, they had persuaded thirty companies to hire five, 
thousand blacks.208 With the aid of Sullivan, Operation 
Breadbasket was set up in September 1962, in order to apply 
the same technique in Atlanta. It was headed by the Eev.
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Fred C. Bennette. The appeal of the Breadbasket concept 
was its simplicity. The church provided the basic structure, 
and the boycott was an extremely effective form of direct 
action because many who were afraid to take part in a 
demonstration were perfectly willing to merely cease buying 
a particular product. By 1966, Breadbasket had won five 
thousand jobs in Atlanta, and was extended to Cleveland, 
Chicago» and other cities.
Voter Registration and the SCOPE Project
In common with the other civil rights organizations, 
much of the SCIC's work was in the field of voter regi­
stration; part of the SCIC credo was that "the most important 
step the Hegro can take is that short walk to the voting 
b o o t h . B u t  the SCIC's registration efforts were 
frequently criticized. "That kind of work, that knocking 
on doors" did not suit the SCIC, complained James Forman. 
Successful vote?registration required patient, persistent 
community organization; the SCIC preferred dramatic demon­
strations. The Voter Education Project, which carefully 
appraised the registration efforts of participating organi­
zations, was highly critical of the SCIC. "Organizational 
structure has been a problem," it complained. "VEP has 
frequently been in the position of not knowing what the 
organization was doing . . .  until we read a press release." 
212 The performance of the SCIC was so unsatisfactory
that Wiley Brant on, VEP Project Director, blocked its funds
213for nine months.
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The recruitment, in 1964, of Kandolph Blackwell, 
(ex-VEP Field Director) and Hosea Williams (president of 
the Chatham County Crusade for Voters) gave a semblance 
of order and efficiency to the SCIC's voter registration 
work. The Conference received VEP grants for drives in 
Savannah, Albany, Danville, and Petersburg and, in 1965, 
it mounted the ambitious Summer Community Organization 
and Political Education project.(S C O P E ) . S C O P E  origi­
nally envisaged 2,000 student volunteers working in 125 
Black Belt counties, and eventually fielded about 500 
(aided by 400 local volunteers) in fifty-three counties 
in six s t a t e s . S C O P E  was similar in conception to 
COFO's Mississippi Summer Project, with Northern white 
student volunteers not only spearheading voter registra­
tion drives, but also teaching in "freedom schools", 
building community organizations, and teaching people how 
to take advantage of federal civil rights, farm subsidy,
pi Awelfare, and poverty programmes. The SCOPE workers were 
spread over Virginia, Florida, South Carolina, Georgia, 
and Alabama, most of them concentrated in the last three 
s t a t e s . I t  was originally intended that SCOPE should 
avoid direct action. However, white resistance to black 
registration continued unabated and, because the Voting 
Eights Act was not passed until August 6, it was able to 
frustrate, in large part, the SCDC's registration efforts: 
of the 124,000 who attempted to register, only 26,000
OTQnames were added to the voting rolls. ° Areas that had
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never experienced any civil rights activity gave the SCOPE
workers an especially hostile reception and, after
numerous heatings, gassings,and failings the embargo on
direct action was lifted, with the result that many of
the local drives turned to demonstrations to force easier
219registration procedures. '
170 SCOPE workers were assigned to Georgia, where
they worked in about a dozen counties. Their experiences
illustrated how little the rural South had changed. In
Crawfordville, for example, the SCOPE workers found that
public accommodations were still, in practice, segregated.
When they dared to challenge this informal but rigid
pattern they were jailed; one of them was beaten and
abducted. Crawfordville became the centre of a major
civil rights drive, which utilized picketing, demonstra-
221tions, and a boycott of white merchants.
Prom Crawfordville, SCOPE workers fanned out into 
the surrounding counties of Lincoln, Warren, and Wilkes, 
located in the northeastern edge of Georgia's Black Belt, 
they were among the poorest counties in the state. The 
civil rights movement had thus far never reached this 
area, pwfl white supremacy was the unchallenged way of life. 
"For virtually all of the white people here," observed 
the New York Times, "resistance of one kind or another 
appears to be the reaction to Negro protests." The 
first march was attacked by a white mob; the second was
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lialted by the ubiquitous state troopers. Observing one of 
the marches, the Mayor of Lincolnton commented: "If I had 
a machine-gun, and I could get away with it, I'd mow them 
down." The civil rights acts had changed little in 
Idncolnton. "You can't change it," said one black. "There 
ain't no way to change it."*^
Americus, in the southeastern comer of the state, 
was similarly hostile to black demands, despite two years 
of SWCC activity. The jailing of four black women for 
standing in a "white" voting queue sparked three weeks of 
marches, led by Willie Bolden, Ben Van Clarke, John lewis, 
and Dick Gregory. After the Voting Eights Act came into 
effect, three black registrars were appointed, and the 
black electorate doubled in the space of two days.^^ But 
the movement's main demand, a bi-racial commission, was 
not satisfied, and the one prominent white who supported 
it, County Attorney Warren C. Fortson, was ostracized by 
the white community and forced to leave the city.^.
In Horth Carolina, 140 SCOPE workers conducted a 
joint voter registration project with COEE. Starting in 
the Tidewater counties, they gradually moved inland.
Their registration work was hindered by the fact that, 
under state law, counties were not required to process 
new applicants until October. In Plymouth, civil rights 
workers encountered white violence instigated by the Ku 
KLux Elan. The SCIC replied with a direct action campaign
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led by the Eevs.Fred LaGarde and Golden Frinks, which
demanded school desegregation, a bi-racial commission,
and the immediate opening of the registration books.
Ho sea Williams and Floyd McKissick demanded, in addition,
state action to curb the white vigilantes who terrorized,. •
228Plymouth's black community. After almost a month of 
demonstrations, the Plymouth campaign came to an incon­
clusive end. Governor Dan Moore publicly repudiated the 
Klan, and also helped to set up a bi-racial commission.
But the registration books remained closed.
In Alabama, the SCOPE drives were a continuation 
of the civil rights activity that had flowered in the 
Black Belt after the Selma campaign. Here, the distinction 
between voter registration and direct action was academic, 
for violent white resistance was the rule rather than the 
exception. By July, SCOPE workers had been beaten up in 
Wilcox and Monroe counties; and in Greensboro, Hale 
County, white repression was so severe that a full-blown 
direct action movement emerged.^® During the campaign, 
marchers were tear-gassed, 500 were arrested, and two 
black churches were burnt to the ground. A half-hearted 
intervention by Federal Judge Daniel A. Thomas brought 
little relief. Thomas voided Greensboro's literacy test, 
but permitted the substitution of an "easier" one. He 
refused to enjoin the police from breaking up civil rights 
»arches.231
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The SCLC After Selma
The SCOPE project illuminated the partial nature of 
the SCIC's victory in Alabama. James Bevel's ambitious 
plan for a campaign of massive direct action to topple 
the state government came to nothing; .King's more modest 
proposal for a national economic boycott of Alabama was 
buried under an avalanche of criticism; the SCOPE cam­
paign fell far short of the SCIC's expectations. Most 
discouraging of all, implementation of the Voting Eights 
Act was slow and reluctant. (As King later noted, there 
were no federal examiners at all in the home districts of 
the most powerful Southern Senators.
Nevertheless, when the SCIC met for its annual 
convention in August, it had reason to feel proud and 
confident. The Selma-Montgomeiy march— every yard pro­
tected by the federal government— had been a magnificent 
symbol« "People like Jim Clark had said, 'If you march, 
you do so over my dead body;'" wrote Coretta King,
"and Wallace had said, 'They shall not pass.' But here 
we were."*^ Now, turning its eyes to the North (at a 
time when Watts was still— by a few days—  in the 
future) the SCIC felt the exhilaration of victory. Andrew 
Young, delivering the keynote address, believed that
with a little planning and effort it would be 
possible to recruit a nonviolent army of upwards 
of one hundred thousand in any city in the 
country. . . .  Just imagine what it would be like 
to turn Jim Bevel, Hosea Williams, and C.T.Vivian 
on a community for a few weeks, along with Dr. King 
and the others. 234
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CHAPTER V
MARTIN LUTHER KING'S SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILO SOPHY:
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OP NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION
I. THE RELIGIOUS FOUNDATIONS
The Power of God in History
Christian dogma has traditionally asserted that
individuals are subject to a Divine judgement, based upon
the law: "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also
reap." Martin lather King contended that this law also
applied in the secular world; one did not have to wait
until the afterlife to see that "Truth crushed to earth
will rise again," for the power of a Divine presence was
manifest in the workings of human history. The result of
history's "struggle between good and evil" could not be
in doubt because "the universe is on the side of justice."1
A Divinely-inspired moral law made it inconceivable that
evil could persist indefinitely:
History is the story of evil forces that advance with 
seemingly irresistible power only to be crushed by 
the battering-rams of the forces of justice. There is 
a law in the moral world— a silent, inevitable 
imperative, akin to the laws in the physical world—  
which reminds us that life will only work in a 
certain way.2
At times King appeared to explain specific historical 
events in terms of Divine intervention. He approvingly 
quoted Victor Hugo's verdict on Napoleon: his "fall was 
decreed" because he "vexed God."^ Similarly, the recent
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disintegration of European colonialism had commenced when
Mthe quite invisible law began to operate.Histoiy's
metaphysical dimension was also cited to account for the
origins of the Montgomery bus boycott:
There is something about that protest that is 
supranational. . . .  Whatever the name, some extra- 
human force labors to create a harmony out of the 
discords of the universe. There is a creative power 
that works to pull down mountains of evil and level 
hilltops of injustice. God still works through 
history His wonders to perform. It seems as though 
God had decided to use Montgomery as the proving ground for the struggle and triumph of freedom and justice 
in America. 5
Contemporary critics argued that the "real world"
did not possess the kind of underlying, pre-determined
moral structure that Sing attributed to it, and that there
was no foundation to his belief in "God as a supernatural
being still working wonders in the w o r l d . T o  most
historians the idea of a universal, absolute moral law
governing history appears absurd; in E.H. Carr's phrase,
it "turns history into theology* by ascribing the motive
force of human action to "some extra-historical and super-
nrational power«"' Those who reject such a belief would 
have severe misgivings about any political philosophy 
constructed upon these metaphysical foundations, because 
it would be flawed in two respects. Firstly, it would 
suffer from excessive optimism; secondly, lacking a proper 
appreciation of the role of power in human affairs, it 
would be characterized by a debilitating emphasis upon 
morality, faith, and the power of prayer. Many blamed the
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post-Selma defeats of the civil rights movement upon 
precisely these flaws: King had saddled the movement with 
an ideology which was based upon a false conception of 
political reality. As Andrew Kopkind put it, King had 
“simply, and disastrously, arrived at the wrong con­
clusions about the world;" his view of contemporary 
society, said Kopkind, was completely devoid of histori­
cal perspective: “He seems to believe that progress is 
inevitable because compelled by an abstract moral force."® 
This kind of misgiving contributed powerfully to the 
birth of Black Power: power, not God, nonviolence, or 
love, was the real determinant of history and political 
reality. As Cecil Moore of the Philadelphia HAACP 
contemptuously remarked, "We're not here to pray the 
bigots out, we're here to drive them out."^
The Idea of Progress
The analysis of King's philosophy must make a clear 
and careful distinction between his belief in history 
as progress, and his (alleged) conviction that that pro­
gress was attributable not to the actions of humans, but 
to the intervening hand of a God.
King's fundamental optimism concerning the future 
should not be too readily dismissed as naive or un- 
historical. The idea of progress is a deeply-rooted 
tradition in Western thought. As Prank E. Manuel has 
pointed out, it is an especially strong and persistent
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theme in historical writing,from, the time of the early
Christians onward. Indeed, many historians regard the
idea of progress as the defining feature of historical
thought: it is required by history to distinguish
itself from— and liberate itself from— what J.H. Plumb
called "the dead hand of the past."^ Without faith in
the future there can be no real meaning or direction in
the past, no real "history." As E.H. Carr has put it,
"History • . • can only be written by those who find and
accept a sense of direction in history itself. The belief
that we have come from somewhere is closely linked with
12the belief that we are going somewhere." King's un-
shakeable optimism, his "audacious faith in the future of
mankind," was firmly rooted in the mainstream of Western
historical and philosophical thought.^
King attributed meaning in history to the unfolding
of a divine purpose. His frequent references to God in
history were affirmations that history is progress;
progress was the growth of love (agape), and God was the
source of all love. But, as John W. Kathbun has pointed
0ut, "King does not particularly care which philosophical
14-or theological terms are used to describe God." When 
he invoked God in his description of the origins of the 
Montgomery bus boycott he was not attributing Eosa Parks' 
defiance to a specific act of God: he was simply— and 
correctly— saying that the Montgomery protest had a trans-
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cendent historical significance, a symbolic importance 
which derived from a deeper and wider historical movement. 
For King, such movements were the human manifestations 
of the underlying moral structure of the universe; in 
short, they had meaning, and it did not matter whether 
that meaning was due to the Zeitgeist, a "principle of 
concretion," or a "Personal God."1^ King's conviction that 
life has meaning was an expression of what could he termed 
the lowest common denominator of religious belief, a re­
jection of the existentialist assertion of life's absurdity 
and meaninglessness, and a faith that there was, in Paul 
Tillich's terminology, a "God above the God of theism."^
Kind's Rejection of Determinism
On many occasions it seemed as though King treated 
God as what E.H. Carr called the "joker" in history's pack 
of cards— the one kept in reserve to explain that which 
rational explanation could not account for.^ Yet King 
rejected determinism and the notion of divine inter­
vention in human affairs:
We are gravely misguided if we think the struggle will 
be won only through prayer. God, who gave us minds 
for thinking and bodies for working, would defeat 
his own purpose if he permitted us to obtain through 
prayer what may come through work or intelligence.
. . .  Ho prodigious thunderbolt from heaven will 
blast away evil. Ho mighty army of angels will 
descend to force men to do what their wills resist.
Such statements recur throughout King's writings, sermons,
and speeches. Implicit in his view of social change was
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a faith in man's capacity— his freedom— to make moral 
choices; freedom was the ability to deliberate and choose. 
Determinism conceived of man as a "helpless worm crawling 
through the mass of an evil world; " King agreed with Paul 
Tillich that freedom was the most important defining 
feature of human existence.1^ His thought was informed 
by a humanistic confidence in the innate capacity of 
humans to freely progress toward the achievement of moral 
ends:
I refuse to accept the idea that man is mere flotsam 
and jetsam in the river of life which surrounds him.
I refuse to accept the view that mankind is so 
tragically bound to the starless midnight of war and 
racism that the bright daybreak of peace can never 
become a reality. . . .  I believe that unaimed truth 
and unconditional love will have the final word in 
reality.20
God, nevertheless, retained a central place in
King's social philosophy, for men could not eradicate evil
by himself. Evil was an objective reality; "its nagging,
prehensile tentacles project into every level of human 
21existence." Man had to accept that reality, and
recognize that his freedom "always operates within a pre-
destined structure." Yet that structure was favorable
to justice; by working within it— by accepting God— humans
could create a "beloved community" on earth. Human
effort had to be aided by religious faith.^ King's God
was thus more than Hegel's Spirit or Tillich's almost
desperate "self-affirmation 'in spite of:'" his was a 
24personal God.
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Through a personal God humans could overcome their
innate evil and, instead, develop their innate moral
strength and sense of purpose. A personal God meant the
reinforcement of, and the drawing out of, what was best
in the human personality:
To say that God is personal is . . .  to take what is noblest and finest in our consciousness and 
affirm its perfect existence in Him. It is 
certainly true that human personality is limited, 
but personality as such involves no necessary 
limitations. It simply means self-consciousness 
and self-direction.25
This is how the power of God worked in history: not 
through miracles, divine intervention, or a deterministic 
moral law, but through human actions guided by "self- 
consciousness and self-direction" attained by religious
faith. Faith was "the principle which opens the door for
26God to work through man."
A personal God also sustained the individual in
times of despair and crisis, imparting to him the strength
and courage to endure hardship, suffering, self-sacrifice 
27and defeat. 1 It was this faith that buoyed King's
fervent optimism, as well as convincing him of the virtue
and value of "unmerited suffering." The everyday dangers
entailed by his civil rights role made a personal God a
«living reality? whereas it had previously been merely a
"metaphysical category that I found theologically and
28Intellectually satisfying."
King's rejection of determinism, and his parallel 
■beli©f 2111 absolute moral law, gave a persistent tension
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to his thought. Humans are free, hut "Freedom is always 
within the framework of destiny."2^ Their freedom meant 
they could choose; their destiny meant they had to choose. 
This tension, this polarity, was at the heart of King's 
historical vision. Moral progress was not inevitable for 
humans could choose to follow evil. But the consequences 
of the latter were always disastrous for "Christianity 
contends that evil contains the seed of its own destruct­
ion."^0 King regarded this religious dogma as if it were 
an historical law, and he cited history to prove it. His 
conception of history was not, of course, systematically 
developed, but it was coloured by the ideas, especially, 
of Toynbee, Hegel and Marx. History, according to King, 
was the story of the rise and decline of great nations and 
civilizations, each of which made a specific contribution 
to the moral or material progress of humanity. Their 
decline was not, however, decreed by an immutable historical 
or sociological law, but represented "the passing of 
systems that were b o m  in injustice, nurtured in inequality 
and reared in exploitation.' They represent the inevitable 
decay of any system based on principles that are not in 
harmony with the moral laws of the universe."^ With 
Hegel, King viewed history as the development of freedom 
but, with Toynbee, he attributed the collapse of civiliza­
tions to their incompleteness and spiritual inadequacy. 
Greece was fatally flawed by slavery, Western industrial
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society by colonialism and class oppression,^ Racism was 
the contemporary residue which, if it were not abolished, 
would bring about an irreversible decline.
King's Prophetic Vision
This was the prophetic nature of King's social
vision. Man was confronted by an inescapable moral choice:
"History is cluttered with the wreckage of nations and
individuals who pursued this self-defeating path of
hate. . . .  Over the bleached bones and jumbled residues
of numerous civilizations are written the pathetic words:
'Too l a t e . T h e  prophetic element in King's thought
was accentuated, by his conviction that the moral choices
facing mankind were being posed in a particularly pressing
form} the "fierce urgency of now" could not be eluded.^
"An oppressed people cannot remain oppressed forever? and
all over the globe the exploited and neglected coloured
peoples were breaking loose from "the Egypt of colonialism
and imperialism."^ The American civil rights struggle
was but a part of a worldwide freedom movement:
I see God working in this period of the Twentieth 
Century in a way that men, in some strange way, 
are responding— something is happening in our world. 
The masses of the people are rising up. And where- 
ever they are assembled today, whether they are in 
Johannesburg, South Africa; Nairobi, Kenya; Accra, 
Ghana . . .  or Memphis, Tennessee; the cry is 
always the same: 'We want to be free.' 36
There was an historical uniqueness about the age because
it was a time when, in the words of A.N. Whitehead,
"civilization is shifting its basic outlook," because "the
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pre-suppositions on which society is structured are being 
analyzed, sharply challenged, and profoundly changed."37 
The result of this shift in outlook was the death of 
racism and colonialism. Neo^-colonialism— of which King 
considered the American involvement in Vietnam to be a 
prime example— was a last, desperate attempt by the Vest 
to shore up the decaying structure of racist exploitation.^8 
But whereas in the past, popular demands for justice had 
never been sufficiently compelling to eliminate exploi­
tation, the present cries of the oppressed could no longer 
be ignored, and their demands could not be eluded: "if 
something isn't done, and in a hurry, to bring the colored 
peoples of the world out of their long years of poverty, 
the whole world is doomed."^ Similarly, the question of 
war and peace could no longer be hedged. Unless peace 
became a reality, mankind would "spiral down a militaris­
tic stairway into the hell of nuclear destruction."^
These were the challenges facing Western civiliza­
tion. If it failed to respond constructively, it would 
jo in  the civilizations of the past on "the junk heaps of 
destruction.
Xnve. Direct Action, and Reconciliation
Throughout his career King was labouring to bring 
about specific reforms: in Montgomery, the integration of 
the city bus line; in Birmingham, the desegregation of 
public accommodations; in Selma, access to the ballot box.
But King's vision of the future transcended the sum of 
these objectives: he sought not only to eliminate evil, 
hut also to effect a reconciliation between the oppressed 
and the oppressors. This was the purpose of love (agape), 
and the basis of philosophic nonviolence. King viewed the 
secular goals of the civil rights movement merely as 
means to a higher end, that of establishing brotherhood 
and community. "The basic, conflict is not really over 
the buses," he wrote in his first published article.
Philosophic nonviolence attacked the "basis of injustice_
man's hostility to man. . . .  If we live up to non­
violence in thought and deed, there will emerge an inter­
racial society based on freedom for all.*^
Herbert Warren Richardson has characterized King's 
philosophy of nonviolence as a "theology of reconcilia­
tion" because, as a method for effecting social change, 
it operated outside of, and above the self-perpetuating 
structure of ideological conflict.^ Opposition to evil 
must not be "symmetrical" but rooted in the higher ethic
, , hjtof love for the oppressor. It was for this reason that 
King rejected both Communism and capitalism in their con­
temporary manifestations. Each system represented a 
partial truth, but because they were locked in ideologi­
cal conflict with each other, the evils of both were 
strengthened and perpetuated.^ With this conflict, as 
with all such ideological conflicts, a "higher synthesis"
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must eliminate the evils of each, and combine the strengths 
of both.^
Violence could never achieve this kind of synthesis,
for it always engendered further conflict:
Through violence you may murder a murderer but you 
can't murder, murder. Through violence you may 
murder a liar but you can't establish truth. Through 
violence you may murder a hater, but you can't murder 
hate. Darkness cannot put out darkness. Only 
light can do that. 47
King thus rejected ethical relativism: moral ends could 
only come about through moral means because evil was located 
in the structures of society, rather than in individuals.
He did not deny the presence of evil within individuals_
he was no humanist— but, with Reinhold Niebuhr, he be­
lieved that groups and societies were far more immoral 
than individuals. Rather than consciously choosing to 
follow evil, human beings were locked into the evil 
structures of society, trapped within them, and imprisoned 
inside historical forces that perpetuated evil. Groups 
and societies Justified oppression by inventing fraudulent 
ideologies» of which racism was an obvious example; such 
ideologies eventually assumed an independent historical 
force, so that individuals became entrapped in "the 
bondage of myths and half-truths."^
Ccnsciously-chosen evil was certainly an ever­
present factor in the cold, deliberate perpetration of 
evil in history. Slavery was rooted in economic exploi­
tation; many of the latter-day defenders of segregation
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were motivated by "political expediency and economic gain."'50
nevertheless, the conscious evil of the small minority
could not endure without the "intellectual and spiritual
blindness" of the majority.^ The poor whites of the
South were also the inadvertent victims of racism, but
they were trapped in a structure of evil which their
"fears, prejudice, pride and irrationality" prevented them from 
52perceiving.-^
love and nonviolence was, claimed King, a method 
of social change that could "transform oppressors into 
friends," because "It is the“evil that the nonviolent 
resister seeks to defeat, not the persons victimized by 
the evil."^ Direct action, conducted in this spirit, 
would not“only eradicate specific social evils, but also 
educate the former evil-doer to reject the misguided 
beliefs that had led him to support the evil. It would 
lead bim to see the source of the evil, and to appreciate 
the irrationality of racism. It would demonstrate to poor 
whites, for example, that they were oppressed by exactly 
"the same forces that oppress Negroes in American society," 
and that "through blindness and prejudice, he ¿¡"sicj is 
forced to support his oppressor."^" Direct action motiva­
ted by love thus attacked the roots of evil, not merely 
its surface manifestations. It went beyond restraining 
evil behaviour: it taught people to positively embrace 
justice, to "obey the unenforceable."-5^  love would not 
only eliminate evil but also prevent either the oppressed
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or the oppressor from reacting with bitterness and hatred; 
the proliferation of evil would be halted and, through 
love, a “marvellous unity of God and man“ would "transform 
the old into the new and drive out the deadly cancer of 
sin."56
II. POWER AND MORALITY IN THE THEORY OP NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION
King’s theory of nonviolent direct action was shaped by 
many writers and thinkers, including Marx, Rauschenbusch, 
Hegel, and Tillich. The most seminal influences, however, 
were those of Reinhold Niebuhr and Mahatma Gandhi. The 
former imbued King’s thought with a sense of political 
realism, the latter suffused it with religious idealism; 
Niebuhr taught that morality must be backed up with power, 
even coercion; Gandhi insisted that power must be subordi­
nated to Truth, Love, and Nonviolence. The theory of non­
violent direct action thus incorporated both power and 
morality, and its practice contained elements of both 
pressure and persuasion.
King ' always insisted that power and morality were
inseparable; the one without the other was either impotent
57or destructive.But there was a constant tension in 
his thought between Niebuhrian realism and Gandhi an 
idealism; the latter predominated in the early part of his 
career, the former in the later years. When King first 
formulated and disseminated the theory of nonviolent
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resistance in the years after Montgomery, he placed a strong 
emphasis upon the power of love and nonviolence to persuade. 
Later, when the civil rights movement experienced the un­
yielding resistance of white racism in the Deep South, the 
practice of nonviolent direct action relied more and more 
upon coercion for, as Bayard Rustin observed in 1954, "the 
Negro community is no longer talcing Martin Luther King's 
brand of nonviolence."^ Later still, when King dis­
covered that racism was a national phenomenon, deeply- 
rooted and inflexible, he began to question the basic 
feasibility of persuasion, and exhibited a growing apprecia­
tion of the need for group power, political and economic.
Mahatma Gandhi and Satyagraha
As elaborated by King in his early writings and 
speeches, nonviolent resistance appeared to work by 
changing the heart of the oppressor. King approvingly 
quoted Gandhi's proposition that "Suffering is infinitely 
more powerful than the law of the ¿jungle for converting 
the opponent and opening his ears."^ Direct action, said 
King, was merely a means to "awaken a sense of moral shame 
in the opponent," thus enabling him to abandon his
gooppressive behaviour.
The central position of love (agape, or philosophic 
nonviolence) in King's philosophy of social action derived 
from the influence of Mahatma Gandhi. For Gandhi, non­
violence was not merely a practical method of behaviour, it
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was the very purpose of existence. Ahimsa ("inadequately 
rendered into English as non-violence") was not only a 
philosophical principle, it was, Gandhi contended, "the 
rule and breath of my life."0 It embraced Truth, self- 
abnegation, and humility; it was a "doctrine of selfless 
action." Satyagraha— a word coined by Gandhi— denoted
ahimsa in its active societal dimension. In its politi­
cal manifestation, Satyagraha meant non-co-operation, civil 
disobedience, strikes, and boycotts.6^
Surprisingly, King seems to have misinterpreted 
Niebuhr's critique of Gandhianism. Niebuhr did not argue 
that the Mahatma's methods lacked power, nor that they 
were flawed by a "naive trust in the power of love;" 
rather, he argued that nonviolence did not work in the
c jrmanner which Gandhi described. Satyagraha» claimed 
Niebuhr, was not really pure nonviolence at all, but a 
method of coercion, and its effects were similar to the 
effects of violence. These were unpalatable facts which 
Gandhi seemed reluctant to acknowledge.6^ King, like Gandhi, 
rarely dwelt on the elements of legal, economic, and 
physical pressure involved in nonviolent direct action, and 
attributed its success to the efficacy of love and suffering. 
He was wont to ascribe to nonviolence an almost supra- 
natural power, a "Soul Power" which could magically "disarm" 
policemen and state troopers, thereby defeating physical
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King's almost naive description of nonviolent direct 
action was deliberate. He consciously simplified complica­
ted ideas, communicating them in a way that Southern blacks, 
politically inexperienced but imbued with a deep religious 
tradition, could easily comprehend. Nevertheless, King 
never doubted that love possessed a kind of spiritual 
power, touching the conscience of the oppressor; he agreed 
with Gandhi that "The hardest fibre must melt in the fire 
of love."^ It was a belief which pervaded the civil 
rights movement in its formative years. "There was this 
very strong feeling we could change the hard-core segrega­
tionist attitudes and feelings," recalled John Lewis.
"There was /‘"sic._/ just a great many people who believed 
in that hope— what we later came to call the beloved 
community."^
If conversion of the oppressor was the end of non­
violent direct action, suffering was the means to that end. 
"Without suffering it is impossible to attain freedom," 
wrote Gandhi; "We must be willing to suffer and sacrifice," 
echoed King. 7 In its practical sense "suffering" simply 
signified a willingness to accept the consequences of civil 
disobedience. In its spiritual or religious sense, it 
reflected a belief in the redemptive power of unearned 
suffering. "Progress is to be measured by the amount of 
suffering undergone by the sufferer," stated Gandhi. "Hence 
did the sacrifice of Jesus suffice to free a sorrowing
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w o r l d . F o r  King, too, the life of Jesus "beautifully 
exemplified" the redemptive power of unmerited suffering; 
it was his constant and inexhaustible source of strength 
and inspiration.*^ If the resister conducted his struggle 
with humility and a cheerful acceptance of suffering, he 
would help to transform evil into good, "for when people 
get caught up with that which is right, and they are willing 
to sacrifice for it, there is no stopping-point short of 
victory."'7^  The source of King's philosophic nonviolence 
was the historic Jesus, who had taught that "only goodness 
can drive out evil and only love can conquer hate," but it 
was Gandhi who conclusively demonstrated that "the ethic 
of Jesus" could be a "powerful and effective social force
n-zon a large scale."
Re-fnhnld Neibuhr and Political Realism
Martin Luther King readily acknowledged his immense 
intellectual debt to the American theologian, Reinhold 
Niebuhr. He had taught King many things: the "false optimism" 
of liberalism; the propensity of groups, classes, races, 
and nations for "collective evil;" and the "reality of sin 
on every level of man's existence. Niebuhr looked at the 
world without the rose-coloured spectacles of Protestant 
liberalism. He perceived the clear relationship between 
morality and power: as the latter increased, so the former 
decreased. "The moral attitudes of privileged groups are 
characterized by universal self-deception and hypocrisy,"
75he wrote.'
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Niebuhr's emphasis on power complemented Gandhi's 
emphasis on love, and had a profound influence upon the 
theory and practice of nonviolent direct action. With 
Niebuhr, King saw that given the immoral tendencies 0f 
ruling elites, oppressed groups must always accompany their 
moral persuasion with power and pressure: "lamentably, it 
is a historical fact that privileged groups seldom give up 
their privileges voluntarily. . . . freedom is never given 
voluntarily by the oppressor; it must be demanded by the 
oppressed."7^ This historical fact showed theta belief in 
the "inevitability" of progress was tragically misconceived. 
Time had no inherent power to solve social problems; 
waiting merely postponed their solution, often exacerbating 
them through neglect. Time, unaided by human effort, tended 
to become an "ally of the insurgent and primitive forces 
of < . . social stagnation."7? After all, delay and
evasion were the favourite tactics of the segregationists, 
who were always "zealous and conscientious in using time for 
their evil purposes."7® The entrenched evils of racism and 
social inequality could only be uprooted by the persistent 
pressure of a mass movement.
Thus nonviolent direct action was informed by a re­
cognition of the need for power. Pure nonviolence, based 
solely upon "ethical, rational and emotional forces," could 
only end in failure, for as Niebuhr put it, "There is not 
enough imagination in any social group to render it amenable 
to the influence of pure love."7^ Whatever Gandhi might
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say or write, his method was a form of "negative physical 
resistance," or nonviolent coercion.^ In the real world, 
with the glaring reality of evil and oppression, any poli­
tical strategy based upon nonviolence would have to utilize 
physical as well as moral pressure; it would be "necessary
at times to sacrifice a degree of moral purity for politi-
81cal effectiveness." Gandhi knew this very well, said 
Niebuhr: his conduct of the non-co-operation campaigns 
showed that his religious idealism was qualified by an 
acute appreciation of political reality.
King, in his campaigns, also demonstrated a keen 
sense of the realities of power. He knew that love (agape) 
did not literally "convert" the oppressor; as Niebuhr 
pointed out, "Every effort to transfer a pure morality . . . 
to group relations has resulted in failure. The Negroes 
of America have practiced it consistently since the Civil 
War. • . . Yet they did not soften the hearts of their 
oppressors." The policy of moral appeals and peaceful 
persuasion had been tried by Booker T. Washington, and it 
had failed not because Washington was an accommodating 
TJhcle Tom, but because he had "under-estimated the structures 
of evil" in society. "Pressureless persuasion" could 
not change attitudes because privileged groups espoused 
ideologies which rationalized, as racism did, the oppression 
they systematically inflicted and profited by. Non­
violence could not immediately change the heart of the 
oppressor: the structure that sustained the evil had first
190
to be changed. Reconciliation between the oppressed and 
the oppressors was not immediately attainable, for the 
latter were the victims of blindness, prejudice, and 
false rideology: "When the underprivileged demand freedom, 
the privileged first react with bitterness and resistance."8^
It ■ was, therefore, unrealistic for the oppressed 
to wait, as President Eisenhower suggested, for a change 
in the attitudes of their oppressors. It might be true 
that "morality cannot be legislated," said King, but it 
was undeniable that "behaviour can be regulated;" it was 
impossible to pass a'law that commanded white people to 
love blades, but it was perfectly feasible to enact one 
which prevented white people from lynching them.®^ The 
prevention of racist behaviour was the 'best method of 
eradicating racist attitudes; the law changed habits, 
and new habits, new patterns of behaviour, gradually eroded 
old prejudices.®®
To this end, ethical appeals "must be undergirded 
by some foim of constructive coercive power," whether it 
be the ballot, the boycott, or the demonstration.®^ The 
critics of nonviolent direct action, said King, failed to 
see that it did utilize power and pressure: too often 
"love and power have been . . .  contrasted as opposites—  
polar opposites— so that love is identified with a resigna­
tion of power, and power with a resignation of love." But 
nonviolent direct action was not synonymous with non-
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resistance; it recognized that "love without power is
OQ
sentimental and anaemic." Nonviolent direct action was 
"active nonviolent resistance;" the use of power guided by- 
love, conscience, and morality. It was from Reinhold 
Niebuhr, as much as from Hegel or Gandhi, that King learnt 
that ethical appeals must always be accompanied by "tension," 
"crisis," and "nonviolent coercion.
III. COERCIVE POWER 3N THE PRACTICE OR NONVIOLENT 
DIRECT ACTION
The Economic Boycott
In her study of CORE, Inge Pbwell Bell found that 
most experienced civil rights activists considered non­
violent direct action to be an essentially coercive tactic, 
and frankly accepted it as such. They made little attempt 
to persuade the white community, and new members who showed 
an interest in doing so were regarded as extremely naive. ^  
The leaders of CORE, moreover, were fully aware of the
coercive nature of direct action, "and planned their cam-
91paigns accordingly."7
The economic boycott was the most obvious source of 
power that nonviolent direct action could utilize. Reinhold 
Jfiebuhr had long ago suggested that the boycott would en­
able blacks to gain "a degree of justice which neither moral
92suasion nor violence could gain."7 The civil rights move­
ment of the 1960's proved him correct. When used in con­
junction with sit-ins, pickets, and demonstrations, the
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"boycott could be highly effective. The Montgomery protest 
had been a boycott. The student sit-in movement refined 
and extended the tactic, renaming it "selective buying," 
and using it in a co-ordinated and skilfull manner, to 
reduce the profits of businesses that practiced segrega­
tion. At first aimed at selected chain-stores, pressure 
upon the white community was broadened and intensified by 
boycotting the white business community as a whole.^ This 
kind of boycott, a mass economic withdrawal, was pioneered 
by the Tuskegee Civic Association in the 1950's, and was 
imitated in scores of Southern cities.7 The SCIC employed 
it in all its major .campaigns; as King pointed out, "It 
was not the marching alone that brought about the inte­
gration of Birmingham's public facilities in 1963« The
downtown business establishments suffered for weeks
95under our almost unbelievably effective boycott. 7 
Flexible, simple in concept and operation, and relatively 
immune to white physical retaliation, the boycott was one 
of the mainstays of nonviolent direct action. "Always 
anchor our external direct action with the power of economic 
withdrawal," advised King; this was the way to put pressure 
"where it really hurts.
The power of the boycott should not, however, he 
exaggerated. Its success was largely confined to the 
Upper South and the Border States; in the Beep South, it 
was much less effective. Here, blacks were poorer, and in 
a city like Albany, Georgia, their power of economic with-
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drawal had little impact. In addition, the boycott could 
be a double-edged sword; it was also the favourite weapon 
of the White Citizens Councils, and wherever black 
business was dependent upon white credit, the white communi­
ty could retaliate with effect. Finally, those in power 
in the Deep South were often prepared to endure whatever 
economic hardships the boycott may produce, for the sake 
of preserving white supremacy.
The Power of Disruption
Southern segregationists, wrote King, often yielded 
to the demands of the civil rights movement "because they 
realized that the alternatives could be intolerable."^ 
Nonviolent direct action— the sit-in and the boycott— could 
disrupt the normal life of a community. Sit-ins disrupted 
the business of a store, a restaurant, a motel, or a 
cinema; demonstrations disrupted the everyday routine of 
the central city; and both severely taxed the resources of 
the police. Moreover, whenever direct action was employed, 
there was a risk of attendant disorder and violence. Sit- 
ins and demonstrations invariably attracted white on­
lookers, who were wont to turn into hostile mobs. They 
also tended to attract black onlookers who, untrained in 
the discipline of nonviolence, were less prepared to remain 
passive in the face of white attacks. Violence in self- 
defense was not at all uncommon in.the South; it occurred 
in Jacksonville (1961 and 1964), Chattanooga (I960), Albany
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(1961), Savannah (1963), and Americus ( 1 9 6 5 ) . Direct 
action could unleash such tensions and hostilities as to 
bring about a virtual breakdown of law and order.
Very few white Southerners were prepared to openly 
support integration but, as Charles Morgan, Jr., remarked, 
"When the Southern way of life becomes too expensive, the 
Southern way of life is dead."99 Just as the boycott
damaged present business, so disruption threatened future 
economic expansion. A city with bad "race relations" and 
a reputation for violence deterred investment and tourism, 
and in cities like Dallas, Atlanta, Charlotte, and Memphis, 
the business elite opted for token desegregation, rather 
than suffer the economic damage which continued direct 
action could inflict.^®
When King threatened to "turn Albany upside down," 
and when Wyatt Walker proposed to "literally immobilize 
the nation," they were frankly acknowledging the coercive 
element in nonviolent direct a c t i o n . I t s  purpose, 
wrote King, was to create tension, and bring about a 
situation "so crisis-packed that it will inevitably open 
the door to negotiation." The demonstration was a
powerful weapon in this regard; it violated the rules 
and conventions of white supremacy to such an extent that 
the simple act of marching was tantamount to open rebell­
ion. "When Negroes took over the streets and the shops," 
wrote King, "southern society shook to its roots.
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Nevertheless, as with the boycott, the disruptive 
power of nonviolent direct action was limited. An over­
whelming majority of blacks wholeheartedly supported the 
objectives and tactics of the civil rights movement,but 
only a small proportion actively participated in it. Some 
forms of direct action, it is true, involved vast numbers. 
Hundreds of thousands of children and parents took part 
in the New York and Chicago school boycotts; the March 
on Washington attracted a quarter of a million; and as 
many as one million attended demonstrations in Northern 
cities. In the South, however, where "merely to
march in public was to rock the status quo to its roots," 
the numbers involved in direct action were relatively 
small, and the number willing to go to jail even smaller.10^ 
The Southern Regional Council estimated that some 70,000 
took part in the student sit-in movement, of whom 4,000 
were imprisoned; three years later, over five times that 
number went to jail; and Newsweek found that of the 
Southern blacks it interviewed, eleven per cent had marched 
in demonstrations, and six per cent had been jailed.
This was a magnificent achievement in view of the 
physical danger and economic hardship that direct action 
often entailed. These figures nonetheless over-represented 
the coercive power of nonviolent direct action. "Though 
millions of Negroes were ardent and passionate supporters," 
wrote King, "only a modest number were actively engaged."1®^
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Massive demonstrations— a thousand people or more in 
Southern terms— were the exception rather than the rule.
For the vast majority, moreover, participation in direct 
action was intermittent; "support waxed and waned, and 
people became conditioned to action in crises hut inaction
T AO
from clay to day." Those prepared to march, picket, and
go to jail over and over again were, for obvious reasons,
a tiny minority, and King— who was in a position to know_
was undoubtedly correct when, he observed that "The brunt of 
the Negro's . . . battles was borne by a very small striking 
force."10^ Comparing its theory with its practice, Anne 
Braden concluded that nonviolent direct action was "an idea 
that wasn't tried.
The effect of low participation was to some extent 
mitigated by the fact that a small group of people could 
cause a large amount of disruption. The average COEE chapter 
(a membership organization, unlike SNCC or the SCIC) con­
sisted of between twenty and fifty members, but they were 
usually dedicated actives, who were prepared to sit-in and 
picket for months, even years, if n e c e s s a r y . T h u s  Bayard 
Bustin exaggerated only slightly when he asserted that 
"any fifty Negroes who are prepared to sit down on their
backsides over and over again can . . .  make a breakthrough
112in public accommodations."
The effectiveness of this type of direct action was 
largely determined, however, by the level of black voter 
registration. Where black registration was high, a poli-
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tical sanction, was added to the disruptive power of direct 
action. Where registration levels were low, direct action 
could he crushed with impunity. Like the economic boy­
cott, direct action was thus most successful in the Upper 
South, with the exception of such Deep South cities as 
New Orleans, Atlanta, Savannah, and Charleston, where signi­
ficant black electorates existed.11^ In Alabama, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, northern Louisiana, and south­
west Georgia, the black vote was "relatively small or 
non-existent," and here direct action made very few inroads
into the monolithic structure of segregation and white 
114-supremacy.
IV. THE ETHICAL APPEAL OP NONVIOLENT DIRECT ACTION
The Problem of Powerlessness
Critics of nonviolent direct action contended that 
integration could only come about "through political 
power— not through moral suasion, In cities like
Albany, however, and throughout much of the Deep South, 
blacks had no political power. In Dougherty County,
Georgia (Albany), black voter registration was only twenty 
per cent, although blacks made up forty per cent of the 
total population. In many of the surrounding counties,
the situation was worse. In Baker County, for example, 
not a single black was registered to vote, although blacks 
outnumbered whites by a wide margin; a similar state of 
affairs existed in Lee, Terrell, and Sumter Counties.
198
In southwest Georgia, direct action carried with it no 
political sanctions, and as King pointed out, "You don't 
win against a political power structure when you don't
have the votes.
In the Deep South, the disruptive power of direct 
action could hardly he described as "coercive." Demonstra­
tions were regularly crushed by injunctions from local 
courts and, as often as not, such injunctions were supported 
by the federal courts. In Albany, St. Augustine, Gadsden, 
Tuscaloosa, Danville, and Selma local movements were 
brought to a halt as federal judges sent civil rights 
cases back to local courts, and refused to dissolve in­
junctions issued by those courts.11^ And in the absence 
of any restraint from the federal judiciary, local and 
state police were free to disperse demonstrations with 
dogs, fire-hoses, tear-gas, cattle-prods, and mass arrests; 
jail civil rights workers and local activists; and 
institute a reign of terror over the black community as a 
whole. Faced with this kind of repression, local direct 
action movements soon disintegrated, as fewer and fewer 
people were willing to march, go to jail, and suffer 
physical brutality and economic privation. As Fred 
Shuttlesworth remarked "if the mobs don't stop you, the 
police can. And if the police can't, then the courts
will. «120
If the civil rights movement in the Deep South 
lacked political, economic, and disruptive sanctions, the
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intransigent resistance and pitiless violence it encounter­
ed demonstrated its powerlessness to touch, the heart and 
conscience of the white oppressor. King himself came 
perilously close to admitting the 'bankruptcy of love, 
suffering, and moral suasion as he pondered the aftermath 
of the Birmingham campaign:
If humane people . . .  hoped that a sense of atonement 
would quicken the pace of constructive change, the hope was destined to die a cold death. Instead the 
small beginnings of good will seemed to wither. . . .  
the poverty of conscience of the white majority was 
most clearly illustrated at the funeral of the child 
martyrs. No white officials attended. No white 
faces could be seen . . .  More than children were 
buried that day; honor and decency were also interred. ^
Nonviolent Direct Action and the National Cbnscience
Samuel Iubell noted in 1964 that "Getting bloodied 
and beaten" was "an essential part of the'strategy of non­
violence," because it showed that "segregation can no 
longer be enforced in the South except by constant police 
repression." In the Deep South, with few exceptions, 
white communities were perfectly willing to pay such a 
price, and the civil rights movement made very few gains 
indeed. But if whites in the Deep South were so imprisoned 
by racist ideology that they were immune to Satyagraha. a 
significant number of Northern whites were shocked and 
outraged by the violence they saw inflicted upon non­
violent demonstrators. By the time of the Albany defeat it 
had become clear that the oppressor could be neither con­
verted nor coerced; the strategic problem of the civil
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right s.:movement was, therefore, that of molilizing 
Northern opinion so as to bring about federal interven­
tion in the South. For the most part devoid of power, 
the movement had to discover a way 0f by-passing the 
white-controlled political and judicial institutions of 
the South; excluded from the conventional channels of 
redress, the movement had to "short-circuit" the political 
system by directly drawing upon the power of the federal 
government.
The SCIC, of all the civil rights organizations, 
most clearly perceived the utility of overt police bru­
tality and mob violence in bringing about federal inter­
vention. The ugliest forms of repression could, if exposed, 
dramatized, and publicized, be turned into a powerful ally 
of the civil rights movement. ”If they let us march,” wrote 
King, "they admit their lie that the black man was content. 
If they shot us down, they told the world they were in­
human brutes.
Intelligent Southern whites like Albany Chief of 
Police Iaurie Pritchett, Selma Director of Public Safety 
Wilson Baker, and Mayor of Birmingham Albert Boutwell, 
realized the advantages of keeping the police on a tight 
rein, and of dispersing demonstrations with an absolute 
minimum of violence. These men tended to represent the 
business elements of the South, rather than the rural 
"redneck? or poor white population, and, although
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equally opposed to integration, abhorred the use of violent 
methods because they attracted bad publicity which deterred 
outside investment,& furthered the possibility of federal 
civil rights legislation. In Selma, Birmingham, and a 
host of Southern cities, the leadership of the white 
community was bitterly divided into "the stubbornly old- 
fashioned and reluctantly modem groups, though both were 
segregationist." The aim of the latter group was to
prevent the forces of law and order from responding to 
demonstrations with fire-hoses, police-dogs, tear-gas, 
cattle prods, and hilly-clubs, thus forestalling unfavourable 
national publicity, defeating local civil rights movements, 
and preserving white supremacy. Albany had set the pattern 
for this type of action.
The SCIC, therefore, consciously elected to confront 
that most unintelligent and violent of police forces.
Police brutality became a sought-after commodity because, 
as the files of lime, Newsweek, and the New York Times 
show, press coverage of the civil rights movement was pro­
portionate to the amount of violence inflicted upon it.
As August Meier observed in 1964, the SCIC tended to 
"precipitate police violence and brutality in order to 
focus national and international attention on and obtain 
federal intervention in the South, This strategy had
always been part of the theory of nonviolent direct action.
If the oppressor employed violence to crush nonviolent 
protests, "He will be forced to stand before the world and
20 2 .
God splattered with the blood . . .  of his Negro brother," 
King had contended in 1956. ° He had originally hoped
that the willingness of blacks to accept suffering would 
"cause the oppressor to become ashamed of his own methods."1^ 7 
When, however, it became apparent that the conscience of 
the oppressor was impervious to the ethical appeal of 
nonviolence, the conscience of the nation as a whole 
became the target for Satvagraha.
The theory of nonviolent direct action assumed that 
white America would respond to a moral appeal of suffici­
ently compelling purity: "public support is magnetically 
attracted to the advocates of nonviolence, while those 
who employ violence are literally disarmed by overwhelming
Tposentiment against their stand." Nonviolence, King 
believed, would arouse the conscience of the "great decent 
majority," who were sincerely committed to the ideals of 
democracy and equality but who, either "through blindness, 
fear, pride, or irrationality have allowed their consciences 
to sleep."  ^ Racism, it was implied, was— at least in 
its most virulent form— a phenomenon of the South, deplored 
and detested by the rest of the nation. When racists 
Unleashed violence against nonviolent demonstrators,
"Americansof conscience in the name of decency demand 
federal intervention and legislation."1^0 Thus the fire­
hoses and police dogs of Bull Connor, and the tear-gas and 
billy-clubs of A1 lingo and Jim Clark, galvanized public 
opinion behind the civil rights movement, and helped propel
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the Civil Eights Act and the Voting Eights Act through the 
Congress and into the statute book. As John 3?. Kennedy 
cynically remarked to King on one occasion in 1963: "Our 
¿judgement of Bull Connor should not be too harsh. After 
all . . .  he has done a good deal for civil rights 
legislation this year."*^
V. CONCLUSION: NONVIOLENT DIEECT ACTION IN THEOET 
AND PEACTICE
Nonviolent direct action, King believed, was a means of 
educating white America. If the evil of racism were 
fully comprehended by the North, public pressure from 
“the millions of Americans across the nation" would force 
the government to act on the movement's b e h a l f . N o n ­
violent direct action exposed and dramatized the depravity 
of racism; it
dissolves the deceptive facade and reveals basic 
evils and contradictions in the society. Tens of 
millions a decade ago were ignorant of the actual 
conditions of life of the Negro . . . Until 
there was awareness, there could be no consensus 
to make corrections. 133
The persistence of societal evils, said King, was at least 
partially attributable to ignorance. Knowledge would 
lead to their elimination. The purpose of nonviolent 
demonstrations was to show “in magnified strokes . . .  who 
was the evildoer and who was the v i c t i m . T h u s  non­
violent direct action and democracy were "self-renewing 
and creative;" as the former exposed and dramatized in-
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justice and evil "the nation and the world were sickened 
and through national legislation wiped out a thousand 
Southern laws, ripping gaping holes in the edifice of 
segregation." ^ 5
In formulating the strategy of nonviolent direct
action, King made two basic assumptions about the society
he lived in. The first was that racism was "an idea
that is out of harmony with the basic idea of the nation.”1^6
The second was that "the vast majority of Americans . . .
support and approve" the methods of nonviolent direct 
137action. These were assumptions, however, of only limited 
validity.
The Decline of Racist Ideology
In 1964, citing a Newsweek poll, King contended that:
those whites without a vested interest in segrega­
tion have found acceptable exactly the changes that 
the nonviolent demonstrations ^resentas their 
central demands. Those objectives Negroes have 
dramatized, fought for and defined have clearly 
become fair and reasonable demands to the white 
population, both North and South.138
White racist ideology had continually declined since the
first opinion polls on the subject were conducted in the
1940's. White support for integrated schools, for example,
increased from 30 per cent in 1942, to 70 per cent in
1 9 6 3 Opposition to integration was rapidly declining,
by varying degrees, in every field of life. It was a
decline which reflected a growing recognition that blacks
were, indeed, the victims of discrimination. In 1946,
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only 25 per cent of whites were prepared to support this 
proposition; 61 per cent were willing to do so in 1963.
By the latter year, less than a quarter of whites professed 
an objection to contact with "blacks in employment, schools, 
and public accommodations.1^1 Substantial majorities, 
moreover, were prepared to support civil rights legislation 
which would guarantee to blacks voting rights, fair em­
ployment practices, and the desegregation of public 
142 -facilities. It was not, therefore, surprising that King 
should have been firmly confident that black America's ' 
demand for equality "far from alienating America's white 
citizens, brought them into closer harmony with its Negro 
citizens than ever before."1^  And by 1964, he felt that 
the task of eliminating overt racism had been almost 
accomplished, and that "race and color prejudice-will have 
all but disappeared • .'. in the next five years.
The Persistence of White Racism
Lerone Bennett once asserted that "There are no 
degrees of racism," just as one could not be "a little bit 
pregnant.“1^  However, white attitudes were hot so clear- 
cut: as the 1963 Newsweek survey found, whites supported 
black demands— "up'to a point." White racism, it 
discovered, was*"widespread and deeply-rooted . . . 
extending in some degree to the vast majority of ordinary, 
well-meaning Americans."1^
In 1953, Gordon Allport had found that one in five 
white Americans was an outspoken racist, and three in five
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could be described as "conforming bigots."148 A decade 
later these proportions had not markedly changed.
Newsweek found that a fifth of white Americans were "hard­
core" racists, psychologically incapable of admitting 
the notion of racial equality.14^  But overt racism was 
by no means confined to this group: racist stereotypes 
were so prevalent that, when measured against the demands 
and aspirations of blacks, "the only conclusion to draw 
would be that America is on'the threshold of a bloody 
race war."1^0 The most significant manifestation of 
overt white racism was opposition to open housing. A 
majority of whites were firmly against the idea, whilst
even more expressed distaste at the prospect of black 
151neighbours. ^ This desire to maintain residential segre­
gation, observed Samuel Lubell, was "the strongest source 
of white resistance to Negroes in the North."152 It was 
upon this rock of white racism that the civil'rights move­
ment ultimately broke.
The contradiction between the belief of whites in 
equal opportunity in principle, and "the personal aversions 
to Negroes so many of them apparently feel" in practice, 
was'rationalized in several, subtle ways.1^  One was in 
opposition to the pace of racial change. Throughout the 
1960's, opinion polls revealed that most whites considered 
the speed of racial change "too fast," and the demands of 
the civil rights movement "too much."1^4 The black demand
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for equality did not evoke a sympathetic response; by 1966, 
85 per cent of whites felt that civil rights progress was 
too fast.155 “During the 1960's," wrote Jerome Skolnick, 
"assertive attempts to achieve . . .  equality of oppor­
tunity have met with the disfavor of a majority of 
Americans."156
Opposition to the methods of the civil rights move­
ment disguised another reservoir of white racism. King's 
claim, made after Selma, that the vast majority of Americans 
supported nonviolent direct action, was wildly inaccurate.
On the contrary, it received very little support from the 
white community as a whole, which deemed demonstrations 
harmful, not helpful, to the cause of civil rights.15*'7 
Freedom Rides, sit-ins, picketing, and going to jail also 
met with strong white disapproval.15® Indeed, between 
55 and 45 per cent of whites could not distinguish between 
the nonviolent conduct of the civil rights movement, and 
the violent response of its opponents, perceiving non­
violent direct action to be a "violent" tactic.15^ As far 
as most whites were concerned,'the demonstration was 
only slightly less disagreeable than the riot.1®® In 
the light of such statistics, it is doubtful if nonviolent 
direct action increased overall public support for the 
civil rights movement; "It was almost as though every time 
defiant Negroes came into the homes of white Americans on 
television, millions of white people leered right back 
at the tube."161
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The Dynamics of Racial Change in the 1960»b
If it were true that nonviolent direct action was 
nnot an effective means of increasing public support for 
the goals of the movement," why were the civil rights acts 
passed at all? If one believes, with Stokely Carmichael, 
that this legislation changed "virtually nothing," then 
there is no need for an explanation.162 In 1967, King was 
conceding that the overall impact of the 1964-1965 legisla­
tion had been superficial. It had dealt merely with the 
outward badges of inequality, not its structural realty; 
it had struck at the cultural and political aspects of 
white supremacy, n0t the economic. "The practical cost of 
change for the nation . . .  has been'cheap. The limited 
reforms have been obtained at bargain rates," and for 
this reason they had been conceded by white America with 
relative willingness.1^  Even so» when "the recording of 
the law in itself is treated as the reality of the reform," 
its impact was considerably blunted.1^  Half-hearted and 
intermittent enforcement made the civil rights acts little 
more than the shadow of racial change.
nevertheless, the effects of 1964-1965 legislation 
were gradual and cumulative. El the perspective of over 
a decade it is possible to agree with King that the civil 
rights laws, although limited, superficial, and inadequately 
enforced, marked the beginning of the end of Southern 
segregation. The question still has to be answered: why 
were those laws passed; were they really "written in the
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streets of the South"?10^
The Black Electorate in the North
1*1 1964 there were six million registered black 
voters, two-thirds of whom lived in the North.1€^  Ad­
mittedly, that vote had achieved little "in terms of 
substantive gains for the Negro," but in an increasing 
number of Northern cities and states the black vote had 
the power to "swing" e l e c t i o n s . A s  the white ethnic 
minorities became increasingly affluent and moved to the 
suburbs, their allegiance to the Democratic party 
weakened, making blacks a much more important constituent 
of the Democractic "coalition." In New York, for
example, the black share of the Democratic plurality 
increased from 9 pen cent in 1957» to 36 per cent in 1961. 
The 1963 victories of Mayor Tata in Philadelphia, and 
Mayor Daley in Chicago, were won with a minority of the 
white v o t e s . I n  national elections, too, the black 
vote could be decisive, for it was concentrated in seven, 
politically crucial, Northern industrial states, and 
had provided the margin of victoiy for Truman in 1948, 
and Kennedy in I960.1'70 Even in 1964, although Johnson
would have won without the black vote, four Southern
171states would have gone Republican without it, ( As 
William Brink and Louis Harris observed, whereas the 
Republicans could do without it, "the Democrats must have 
a massive Negro vote to win elections."1'7^
21 0 .
The civil rights legislation of 1964-1965 (as well 
as the War 0n Poverty) was the price a Democratic admini­
stration had to pay for its black support. This legis­
lative "pay-off” was, however, contingent upon the extent 
to which concessions could be made to the Democratic 
party's black supporters without alienating its white ones. 
Por a party made up of "Negroes and people who hate 
•Negroes," race was an explosive issue, and as the civil 
rights movement spread t0 the North, white resistance to 
black demands led to massive white defections from the1 rp-z
Democratic party. Democratic politicians were well 
aware of the depth of white racism in the North: it was 
there for all to see in the defeat of open housing measures 
in nine states; in the vote accorded to George Wallace in 
the Wisconsin, Maryland, and Indiana primaries; and in 
the almost unanimous white opposition (as recorded by 
opinion polls) to such proposals as school busing and 
preferential hiring f0r blacks.1^
Polls commissioned by the Democratic National 
committee in 1964 showed that while racism had the poten­
tial to cause massive defections from the Democratic party, 
as yet it was still a "protest" vote, which spent itself 
in local, not national'elections.The integration of 
public accommodations, the enforcement of voting rights, 
and the desegregation of Southern schools were measures 
specific to the South, and they met with the approval of 
the Northern white majority. The Johnson administration
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thus felt free to make these legislative concessions to 
the civil rights movement, confident that they would n0t 
seriously damage its political support.
Hpayiplent Direct Action as a Means of Forcing the Issue
"For the politician,» wrote the political scientist 
James Q. Wilson, "politics involves attaining office and 
governing, and it ought to he possible . . . t0 exclude 
many issues from its purview."1^6 King knew the truth 
of this insight, and recognized the need to raise issues 
in such a way that politicians could n0t avoid or ignore 
them. "The federal government reacts to events more 
quickly'when a situation of conflict cries out for its 
resolution," he wrote. Nonviolent direct action, 
as practised by the SCLC, sought to create ¿just such 
"conflict situations."
Critics of the SCIC accused it of deliberately 
provoking police brutality and mob violence. James For­
man of SNCC recalled the scene of ¿jubilation in the SCIC 
head-quarters in Birmingham, after police-dogs and fire­
hoses had been turned on the demonstrators; "Dorothy 
Cotton and Wyatt Walker were jumping up and down, elated. 
They said over and over again, 'We've got a movement, we've 
got a movement. We had some police brutalityl'"^78 
Walker, in particular, keenly appreciated the propaganda 
value of police violence. In his plan for the 1964 
Atlanta campaign, he explicitly stated that the demonstra-
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tions should seek to bring about a breakdown in police 
discipline. Although "police conduct will be exemplary," 
he wrote, persistent pressure "will cause it to break."'^ 
Ih what sense did nonviolent direct action deli­
berately "provoke" white violence? Certain forms of 
direct action carried with them a strong possibility of 
physical injury. The night march, for example, was an 
extremely dangerous tactic, which invariably attracted 
white attackers. Some of the tactics employed in the 
Atlanta campaign of January 1964— lying under the wheels
of police vans and going limp upon arrest— seemed calcu-
IflOlated to exhaust the patience of the police. By 1963,
nonviolent tactics were being used in an increasingly
aggressive'manner, rather than in a spirit of love for
the oppressor. Demonstrators often engaged in "subtle
provocations," wrote one observer. "They offer their
181'cheek* with the prospect of receiving a slap." Many 
whites who regarded themselves as sincere friends of the 
civil rights movement agreed with the New York Times 
that "Nonviolence that deliberately provokes violence
1 Q pis a logical contradiction."
Although King admitted that the goals of the civil 
rights movement were considerably furthered when "racists 
resist by unleashing violence against nonviolent demon­
strators," he insisted that the movement could not be 
logically blamed for the violence of its racist opponents:
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"the oppressed person who agitates for his rights is a0t the 
creator of tension. He merely brings out the hidden tension 
that is already alive."182 In the classic defense of non­
violent direct action contained in Letter From Birmingham 
City Jail. King asserted that to blame peaceful demonstra­
tors for the violent reactions of their oppressors was 
like "condemning the robbed man because his possession 0f 
money precipitated the evil act of robbery."^8Z|'
Apart from this moral argument, however, King well 
knew that if the federal government was willing to prefer 
order to justice, it would choose justice over anarchy and 
racial massacre. .Blatant and calculated defiance of 
federal law, and conscienceless brutality toward nonviolent 
demonstrators were the surest ways of bringing about 
federal intervention in the South. The most successful 
examples of nonviolent direct action, such as the Freedom 
Hides and the Selma campaign, brought both these elements 
out into the open, transforming the issue from a conflict 
between blacks and whites in the South, to a legal and 
political confrontation between the state of Alabama and
h.
the national government. As the state of Alabama could 
not secede from the Union, and as the federal government 
could not afford to countenace open rebellion, the result 
of such confrontation could go only one way. Federal 
intervention in this kind of situation was rendered less 
painful by. the fact that it was not politically detrimental
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outside the South.18'’ Thus nonviolent direct action 
was a way of forcing the issue, demonstrating that order 
and segregation were mutually exclusive options.
The pressuJP for federal intervention was augmented 
"by the ever-present threat of black violence. The main­
tenance of nonviolent discipline was always a difficulty 
in demonstrations. The danger was not so much from the 
demonstrators themselves but, as noted above, from black 
onlookers who, incensed at the white aggression they 
witnessed, were perfectly willing to fight back in self- 
defense. Moreover, there was always the danger that if 
the demands of the civil rights movement were not met, 
black frustration and bitterness would turn to destruct­
ive rage. The possibility of violent black uprisings 
haunted the minds of white leaders in the North and the 
Upper South, and the spokesmen of the civil rights 
movement, especially King, were adept at exploiting their 
fears. If nonviolent demonstrations failed to achieve 
reforms, warned King, black disappointment ”will come out 
in ominous expressions of violence.” He added that he 
was not issuing a threat, but merely citing "a fact of 
history."188 Nevertheless, King and other black leaders 
had a vested interest in what Ralph Ellison termed "nega­
tive propaganda."18'7 The warning "Deal with us or the 
radicals will take over" was not so much, as Lerone 
Bennett charged, a symptom, of "programmatic poverty," but 
a reflection of the fact that the influence and legitimacy
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of "black leaders depended entirely upon their ability to 
produce tangible results. So they offered their own 
moderate, responsible, nonviolent leadership^against 
the extreme, irresponsible, and violent leadership of, 
for example, the black nationalists. If white America 
did not grant concessions to the former, blacks would 
desert to the latter, "a development that will lead 
inevitably to a frightening racial n i g h t m a r e . T h e  
civil rights acts of 1964 and 1965 were intended not so 
much to realize King's dream as to prevent his nightmare.
White Participation in the Civil Rights Movement
"There is a dangerous silence today which unin­
tentionally encourages evil to flourish," said King 
in 1965- The silence of the people of goodwill was even 
more of a problem than the bigotry and hate of the evildoer. 
A decade earlier, that silence had enabled the segregation­
ists to frustrate school integration. It was, therefore, 
imperative, King had written in 1958» for the "moral 
forces of the nation" to rally behind the drive for equality. 
Statements of sympathy and support were not enough* active 
participation in, and support of the civil rights move­
ment was required. The federal government, Northern 
■white liberals, Southern white moderates, and the labour 
movement must "rise above the reiteration of generalities 
begin to take an active part in changing the face of 
the nation."1^1 The church had a special responsibility
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to support the struggle for brotherhood. It was in a 
unique position to educate white Southerners out of their 
bigotry, to desegregate their own congregations, and to 
"lead men from the darkness of falsehood and fear to the 
light of truth and love."19^
Five years later, King expressed bitter disappointment 
with the lack of white support for the civil rights move­
ment, in a document which Reese Cleghom termed "a declara­
tion of black independence." In Letter From Birmingham 
Citz; Jail, King lamented the inability of white "moderates" 
to understand, let alone aid, the movement. The white 
moderate, he sadly concluded, was a greater obstacle than 
the White Citizens Councils or the Ku Klux Klan.193 But 
his greatest disappointment was reserved for the church.
He had once believed that "because our cause was so just, 
we could be sure that the white ministers of the South 
. . .  would rise to our aid. . . .  I ended up, of course, 
chastened and disillusioned."194 All too often, the white 
churches mouthed "pious irrelevancies anfl sanctimonious 
trivialities;" worse still, the church as a whole had 
become "the arch-supporter of the status quo."19^
Finally, in the summer of 1963, thousands of whites 
began to take part in demonstrations. Many even went to 
jail. In the wake of the Birmingham campaign, a black- 
white alliance was formed, which gave to the civil rights 
movement the additional momentum it required. It was a 
“coalition of conscience," said Andrew Young, consisting of
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"labor, civil rights, young white college students, and
church people•" It was due to the pressure of this
informal alliance that the legislative break-throughs
of 1964-1965 came about. ^ 6
The number of whites who participated in the civil
rights movement was extremely small. Nevertheless, it
was only in 1964 that CORE became a predominantly black
organization. SNCC was always largely black, but a
handful of dedicated whites served as full-time field
workers, and hundreds of white student volunteers aided
SNCC's work in Mississippi between 1963 and 1965.
The SCIC also utilized white students in its SCOPE
project of 1 9 6 5 « In addition, countless thousands
of whites marched in demonstrations throughout the
nation, with massive sympathy marches occurring in the
North in the summer of 1963 and the spring of 1965.^^
By 1964, however, white participation in the
civil rights movement had become an issue of controversy.
Many in SNCC and COEE argued for an all-black movement,
believing that the presence of whites reinforced the
racist stereotype of black incompetency. Only blacks,
201it was argued, could "relate" to the black community.
Eventually, in 1967» SNCC and CORE excluded whites from
membership, at the same time denying that they weremo-
202tivated by racism. It was not only advocates of 
Black Power that questioned the need for white partici­
pation. Bayard Rustin, for example, claimed that while
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spiritually desirable, it was not necessary: "not one white 
person1 was needed to integrate public accommodations in 
the South. By 1965, the civil rights movement was 
being »taken over” by local black communities, and whites 
were no longer required unless they possessed sought-after 
skills; as one observer put it, "simply being there« was
P04no longer enough.
On balance, white participation was far from detri­
mental to the movement. In the early days of the move­
ment, integrated teams of civil rights workers directly 
violated the most sacred racial taboos of the South: this 
was a vital step in the ultimate destruction of white 
supremacy. While it was often argued that white volunteers, 
if insensitive and patronizing, only bolstered the myth 
of black inferiority, the reverse was usually the case.
B7 publicly identifying with the civil rights movement, 
they punctured the myth of white superiority. Secondly, 
it was a grim fact of racism that «when blacks and 
whites die together in the cause of (justice, the death 
of the white person gets more attention and concern than 
the death of the black person. "205 iea<iers 0f SNOC
and the SC3XJ were well aware that the presence of white 
volunteers was the surest method of publicizing Southern 
violence. The seventy blacks who died at the hands of 
white racists between 1955 and 1966 received considerably 
less attention than the five whites who lost their lives 
in 1964 and 1965-206
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Many of "tils whites who volunteered foi* service
in SNCC and COEE were looked upon with disfavour_even
disgust— by a society .that was still infused with McCarthy- 
isra, and narrow cultural conformity. Their commitment to 
racial equality was often obscured by the fact that they 
wore sandals and beards, professed pacifism, refused to 
condemn Communists, and expressed open contempt for the 
prevailing values of their society.
The SCIC, on the other hand, attracted the more 
"respectable" whites: clergymen, trade union leaders, 
and nationally prominent politicians. King was especially 
successful in attracting clerical support. Clergymen 
of all races and creeds augmented SC1C demonstrations in 
Albany, St Augustine, Selma, and C h i c a g o . S e l m a  was 
especially notable for white clerical participation. When 
King appealed to the churches for support, approximately 
four hundred nuns, priests, ministers, and rabbis con-
p A Overged on Selma. Many of the Roman Catholics had
come without episcopal approval and, as Charles Pager
noted, for nuns to take part in civil rights demonstrations
was an ”unprecedented event in American C a t h o l i c i s m . " ^ ^
This kind of clerical presence, which included bishops,
archbishops, denominational heads, and divinity school
professors, gave the civil rights movement a legitimacy
pnri moral authority which— in white eyes— it might
210otherwise have lacked.
White political and financial support was even
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more important to the movement than white participation. 
With the exception of the NAACP, all the major civil 
rights organizations were dependent upon white financial 
contributions. Apart from the thousands of individual 
contributors, philanthropic foundations and labour 
unions played an important role in financing the move­
ment. The Vote Education Project, and the SCLO's Citi­
zenship Education Program, were both funded by the Field
211and Taconic foundations. Northern universities were
212an important source of funds for SNCC. Certain labour
unions, notably the Teamsters, the United Auto Workers,
anri the United Packinghouse Workers, were significant
contributors to the various organizations which made
213up the civil rights movement. ^ Eesented though it was 
by many hack activists, the financial base of the move­
ment was largely white. Politically, too, the support 
of the major religious denominations, Northern univer­
sities, the liberal wing of the Democratic ’ party, and the 
AFL-CIO was crucial in bringing about the passage of 
the 1954 and 1965 civil rights acts.
The hundreds of whites who flocked to Selma, and 
the thousands who later trekked to Montgomery, led King, 
on his own admission, to overestimate the amount of 
support that white Americans accorded to the civil rights 
movement:
As I stood . . .  and saw white and Negro, nuns and 
priests, ministers and rabbis, labor organizBrs, 
lawyers, doctors, housemaids and shopworkers ...
/Continued
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I knew I was seeing a microcosm of the mankind 
of the future in this moment of luminous 
genuine brotherhood. But these were the best 
of America. Elsewhere the commitment was 
shallower. . . .  Justice at its deepest level had but few stalwart champions. 214
By 19^6, the white backlash, the war in Vietnam, mv)
Black Power had caused white support for the civil rights 
movement to melt away. But between 1963 and 1965, the 
influence of its white supporters, even though a small 
minority of whites as a whole, was magnified by two 
factors. Firstly, they were concentrated among the 
nation's educational, economic, and political elite—  
that vague but real class that is condescendingly 
referred to as "the Eastern liberal establishment." This 
class held a position of inordinate power in the Kennedy 
pnd (to a somewhat lesser extent) Johnson administra­
tions.^"* Secondly, Northern politicians were on the 
whole prepared to identify with, and support the goals 
of the civil rights movement as long as white racism 
in the North did not become a political threat. Some, 
like Jerome Cavanagh of Detroit, Robert Wagner of New 
York, and Ralph Locher of Cleveland, would take part in 
sympathy marches and fete Martin Luther King. Later, 
of course, when black demands in the North made white 
racism become politically articnlate, all but the most 
dedicated liberals abandoned their support for the civil 
rights movement. As King remarked in 1967:
Why, this Mayor Locher here in Cleveland, he's 
damning me now and calling me an extremist,
/Continued
and three years ago he gave me the key to the 
city and said I was the greatest man of the 
century. That was as long as I was safe from 
them down in the South. It's about the same 
with Daley and Yorty too; they used to tell me 
what a great man I was. 217
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DEFEAT HT THE NORTH : THE CHICAGO CAMPAIGN 
Northern Racism
In 1962, a team, from Wayne State University warned that 
with the single exception of New York, segregation was in­
creasing in every major American city. In 1930, over half 
the urban black population had lived in majority white 
areas; only 15 per cent did so thirty years later. The 
nation was witnessing "the creation of two cities bearing 
a single name." One was black, poor and confined in 
segregated slums; the other was white, affluent, and housed 
in spacious suburbs,^"
Anti-discrimination laws had done little to alleviate 
this situation. By 1965, thirty-four states prohibited 
discrimination in employment, seventeen in housing, and seven 
in public education. Most of these laws had been en­
acted only recently. Even so, they were flawed by weak 
sanctions, inadequate enforcement, and limited scope. Herbert 
Hill of the NAACP, reviewing the enforcement record of the 
New York Commission on Human Rights— one of the strongest 
state anti-discrimination agencies— found that nearly 70 
per cent of the cases brought before it were dismissed, 
and that the 18 per cent that were settled by "conference 
onri conciliation" applied to individuals; they did not 
deal with the broad discriminatory policies of a whole 
industry, or labour union.-^ Agencies in other states
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were even weaker. A study by the American Jewish Congress 
found that their reliance upon conciliation, and their 
lack of criminal penalties, reduced their directly co­
ercive effect to a minimum.^
The ballot had been equally unsuccessful in combating 
discrimination. As Prank Millspaugh noted in 1965, one 
man-one vote was powerless in the face of "two other men, 
also voting, whose economic and social interests are 
served by keeping the first man subjugated."-* In 1948,
Henry lee Moon of the NAACP analyzed the political conse­
quences of the black migration from the rural South to 
the urban North. He concluded that although blacks were 
only a tenth of the total population, the growth of a 
black electorate in the North would enable them to act 
as a "balance of power" between the two major parties, 
negotiating important concessions in return for political 
support. Actually, things had not worked out that way.
The black electorate gave large pluralities to the Demo­
cratic party with such consistency that their loyalty 
became self-defeating as the Democrats took the black vote 
for granted, and the Republicans tended to write it off.*^
The city of Chicago illustrated the dubious benefits 
of conventional politics for black people. In his 1961 
study of Chicago politics, James Q. Wilson noted the para­
dox that that city's black population had political repre­
sentation without political power: "Negroes are . . .  the 
objects rather than the subjects of civic action. Things
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are done for, or about, or to, or because of Negroes, but 
tbey are less frequently done by them."8 Although making 
up a third of the city's population— a theoretically 
strong political position— studies showed that Chicago was 
the most segregated city in the United States; yet, 
election after election, black voters loyally supported 
the Democratic machine of Mayor Richard J. Daley.^ Here 
was a situation where blacks could, indeed, follow a 
"balance of power" strategy, yet they voted for a man whose 
covert policy was to perpetrate racial segregation.
Chicago epitomized the "dead-end politics" to 
which blacks were condemned.10 The Democratic machine 
acted coercively to maintain housing segregation (thus 
preserving its white support), and it acted co-optively 
to give black politicians a material stake in the continua­
tion of that segregation. Owing their positions to the 
existence of all-black wards and the machine organization, 
black elected officials and office-holders were not 
likely to campaign for integration. The South Side 
ghetto elected six black aldermen who constituted, under 
the patronage of Congressmen William Dawson, a "sub­
machine," bound by political self-interest to the larger
11machine of Mayor Daley. The terms of this alliance 
were that Daley deferred to Dawson on matters concerning 
the latter's political bailwick, while Dawson delivered 
the black vote on election day, and accepted the racial 
status quo. Given the poverty of most Chicago blacks,
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it was not difficult for Dawson to retain their votes.
A weh of "welfare colonialism" made the black electorate
reluctant to oppose the Democratic machine.■ "We're a
service organization," said one of Dawson's aides. "That's 
12our strength."
Residential segregation was the source of all other 
forms of discrimination. It was also the source of the 
Democratic party's power. Officially-tolerated private 
violence was a final means of keeping blacks out of white 
neighbourhoods. Anti-integration riots were common in 
Chicago. They had taken place in 1951» 1953, 1955, 1957, 
and I960; they would recur in 1963 and 1966. In all 
of these riots but the last, it was generally recognized 
that the city government was deliberately lax in restrain­
ing the rioters, and as Wilson observed: "If segregation 
has been supported by violence, and that violence has 
gone unchecked, there develops a tradition of violence 
which many whites come to believe has • . . the tacit 
consent of the authorities."^ Chicago epitomized 
Northern racism in both its subtly manipulative and brutally 
coercive aspects. It was in Chicago that the SCIC elected 
to undertake its first campaign outside the South,
The Decision to Move North
By 1963, King was well aware that in the North there 
were "brothers and sisters who are suffering discrimination 
that is even more agonizing, in a sense, than in the South.
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But although he had long 'toyed with the idea of a 
Northern campaign, as late as 1954 he was still hesitant 
to embark on one. Nor one thing, there was still as much 
to do in the South: the crucial issue of voting rights 
had yet to be tackled. 1954 was to have been the year of 
a statewide direct action campaign in Alabama, master­
minded by James Bevel, but, for various reasons, it never 
got off the ground, and had to be delayed until 1965.^
The Goldwater candidacy was a compelling reason for 
caution. Alarmed by the Republican challenger, the SCLC 
agreed with the NAACP to suspend further demonstrations 
until after the presidential election.^ Meanwhile,
the Conference concentrated its resources in areas of
• 17easy voter registration. '
The decision to stay out of the North was not 
merely tactical. While aware of the potential for violence 
in the cities of the North, King believed that the frustra­
tion of Northern blacks would be lessened "by continuing 
to make progress in the South," which would provide "an 
outlet with which Negroes all over the country can 
i d e n t i f y . T h e  riots in Harlem, Rochester, and Phila­
delphia in the summer of 1954 had not shaken this belief. 
Like other black leaders, King underestimated the serious­
ness of the outbreaks. He thought that the extent of the 
violence had been wildly exaggerated by the press, and 
was convinced that a major cause of the rioting had been 
the absence of firm leadership, which had allowed
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"irresponsibles" to assert themselves.10 Misguided 
tactics such as the dumping of garbage on Triborough bridge 
had merely served to discredit the movement.20 Well aware 
that black violence would be exploited by white racists,
King emphasized that the rioters had never been a part 
of the civil rights movement.21 The Rev. Joseph E. Lowery, 
chairman of the SCIC board, bluntly asserted that "to 
identify gang tactics with the nonviolent civil rights 
demonstrations is absurd." Such reactions, which echoed 
Ray Wilkins's characterization of the rioters as "punks" 
and "hoodlums," were understandable, but betrayed a belief 
that'sufficient moral condemnation would cause the problem
23of violence to go away.
By the beginning of 1965— before the Watts riot—  
King had decided that the SCIC should, after all, operate 
in the North, if only to act as a catalyst for the forma-
pj\tion of local civil rights coalitions. 3h a January 
interview, his sense of urgency was marked: "America 
will be faced with the ever-present threat of violence, 
rioting and senseless crime as long as Negroes are packed 
into malodorous, rat-infested ghettos."20 La March, with 
the Voting Rights Act well on its way to the statute book, 
he announced his intention to visit ten Northern cities.20 
The approval of the SCIC board for a Northern campaign 
was obtained in April, although not without considerable 
opposition, and the board's insistence that the Conference 
would only act on a "consultative" basis to Northern groups.
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It would "assist" already established local organizations, 
but would not found new Northern affiliates.2'7 "You can 
expect us in Baltimore, Philadelphia, Detroit, Ios Angeles, 
and Chicago," King promised. "I tell you, we will take 
the nonviolent movement all over the United States."2®
I. PEELIMINAEY MOBILIZATION AND THE FORMULATION OP 
A STRATEGY
The Civil Rights Movement in Chicago
King chose Chicago,because he was invited there 
by the local civil rights coalition, the Coordinating 
Council of Community Organizations (CCCO).2^ It had 
become plain during his preliminary tour of the North 
that in several cities his presence would arouse resent­
ment and jealousy from the established black leadership. 
Cecil Moore, head of Philadelphia's NAACP branch, was 
openly hostile, saying that "The imported Gandhian philo­
sophy of nonviolence . . . will not be accepted in 
Philadelphia, where we believe in self-help and self- 
defense."^ Harlam's Adam Clayton Powell was similarly 
cool. It would be "unwise," he said, for King to work in 
Harlem unless he was invited by "broad united leadership. 
Despite the support of the local COPE and NAACP branches, 
King realized that Powell had effectively put New York out 
of bounds. He had brushed with Powell once before, and 
had no desire to repeat the experience.
King's reception in Chicago had been different. A1
2 3 0 .
Raby, convener of the CCCO, openly sought his aid in their 
faltering struggle to integrate the city's school system.
King, in turn, was duly impressed by the large and enthu­
siastic crowds that greeted him during his visit in 
32July. After several telegrams and a meeting with Raby 
at the annual SCIC convention in August, King agreed to commit 
the SCIC to a major campaign in Chicago.33 After consult­
ing one hundred and fifty local leaders in early October,
King promised to begin an allout effort in the New Tear.3^ 
Meanwhile, a ten-man advance task force was despatched to 
the city, led by James Bevel.3^
The SCIC's host organization, the CCCO, was a 
coalition of about forty civic, labour, religious, and 
civil rights groups; it included the NAACP, the Urban 
league, the Catholic Interracial Council, the Cook County 
Bar Association, the United Packinghouse Workers, «nd 
the American Jewish Congress.36 Before 1963, there had 
been no real civil rights movement in Chicago, but Edwin 
Berry, director of the city's Urban league, had punctured 
Chicago's compiacency by documenting the facts of de 
facto, segregation. In 1957» he charged that Chicago was 
the most segregated city in the United States, and 
committed the Urban league to a more militant posture, 
rising above its traditional role as a "glorified em­
ployment agency."3^ Although the city continued to 
say that any segregation was "voluntary" ("members of a 
minority group live together because of cultural, social
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and other ties”) evidence to the contrary accumulated.58 
In 1962, the US Civil Eights Commission reported that 
the school board had actively impeded desegregation.5*^
A panel appointed by the city to investigate the city's 
schools found that 82 per cent of the grade schools were 
segregated, and that predominantly black schools had 
larger classes and over double the proportion of un­
certified teachers.*1-0 Testifying before a Con­
gressional committee, Phillip M. Hauser, who had headed 
the panel, asserted that Chicago's Superintendent of 
Schools had become "the symbol of segregation— a repre­
sentative of the status quo."*1-^
The obstinacy of the'Superintendant, Benjamin C. 
Willis, succeeded in uniting the civil rights movement 
around the goal of school integration, and two school 
boycotts, in 1963 and 1964, had enjoyed massive support 
from the black community. Willis's reappointment in 
May 1963 brought the controversy to a head: beginning 
on June 10, daily marches to City Hall were staged; 
in August, the Mayor's private home was picketed. Both 
efforts were accompanied by mass arrests, ensuing pro­
tests from the Illinois American Civil Liberties Union.*1'5 
The pressure for Willis's dismissal was augmented when 
the leaders of Chicago's business community issued a 
statement urging "a positive policy and program to 
eliminate segregation" in the city's schools.*1^
On July 4, 1965, the CCCO requested the Department
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of Health, Education, and Welfare to freeze #34 million
of federal funds destined for Chicago until such steps 
45were taken. ^ Three months later, the funds were cut
¿ i f .off. This was the first time that Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act had been applied in the North_a stunning
victory for the Chicago civil rights movement. Or so it 
appeared, for five days later the funds were "unfrozen1* 
at the direction of the President This was an ominous 
event for the civil rights movement in the North. Not 
only did it demonstrate the immense political "clout" of 
Mayor Daley, it also crippled, temporarily at least, the 
campaign against segregated education. Another three 
years would pass "before the federal government again
applied Title VI sanctions against a Northern school
. 48system.
At the very time that the SCIC was committing itself 
to supporting the Chicago school fight, it "became clear 
that that fight had already "been defeated. The unifying 
focus of the Chicago movement was lost, and the CCCO, 
formidable only on paper, rapidly declined in strength, 
with its demonstrations dwindling from an initial peak of 
six hundred to a daily average of fifty.^ When the SCIC 
came to Chicago, it had little idea that it would be bearing 
the main burden of the effort, yet this was to be the case.
James Bevel's Advance Task Force
When James Bevel and his team of fourteen SCIC
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organizers arrived in October, they made a survey of the 
social, political, and economic characteristics of the 
West Side Ghetto, where the SCIC's efforts would be con­
centrated.^0 Their findings made it clear that this 
would need to be a very different campaign from Birmingham 
or Selma. Goals would have to be clearly defined, a 
task made more difficult by the affair of the HEW funds; 
new life would need to be breathed into the COCO; in 
the West Side ghetto, where few community organizations 
existed, they would have to build from scratch, from the 
ground up; black ministers, traditionally reluctant to 
get involved in politics, would need to be mobilized;
«-nr! a special effort would have to be made to bring the 
alienated youth of the street-gangs into the movement.
During the last three months of 1965, James Bevel 
laboured to organize the West Side. There were three main 
facets to the preliminary mobilization. Firstly, the 
SC IS organizers tried to persuade the immensely powerful 
street-gangs to ally with the movement, and to accept non­
violence, if only as a tactic. As a means of convincing
them, James Orange submitted to eighteen beatings from '
51members of the Cobras and the Vice lords.
Jesse Jackson, a new recruit to the SCIG, was 
responsible for setting up a Chicago branch of Operation 
Breadbasket. This involved persuading the black clergy 
to accept the role of leading the community in economic 
boycotts against businesses which practiced discrimination
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in their employment practices. When King outlined the 
Breadbasket concept in February to a meeting of three 
hundred ministers, the response was enthusiastic, and a 
permanent organization was founded.^
The third, and most important task was the 
setting up of community organizations, or Unions to End 
Slums, in the various ghetto areas of the city. These 
were modelled on the Woodlawn Organization, a self-help 
group set up in the South Side ghetto with the aid of 
Saul Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation. TWO had 
successfully challenged the University of Chicago's plan 
to expand into the Woodlawn area; it had campaigned against 
landlords who neglected their property and merchants who 
overcharged; and had been in the forefront of the drive to 
oust Benjamin Willis.*^
The SCIC-organized Unions, it was hoped, would give 
the cidl rights movement some kind of solid and permanent 
structure. They would have a variety of functions. Their 
own structure was designed with the help of the Industrial 
Union Department of the AFL-CIO, and it was intended that 
they would be able to utilize labour union techniques. 
Through Operation Breadbasket, local ministers would lead 
"selective buying" campaigns; rent strikes would be used 
to win housing contracts from landlords; and tenant co­
operatives would be formed to take advantage of federal 
mortgages, as well as loans and grants for slum rehabili­
tation.^1- Again with the aid of the IUD, wage surveys
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were carried out, with a view to organizing shopworkers 
and hospital employees, and implementing minimum wage 
standards.^ The Community Unions would also act as 
political units, running independent candidates against 
the regular, machine Democrats. Finally, they would be 
a means of spreading the philosophy of nonviolence, atkI 
the tactics of direct action, providing the leaders of 
the movement with a mass following.^
The Chicago Plan
After much thought, James Bevel concluded that the 
situation of the Northern black ghetto was that of an 
internal colony, an analogy hitherto developed by, among 
others, Kenneth B. Clark and Malcolm X.*^ The concept of 
"internal colonialism had an important influence on the 
formulation of goals and tactics by the SCIC. If the ex­
ploitation of the ghetto was perpetuated by a complex 
matrix of forces, the campaign would need to be multi­
faceted; and if, furthermore, that exploitation were 
primarily economic in nature, direct action would only be
effective against specific, relevant, and vulnerable
a. 58targets.
On January 7, 1966, Dr. King and A1 Baby announced 
•'The Chicago Plant’ The SCIC-CCCO campaign was to be a broad 
assault on the economic exploitation of the ghetto. Acknow­
ledging his debt to Bevel, King defined the ghetto as "any 
area which is exploited by the community at large . . . 
where free trade and exchange of culture and resources is
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not allowed to exist.”59 Many institutions, he continued, 
private, city, state, and federal, had a political and 
economic stake in this exploitation; few whites could 
avoid at least an indirect responsibility for its continu­
ation. The campaign would be escalated in stages. The 
first two months would be spent in organization and educa­
tion; small demonstrations would then "reveal the agents 
of exploitation," and mould "community consensus . . .  around 
specific targets;" massive nonviolent direct action would
• r j r  60commence m  May.
It was not until July that a list of specific 
demands was presented to the city, but"The Chicago Plan" 
had broad, ambitious objectives. A significant expansion 
of the War on Poverty, and the enactment of an open housing 
law by Illinois were the least that King expected. Such 
action would require strong white support, and King hoped 
to create the kind of "coalition of conscience" that had 
impelled the Civil Eights and Voting Rights Acts through 
Congress. At its 1963 convention, the SCIC had re­
affirmed its faith in the alliance with white liberals.
In Chicago, this "grand alliance of the children of light" 
would have to be reconstructed on an even larger scale. ^ 
King was depending upon the support of "major religious 
groups, the trade union movement and various elements of 
the liberal community."^5 A special effort would be made 
to involve the student and Roman Catholic populations.^
King well knew the vital importance of a success in
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Chicago. la the North thus far, nonviolent direct action 
had produced little but frustration. King had to show 
that nonviolence could produce tangible gains: unless 
the citx.es, the states, and the federal government made 
serious efforts to ameliorate slum conditions, many more 
riots would break out, and black separatism would increase, 
leading blacks into a hostile isolationism that could only 
be self-defeating. ^ A victory in Chicago would halt 
these trends; it would put the ailing civil rights move­
ment back on its feet, and provide it with a body of non­
violent tactics which could be used throughout the North: 
"If we can break the back of discrimination in Chicago, 
we can do it in all of the cities of this country."^
Problems of Organization and Confrontation
The SCIC's campaign time-table proved, as usual, 
over-optimistic. It was not until the end of July that 
direct action began. The Meredith Freedom March diverted 
precious resources to Mississippi, and in Chicago itself, 
working in completely unfamiliar surroundings, the move­
ment encountered difficulties in three major areas: 
organizing the black poor, mobilizing white, liberal support, 
find forcing a dramatic confrontation with City Hall.
The process of organizing the poor was agonizingly 
slow. The leaders of the Chicago Freedom Movement recog­
nized that a single, monolithic organization would be too 
cumbersome, and too remote from the one million inhabitants
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of the city's two giant ghettos. What was needed was a 
number of local community organizations, corresponding to 
the various ghetto neighbourhoods. Democratizing the 
structure of the movement in this way would create a large 
number of part-time volunteers, and create an indigenous 
leadership which would be able to carry on with the 
struggle after the eventual departure of King and the SCIC.
To this end, the CFM proposed to organize "Unions 
to End Slums" in twelve areas, which together embraced 
some three hundred thousand people.67 Each Union would 
be divided into locals of ten blocks, which themselves 
would be sub-divided into councils of twenty-five families.68 
The locals would constitute the basic unit in the structure 
of the movement; they would hold weekly mass meetings, as 
well as conducting demonstrations, boycotts, and rent 
strikes. In the end, however, the SCIC was defeated by 
its limited resources and by the mammoth size of its task. 
Only two full-time organizers could be assigned to each 
l o c a l . I n  early March, the Industrial Union Department 
of the AFL-CIO provided one hundred and twenty-five UAW 
organizers, but they were available for only four days.'78 
The SCIC had never engaged in this kind of work before.
With their fondness for oratory, spontaneity, and 
dramaticr confrontations, many of its staffers found 
community organizing tedious and unrewarding, especially 
when the people whom they were trying to organize greeted 
their efforts with apathy, fear, hostility, and cynicism.
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King was aware ‘that lie would be dealing in Chicago 
primarily with one man, Mayor Richard J. Daley. However, 
he was not daunted by Daley's power: its very enormity, 
he felt, would make the task of negotiation easier— far 
easier than with a mayor like John Lindsay of New York, 
who was more liberal, but who had lost control over the 
decision-making power in his city.72 King also realized 
that Daley would do everything to avoid the kind of overt 
brutality that the SCIC had turned to such advantage at 
Birmingham and Selma; in the North, he said, "the Pharoahs 
are more sophisticated.n7^ Even so, King did'not anti­
cipate such difficulty in forcing a confrontation in 
Mayor Daley's Chicago.
The Democratic machine's first reaction to the 
campaign was patently transparent. To head King off 
before he arrived, the Chicago Conference to Fulfill 
These Rights Ihc. was formed. Most of its members were 
Democractic politicians, and office-holders whose jobs 
were in the gift of the Mayor. Its object was to show 
that Chicago could get along without the "outside 
interference" of King and the SCLC. "We have adequate 
leadership here," said black alderman Ralph H. Metcalfe; 
King was guilty of "ulterior motives."7^ This effort 
to forestall the promised protests did not succeed.
Faced with the unpleasant fact of King's presence, 
the Mayor changed his tactics. He openly welcomed King, 
agreed with his goals, and claimed that the city was already
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doing its utmost to tackle the evils of slum housing.
When King tried to publicize those evils by assuming 
what he termed a "supralegal trusteeship" of a West Side 
slum tenement, Daley responded by ordering a "crackdown" 
on slum landlords, sending fifty housing inspectors into 
the ghetto.7^ Then, he proposed a £195 million bond
issue for civic improvements, and negotiated a loan from 
the federal government for the rehabilitation of slum 
apartments.78 On the day that King announced a massive 
march on City Hall, the Mayor promised to eliminate every 
slum in the city within two years.77 All the while,
Daley was sending "fact sheets" to potential allies of 
the movement, which claimed, among other things, that 
in 1966 alone, twenty-nine thousand flats had been 
sprayed for rats, and four thousand suits had been 
brought against violators of the city's building code.78 
The desired confrontation with the city administration 
was proving extremely elusive. "We haven't got things 
under control yet," admitted Andrew Young. "The strategy 
hasn't emerged yet."'7 King's frustration, verging on 
anger, was apparent'in his first meeting with the Mayor, 
on March 24. Although he had intended that A1 Raby 
should qjeak for the Chicago Freedom Movement, King himself 
spoke for twenty minutes. He made plain his displeasure 
at the city's lack of response to the movement's demands. 
Noting that nobody from the Board of Education was present,
he implied that the negotiations were not being conducted
in good faith, and went on to warn that there was a
serious possibility of violence without concessions from 
80the city. In an unusually candid interview in July, 
King gave vent to his frustration. Ia the North, he said, 
"They'll let march all summer and not give you a thing.
In Chicago . . .  Mayor Daley's response was to play
tricks with us— to say he's going to end the slums, but
81not doing any concrete things."
II. CONFRONTATION AND CAPITULATION
The Soldier Field Rally and the Vest Side Riot
During June, the Chicago Freedom Movement began to
formulate a plan of action to mobilize the support of
those already organized around a set of specific demands.
Constituent groups were invited to submit programmatic
proposals by June 17, and a special invitation to parti-
8?cipate was extended to the Spanish-American community. 
Meanwhile, a series of local "Freedom Festivals" led 
up to a massive rally at the Soldier Field stadium, where 
the final package of demands was presented. ^
The Soldier Field rally of July 10 marked the 
commencement of the direct action phase of the campaign. 
Floyd McKissick's presence among the guest speakers 
emphasized the unity of the civil rights movement, which 
had been recently sundered by the Black Power concept
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recently adopted by SNCC and COKE during the Meredith
84March. Even more important was Archbishop Cody's 
endorsement of the OEM’s demands. The Archbishop ordered 
a pastoral letter of support to be read from the pulpit 
of every Homan Catholic Church in the Chicago Arch­
diocese, the largest in the country.8^ King's own speech 
dwelt upon the hideous conditions of ghetto life. "We 
are tired," he said, "of living in ratrinfested slums 
and in the Chicago Housing Authority's cement reservations." 
As usual, he stated that freedom would never be granted 
voluntarily by the oppressor unless it were firmly demanded 
by the oppressed, and as well as issuing the standard 
threat to fill the jails of the city, King extended a 
warning to the Mayor: heed black demands or be prepared 
to lose black votes: "This day we must decide that our 
votes will determine who will be the Mayor of Chicago 
next year."88
A list of the demands was affixed to door of 
City Hall. Affirmative efforts to eliminate discrimina­
tion were sought from the city, state and federal govern­
ments, from private business, and from labour unions. The 
central demands dealt with housing. Pledges of non­
discrimination were asked for from the real estate industry, 
anrl from banks and other lending institutions. The Chicago 
Real Estate Board was commanded to drop its suit against 
the city's fair housing law, and to suspend the licences 
of recalcitrant members. The City was instructed to
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embark upon a crash programme of slum rehabilitation, 
and to erect low-density public housing in each of the 
city's fifty w a r d s . K i n g  met Daley the next day; again, 
nothing of substance emerged, the Mayor merely claiming 
that he was doing all that could be done, and accusing 
the CFM of making extravagant demands without offering
Q O
specific programmes. Recording his disappointment with
the meeting, King promised that "there will be marches
and there will be mass failings."8<^  He also repeated his
threat of the previous day, that black voters would be
encouraged to oppose the regular Democratic candidates
in the elections of the following year.^8
Two days later, a riot erupted in the Vest Side
ghetto. King and his aides were powerless to stop it.^
Only three days earlier, King had warned that without
concessions from the city, a riot could very well
92occur.7 Heverthless, accusations of SOLO irresponsibility 
flew thick and fast from City Hall. Daley charged that 
the riot had been deliberately organized by certain members 
of King's staff, who had been "instructing” youths in the 
techniques of urban insurrection.^ (A film of the Watts 
riot had, indeed, been shown to black youths. Its purpose, 
however, had been to demonstrate the futility of such 
violence.) The leaders of the Chicago Freedom Movement 
replied that the riot had stemmed from two causes: the 
callousness of police officers, and the longstanding 
neglect of slum conditions by the Mayor and the City
Council.' Daley's only attempt to ameliorate those 
conditions in the wake of the riot was to have water- 
sprinklers attached to fire-hydrants, and to import dozens 
of temporary swimming-pools (acting on the theory that 
the violence had been caused by the 101 degree heat.)^
The movement was making little progress, and it 
appeared, moreover, that many of Chicago's young blacks 
had rejected the message of nonviolence. The appropriate 
tactic for pressuring the city into meaningful action 
still had to be found. James Bevel, King's chief advisor 
in Chicago, insisted that demonstrations without specific, 
vulnerable targets would be fruitless. The question, said 
Bevel, was "What kind of pressure do we put where?"^
The Open Housing Marches and the Summit Agreement
At the end of July, the right tactic was found: 
blacks would march into all-white suburbs in order to 
dramatize the issue of open housing. As Newsweek 
commented, "the very essence of that strategy was provoca­
tive."^ Inevitably, the marchers were greeted with 
hostility and violence reminiscent of Birmingham and 
Selma. The first foray, to Gage Park, was conducted under 
a shower of rocks and bottles, and when the marchers
returned the next day, the violence escalated: fifty-
. . ggfour of them were injured.' The mobs grew larger and 
more aggressive with each successive demonstration, antj 
the police— having been accused of laxity by King and
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Raby— were obliged to protect the marchers by arresting 
rock-throwers.^ The police protection did not, however, 
prevent King from being knocked off his feet by a rock 
as he led a column of marchers through the sedate suburb 
of Marquette Park,100 Genuinely shocked by the violence 
he sadly observed that "I have seen many demonstrations 
in the South, but I have never, seen anything so hostile 
and hateful as I've seen here today."101 -Nevertheless, 
this was the very essence of nonviolent direct.action.
Not only was the full depravity of Northern racism 
exposed, but also King had found Daley's Achilles 
heel: the only.way that the_white suburban homeowners 
could register their annoyance at the marches was to vote 
Republican. A "white backlash" in the forthcoming 
elections, together.with the possible defection.of ... 
thousands of black voters, would damage the Democratic 
party and break-the grip of the machine on Chicago politic 
As, James Bevel put it, "Eveiy time we march, Daley loses 
10,000 votes— from the whites".10^
Paced with.a massive.white backlash,, the Mayor 
was understandably anxious to bring, a halt to the open 
housing marches, but he still believed that the CPM could 
be "bought off”-with a few minor concessions. The package 
offered by Daley on August 10 had "the ring of the ward 
healer’s art:" an extra j&frO.million for the urban renewal 
programme; three hundred ¿jobs as housing-project guards; 
and the employment of one black journeyman glazier by the
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Chicago Housing Authority. The package was accompanied by 
a set of prepared quotes, to be released to the press upon 
King's signature; one of them began; "Today, Mayor Daley 
has again demonstrated his leadership by. . . .»loz,v
Hone of these concessions touched upon the OEM's 
central demand: open housing. The marches continued, with 
increasing frequency: on August 14, they were staged in 
three areas simultaneously.10^ More negotiations took 
place. This time, the Chicago Real Estate Board offered 
to "urge" its members to shun racial discrimination, and 
comply with the fair housing order issued by Governor 
Otto Kemer on July 13. Savings and landing associations 
also promised to "urge” a policy of non-discrimination 
upon their members. The leaders of the CEM, however, wanted 
concrete action, such as immediate compliance with the 
city's fair housing ordinance, and prompt action on com­
plaints by the city's human rights commission.1®^ In 
addition, real estate boards should cease their legal 
fight against open housing legislation, and suspend the 
licenses of realtors who refused to post their listings on 
a non-discriminatory basis.10'7 Finally, the CFM sought a
commitment from the city that public housing would, in the
10Rfuture, be dispersed throughout the metropolitan area.
.Compared with the movement's demands, the promises 
they had been offered were not "such as to warrant the 
end of demonstrations," said King.10® On August 8, SCIC 
aide Jesse Jackson announced— apparently on his own
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initiative— that the CFM was planning two simultaneous 
marches, one in Bogan and the other in Cicero.110 Whites 
were horrified at this prospect. Cicero was notorious for 
racist violence. In 1952, Governor Adlai Stevenson had 
had to call out the National Guard to put down an anti­
integration riot. Fourteen years later, not a single 
"black person lived in Cicero. If a march were held 
there, predicted Cook County Sheriff Richard B. Ogilvie, 
the violence would "make Gage Park look like a tea- 
party." The city obtained a federal injunction that 
severely restricted the number, size, and timing of 
marches. Convinced, however, that King would defy 
what he termed an "unjust, illegal, and unconstitutional" 
act, the city returned to the negotiating table and 
offered new proposals. The resulting "Summit Agreement" 
of August 26 was hailed by King as "far-sighted and 
creative;" Newsweek thought it "a solid vindication of 
Southern style nonviolent protest in a Northern city."11-* 
Others, like Chester Robinson of the West Side 
Organization, were more skeptical: "We feel that the 
poor Negro has been sold out by this agreement."11^ The 
pact was full of vague promises that were obvious loop­
holes. As the Chicago Tribune pointed out, the CREB 
refused to drop its suit against the city's fair housing 
law; how could it then honestly "remind its members of 
their duty to obey the ordinance"?11^ Privately, many 
SCIC staffers admitted that even if it were enforced,
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that law was so weak that it would make little difference.116 
Even within the terms of the agreement, no method was 
devised of implementing it; there was no way of compelling 
the various parties to fulfill their promises. "The 
problem," said James Bevel, "is the follow-up."11? Although 
the CPM set up a standing committee to monitor implementation 
of the agreement (setting the target at one per cent black 
occupancy in the suburbs by April 1967)» the city refused
to include this in the written agreement; it would not
H Rbe bound by a time limit.
Predictably, the city went back on its word. In
October, a OEM report concluded that the city was taking
no positive steps to carry out the agreement.11^ King
promptly threatened more marches (saying that the Cicero
expedition had merely been "postponed"), but it was an
idle threat; the momentum and unity of the movement had
120already been broken. Another follow-up report confirmed
the non-implementation of the "Summit Agreement." It found
that only one out of twenty-three completely segregated
public housing projects had been integrated, and that
this was more than offset by the creation of two new se-
gregated ones, After the failure of the SCIC winter
voter registration drive, the city stopped even pretending:
"There is no housing agreement," said Alderman Thomas
Keane. "There were only certain suggestions put down and
122goals to be sought."
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III. WHY THE SCLC FAILED IN CHICAGO
The Desertion of White Liberal Support and Internal T U m H t v  
Why did the SCIC fail in Chicago? More specifica­
lly, why did King halt the open housing marches to settle 
for a pact which so clearly lacked substance? Part of the 
answer was that the marches, although producing the kind 
of confrontation the SCLC had all along sought, also 
divided the leadership of the Chicago Freedom Movement, 
and alienated much of its white liberal support. That 
support had always been limited. While the bulk of the 
labour unions were firmly allied with the Democractic 
machine, two of them, the United Auto Workers and the 
United Packinghouse Workers, gave material assistance to 
the C F M . I n  March, UAW regional director Robert 
Johnson had vowed that "The UAW is in this thing all the 
way. . . .  Our men will be on the streets with King's 
people, and we will not stop until we have made this a 
better Chicago." However, on August 11 Johnson Joined
with other labour leaders who, after meeting with Daley, 
called for an end to the open housing m a r c h e s . A r c h ­
bishop Cody's volte-face was an even more serious blow.
If the marches continued, he argued, serious injuries 
could well occurj "With a heavy heart," he asked that the 
marches cease. Although the Catholic Interracial 
Council opposed Cody's position, the Archbishop's defect­
ion marked the breakup of the "coalition of conscience"
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that King had laboriously constructed in. Chicago. So 
widely-respected a figure could not be ignored. James 
Bevel, aware that a halt in the marches would break the 
campaign's momentum and dissipate its moral advantage, 
bitterly remarked that "If the bishop doesn't have the 
courage to speak up for Christ, let him go to the Devil. 
Thus white liberal support crumbled at the very time 
that the movement was finally bringing effective pressure 
to bear upon the Mayor and the City Council.
Pressure to end the marches was intensified by a 
split within the movement's black leadership. The Agenda 
Committee of the CFM had long been divided over the 
relative merits of community organizing (self-help) and 
nonviolent direct action. The Rev. Arthur Brazier,
head of the influential Voodlawn Organization, strongly
lPflfavoured the former approach. Both Brazier and the
Rev. Carl Fug.ua, chairman of the Chicago NAACP,argued 
against staging demonstrations in all-white areas. Such 
a tactic, they reasoned,would only provoke a "white 
backlash" that wou^ -d redound to the benefit of conservative 
Republicans, thus increasing resistance to the movement's 
d e m a n d s . l a t e r  in the year, Fuqua characterized the 
SCIC as a group of "chronic protesters" who had accom­
plished "absolutely nothing."1^0 (It should be pointed 
out that the Chicago branch of the NAACP was dominated by 
the Democratic machine.) ^ With the defection of white 
allies, and with intense opposition from within the lead-
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ership of the CFM, King had no choice but to halt the 
marches.
Daley’s apparent capitulation of August 26 was, 
in reality, the capitulation of the Chicago Freedom Move­
ment. Rather than force Daley to the conference table, 
the erosion of white liberal and black support compelled 
King to settle for considerably less than half a loaf.
The verbal militants of SNCC, CORE, and the Vest Side 
Organization accused King of "selling out." They failed 
to appreciate, however, that it was the chronic lack of 
black support and participation that brought about the 
premature curtailment of the open housing marches. In a 
city with a black population of one million, the turnout 
at meetings and demonstrations was meagre. The open 
housing demonstrations attracted between fifteen hundred 
p-nd twenty-five hundred participants, over half of whom 
were w h i t e . C O R E  and the Vest Side Organization could 
persuade barely two hundred people to march into Cicero. 
"Freedom is not won by a passive acceptance of suffering," 
wrote King in 1967- "Freedom is won by a struggle against
suffering. By this measure, Negroes have not yet paid
12 /1the full price for freedom."
Problems of Community Organizing
The work of the SCIC in the field of community 
organizing was crowned with some important successes.
Jesse Jackson, with the help of a Ford Foundation grant,
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built up the Kenwood-Oakland Community Organization in 
a slum area previously devoid of any overall neighbour­
hood organization.*^ Operation Breadbasket, also 
directed by Jackson, claimed to have won four thousand new 
or upgraded jobs by December 1966.^^ The East Garfield 
Park Community Organization was another local self-help 
group built from scratch. The EGFCO’s signal success was 
a rent strike by the tenants of the Old Town Garden apart­
ment complex. Eventually, with the aid of UAW lawyers,
137a housing contract was won. 1 This was justly con­
sidered a breakthrough, and by February 1967, thanks to 
the work of James Bevel, Meredith Gilbert, and Sam Smith, 
a dozen such contracts had been negotiated, covering some 
ten thousand tenants.*^® The SCIC continued to work in 
Chicago after the Summit Agreement. Stoney Cooks and a 
staff of twenty-four persevered in the work of community 
o r g a n i z i n g . T h e  movement obtained #4 million in FHA- 
insured loans for the acquisition and rehabilitation of 
five hundred slum apartments.*^® With a grant from the 
Office of Education, the Chicago staff also undertook an
adult education project, in conjunction with volunteers
141from Michigan State University.
The efforts of the SCIC were less successful,- 
however, in raising the political consciousness of Chicago's 
black population, the fundamental objective of community 
organization. This was partly due to severely limited
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resources. Even so, King later admitted that the Confer­
ence had failed to commit itself to the kind of sustained, 
long-term effort that effective community organizing 
demanded. Some of the SCIC staff, such as James Bevel 
and Jesse Jackson, displayed considerable aptitude for 
working in the Northern ghetto, but most were dispirited 
and demoralized by the resistance and apathy they en­
countered. "None of us wanted to spend another day in 
Chicago," admitted Andrew Young. "We wanted to return to 
the South, to familiar terrain.
It was entirely natural that the idea of open
housing marches should appeal to the SCIC, which was
expert in the art of the dramatic demonstration. Once the
direct action phase was launched, however, field workers
were diverted from the task of community organizing, which
1 4 4suffered as a consequence. Stoney Cooks, Bevel's succ­
essor as director of the Chicago project, believed that 
these two strategies, community organizing and direct
action, were never adequately integrated into a single,
145coherent strategy. ^ Moreover, there were conflicting 
ideas as to the most effective method of community organi­
zation. One was to concentrate the SCIC's resources "in 
a specific but limited geographic location" (East Garfield 
Park); the other was to strengthen and promote the 
activities of the existing organizations that comprised 
the CCCO, using SCIC workers as "catalytic agents.
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Unfortunately, these two strategies were developed "on 
two separate and distinct levels,n with the result that 
the SCIC spread itself too thinly."^
The SCIjC made a special effort to make the black 
youth gangs ¿join the nonviolent movement. For months,
James Orange and Jimmy Wilson conducted nonviolent work­
shops with members of the Cobras, Vice lords, and Blackstone
1 ZlAHangers. King himself met with some of the gang
leaders, in an attempt to prevent violent clashes with the 
p o l i c e . D u r i n g  May and June, James Bevel tried to 
stop the various gangs from fighting among themselves, and 
convert them into nonviolent demonstrators who would be 
able to "close down C h i c a g o . T h e  SCIC's work with 
the gangs was by no means fruitless. Some of the gang- 
members became unofficial bodyguards to King, and the 
Blackstone Hangers worked to prevent the West Side riot 
from spreading to the South Side g h e t t o . O n  the whole, 
however, the SCIC failed to harness the energies of the 
gangs to the nonviolent civil rights movement. Most were 
ho stile to the idea of working alongside whites. King 
succeeded in persuading a few to accept nonviolence, at 
least as a tactic, but, as Coretta King recalled, "As he 
preached nonviolence to them, many of them still said,
•We believe in violence. ,n^ 2
The Political Dilemma of the SCIC
On March 25» 1966, King announced that he was lead-
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ing a campaign against slums, not against Mayor Daley. 
"City Hall was buzzing with joyous relief" when it heard 
this, for it meant that King would support neither Dick 
Gregory's bid for the Mayorship, nor the election of 
anti-machine Democrats. King was reluctant to become 
involved in the treacherous quagmire of Chicago politics, 
and the SCIG had always been an ostensibly non-partisan 
organization. Nevertheless, although King believed that 
he was preserving the friendship of President Johnson, 
his declaration of political neutrality . undoubtedly 
weakened his bargaining position vis-a-vis Daley. On 
July 10, King adopted a more aggressive posture, vowing 
to "register eveiy Negro in Chicago of voting age.""^^
The next day, after his second barren meeting with the 
Mayor, he promised that henceforth the campaign would 
be "more political," for the black vote "can and will 
be the balance of power in Chicago."1^6
little was done to substantiate this threat 
until long after the Summit Agreement. In a series of 
bitter exchanges in November, Daley accused King of 
seeking to stir up a backlash vote against the Democractic 
p a r t y . J a m e s  Bevel angrily replied that although 
"there are a few Negroes who may feel that they are 
owned by the Democractic machine, at the same time there 
are a million suffering Negroes in this town."1^8 As it 
hecame patently obvious that Daley had no intention of 
honouring the Summit Agreement, King announced an inten-
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that such a strategy could not have defeated Daley in 1967. 
But a political campaign to oust Daley was never a prac­
tical option for the civil rights movement. The movement 
could not afford to wait four years for results; it had to 
show immediate and visible gains if it were to arrest the 
spread of rioting, and the growth of black separatism.
"We have got to deliver results— nonviolent results in a
Northern city— to protect the nonviolent movement," said 
166Andrew Young. This explains why the SCLC's strategy in 
Chicago seemed to fall between two stools: a long-term 
strategy of community organization, and a short-term one 
of direct action. Daley countered the latter by coming 
to an agreement which he had no intention of implementing; 
as for the former, the CFM could not hope to match the 
efficiency of the Democratic machine. In any case, dis­
agreement within the Committee for Independent Political
Action (part of the CCCO) had ruled out a political
167assault on the machine even before King's arrival. ' 
Nothing had come of Lawrence Landry's proposal for the 
formation of Freedom Democractic clubs, and "freedom 
elections" in fifty black w a r d s . E v e n  if it had been 
wholeheartedly adopted, an anti-machine effort would have 
been extremely difficult. In William Dawson's First 
Congressional District, which embraced most of the South 
Side ghetto, the Democractic party employed one captain 
nnri two assistants in each of its 446 precincts— 1,338
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campaign workers. 7 The movement could not have matched 
the material benefits offered by the machine, nor combat 
the fear of losing those benefits by opposing the 
regular Democractic party. As one pastor put it, "Every 
welfare recipient is afraid to oppose the wishes of his 
precinct captain."1'’0 Against this, the SCIC’s voter 
registration drive, conducted by fifteen workers and a 
budget of #18,000, was pathetically inadequate.1'71 King 
might well apologetically explain that the drive had 
merely been "a trial run to learn methods."1*'7^
White Opposition to Open Housing
The immediate results of the Chicago campaign 
did not compare unfavorably with those of Birmingham 
or Selma. In all of these cities, negotiated agreements 
went largely unimplemented, and the SCIO issued threats 
of further demonstrations which failed to materialize.1^  
However, as August Meier pointed out, local failures at 
Birmingham and Selma had succeeded in focusing "national 
anri international attention on the plight of thè Southern 
Negro, thereby facilitating overall progress" by means 
of federal civil rights legislation.1'7^
King had hoped for a similar federal response to 
the Chicago campaign, saying "Our work will be aimed at 
Washington."1^  But the 1966'Civil Rights Bill failed, 
as "the once unbeatable civil rights coalition . . .  fell 
apart in the Senate."1'’6 This was, wrote William Brink 
and Iouis Harris, "the greatest single defeat suffered by
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the Negroes . . .  since 1954.
By the time of the debate on the 1966 bill, there 
had been major riots in Watts, Cleveland, and Chicago.
While these outbreaks hardly helped the bill's chance of 
enactment, they ware not the cause of its demise. The 
defection of white support from the Chicago movement, «nri 
the defeat of the 1966 Civil Bights Bill were not reactions 
to black violence, but reflections of the depth and 
intensity of white opposition to open housing.
The term coined to describe white resistance to 
black demands ("backlash'') was highly misleading for, as 
Thomas Pettigrew noted, "there is no evidence that these 
anti-Negro opinions have been recently adopted."^® As 
early as July 1963— exactly the time when demonstrations 
were spreading to the North in the wake of the Birmingham 
campaign— Time was detecting "signs of dismay and 
hostility among Northern w h i t e s . T h e  white backlash 
was not, therefore, a fearful, defensive response to 
black rioting (there were no riots until 1964), but 
tenacious opposition to the basic goals of the civil 
rights movement in the North. Interpreting the results of 
its survey of white opinion, Saturday Evening Post con­
cluded that "the white North is no more ready to accept
180genuine racial equality than the Deep South."
"Nothing today more clearly indicates the residue 
of racism still lodging in our society than the responses 
of white America: to integrated housing," King wrote after
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the Chicago defeat. In 1964, California's white voters
had enacted a constitutional amendment (Proposition 14)
which had not only repealed a mild fair housing law, but
also forbade the passage of such legislation in the future
Proposition 14, in effect, permanently legalized housing
discrimination.18 *^ This blatantly racist measure had
been passed over the opposition of all three religious
denominations, the leadership of the labour movement, and
more white liberals than had ever previously been mobili-
zed on a civil rights issue. By the end of 1964, nine
Northern states had either defeated or repealed fair
185housing legislation. '
The demand for open housing seemed to rub raw the 
exposed nerve of Northern racism. "Where housing is 
concerned," wrote Thomas Pettigrew, "much of the subtlety 
which clothes racial prejudice in the North is lost—  even 
among the well-educated."186 Middle-income suburbanites—  
a quarter of the total population— opposed open housing. 
Whilst professing sympathy for the civil rights movement, 
they were, in reality, "the strong, silent partner to 
overt anti-Negro sentiment."18^ Even more than the drive 
for school integration, it was the demand for open housing 
that mobilized the forces of Northern racism in a militant 
counter-attack on the civil rights movement.
In California, the leaders of religious denomina­
tions arifl labour unions had been powerless to "deliver"
1  Q Qtheir members. The passage of Proposition 14 exposed
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the weakness of white liberalism, demonstrating it to be
unrepresentative of white opinion. The 1966 Congressional
and state elections made a similar point. Throughout the
North, candidates of both parties exploited political
racism and, in several states, men whom King labelled
"political clowns" became governors or narrowly missed
e l e c t i o n . T h e  right-wing reaction was most pronounced
in cities where militant open housing campaigns had
occurred. Here, wrote the New York Times,
One finds no sudden flash of feeling that could 
be described as 'white backlashj Instead, whites 
appear more prone to draw upon a considerable 
reservoir of prejudice against Negroes, to voice 
antagonisms that have lain there, just beneath 
the surface, all along.190
Ooen Housing and the Disintegration of the Civil Eights Movement'
In 1961, James Q. Wilson argued that a "strategy 
of protest," based on demonstrations, would be ineffective 
against housing discrimination. Dramatizing the evils 
of . housing segregation would achieve nothing, because 
"anti-Negro practices in real estate do not violate clear 
community norms as does violence. . . .  no moral stigma 
attaches to the man who refuses to sell his home to a 
Negro."■L^ 1 It was typical of King to "attack the worst 
first" but, by making open housing the central demand of 
the Chicago campaign, he was choosing an issue that 
presented insuperable political obstacles. King, wrote 
William Brink and Louis Harris, ran "smack into the white
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man's deepest prejudice.”152 The resulting defeat, the 
general white backlash, and the increasing political 
isolation of the black community seemed to undermine the 
very foundations of nonviolent direct action. Although 
tohite America had been prepared to curb the sadistic bruta­
lity of a Bull Connor or a Jim Clark, wrote King, "it had 
never been truly committed to helping him out of poverty, 
exploitation or all forms of discrimination."155
Open housing, of any civil rights issue, evoked the 
maximum amount of white opposition, but it did not, con­
versely, elicit a similar degree of support from the black 
community. James Wilson noted in I960 that black leaders 
were divided on whether to insist upon integration as a 
pre-requisite for material improvements for black people. 
Should they, for example, insist that public housing be 
located in white neighbourhoods, even at the risk of having 
no public housing at all? Or should black schools and 
homes be improved, even if this reinforced and perpetuated 
segregation?19^ In the early 1960's, the most militant 
black leaders believed that slum housing, inferior schools, 
unemployment, and ¿job discrimination could never be elimina­
ted without residential integration, and were prepared to 
sacrifice immediate improvements to this long-term goal.
For most Northern blacks, however, open housing 
was the longest of long-term goals; they considered better 
schools, better accommodation, and better jobs more urgent 
needs.195 Moreover, the goal of housing integration
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became increasingly identified with the ambitions of the 
black middle-class. Whatever progress were made in inte­
grating the all-white areas, noted Wilson, nthe great 
bulk of Negroes continue to live, and will continue to 
live . . .  in the densely-populated all-Negro areas of 
the south and west sides of the city."1^6 Writing at the 
same time, E.U. Essien-Udom agreed that "Most Northern 
lower-class Negroes do not share . . .  the opportunities 
which integration 'victories' are supposed to bring 
them.”^ ^  Black nationalism was not simply a patholo­
gical response to white rejection; it was, wrote A.James 
Gregor, an entirely logical reaction, in that integra­
tion did not alleviate the problems that afflicted the 
"Negro masses as distinct from the . . .  semi-professional 
and white-collar" blacks. The strategy of integration, 
argued Gregor, was driving an economic, ideological, and 
spatial wedge between the middle-class black leadership 
and the lower-class black majority.’^ ®  As expected 
improvements in employment, housing, and education failed 
to materialize, noted Kenneth B. Clark, lower-class 
blacks tended to see "the advances of the black middle- 
class as being at their expense," a perception that was 
exacerbated by the feeling that blacks who lived in white 
neighbourhoods had deserted their less fortunate brethren 
in the ghetto to adopt the cultural norms of white 
society.1^  "A favourite saying among Negroes now," 
commented James Farmer on 1964, "is 'So-and-so used to be
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black."200
As tbe civil rights movement ran into the stone wall 
of white backlash, more and more blacks argued the need to 
work for immediate improvements, even within the context of 
the segregated ghetto. In the face of such white resistance, 
the strategy of integration seemed less and less relevant; 
it articulated an ultimate ideal, but it ignored the 
present-day reality. The theoreticians of Black Power, as 
well as such whites as James Q. Wilson, lewis Killian,
Joseph Alsop, Richard A. Cloward, and Prances P. Piven, 
argued that integration favoured the assimilation of a 
small number of individuals into white society at the 
expense of raising the collective standards of the black 
majority that remained, unfortunately but in fact, in 
the segregated ghetto. The trouble with King's 
"Summit Agreement," said Chester Robinson of the West 
Side Organization,'was that "it is a lot of words that 
give us nothing specific we can understand. We want it 
to say: apartments should be painted once a year; commu- 
nity people should have jobs in their community." To 
leaders like Robinson, the Black Power concept— racial 
cohesiveness, the strengthening of black institutions, 
and the immediate improvement of ghetto conditions— was 
appealing and relevant. The goal of open housing, while 
revealing the depth of Northern white racism, contributed 
to the disintegration of the civil rights movement.
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The White Backlash and Black Political Isolation
In 1951» Samuel Iubell had observed that the 
Democratic party was no longer a party of the “have-nots." 
The ethnic minorities that had attached themselves to 
that party in the 1930's were now the "new majority," and 
"no new economic gains can be promised any group of Demo­
crats without threatening the gains of other Democrats.
The intensity of white resistance to the demands of the 
civil rights movement in the North demonstrated the truth 
of this analysis, and transformed what had been a North- 
South conflict into a "conflict of whites against Negroes 
across the whole nation.". .The bulk of the Northern
Wallace vote in the 1964-‘ presidential primaries had come 
from Eoman Catholic minority groups. These minorities^, 
had. themselves experienced bitter discrimination. "They 
believe," wrote Thomas Pettigrew, "that Negroes are un­
justly making rapid strides at their expense, helped-out 
by a too-generous, federal g o v e r n m e n t . Newsweek 
found in 1964 that among Polish, Hungarian, Slovak, and 
Italian-Americans 61 per cent agreed with the proposition 
that blacks were , getting a "better break" than they had 
had.^k Although they had rallied around the Democratic 
banner in 1964, giving 72 per cent of their vote to Lyndon 
Johnson, they perceived black demands for massive govern­
ment aid as a direct threat to their economic.security. 
"Their articulated resentment," wrote James W. Carey, !!is 
on the gut issue of economics: Jobs, money and property
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values." Proposals for compensatory treatment for blades,
such as the "Domestic Marshall Plan" of the National Urban
League, were "simply not . . . salable to the white ethnic 
207worker," (
In 1964, David Danzig believed that the potential 
for a mass defection of Roman Catholic voters from the 
Democratic party made blades "more exposed to social re­
action within the white community than . . .  at any time
208since Reconstruction." When open housing became a
central demand of the civil rights movement, economic fears
and racism coalesced. Brink: and Harris found that while
52 per cent of all whites would be "upset" if blacks moved
into their neighbourhoods, the percentage rose to 59 per
cent among Irish Catholics, 62 per cent among Italian-
Catholics, and 79 per cent among Polish C a t h o l i c s . B y
1966, they wrote, "the defections from the Democratic
party of the late-arriving Catholic minorities are crystal
2loclear in state after state." They reflected, wrote
King, the tragically mistaken belief that black demands
for change represented "a demand for privileges rather
than . . .  a desperate guest for existence." The
failures of 1966 had a profundly discouraging effect
upon King, eroding his faith in the "great decent majority,"
and forcing him to conclude, sadly, that "the vast majority
212of white Americans are racist."
267
THE COLLAPSE OP THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE EMERGENCE
OP BLACK POWER
"The Black Power slogan? wrote Martin Luther King, "was 
horn from the wounds of despair and disappointment.”^ As 
Stokely Carmichael had predicted, the meagre and equivocal 
gains of years of unremitting struggle and sacrifice 
gradually undermined the basic assumptions of the non- 
violent civil rights movement. Bruised, battered, and 
disillusioned by six years of work in the Deep South, SNCC 
rejected, in 1966, the philosophy of nonviolence, the 
strategy of coalition politics, the tactics of direct 
action, and the goal of integration with white society.
I. THE INADEQUACY OP THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS
Weak Enforcement and Southern Resistance
In August 1965, historian C. Vann Woodward argued 
that regarding civil rights, "Congress has just about 
fulfilled its rule. . . .  Within the past year, Congress 
has put more teeth into the law, and more law on the book 
than in the whole period since 1965.”^ However, as King 
often pointed out, the recording of legislation is not 
necessarily the reality of reform. A few months later,
Gene Roberts penned a more realistic appraisals "the 
question now is not whether the Negro can win new legis­
lation, but whether he can muster enough political strength
CHAPTER VII
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to - . . prevent tlie erosion of the gains lie made when 
the revolution was at its peak."^
The 1964 Civil Rights Act had swept away segregation 
in public accommodations, thus removing the outward and 
most humiliating badges of the caste system in the South; 
but economic conditions— black: poverty— remained.^ Ror was 
the integration of public accommodations as significant 
a change as expected. In the poorest areas of the South, 
such as Lincoln County, Georgia, there were hardly any 
public accommodations to be integrated.^ Even such famous 
victories as Birmingham had failed to bring about the kind 
of sweeping transformation hoped for by King, Fred 
Shuttlesworth, and the other advocates of nonviolent direct 
action. Paul Good visited that city over two years after 
the demonstrations of 1963. He found that the police force, 
the fire department, the judiciary, the board of educa­
tion, ^ and the city council were still all-white. Only 
thirty per cent of the adult black population was regis­
tered to vote. Movement leadership was divided, and its 
followers apathetic. "Birmingham today," wrote Good,
"reveals some disquieting truths about the effect of the
n¿ivil rights movement in the urban South."r
Tax enforcement of the Toting Rights Act added to 
the gloomy picture. This piece of legislation, wrote 
King, had been proclaimed as "the dawn of freedom and the
Qopen door to opportunity." The Attorney General made 
it clear, however, that the federal government did not
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feel obligated to actively encourage black voter registra­
tion. ^  "What was minimally required under the law," King 
argued, "was the appointment of hundreds of registrars 
and thousands of federal marshals to inhibit Southern 
terror." Instead, fewer than forty registrars had been 
appointed by July 1966.10 By August, only forty-two
of the nine hundred counties covered by the Act had 
received them. Seventy-nine counties with less than 25 
per cent black registration still awaited federal examiners, 
and Georgia, which contained twenty-nine of these counties, 
had none at all until the Spring of 1967— a circumstance 
attributable to the influence of Senator Richard B. 
Bussell.’5''1' "We are still a long wav from the goal of 
full enfranchisement," reported the U.S. Civil Rights 
Commission in 1968.^
Gains in black voter registration were thus agoni­
zingly slow: half a million names were added between 
1964 and 1966, another half million over the next two 
years.^ White resistance to black voting did not 
immediately decline after the passage of the Voting Bights 
Act. 3h the rural Sodh, where local registrars "know the 
Negroes who try to register, and the jobs they hold on 
the plantation they 'belong1 to," whites did not accept 
the passing of the old order with calm resignation: 
they resisted to the bitter end, clinging to the*vestiges 
of segregation for as long as possible.^ In August 
1965, for example, the SCIC had initiated demonstrations
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in Greensboro (Ha16 Comity), Alabama, which had shattered
the traditional "paternalism” of black-white relations.
But that paternalism had depended upon black acceptance
of segregation; when segregation was challenged, "Bale
County whites . . .  reacted with revulsion and cold fury."
Churches were burned, sharecroppers were evicted, credit
was withdrawn, and servants were dismissed.^ In places
like Hale County, the Southern Eegional Council observed,
"contact between the races is a personal one, and so
more painful when one tries to change patterns." White
hostility was directed not only against those who actively
participated in the civil rights movement, but against
the black community as a whole, "so there is no foundation
of respect, anywhere ¿f~on the part of whitesJ  In
Wilcox and Lowndes counties, Alabama, in West Feliciana
Parish, Louisiana, and in a host of Mississippi
counties, hundreds of families were evicted from their
farms for attempting to register to vote— after the
17passage of the Voting Eights Act. (
Weak enforcement encouraged white resistance, 
gpfl nowhere was this more apparent than in education.
The 1964 Civil Eights Act had finally given the federal 
government the power to withhold funds from school systems 
that continued to maintain segregated schools. But the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare accepted 
'• freedom of choice" plans, thereby placing the burden of
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school integration upon individual black parents nnd
children, exposing them to all manner of white reialia-
tion. Many parents who filled out transfer forms changed
their minds before the beginning of the school year.^
In the cities of the South, "day-by-day torture of the
Negro children by their schoolmates, teachers and
administrators" led many more parents to withdraw., their
children from "white" schools. In the countryside, wrote
Glenda Bartley, "the'threat that black children might
eventually go to school with white children, brought a
wave of terror unmatched since post-Reconstruction whites
21rode around in bedsheets." The result was that in 
September 1965> only six per cent of black children went 
to school with white ones; in Mississippi, Alabama, and 
Louisiana the proportion was less than one percent. A 
year later, the South-wide figure was still only twelve 
per cent.^ As New Republic commented, the federal 
government's acceptance of any desegregation plan offered 
by Southern school boards seemed to indicate a weak 
commitment to full integration.^ Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act turned out to be a thin stick, rather than a 
heavy club. Only sixteen school districts had their 
funds terminated, and they were all ones that had flatly 
refused to submit any desegregation plan at all. "Not a 
single district in the South," wrote Gary Orfield, "was 
called to account for violation of its plan."^
Weak enforcement of school integration had a
2?2.
disastrous effect on the already flagging morale of SNCC.
With the American Friends Service Committee,_SMCC had
made a major effort, in the Autumn of 1965, to persuade
black parents to send their children to "white" schools,
and had closely monitored the disappointing results. It
was to be SNCC's last effort in support of integration,
nnd it only seemed to prove that civil rights laws^that
were the products.of a fundamentally racist society
were intrinsically flawed. D Pat Watters and Reese
Cleghom, surveying the overall impact of the civil rights
movement in 1967, came to a pessimistic conclusion. "In
some of the worst areas of the South," they wrote, "one
would have to look hard in 1965 and 1966 to see much
difference from the pre-1960 order of race relations.
Prom public accommodations to the decade-old effort to
desegregate.schools, tokenism was the most that had been
27achieved anywhere." '
The Failure to Curb Racist Violence
In January 1966, the New York Times reported that 
twenty people had died in the South at the hands of white 
racists during 1965« . This set a macabre record: fourteen 
had been killed in 1964, thirteen in 1963. Eleven of 
the 1965 killings.had occurred in two states: Mississippi
p Oarirl Alabama. I By the end of 1966, nobody had been con­
victed for any of these murders.
These killings represented the tip of an iceberg
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of white repression. The Southern Regional Council re­
corded 122 nacts of intimidation, reprisal and violence", 
that had taken place between September 1965 and February
1 9 6 6 . Most of them had been directed against blacks 
trying to integrate "white" schools, or attempting to 
register to vote. Evictions, firings, arson, harassment, 
and police brutality were still rife; the age of random 
white violence against blacks and "righters” clearly had 
not passed. .Bor would it pass, believed King, until 
Southern blacks-and white civil rights.workers were 
"shielded, from terror.and oppression by reliable, alert 
government protection."^. In 1964 he had urged that 
federal marshals be employed to combat racist violence., 
and, when nonviolent demonstrators had been attacked by 
police-dogs and tear-gas during the St. Augustine 
campaign, he had telegraphed. Iyndon Johnson to send 
marshals.^ But his request , was declined, and the
Justice Department continued to insist that it had no 
constitutional power to curb violence in the South.
When King heard of the acquittal of LeRoy 
Collins (the alleged murderer of Viola Liuzzo), he vowed 
to undertake a new campaign in Alabama, in order to 
highlight the need for legislation that would make murder 
a federal crime. If white racists could continue to 
kill civil rights workers with impunity, "all the progress 
we have made up to this point in the South" would be 
seriously threatened.-^ Flanked by John Lewis of SNCC,
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and Charles Morgan of the ACLU, Andrew Young announced
the new drive on November 5 »^ Five days later, King
outlined the objectives of the campaign: a law providing
for uniform, non-discriminatory jury selection; and a
law making homicide a federal felony.^. The Episcopal
Society for Cultural and Bacial Unity, the National
Council of Churches, and other organizations pledged 
35their support.
_  The SCLC-led campaign was concentrated in Greene 
County, Alabama; it was the fifth poorest county in the 
nation, and had a black population of 80 per cent.
Daily demonstraUens, led by Ho sea Williams, commenced in 
Eutaw on November 10, and during the next month they 
spread to Greenville and Selma.^ In the first week of 
December, King toured the Alabama Black Belt in order 
to encourage the marches and, after hearing him preach,
350 marched in Eutaw, and 250 in Greenville.^® The 
campaign, however, was not a success. It had little 
active support from SNCC, which was busying itself with 
an intensive voter registration drive, in preparation for 
the 1966,Democratic primaries.^ In addition, SNCC was 
opposed to the SCDC's tactic of using local demonstrations 
for the purpose of promoting national legislation.. The 
SCIG campaign was badly planned, and the local people were 
not put in the picture.^ Although the marches were not 
without violent police reactions (especially in Green­
ville), there was no Selma-type brutality to command the
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national headlines. The Greene County Sheriff’s 
department discovered that the most sensible tactic 
was to let the marchers march— all day long if they wanted 
to. Thus, as the Richmond Afro-American observed, the 
"campaign for 'equal justice' turned into^a daily, almost 
uneventful series of strolls to the county courthouse.
In his annual report, Hosea Williams ascribed the failure 
to a combination of white repression and black apathy.^ 
President Johnson did, in fact, introduce the 
kind of legislation that the SCIC desired but, tied to 
the open housing provision of the 1966 Civil Rights 
Bill, it was never enacted.^ Its failure, plus the 
refusal of the federal government to use marshals for 
law enforcement in the South, meant that "the. old way 
of life— economic coercion, terrorism, murder, and
u rinhuman contempt— has continued unabated." ° As during 
Reconstruction, the intent of the law was being sub­
verted by a national reluctance to curb Southern white 
resistance. As the Southern Regional Council pointed 
out, this resistance should have surprised nobody: 
historically, it had always flourished "to the degree 
that the enforcement arms of the federal government 
allowed it."^ Lax enforcement of the 1964-5 legisla­
tion, together with the failure of the 1966 civil 
rights bill, meant that Southern white violence went 
virtually unchecked. When the killers of Viola iiuzza 
a-nfl Jonathan Daniels went free, wrote King, "many of us
42
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wept at the funeral services for the dead and for
A Ddemocracy."
II. THE COLLAPSE OP THE CIVIL EIGHTS MOVEMENT tw the ,SOUTH
The Pinal Campaigns: Birmingham and Granada
It was one of Martin Luther King's most consist­
ently-held beliefs that while legislation could "declare" 
rights, "only when people themselves begin to act are 
rights on paper giveiulife blood."49 Demonstrations were 
still needed, for they were "part of the process . . . 
of law enforcement."^
The truth of this assertion was illustrated by 
the implementation of the Voting Rights Act. Although 
the total number of federal registrars was hopelessly 
inadequate, demonstrations were often successful in 
gaining easier registration procedures, or bringing about 
the arrival of federal examiners. The Birmingham demon­
stration of early 1966.clearly underlined the advantages 
of persistent pressure, in the form of nonviolent direct 
action. In that city, less than a third of the adult 
black population was registered to vote.^ In December 
1965» with the Democractic primaries— and the chance to 
unseat Governor Wallace-ronly a few months away, the 
SCLC inaugurated a county-wide registration campaign, 
with the help of Northern volunteers. In the New Tear, 
Pred Shuttlesworth and Ho sea Williams led daily demon­
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strations. A telegram demanding federal examiners was 
sent to the Attorney General, and easier registration 
procedures were demanded from the city: "We want regis­
trars in Negro neighbourhoods," said Williams, “and we 
want them at night, when Negroes aren't working."5$ By 
January. 12, the SCIC had conducted fifteen marches in 
nine days.^ Eight marches (and a considerable amount of 
police violence) later, twenty-three federal registrars 
were sent to Jefferson County. The next day, one
thousand blacks were registered, over 14,000 during the 
following month.^
The need for a vigorous civil rights movement was 
also illustrated by the Meredith March of June 1966, which 
passed through dozens of towns that had never experienced 
any movement activity, and where "rural Negroes . . .  
remained at the mercy of white power exerting absolute 
dominion over, their lives."-56 -One such town was Granada. 
Its police department, post office, schools, and churches 
were still completely segregated. And of an adult black 
population of 4,000, only 700 were registered to.vote.'5'7 
Communication between the races was non-existent; white 
ministers who had attempted to form a bi-racial committee 
were sacked and forced out of town.^®
When-the Meredith March passed through Grenada, 
King and Eloyd McKissick extracted a promise from the city 
to hire six black voting registrars, and extend regis­
tration hours into the late e v e n i n g . A  thousand black
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names were swiftly added to the voting rolls. 60 When the 
marchers departed, King left eight SCIC field workers 
behind, who would..encourage Grenada's black population 
to challenge every aspect of segregation and white 
supremacy.61 Predictably, with King and the national 
news out of the town, Grenada's white leaders acted 
decisively to crush the nascent movement: on July 3, all 
the SCIjC workers were arrested and ¿jailed, along with 
forty-one others who tried to protest. 62 Further demon­
strations were violently dispersed by the Highway Patrol; 
a car carrying two civil rights workers was sprayed with 
bullets; and the SCIC's list of demands was rejected 
with .the statement: "There will be no concessions of any 
type or degree to anyone whatsoever, likewise there will 
be no acceding to.any such demands."6^ For a while it 
seemed as if the city's uncompromising stand had worked, 
and that fear had been re-instilled into the black 
population: when Hosea Williams appealed for volunteers
to test the city's public accommodations, only fifteen
64people responded.
The Grenada Movement did not die. . During the 
following month, the SCIC team, led by Hosea Williams and 
Leon Hall, conducted a direct action campaign to break 
down the city's virtually intact wall of segregation. It 
was met with the traditional Mississippi combination of 
mob violence and police brutality. On July 8, a street 
rally of 1,200 people was dispersed with tear-gas; the
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next day, 300 marchers were trapped in the city square and 
showered with bricks and bottles hurled by a white mob, 
while the police impassively looked on.6^ When the new 
school year began, eighty-seven black children and parents 
were attacked while attempting to enter a "white" school* 
which a federal Judge had ordered to desegregate.66 Only 
five policemen were on duty that morning. 6'7
As Andrew Jaffe wrote in New South, the racist 
violence of Grenada "did not elicit even the superficial 
national response that the Movement had come to expect." 66 
Nevertheless, thanks to the intervention of the federal 
judiciary, the rights of: Grenada's blacks were at last 
beginning to be recognized. At hearings in Oxford, Judge 
Claude Clayton* appalled by the violence, strongly con­
demned the city's failure to protect civil rights marchers 
and black school-children: "X am astonished that such 
violence . . .  could have occurred as many times as it 
did with so little reaction on the part of the public 
officials. . The problem lies-at the very door of the 
sheriff's office."6 .^ As a result of Claytbn's inter­
vention (supported by a Justice Department brief), Dr.King, 
Andrew Young, and Hbsea Williams were able to escort 160 
black children into one of the city's "white" schools, 
protected by 275 white officials. '76 It was a small but 
significant victory and, after the shocking violence of 
September 12, there were even signs of remorse from some 
of Grenada’s white citizens, three hundred of whom issued
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a statement promising they would use "all of our influence
to the support of law and order"— including court-ordered
71school integration. The Grenada Movement was also 
responsible for the^arrival of four federal voting regis­
trars who, once they agreed to move their offices to the 
black neighbourhood, were enrolling two hundred people a 
day.?2 In his 1967 annual, report, King was able to claim 
that Grenada's "non-destructive rebellion"_had led to the 
attainment of forty of the movement's fifty-three original 
demands.
The Decline of the^Civil Rights Movement in the South
...... In February 1967, the New York: Times reported that
"the civil rights movement.has collapsed in broad areas 
of the South, and is fighting what seems to be a last- 
ditch battle for survival in its.few remaining spheres of 
influence,"^ Two years earlier, in the Summer, of 1965, 
SNCC, COKE, and the SCIC had between, them.deployed one 
thousand field workers in the region, most of them, heavily 
concentrated in the Deep South, and North Carolina.^ In 
1966, the number had declined to 300 and, at the beginning 
of 1967» fewer than fifty remained. SNCC, COKE, and the 
SCIC had only about a dozen full-time field workers each, 
scattered throughout the eleven Southern states.^
. SNCC was the civil rights movement's first, and 
most costly casualty. In late 1964, SNCC had expanded to 
than 200 full-time field workers, and an e<jualmore
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number of part-time volunteers.77 But its new strength 
•was never fully utilized. Plans were made for a 1965 
project, along the lines.of the 1964 Mississippi Summer 
Project, but considerably wider in scope, covering 
selected Black Belt counties from Texas to Virginia. '78 
However, this ambitious plan was never implemented, owing 
to a combination of internal factionalism, interracial 
tension, disillusionment with the concept of leadership, 
and sheer "battle fatigue."79 SNCC's failure to 
follow up its 1964 project was the start of an organiza­
tional decline which perceptibly slowed the momentum of 
the civil rights movement as a whole. By the Summer of 
1966, SNCC1s staff had fallen to 135» Of this number, 
only about eighty were field secretaries, and little more
than.half of these were actively engaged in local organi-
Anzing. Its espousal of Black Power, its opposition to 
the U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam, anfl its* 
support of the Palestinian cause cost SHCC virtually all 
of its white financial aid. By December 1966, its staff
O]had shrunk to eighty. One of the driving-forces of the 
civil rights movement was on the verge of extinction.
With the parallel decline of COEE, only the SCIO, 
of the direct action organizations, remained a significant 
force in the South. Hosea Williams supervised a staff of 
105 which* in 1966, conducted voter registration drives
opin seventy-nine counties. This staff, however, included 
only five full-time field organizers, the rest being part­
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time subsistence workers. 83 The Chicago campaign had led 
to an inevitable contraction of SCIC manpower in the 
South and, like SNCC, the SCIC suffered as a result of 
its anti-war stand. (In May 1967, the Conference was 
forced to reduce its total staff from 150 to eighty-five.)8^ 
Writing at about this time, Pat Watters and Reese Cleghorn 
pronounced the civil rights movement "dead, or dormant;"83
The decline of the civil rights movement, and the 
federal government's commitment to only token enforce­
ment of civil rights legislation meant that "an erratic 
pattern of racial progress and recalcitrance" character­
ized the South,86' Desegregation of public accommodations, 
voter registration, and school integration were all 
considerably easier where there were strong and active 
local movements. Even when the immediate results of 
civil rights campaigns were negligible, such drives were* 
beneficial because, firstly, they created black community 
organizations that functioned as vehicles for political 
action; and secondly, they penetrated the barrier of 
fear, instilling the idea that white authority could be 
challenged. No town could ever be the same after a march, 
a demonstration, or a sit-in. These forms of direct 
action, the symbolic defiance of white supremacy, planted „ 
the seeds of a black political renaissance. The apparently 
inconclusive SCIC demonstrations in Eutaw and Demopolis, 
for example, challenged the belief that "government is 
white folks' business, and that the election of black
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officials is against the natural order."a? They paved 
the way for the election of blacks in Greene County in 
1969, and for virtually complete black political control 
by 1971.88 Similarly, the Meredith March led to local 
movements in Batesville, Belzoni, and Grenada. Demon­
strations in Batesville were quickly snuffed out, but 
the Belzoni movement resulted in the integration of 
restaurants, the hiring of blacks in local stores and 
factories, and an increase in black voter registration?^ 
The Grenada Movement, in addition to the gains cited 
above, also led to a black running for city council in 
1967— the first such*attempt since Deconstruction. 9°
Unfortunately, with the sudden and rapid decline 
of SNCC and COEE, and the shift of SCIC personnel to 
the North, the political activation of myriad black 
communities was indefinitely delayed. "The trouble is," 
said Vernon Jordan in 1967, "the Movement never reached 
most counties in the South.
The Collapse of the Movement and the Development
ox black Political Power ^
It was in the area of voter registration and 
political education that the collapse of the civil 
rights movement was felt most keenly. There were, of 
course, many local civic and political organizations, as 
well as hundreds of NMCP branches, which conducted 
successful voter registration drives unaided by the 
larger civil rights groups. Such organizations, however,
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were concentrated in the Upper South, and certain Deep 
South cities such as Atlanta and Savannah. In these 
areas, voter registration was relatively easy. Intense, 
violent white opposition to black: voting was largely 
confined to Alabama, Mississippi, south-west Georgia, 
and parts of Florida and Louisiana. It was here that 
local black: organizations tended,to be weakest, and most 
needed the support of SUCC, COKE, and the SCLC.
The,entry of these organizations into.Deep South 
communities, invariably resulted in the formation of new 
political groups.. As Donald Matthews and James Prothro 
pointed out, fear, economic dependence,¿and the small 
size of the black middle-class, severely narrowed the 
"social bases of leadership recruitment" in the Deep 
South.^ Here, the field workers of SHCC, COEE, and the 
SCLC provided a surrogate middle-class, encouraging the 
growth of local leadership, and actingxas catalysts for 
the development of structured community action.
It was in counties where there were both federal 
examiners and strong local movements that voter registra-Q 7tion was most e a s y . T h e  existence of such movements 
was an important criterion for the assignment of federal 
registrars. John Doar, explaining government policy, 
argued that if federal registrars were sent to every 
county that was covered by the Voting Eights Act, "the 
^black__7 public would believe that Federal examiners 
are a substitute for active local organizations." This
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would be "counterproductive as far as bringing Negroes 
out of the caste s y s t e m . T h e  collapse of the 
civil rights movement hampered the growth of such groups, 
relaxing the pressure for forceful and thorough imple­
mentation of the Voting Eights Act.
The accumulation of registered voters was only 
the first staging-post on the long road to political 
influence: the techniques of political action also had 
to be mastered. Candidates for office had to learn comp­
licated party rules, intricate nominating procedures, and 
complex election laws. Similarly, ordinary voters needed 
instruction in.how to fill in a ballot paper or use a 
voting machine, how to "split" a ticket, and how to use 
a "single-shot" vote. SNCC, COKE,.and the SCIC had 
taught these procedures,.informed people of their politi­
cal rights, and provided, or provided access to, legal 
expertise. Eaw.votes alone were insufficient to attain 
political power. "Southern Negroes," wrote Matthews and 
Prothro, "must create their own political organizations 
before they can become a significant force in Southern 
politics."^ The demise of the civil rights movement 
made this task immeasurably more difficult.
The«1966 Pemocractic Primaries: The Triumthof Political 
““ Racism ’ ’
It was one of Martin Luther King's firmest 
beliefs that once the walls of segregation had tumbled, 
Southern poor whites would end up on the same side of the
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political fence as blacks. Eventually, they would realize 
that ”the same forces that oppress Negroes in American 
society oppress poor white people." 96 This was not ¿just 
a Utopian dream of King's. Bninent historians such as 
C. Venn Woodward and Dewey Grantham detected the beginn­
ings of such a political realignment, and the 1964- 
national elections seemed to indicate that it was becoming 
a reality." Lyndon Johnson's smashing electoral triumph 
showed, in King's opinion, that the politics of race in • 
the South was being splintered by the "strain of economic 
deprivation which cuts across caste lines.” Already* 
wrote King, poor whites and blacks, both propelled by 
similar economic interests, were participating in a de 
facto, political alliance} soon such alliances would be 
"frankly acknowledged." 98
The 1966 Democratic primaiy in Alabama would be 
a testing-ground for this kind, of realignment. .. It was 
Alabama's first election in seventy years in which blacks 
could freely vote. It would also offer a clear-cut choice 
between Inrleen Wallace, wife and puppet of the racist 
demagogue, and Richmond Flowers, a racial moderate.
Flowers had personally prosecuted the alleged killer of 
Jonathan Daniels, had investigated the activities of the 
Ku Klux Klan, and had condemned the behaviour of the 
Alabama state troopers of A1 Lingo. Flowers also openly 
sought black support."
Alabama was the SCIC's spiritual home, the main
287
source of its strength., and the scene of such victories 
as Selma, Birmingham, and Montgomery. It was, therefore, 
natural for the SCIC to take a special interest in the 
forthcoming primary. Its pre-election strategy, formula­
ted by Hosea Williams, called for a "Spectacular Task 
Force" to conduct an intensive voter registration drive, 
invigorated by a tour of the Black Belt by King, in the 
Winter of 1966. It would be a two-pronged drive. Voter 
registration and political organization would be concen­
trated in eight.Black Belt counties, with a view to the 
election^of black officials. It the same time, the SCLC 
would try to defeat Wallace "by undermining his strong­
holds in urban areas" such as Birmingham, Mobile, 
Montgomery, and Tuscaloosa. Hopefully, the arrival of 
federal examiners.would facilitate the drive.
After election day, "A lot of high hopes built on 
the. new Negro vote in the South, came crashing, down,” 
wrote Pat Watters. 1^1 ^Flowers, who had courted the black 
vote, was left with only three per cent of the white 
vote. He carried most of the black-majority counties,
as well as the state's eight "whitest" counties— a re­
flection of.'the Populist tradition of the north Alabama 
hill country. Wallace's strength was concentrated in the 
small towns throughout the state, where blacks were 
fifteen to twenty per cent of the population, and where 
black voter registration was only forty-two per cent. The
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civil rights movement had neglected these areas, having 
concentrated, as dictated by limited resources, on 
counties with large black majorities.10^ "It would be
a mistake to suppose that segregationist sentiment in 
Alabama is the last gasp of a dying and archaic system,” 
wrote William Brimk and Iouis Harris, "actually, it is 
showing more strength than ever.”
It was a similar story in Mississippi and Georgia, 
where John Bell Williams and Lester Maddox sailed to 
victory on the winds of white supremacy. In these states, 
as in Alabama, blacks found themselves politically 
isolated. Their major allies were not poor whites, but 
upper-class whites who disapproved of the inflammatory 
racist demagoguery of Wallace, Maddox and Williams.105 
Eace, evidently, was still the over-riding issue in 
Southern politics, and lower-class whites showed little 
inclination to.abandon their vociferous opposition to 
black eguality. Human V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham 
saw in these events a clear parallel with the eventsj.of 
the 1890's when, with the "Solid South” threatened.by 
the emergence of a two-party system based on class, the 
Bourbons had use racism to destroy*the interracial 
alliance that was being .fostered by Populism.1^  The 
results of the 1966 elections seemed to demonstrate that 
the kind of black-poor.white alliance envisaged by King 
in his Montgomery speech of 1965 was, in*the words of 
Prank Millspaugh, "hopelessly illusionary.”-^7
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SNCC had already ceased to think in terms of re­
forming the Democratic party. The 1966*elections confirmed 
•what SNCC already knew, that, as Stokely Carmichael put
it, the Democratic part "didn't mean LBJ, hut a crew of-
i nftracist bullies and killers." w  Blacks were politically 
isolated* and were best advised to make a virtue out of 
necessity by forming their own, independent political 
parties, along the lines of the Lowndes County Freedom 
Organization. In 1965 and 1966, SNCC workers tried to 
emulate the LCFO example in a dozen Alabama Black Belt 
counties, . encouraging blacks to boycott the Democratic 
primaries, form independent "freedom" parties, and 
nominate their own candidates for the November general 
election.10^
The SCIC was sharply opposed to this strategy.
"We don't want no part of it,", said Hbsea Williams. "Will 
Negroes treat white folks the way white folks treated 
them? . . .We can't go pitting race.against race."1^
But the massive Wallace vote showed that, like so many 
other Southern institutions, the Democratic party was 
"for whites only" and that, regardless of what blacks 
might want, whites were pitted against them. During the 
Meredith March, an SCLC worker criticized "Black Power" 
on the grounds that "you'll end up with whites hating 
Negroes.and vice versa." -His opponent, a SNCC supporter,
illreplied, "Whites do already."
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III. THE DECLINE 0E PHILOSOPHIC NONVIOLENCE
Philosophic Nonviolence and the Early SNCC
When SNCC was formed in I960, it pledged itself 
to "the philosophical or religious ideal of nonviolence 
as the foundation of our purpose, the pre-supposition of 
our faith, and the maimer of our action." 112 Many of the 
original SNCC activists were profoundly stirred "by the 
philosophy of Gandhian nonviolence as a means of con­
verting the oppressor. This was especially true of those 
who had ¿joined SNCC through the Nashville Student Move­
ment, where they had come under the .influence of the 
Rev. James M. Lawson, a man strongly committed to philo­
sophic nonviolence. Lawson had come to a synthesis of 
Christian and Gandhian ideas at about the same time as 
King. 115 .Many of the early leaders-of SNCC— John Lewis, 
Diane Nash, James Bevel, Marion Barry, Cordell Reagan, 
and. Bernard Lafayette— had attended his workshops. on 
nonviolent direct action.11^ Iawson taught that"your 
flesh could suffer like Christ's out of love," John Lewis 
recalled in 1967* "You have to understand this to 
understand what SNCC was in the beginning." 115 Thus Charles 
McDew* could say that SNCC opposed segregation "not only 
because it disadvantages the Negro, but because it blights 
everything it touches. . . .  you cannot draw_a man near 
to you by striking him a blow." Similarly, Diane Nash 
saw the movement as "applied religion," because it was
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motivated by love, and strived towaid a " beloved community." 117
Even in tbese early days, however, observers noted 
that most of the students tended to view nonviolence in a 
pragmatic light. 118 SNCC's original statement of purpose 
was the work of the small but strongly committed Nash­
ville group. Many of the student delegates, according to 
Martin Oppenheimer, "never saw the statement; many others
did not understand it, much less agree with its full im- 
119plications." v  There were also those, as admitted, 
to whom "violence presents itself as a quick, effective
answer „120
The Erosion of Philosophic Nonviolence
A majority in SNCC always regarded nonviolence as a 
practical, rather than a philosophical commitment. Most 
of the staff, wrote Julian Bond in 1963, saw it as "an 
effective^means of protest," not a "way of life and a 
philosophy of living." Nevertheless, philosophic non­
violence was an important influence in the early SNCC, _ 
despite the fact, that its adherents were in the minority.
By 1964, however, philosophic nonviolence was being- eroded 
by constant exposure to white violence and brutality. More 
and more came to regard nonviolent direct action as a co­
ercive weapon. John Lewis, one of the strongest devotees 
of nonviolence, summed up the new mood in SNCG: "There's 
a growing— and it's fast growing— trend towards 'aggressive 
nonviolent action.' You no longer walk quietly to the paddy-
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wagons and happily and willingly to ¿jail. " 122 Few, either 
in SUCC or COEE, now believed that nonviolence worked by- 
converting" the oppressor, and those who did so (usually 
inexperienced northern white volunteers) were regarded 
as pathetically naive.12^
Most activists came to a point-when it became psycho­
logically impossible to love the enemy. John lewis was 
savagely beaten at Selma, and knew "that it was my last 
demonstration .... The body gets tired. You put out so~ 
much energy and you saw such little gain. Black capacity 
to believe white would really open his heart. . . was 
running out." Stokely Carmichael had never been a 
believer in philosophic nonviolence. During a training 
session for the Mississippi Summer Project volunteers, he 
had engaged in a. heated, debate about nonviolence with James 
Xawson, a committed believer. There were limits to human 
love,, argued Carmichael. There.came a time when "you 
get tired of being beaten and going.back the-next day for 
your beating for five days in a row."’1'2^ By 1965, the 
majority of SNCC workers agreed with Carmichael.^’ later, 
he recalled.when even tactical nonviolence became impossible 
for him, after a demonstration in Montgomery during the 
Selma campaign. A black woman had been knocked down by 
a fire-hose; demonstrators were being trampled by the 
horses of the sheriff's posse: "Suddenly, everything 
blurred. I started screaming and I didn't stop until they 
got me to the airport. That day I knew I could never be
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hit again without hitting hack." 127 Similarly, for James
Forman, "the "brutality of the blue-shirted Alabama police
and the club-swinging posse of Big-Belly Jim Clark" put
an end to his faith in nonviolence.12^
For Carmichael, Forman, and hundreds of others,
nonviolence became not only psychologically impossible,
but also psychologically demeaning. Psychiatrists who
took part in the Mississippi Summer Project, noticed that
many of the SNCC workers were suffering from emotional
exhaustion, a kind of "battle fatigue" that led to
"chronic withdrawal," bitterness, and hatred of whites.12^
Psychiatrist Alvin F. Poussaint concluded that their
condition was exacerbated by nonviolence. The unnatural
suppression of their anger toward whites led to ulcers,
nervous disorders, and outbursts of violent aggression
against white civil rights workers.1^0 In view of
the continuous harassment and violence that was the lot
of most SHOO workers, it was not surprising that, as
Robert Moses noted in 1964, "the majority of the students
are not sympathetic to the idea that they have to love
the white people that they are struggling against."1^1
By 1965» the ideas of Malcolm X, especially his
call for retaliatory violence, were finding a sympathetic
132audience in SNCC. ^ Soon afterwards, the works of 
Franz Fanon provided an intellectual basis for the com­
plete rejection of nonviolence. Hatred of the oppressor, 
Fanon wrote, far from being undesirable, was psychologically
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healthy for an oppressed people, especially when that 
people was a coloured one.133 nonviolence came to be 
perceived as a demeaning philosophy, which disguised the 
aggressive militancy of the movement, making it "accept­
able” to whites. Nonviolence placed a rigid moral 
straight-jacket on the movement, demanding a standard of 
ethical behaviour that had been expected of no other ethnic 
group. Criticism of nonviolence was not confined to SNCC 
and COBE; it affected all segments of the black popula-
especially in the North. As Hmmamu Barake (then 
leRoi Jones) put it in 1964: "King's lie is that there is 
a moral requirement to be fulfilled before entrance into 
the secular kingdom of plenty.»134 Black Power deemed it 
degrading to even attempt to cdmbat white racist stereo­
types by displaying love for the oppressor.
The Terms of the Debate
Although SNCC eventually came to identify Black Power 
with guerrilla warfare, and a world—wide revolution of 
coloured peoples, the original slogan was not a call to 
actual violence, but a rejection of philosophical violence.133 
This was an important distinction which was, however, lost 
upon the white majority. The core of the debate was not 
whether the civil rights movement should become violent, 
but whether or not nonviolence— in the sense of love for 
the oppressor— should remain its central philosophical 
principle. Nonviolence is not the opposite of violence "
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said James Meredith. "What really happened with non­
violence, they took the Negro as he was in I960 
and they attached the name 'nonviolent' to him, and 
thereby gave a legitimacy to a particular movement.
This changed nothing. . . .  The Negro was never violent."156
For most SNCO workers, nonviolence was simply 
irrelevant. As one of them put it,"The assumption of non­
violent protest is that the other guy has a conscience 
you can appeal to. That's just not true in Mississippi."15? 
When SNCC shouted "Black Power," it was not declaring 
that blacks would kill whites, but that blacks should have 
the absolute right to decide their own tactics, on a prag­
matic basis, like any other ethnic group in American 
society. When whites inflicted violence upon blacks, they 
were not entitled to expect love in return.. "White people 
must be made to understand," wrote Carmichael, "that they 
must stop messing with black people, or blacks will fight
back. «138
IV. THE GROWTH OF BUCK SEPARATISM IN SNCC
The Coalitionist Strategy of the Civil Rights Movement 
Black Power, as well as rejecting philosophic 
nonviolence, urged blacks to shun alliances with whites. 
Bayard Rustin, Sing's unofficial political adviser, was 
the most articulate exponent of coalitions with white 
groups. The superordinate goal of the civil rights move 
ment should be, in Rustin's opinion, the realignment of
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the American party system, and this could only he done by 
maximizing white support for the movement. The civil 
rights coalition had the potential to become "a coalition 
of progressive forces which becomes the effective political 
majority in the United States."1^  This coalition, em­
bracing blacks, white liberals, church groups, and or­
ganized labour, had defeated the Dixiecrat-Republican 
alliance to pass the Civil Rights Act and the Voting 
Rights Act, as well as the other legislation that made up 
the "Great Society" programme. The expansion of the black 
electorate in the South would consolidate the coalition, 
further weakening the reactionary influence of the South­
ern segregationists (whose influence extended far beyond 
the South). If such a coalition strategy were pursued, 
Rustin believed, the power of the Southern conservatives 
would be so weakened that the Democratic party would be 
transformed and radicalized. like the Social Democracies 
of Western Europe, it would embrace the poor and working-
classes of all races in a majority for radical social
. 141change.
SNCC’s radicalism came from "having been frustrated
in seeking change within the framework of the existing 
142society." SRCC had originally pursued the strategy
of reforming the Democractic party, in the hope that it 
could become more responsive to the needs of blacks.
Most of SRCC's work was in the field of voter registration; 
its major effort was the creation of the Mississippi
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Freedom Democratic Party, which sought official recogni­
tion from the national Democratic organization. Yet in 
its David-and-Goliath battle to displace Dhdecrat power 
in the.South, SNCC found itself physically attached, poli­
tically isolated, and bereft of significant support from 
white liberals, organized labour, the Democratic party, 
and the federal government. Opposed though he was to 
Black Power, Bustin had to confess that."it took countless 
beatings and twenty-four failings— that, and the absence 
of strong and continual, support from the liberal community—  
to persuade Carmichael that his earlier faith in coalition 
politics was mistaken."1/14 Black Power contended that 
no white group, not even the.supposedly radical ones, 
could be relied upon for support.
Socialists and Organized labour
One of the most obvious differences between the 
"Old" Left and the "Hew" left, was the latter's lack of 
faith in organized labour... It was not a blind, unreason­
ing distrust. In its.early days, SNCC had been impressed 
by Bayard Bustin' s emphasis on the primacy of economic 
issues in the struggle for black equality. Rustin had 
been a.moving force behind the Y0ung People's Socialist 
League, which had a strong chapter at Howard University, 
a breeding-ground of.black radicalism. Howard's Non­
violent Action Group, a SNCC affiliate that included 
Stokely Carmichael, Courtland Cox, Bill Mahoney, and
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Cleveland Sellers, was impressed by Rustin's Socialist 
back-ground, as well as by his unpretentious willingness 
to engage in informal "rap" sessions with them.1^  They 
soon discovered, however, that Rustin's Socialism led 
to a stifling dependence upon organized labour.
At SNCC's Fourth Leadership Training Conference, 
held at Howard in November 1963 (and organized by Rustin), 
speakers from the labour movement and the Socialist Party 
were prominent. It soon became clear, however, that the 
Socialist tendency to.emphasize class, as opposed to 
race, did not speak to the realities of racism in the 
Deep South, and led to the mildest kind of reformism.^6 
Rustin, and veteran Socialist leader Norman Thomas pro­
claimed that full employment should be.the primary goal 
of the movement. Yet Thomas's-specific proposals amounted 
to little more than New Deal-type public works programmes.*^''7 
The implication of the Socialist line was that white a-nfl 
black workers were equally,disadvantaged, an assertion 
that seemed absurd to SNCC, which spent its time attempting 
to tear down barriers that were so obviously racially 
specific. Paul De Brul of the.Industrial Union Department 
of the AFL-CIO even suggested that SNCC's Freedom Election 
in Mississippi had been a waste of time. Instead, SNCC 
should have backed the election of "moderate** Rubel 
Phillips for the Governorship. SNCC found this suggestion 
both stupid and immoral. Not only was Phillips a segre­
gationist, but also only a handful of black Mississippians
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could vote. Such, a tactic would do nothing to advance 
the fight to abolish harriers to black voting. As 
Elizabeth Sutherland noted, although most of the speakers 
were Socialists, "it was hard to tell that from anything 
they said. They failed to impress the SNCC workers."148
These differences in outlook were less important 
in bringing about SNCC's estrangement from organized 
labour than the latter's failure to practice what it 
preached. The craft unions were notorious for their 
"almost.total" exclusion of blacks. In Chicago, for 
example, where over a million black people lived, there 
was not a single black glazier, or sheetmetal worker; 
and there were only two hundred black electricians.149 
Ia 1959, angered by the failure of the AFI^CIO to up­
root such discrimination, A. Philip Randolph had formed 
the Negro American Leadership labor Council, a move 
supported by Rustin.150. At the same time, even the 
most liberal unions, such as the International Ladies
Garment Workers Union, were shown to be practicing
151discrimination. To SNCC, labour appeared more of an
enemy than a natural ally.
Fear of Co-Optation
"The New Left of the early sixties, and many of 
the black radicals as well,"..wrote Tom Hayden in 1970, 
"were pre-occupied not with the danger of fascist re­
pression but with that of liberal co-optation."1^ It was
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largely for this reason that SNCC became increasingly 
reluctant to work within liberal coalitions. The inde­
pendent politics of Black Power was a logical consequence 
of this attitude.
SNCC found that liberals constantly sought to curb 
its militancy, moderate its demands, and channel its 
energies for. the benefit of the Democratic party. After 
the 1963 March on Washington, SNCC developed an almost 
hysterical distrust of what James Foiman called "the labor- 
liberal syndrome."1^  The March, which vetoed the use 
of direct action and censored John Lewis's speech, con­
vinced SNCC that its radicalism would be fatally compromised 
if, through regular collaboration, it became absorbed 
by a liberal coalition.1-^ The formation of the Council 
on United Civil Eights Leadership, in June 1963, intensi­
fied these f e a r s . I n  an attempt to impose a kind of 
collective leadership on the civil rights movement, the 
HAACP began to "Eed-bait"SNCC, demanding that it dis­
associate itself from such "subversive" groups as the 
National Lawyers' Guild. SNCC was attacked for its stand 
against the war in Vietnam and, increasingly, the CUCRL 
became a forum for NAACP attempts to pressure the other 
civil rights organizations, especially SNCC, to become 
more "moderate" and "responsible."1^6 SNCC's rejection 
of the NAACP-inspired moratorium on direct action in the 
period before the 1964 Presidential election, signalled 
its belief that the interests of the Democratic party
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nnd tlie interests of blade people did not coincide; and
that the path of "moderation" led, inevitably, to the trap
157of co-optation.
The Failure of Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party challenge 
The creation of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic 
Party was an attempt to put Rustin's coalition theory to 
the test. If the Democratic party were to become a 
radical force in American politics, "The liberal must be 
forced to choose between the Negro's support and that of 
the Dixiecrats. b1*^ The SNCC-inspired challenge of the 
MFDP presented such a choice in a clear-cut way. The 
challenge to the regular Mississippi delegation was based 
on four, indisputable points: that the regular party sys­
tematically excluded blades; that it had repudiated the 
national party platform, rejected the national party's 
loyalty oath, and refused to campaign for the national 
Democratic ticket.1^  "Our ultimate goal," wrote 
Cleveland Sellers, "was the destruction of the awesome 
power of the Dixiecrats. ... With the Dixiecrats deposed, 
the way would have been clear for a wide-ranging distribu­
tion of wealth, power and priorities throughout the nation."1^6 
If it were to be successful, however, the MFDP 
challenge would need the support of powerful party leaders, 
fflAn 1-ftTA: David Lawrence of Pennsylvania, Wayne Morse of 
Oregon, Robert Wagner of New York, and Richard J. Daley 
of Chicago.161 Iyndon Johnson determined to prevent the
unseating of the regular delegation and, to this end, 
intense pressure was exerted upon those liberals who 
were backing the MFDP challenge. In addition, the FBI 
carried out "surveillance” of the MFDP and its supporters. 
"By means of informant coverage, by use of various confiden­
tial techniques," and "by infiltration of key groups by the 
use of undercover agents," the FBI was able to prevent the 
seating of the "illegal" delegates, and "advise the 
President in advance" of the plans of the MFDP supporters}62 
Bayard Rustin later argued that SNCC and the MFDP 
had been unwise to reject the compromise eventually 
offered by Hubert Humphrey. But SHCC regarded the offer 
(two non-voting delegates) as a token, not a genuine com­
promise.^6^ They had already accepted the compromise 
worked out by representative Edith Green, whereby members 
of both delegations would be seated if they agreed to 
take a loyalty oath to the national platform and ticket.16^ 
Johnson, however, was utterly opposed to barring any of 
the regular delegates, even if they refused to take such 
an oath.16^
The MFDP challenge had, in fact, presented an 
opportunity for the kind of political realignment advocated 
by Rustin, King, and the other proponents of the coalition 
strategy. But, as Sam Bottone wrote, their "support for 
Johnson has led to the abandonment of their own goal."166 
The desertion of white liberal support made the MFDP 
challenge SUCC’s last attempt at coalition politics.
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Its failure destroyed the little that remained of SNCC's 
confidence in the "ultimate reality of national political 
institutions." 67 It seemed to demonstrate, as Stokely 
Carmichael put it, that "black people . . . could not rel7 
on their so-called allies."166 The defeat was SNCC's 
final, desperate attempt to "work within what they called 
‘the system'.» After Atlantic City, SNCC could no longer 
believe that the Demcratic party, or the federal government, 
could speak to the needs of the poverty-stricken, oppressed, 
and disfranchised blacks of the Deep South.169 The defeat 
led directly to the all-black Iowndes County Freedom Organi- 
zation, and to the separatist politics of Black Power.170
V. SNCC AND TEE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT:
FROM REFORM TO DEVOLUTION
When Bayard Bustxn asserted that the Democratic party was 
the "party of progress, the New Deal, the New Frontier, 
and the Great Society," SNCC replied that it was also the 
party of George Wallace, James Eastland, Lester Maddox, 
and James H. Gray.171 To SNCC, the influence of these men, 
and others of their ilk, was palpable: in the appointment 
of federal ¿judges who were committed segregationists; in 
the failureof the Civil Rights Commission to hold hearings 
in Mississippi; in the Administration's refusal to resolu­
tely attack segregation; and in, above all, the federal 
government's adamant refusal to curb police brutality and 
private violence in the South. These failures destroyed
SNCC's faith in the legitimacy of the federal government 
eroded its commitment to nonviolence; and killed its 
belief in the feasibility of change within the existing 
structure of society.
The Federal Government and the Albany Campaign
The Albanv campaign demonstrated that when the 
federal government assumed a posture of "neutrality”, it 
effectively aligned with the segregationist' status quo. 
Without federal intervention, local police could crush 
demonstrations through the technique of mass arrests.
By allowing this kind of action the federal government 
was turning a blind eye to national law and Supreme 
Court decisions. The first people to be arrested in 
Albany were integrated groups that were testing the order 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission that banned segre­
gation in interstate transportation. But, despite the 
fact that these arrests "violated an express federal 
ruling," the government took no action.172 A pattern of 
arbitrary arrest was established which eventually broke 
the Albany Movement. The only helpful move from the 
Justice Department was an amicus curiae brief to oppose 
the city's request for a permanent injunction against 
demonstrations.17-^  Eventually, a federal court ruled 
against the movement: the judge was one of President 
Kennedy's segregationist appointees, "an old-line
17*Talmadge supporter."
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When a temporary truce was announced on December 
18, 1961, Albany Chief of Police Iaurie Pritchett was 
the recipient of a telegram from Robert Kennedy, which 
congratulated him on his "nonviolent" handling of the 
demonstrations. The Few York Tiroes and the Atlanta Const! 
tution echoed the praise, for Pritchett had kept order 
by peaceful arrests. But, as the Georgia Council on 
Human Relations pointed out, "many of the arrests have 
been made when no threat to public safety existed . . .
The only thing the Chief preserved was the segregationist 
status quo." ^ 5  The Southern Regional Council likewise
observed that Pritchett's methods had been far from 
praiseworthy, and advised the Justice Department not to 
"overpraise public order" in the future. ^ 6  Pritchett's 
distaste for overt brutality was not shared by the law 
enforcement officers who beat up five movement leaders 
during 1961 and 1962. The widespread existence of police 
brutality in southwest Georgia was not difficult to prove 
or documentj all it took to recognize it was "a willing­
ness to face reality.""^7 Albany was the beginning of 
a bitter political education formny SNCC activists. "As 
the years passed," wrote James Forman, "it became clear 
that the federal government was a partner in the crimes 
against black people.
The Federal Government and the Mississippi Voter ■ "Registration hrxves
SNCC was encouraged by the federal government to
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conduct a voter registration drive in Mississippi, and 
believed that the Justice Department had promised some 
form of protection in the likely event of white racist 
violence. Later, the Department denied having given 
such an assurance. Certainly, no firm, written pledge 
was given hut, as Harold Fleming of the Southern Regional 
Council saw it, ’’because of the Kennedys' view of poli­
tical reality,” they had encouraged SNCC's belief.180
In May 1962, civil rights workers publicly told 
of their harrowing experiences in the voter registration 
campaign. Robert Moses recounted his short and violent 
sojourn in Amite County, and described the death of 
Herbert Lee, one of the movement's first fatalities.181 
Two days of testimony vividly highlighted ”the widespread 
use of dogs to terrorize Negroes; the lawlessness and 
sadism of Southern police officials;” and ”the inability 
of the FBI to do anything about police brutality."182 
But the inquiry had no effect upon government policy, 
which was one of non-intervention.
The shooting of James Travis, and the narrow es­
capes of Robert Moses and Randolph Blackwell, led the civil 
rights movement to intensify its campaign to bring about 
federal intervention. The Voter Registration Project 
(under whose auspices SNCC was working) announced a "satura­
tion” registration campaign in Leflore County, where'the 
shootings had occurred. ^ "The time has come," wrote VEP
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director Wiley Branton, "to pick up the gauntlet.fc18^ 
White acts of violence and intimidation had made Con­
stitutional rights "virtually inoperative" in Mississippi. 
"The peace of the United States is broken bv the lawless­
ness in Mississippi," wrote Branton. "The federal 
government has an obligation, which it is not fulfilling, 
to restore it."185 Only once did the Justice Department 
intervene, persuading the city of Greenwood to release 
from Jail eight civil rights workers. As usual, however, 
there was a quid £ro £uo with the segregationists: the 
Department agreed to drop its suit to enjoin the authorities 
from interfering with voter registration.180
The Greenwood project ground to a standstill. Two 
years of SUCC activity had added a mere 3,871 black 
names to the voter rolls in the state. In the Autumn of 
1963, the VHP admitted temporary defeat and suspended 
further funds for Mississippi. There could be no progress 
there "without massive federal action."18? White violence 
continued, unabated. The toll in the 1964 Summer Project 
was six murders, thirty-five shootings, eighty bombings,
T O O
and one thousand arrests. uo The kind of opposition SNCC 
faced was "a concerted . . .  galvanized, organized onslaught 
of total ¿"’white_7 community resources."18^ The Southern 
Regional Council pleaded for some kind of federal inter­
vention: "It is not, after all, radical or extreme to 
affirm that anarchy is intolerable."1^0 But the Justice 
Department, while expressing sympathy, especially for the
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relatives of the murdered civil rights -workers, apologeti­
cally explained that it did not possess the authority to 
interfere in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.
¡Southern Violence and the Constitut-f rm
In Mississippi, as in Alabama, southwest Georgia, 
and northern Iouisiana, the fear of the black community was 
the civil rights movement's first obstacle: fear of police 
repression, private retribution, and economic retaliation* 
The absence of federal restraints on white violence, official 
and unofficial, made that task doubly exacting. Howard Zinn 
spoke for manv in SNCC when he argued that the movement 
could make little headway until "the stone wall of police 
power" were broken by some kind of federal presence in the 
South. 191
The Justice Department consistently claimed that the 
federal government simply did not have that kind of power. 
According to Assistant Attorney General Burke Marsha]!, the 
federal nature of the Union, as defined in the Constitution, 
placed severe restraints on the police powers of the 
national government. 3h the first place, the maintenance 
of law and order was the proper duty of the individual 
states. When federal rights were violated by state actions, 
the federal courts could only provide remedies on "an 
individual case-by-case basis." Marshall denied that the 
federal government could initiate suits to "protect federal 
rights guaranteed to individuals," strike down unconsti-
tutional state laws, or prevent "abuse of police power."1^2 
In the second place, if the federal government interfered 
in matters that were traditionally reserved to the states, 
it would "lead inevitably to the creation of a national 
police force.
These arguments appeared to Justify Robert Kennedy's
claim that he "lacked the power" to prevent violence in
Mississippi; and that the disappearance of three civil
rights workers (later found dead) was "a matter for local
..194-law enforcement." ^  Experts on Constitutional law, 
however, agreed that they were spurious. Astonished by 
Kennedy's claim of executive impotence, twenty of the 
nation's most eminent law professors cited the specific 
statutes that accorded the federal government the power to 
protect Constitutional rights wherever and whenever the 
states failed to do so. Such rejoinders were to no
avail. Although the long-discredited theory of federalism 
(a theory that had traditionally been pressed into service 
by the South to defend slavery and segregation) provided an 
excuse for federal inaction, it was not its cause. "The 
true answer," wrote Watters and Cleghorn, "was to be found 
in the remaining power of white supremacy in Washington.
Burke Marshall admitted that the restraints of 
federalism were frustrating for those who were trying to 
establish federal rights in the South, and noted that many 
civil rights workers were losing their faith in the law. ^ 7  
When SHCC, in 1966, turned from reform to revolution, nobody
309.
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should have been surprised. As Harold Fleming put it: 
"Americans have been terrorized, beaten, gassed, unfairly 
arrested and persecuted, bombed, and on occasions hilled in 
attempts to exercise constitutionally-protected rights.
As early as 1963» SNCO had ashed "Which side is the federal 
government on?” Another three years of exposure fa 
Southern violence answered the question, and "the movement's 
ally became its enemy."^00
The Meredith March and the Black Power Slogan
Mississippi in 1966 was the perfect setting for the 
birth of Black Power. A year earlier, at Selma, a white 
attack upon nonviolent demonstrators had outraged public 
opinion, prompting President Johnson to propose the 
Voting Eights Bill, and promise that "We shall overcome." 
Now, however, the conscience of the nation seemed to be 
asleep; the time-tested SCIC formula was no longer working. 
As the marchers passed through Philadelphia, local whites 
threw rocks, and assaulted them, while law officers stood 
by and watched. King's request for federal protection 
drew an unmistakeably cool response: "The President knows 
it is going to take a lot of effort to;produce understanding 
down there," said his Deputy Press Secretary. Two days 
later, in Canton, state troopers attacked the assembled 
marchers to their camp-site, lobbing tear-gas grenades and 
clubbing whoever they could lay their hands on. In its 
violent intensity, this unprovoked aggression equalled the
3 1 1 .
Selma attack of the previous year. This time, however, the 
Attorney General chided the marchers for "trespassing" 
on private property.20^
These events reflected how little federal civil 
rights legislation had actually changed the Deep South.
They also demonstrated the irrelevance of philosophic 
nonviolence, and the unreliability of the government. The 
Johnson administration's position of cold "neutrality" 
undefined King's philosophy at precisely the time SNCC 
•was deliberately challenging it. "I've heard nothing 
from President Johnson," King complained. "It's terribly 
frustrating."20^ As Paul Good wrote, "If the President 
had wanted to boost Black Power, he could not have chosen 
a better way." ' The Meredith March showed that Southern 
blacks were politically isolated and physically defense­
less.
Although SUGG introduced the slogan, the mood 
behind it had long been in the air. Black Power was not a 
clearly thought-out political strategy: it was a "mood of 
answering anger, of retaliatory violence among Negroes of 
the South" that was detected by observers long before the 
Meredith March; a mood that echoed "the white lawlessness 
so long the South's disgrace."206 It was the feeling ex­
pressed by Charles Evers, (brother of the murdered NMCP 
leader) who, standing at the base of the Confederate 
memorial in the middle of a "white" park, shouted angry 
warnings to a group of aimed“white'men:
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If you don't bring ¿ftrouble_J7 . . . you won't p-et it 
But if you bring it, you're going to get it. We're 
tired of your bombings and beatings. We've talked 
with you and we've prayed for you, and now we're 
going to sit and wait for you. 207
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CHAPTER Till
THE SC IE AÏÏD THE WAR EST VIETNAM
Black Americans have always been placed in a painful 
quandaiy by the wars of their country. Moved, like whites, 
by feelings of patriotism and loyalty, blacks have also 
regarded serving their countiy as a way of establishing 
a claim for legal and political equality. They fought, 
however, under a triple disadvantage. In the services, 
they were despised, segregated and only reluctantly 
called upon to bear arms. When they did fight, their 
bravery and participation was ignored or quickly for­
gotten. Finally, their loyalty, courage and endurance 
never persuaded whites to reward them with equal treatment. 
"In every American war" wrote Robert W. Mullen, " . . .  
black soldiers have paid a price in flesh and blood that 
remained denied."^ ......
This contradiction.between the white profession of 
freedom and the white practice of racial domination was 
starkly illuminated by the rise of American imperialism.
In the Philippines, black soldiers found themselves 
fighting a people whom their white compatriots called,
p"niggers." In Mexico, Haiti, Korea, the Dominican 
Republic, and Vietnam.the United States, inheriting the 
role of the European colonial powers, fought wars to stifle 
the independence of non-white peoples. It is not surprising 
that black leaders have been profoundly disturbed by such
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wars, recognizing that racism and imperialism go in
hand* Frederick Douglass, in an earlier age of "Manifest 
Destiny” denounced the Mexican war as "disgraceful, cruel, 
and iniquitous." A generation later, his son, lewis, 
berated the Philippines war in a similar manner', charging 
that "the expansion of the United States means extension 
of race hate . . .  and the grossest injustices."“^ When, 
in February 1967, Martin lather King bitterly denounced 
the United States' involvement in Vietnam, he was, as 
Herbert Aptheker noted, "pursuing a deeply-embedded 
tradition in Afro-American histoiy."^
King's Moral Perceptions
Unlike his friends James Lawson and Bayard Eustin, 
King was not, strictly speaking, a pacifist. Keinhold 
Niebuhr's critique of pacifism had convinced him that 
violent resistance to tyranny could be Justified under 
certain circumstances, and he came to regard himself as a 
"realistic" pacifist. Two factors, nevertheless, persuaded 
M m  to view war as "obsolete". Firstly, Gandhi had demon­
strated that nonviolent resistance eliminated the need for 
violence. Secondly, the invention of nuclear weapons 
made war too dangerous ever to serve any good. The alter­
native to casting violence between nations "into unending
limbo" was to risk "plunging the whole of mankind into the
£
abyss of annihilation."
King’s attitude toward communism was characterized 
by a similar compromise between realism and idealism.
315
Philosophically, he rejected Marxism's materialism, humanism, 
ethical relativism, and elevation of the state over 
individual liberty. Marxism, nevertheless, vividly illu­
minated the failures and defects of capitalism; it 
passionately opposed poverty, racism, imperialism, and 
social inequality; its wide appeal among the poor peoples 
of the world could not be explained away by conspiracy 
theories. Such a philosophy, King believed, "can never 
be defeated by the use of atomic bombs," because it was 
"poverty, insecurity, injustice, and racial discrimination" 
which constituted the "fertile soil in which the seed of 
Communism grows and develops."'7 Liberty and democracy 
would flourish only where such conditions were abolished, 
where capitalism was reformed and rendered more humane, 
and where society was infused with a "daring, revolutionary 
commitment to Christ" so that justice and equality could 
be made real.®
There were additional reasons for King's opposition 
to the war in Vietnam. In common with most other black 
American^ he abhorred colonialism. It was a system which 
meant that in-Africa alone, "two hundred million blach men 
an(\ women. . . .  were dominated politically, exploited
Qeconomically, segregated and humiliated."7 He had enthusias­
tically hailed the independence of Ghana, and looked forward 
to the complete extinction of the European empires. The 
emergence of an independent Africa was an inspiration to 
the civil rights movement, and it gradually became apparent
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that the United States was trying to prevent a similar
historical development in south-east Asia,10 The analogy
"between African independence, Vietnamese independence and
their own struggle for civil rights was clear to many
black Americans. Finally, King, as a minister, felt it
his duty to be unconstrained by conventional morality
and political wisdom. He had a prophetic role, emphasized
by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize, to work unstintingly
for the cause of world peace. It was his firm conviction
that, "all the people of the world. . . . must evolve
for all human conflict a method which rejects revenge,
11aggression and retaliation."
I. THE ESCALATION OF THE VAR AND THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT
g-fnp^s 1965 Statements
In an address to the Virginia State Conference of 
the SCLC on July 9» 1965» King declared that he could no 
longer remain silent while the war in Vietnam was being 
intensified. "All I know is that the war in Vietnam must 
be stopped," he went on. "There must be a negotiated 
settlement." Urging the civil rights movement to take a 
forthright stand against the war, he saw "no reason why 
there can't be peace rallies like we have‘freedom 
rallies." A month later, at the SCLC's annual conven­
tion, King called for an "unconditional and unambiguous 
statement" from the President that he was willing to enter 
into good* faith negotiations with North Vietnam and the
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Viet-Cong.1 5^ King also suggested that the President, as 
a gesture of good will,' "consider halting the bombing of 
North Vietnam" and, as his own contribution to the 
achievement of peace, King offered to make a personal 
appeal for negotiations to Ho Chi Minh, the leaders of 
South Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations.1^ 
King's first venture into the field of foreign 
policy was criticized from all around. His own organiza­
tion refused to support his stand, arguing that the SCLC 
was primarily a civil rights organization, and that its 
resources were inadequate "to assume the burden of two 
major issues." While respecting King's right to speak 
against the war, the board insisted that he speak as an 
individual, and that the SCLC's efforts "in mass demon­
strations and action movements be confined to the question 
of racial brotherhood."1^
The reaction of the press to King's peace proposals
was even more unfavourable. "When he applied his doctrine
of non-violence to Vietnam," observed the Nation, "he was
deluged by threatening editorials and cartoons, by
16slanted news stories." The consensus press opinion was
that King was not qualified to speak out on such issues,
and would only harm the civil rights cause if he insisted
on continuing to do so. King, charged Time, was "confusing
the cause?" civil rights leaders, argued Hoy Wilkins, did
not have "enough information on Vietnam" to make an
17informed opinion.
King's statements could not have been more unwelcome
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to President Johnson, who was determined to escalate the 
war. Acting on Johnson's orders, United Nations Ambassa­
dor Goldberg warned King that his interventions were 
threatening the success of important peace initiatives.
To make it crystal clear that King was speaking out of 
turn, Senator Thomas Dodd, a close friend of the President, 
said that by airing his views on matters about which "he 
has absolutely no competence to speak," King had "alienated 
much of the support he previously enjoyed in Congress."^ 
This combination of pressure and persuasion was, for a' 
time, successful. "They told me I wasn't an expert in 
foreign affairs, and they were all experts." King later 
recalled. "I knew only civil rights and should stick to 
that."20
The disapproval of the President, the press, other 
civil rights leaders, and his own organization were 
compelling reasons for King to back away from his out­
spoken stand against the war. There was also the danger 
that he might alienate a considerable portion of his 
black support. In a 1966 opinion poll, Newsweek dis­
closed that only 18 per cent of its black sample believed 
that the United States should withdraw from Vietnam;
black attitudes toward the war appeared to reflect white 
21attitudes. Richard Rovers found that at the 1966 White 
House Conference on Civil Rights, the war was not a major 
issue among the black delegates, and that many blacks 
held the military in esteem; they saw the armed services
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as "the Negro' s high school and Harvard," and the provi- 
der*of employment and training in an institution that 
was less overtly racist than the larger society.^ Even 
Bayard Bustin, Quaker, pacifist and conscientious 
objector, urged blacks to take advantage of the oppor­
tunity provided by the armed forces to "learn a trade, 
earn a salary, and be in a position to enter the Job 
market on their return,
Black leaders like Bustin and Whitney Young were 
also afraid of alienating the support of President 
Johnson, a man whose help was crucial in determining the 
pace of black progress, "Johnson needs a consensus,"
Young told SNCCs James Borman, "If we are not with him 
on Vietnam, then he is not going to be with us on civil
piLrights," That Johnson had been a friend of the civil 
rights movement was undeniable, and much political 
credit accrued to him in the black community as a result 
of the Civil Eights Act, the Voting Eights Act and the 
War on Poverty, King had considerable respect for 
Johnson, a respect, bordering on affection, that was 
shared by the SCIC. It was understandable that in the 
summer of 1965, with his "We Shall Overcome" speech fresh 
in everyone's mind, King should have given Iyndon Johnson 
the benefit of the doubt on Vietnam.^
fiNCC's Opposition to the War
It was left to SNCC to become the first civil 
rights organization to publicly oppose the war, and it was
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SNCC that bore the full brunt of the ensuing condemnation 
and persecution. On the issue of Vietnam, as in the Deep 
South, SNCC cut out the path which the SC 10 would later 
follow.
Until 1965, wrote James Porman, "most of us
¿fin SNGC_J7 — including myself— considered the war not irre-
26levant, but simply remote." In that year, however,
Robert Parris (fonnerly Robert Moses) left SNCC to devote 
himself to the peace movement, serving on the “Committee 
of Unrepresented People."2? Parris was one of the first 
leading figures to directly link the war in Vietnam to 
the civil rights struggle in the Deep South. Racism and 
oppression were not peculiar to the South, he argued, they 
were endemic to the entire United States. It was not, 
therefore, difficult to see that the United States was 
fighting against freedom in Vietnam, just as it was 
fighting against freedom in the South. The task that con­
fronted the civil rights movement was to define its re­
lationship to the world-wide freedom movement, of which 
the revolution in Vietnam was a part. Moreover, it was 
not enough for people to oppose the war as “individuals," 
not was it sufficient for civil rights groups to pass 
formal resolutions condemning the war: they needed to 
act against the war, and they needed to question the basic 
assumptions of American foreign policy— including the
assumption that foreign policy was the exclusive domain of
28the President and his advisers.
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By the end of 1963» most SNCC workers agreed with
Parris that Vietnam was a "colonialist war," but fear of
repression was restraining' SNCC from stating its con-
29elusions publicly. When Tuskegee student leader Sammy 
Younge, Jr. was murdered in January 1966, SNCC cast away 
such fears. lounge's death, and the deaths of a dozen 
other civil rights workers, threw into relief the contra­
diction between the professions and practices of the 
American government. Claiming to be fighting for freedom 
in Vietnam, that government would not enforce free 
elections and the rule of law at home. On examination, 
the SNCC statement argued, this apparent contradiction 
disappeared, for "our work has taught us that the United 
States government has never guaranteed the freedom of 
oppressed citizens . . .  our country's cry of 'preserve 
freedom in the world' is a hypocritical mask behind which
it squashes liberation movements" like the National
-50liberation Front.^
The reactions to SNCC's statement showed that the 
civil rights movement was badly divided over the war. The 
NAACP and the National Urban League denounced the statement; 
CORE issued a statement of its own which, although less 
strident in tone than SNCC's, affirmed that "the escala­
tion of that war is wrong;" and King, on behalf of the 
SC 1C, refused to condemn the statement while limiting his 
remarks to a defense of the right of dissent, including the 
right to be a conscientious objector.-' Defending Julian
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Bond, who was being denied his seat in the Georgia legis­
lature for having endorsed SNCC's position, King told 
his congregation that "This was a man who dared to speak 
his mind. This was a man who dared to be different.
The Dilemma of the SCIC
SNCC's stand posed a severe dilemma for King. One 
SCIC worker recalled that "he was in real agony about it, 
and he kept saying that he was going to have to speak 
against it /"the war_7 . . .  that it was something that 
he had to do."^ Yet his earlier statements had incurred 
the wrath of the President, and the SCIC was still divided 
over the war. Vietnam was acting as a wedge that was 
widening the split between the conservative and militant 
wings of the civil rights movement, leaving the SCIC in 
the middle. The conservatives, wrote Charles Pager, had 
"hastily scrambled aboard the Johnson escalator." Now 
that SNCC and CORE were risking public condemnation and 
financial ruin by opposing the war, King's silence was 
becoming "louder and more painful to those who have
•Zhfollowed him thus far.w>
King could not afford, however, to commit the SCIC 
to an anti-war position. In Chicago, he was labouring to 
construct a broad coalition of civil rights, liberal, 
labour, and religious groups. Unity among these groups 
on a civil rights issue such as open housing was difficult 
enough; a peace consensus in addition would be impossible. 
Nevertheless, throughout 1966, King spoke out against the
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war to selected audiences. In the New Year's Day issue 
of the Chicago Defender, he defended his right, and 
affirmed his duty to speak out against the war. "As a 
minister," he wrote, "I cannot advocate racial peace and 
non-violence for black men alone." Peace was not merely 
a foreign policy Question to be left to the President: 
it was "a matter of human rights," a moral issue that was 
"God's business" and, therefore, "yours and mine."^ Two 
months later, in the same newspapèr, King exprèssèd his 
growing horror at "a war in which children are incinera­
ted by napalm. . .‘. a  war mutilates the conscience.
In May, King agreed to serve as a co-chairman of a new 
anti-war group, Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam. 
Sending a message of support to a peace rally in the 
capital, he asserted that "This confused war has played 
havoc with our domestic destinies.Although muting 
his opposition to the war, he was ¿specially concerned that 
those who held anti-war opinions should not be intimidated. 
"There is a terrible attempt to silence dissenters," he 
complained in the spring, "and to make those who dissent 
appear to be traitors. Thèse people confuse dissent with 
disloyalty, and silence many who fear being called traitor 
if they stand against the war."'58
Gradually, the SCLC expressed public disapproval of 
the war. At its 1966 annual board meeting, it accused 
government policy of having become "imprisoned in the 
destiny of the military oligarchy" ôf South Vietnam, a
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vicious dictatorship that was crushing opposition elements 
among the student, Buddhist and Roman Catholic communi­
ties. "The moment is now opportune and the need urgent," 
the hoard resolved, "to reassess our position and , -t
seriously examine thè wisdom of prompt withdrawal." This 
was the first time that the SCIC had formally recorded 
its opposition to the war.^ Once again, however, the 
staff and hoard were moving too fast for the affiliates.
At the SCIC's annual convention in August, the hoard called 
for unilateral de-escalation on the part of the United 
States, arguing that "the war is corrupting society from 
within and degrading it from without." This resolution, 
however, was never presented to the full convention. 
Clearly, there was still stiff opposition to committing 
the Conference to the anti-war cause.^
The War and the Erosion of the "Great Society."
"It is the greatest of mistakes to mix domestic 
civil rights and foreign policy," commented Paul Anthony 
of the Southern Regional Council'when he heard of the 
SCIC Vietnam resolutions.^1 Anthony believed that the 
war need not have an adverse effect on domestic social 
programmes, that the United States could afford both 
"guns and butter." Whitney Young summed up such thinking 
when he said, "I do not agree with those who say we 
cannot support massive domestic programs without an imme- 
diate cessation of the war in Vietnam." The logic of
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"guns and ‘butter” was also apparent in the “Freedom 
Budget,“ a proposal published by the A. Philip Randolph 
Institute in October 1966. The brain-child of Bayard 
Rustin and A. Philip Randolph, the Freedom Budget 
proposed full employment, a guaranteed minimum income, 
the elimination of ghettos within a decade, and greatly 
improved public education and health care. To achieve 
these ambitious goals, the Freedom Budget advocated an 
increase in federal expenditure of £18-5 billion per 
anmun for the next ten years. The framers of the Freedom 
Budget did not regard the war in Vietnam as an obstacle 
to its implementation. The conflict between the War on 
Poverty and the war in Asia, they claimed, was ”not a 
real one. . . .  no effort we are making anywhere in the 
world has any basis except to defend and advance the 
frontiers of freedom."^
When the War on Poverty was first launched, black 
leaders saw it as a promising and encouraging beginning 
to a massive government effort to put blacks firmly on 
the path to economic equality with whites. King called 
the poverty programme "preliminary and experimental;" 
Whitney Young said that unless the programme were rapidly 
expanded, "then I'm out of business."^ In 1966, however, 
Congress reduced the budget of the Office of Economic 
Opportunity from #2*2 billion to #1.7 billion, and cut the 
funding of the community action programmes by a third.^ 
The 1966 budget, wrote Erwin Knoll, left “no doubt that
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the Great Society is missing in action.“^  It was not 
difficult to locate.the cause of these cut-backs.
,rBecause of Vietnam," admitted the director of the Office 
of Economic Opportunity, "we cannot do all that we should 
or that we should like .to."^
The events of 1966— the defeat of the Civil Eights 
Bill, the "white backlash" and the cuts in the War on 
Poverty— convinced King.that "guns and butter" was a 
dangerous and.illusory concept. "While it may be techni­
cally true . . . that you can have guns and butter," he 
explained, "it is a fact of life that where your heart 
is, there your money will go, and the heart of the
/ | QAdministration is in that war in Vietnam." It was 
plain to King that the war had divided the . civil rights 
movement, siphoned off white support, and created a cli­
mate of political reaction which permitted Southern 
segregationists.and Northern conservatives to stifle 
further, domestic reform... In October, he.warned that cuts 
in social spending constituted "an open invitation to 
riots, ..to despair, to bitterness."^ Testifying before 
the United States Senate at the end of the year, he pointed 
out that "the war on poverty is not even a „battle, it is 
scarcely a skirmish. Poverty . . ..and social progress 
are ignored when the guns of war become a national 
obsession. . . .  The bombs in Vietnam explode at home; 
they destroy the hopes and possibilities for a decent 
America."^
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II. THE SCIC'S COMMITMENT TO THE PEACE MOVEMENT
James Bevel and the Spring Mobilization
. Many of King’s colleagues in the SCIC were already 
involved in the peace movement. . In February 1966, a 
group of Conference workers formed the Southern Coordi­
nating. Committee to End the War in Vietnam; it included
the Rev. James Lawson, Dr Robert L. Green, Harry Boyte,
51and.John.Barber. It was James Bevel's commitment to the
peace movement, however, that most influenced King. 3h
January 1967, Bevel took a leave of absence from the SCIC
to direct the newly-formed Spring Mobilization Committee
to End the .War in Vietnam, an organization chaired by
52veteran pacifist A.J. Muste. Bevel was selected, said 
Muste, in order to encourage "greater participation of 
civil rights organizations." Hopefully, Bevel would be 
able to persuade, King to support the Mobilization.-^
Like King, .Bevel had become convinced that the civil 
rights movement would be stymied as long as the war con­
tinued. He regarded America's domestic turmoil as a kind 
of divine ¿judgement on her complicity with evil in Vietnam: 
"The Lord can' t hear our prayers here in America because 
of all the cries and moans of his children in the Mekong 
Delta, and that is all.He can hear as long as the war 
oontinues, so forget your prayers until the war is over, 
America."^ Bevel's mystical, nonviolent ideology 
enabled him to attract a wide array of support for the
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Mobilization, which, would climax in a mammoth demonstration 
in New York, Bevel appealed for all those who opposed 
the war to forget their political differences and.come 
together in the.broadest possible peace coalition.^ 
Following a policy of non-exclusionism, he welcomed the 
support of the Marxist left. "I just never get into 
political arguments," he said, "since they usually don't 
make sense. The things that make most movements effectual 
are those things that are undebateable. Gandhi said 'we 
need salt’ , and you just can't argue with that."
It was. in January.1967 that King decided to in­
tensify his opposition to the war. The depth of Bevel's 
commitment to the peace cause made a profound impression 
on him. "Here was one more sign," wrote David Halberstam, 
"that a bright and passionate friend ¿judged Vietnam more 
important. than civil rights."^ As always, however,
King's decision was a personal.one. The Rev. Bernard 
lee, King!s personal.assistant, recalled being with him 
in an airport en route to Jamaica. King was reading 
magazines:
He froze as he looked at the.pictures from Vietnam.
He saw a picture of a Vietnamese mother holding her 
dead baby, a baby killed by our military. Then 
Martin ¿just pushed the plate of food away from. him.
I looked up and said, 'Doesn't it taste any good?' 
and he answered, 'Nothing will ever taste any good 
for me until I do everything I can to end that 
war'• • • • When we got back from Jamaica that is 
what he did. 58-.
Ting's Campaign Against the War .
On February 25, 1967, King addressed the Nation
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Institute on the subject of "The Casualties of the War in 
Vietnam." That war, fought in the name of security and 
freedom, threatened the United Nations Charter, the 
principle of self-determination, the right of dissent, 
the Great Society, and "the prospect of mankind's survivalo" 
American foreign policyJ he asserted, was "supporting a 
new form of colonialism, . . .  We are presently moving
down a dead-end road that can only lead to national
findisaster." A month later, he announced that he would 
henceforth "take a much stronger stand" against the war, 
and revealed his intention to address peace rallies in 
Chicago and New York. On March 25, in Chicago, King led 
his first peace demonstration, marching alongside 
Dr Benjamin Spock. At the concluding rally, King urged 
the 5 »000marc hers to "combine the fervor of the civil 
rights movement with the peace movement. We must demon­
strate, teach and preach until the very foundations of
ci-our nation shake." On April 4, he delivered his most 
celebrated statement on the war, "Beyond Vietnam," and, 
eleven days later, he spoke to a throng of a quarter of 
a million people outside the United Nations building in 
New York, sharing the platform with Spock, Bevel, Stokely
/■ pCarmichael, and Floyd McKissick.
King's campaign against the war was not confined to 
speechmaking; he also busied himself encouraging the 
formation and growth of various peace groups. At the end 
of March, at the SCIC's annual board meeting, his own
330
organization endorsed his position, pledging "to do every­
thing in our power to end that war."^ Already co- 
chairman of Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam,
King joined with Joseph Rauh of the ADA in founding a 
group called "Negotiation Now," and sponsored "Vietnam 
Summer," a project organized by the CICAV. Vietnam Summer 
was modeled along the lines of a voter registration 
campaign, using thousands of young volunteers to stimu­
late and articulate opposition to the war in local 
communities throughout the nation,
!Two aspects of the peace movement were of particular 
concern to King; the campaign to remove Iyndon Johnson 
from the Presidency and the defense of the right of 
dissent. Although he tried to avoid ad hominem arguments, 
King considered Johnson himself to be the major obstacle 
to peace, and, while declining to run against the Presi­
dent himself on a third-party ticket, he promised that 
he would "very definitely" oppose Johnson's renomination 
in 1968, and urged peace activists to stage demonstra­
tions at the Democratic convention in Chicago,^ King 
was equally concerned with safeguarding the right of dissent. 
Encouraging opponents of the war of military age to 
register as conscientious objectors, he promised that "As 
long as I'm a pastor, this pastorate will be a sanctuary 
for young men who find the war obnoxious." It was im­
perative, he said, that such government actions as the 
indictment of Dr Benjamin Spock and four others on conspi­
racy charges be opposed, "lestthe Federal Government think
3 3 1 .
that men of conscience can be cowed into silence." At a 
rally to protest the indictments in February 1968, he 
vowed that "we as ministers and priests and rabbis . . .  
will forever stand with our young men in their moments of 
conscience; we were ordained to do this." The peace 
movement, he continued, would have to adopt the militancy 
of the civil rights movement and say, " 'we ain't gonna 
let jail-houses turn us around.m ^
The Storm of Criticism
King's commitment to the peace movement was angrily
denounced by many of his erstwhile allies. "Beyond
Vietnam," the Washington Post charged, was made up of
"sheer inventions of unsupported fantasy" and, as a
consequence, King had "diminished his usefulness to his
68cause, to his country, and to his people." It was a 
typical reaction. King's critics rarely confronted the 
morality of the war: they preferred to accuse him of 
tactical stupidity, aiding the enemy, or political 
opportunism.
A common theme of King's critics in the civil 
rights movement was that he was attempting to "merge" the 
civil rights and peace movements. This effortj according 
to the HAACP's board of directors, was "a serious 
tactical mistake. . . .  Civil rights battles will have to 
be fought on their own merits, irrespective of the state 
of war or peace in the w o r l d . A  variation on this 
theme was that King had a right to dissent from the war,
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’’but not," according to Thurgood Marshall, "as a civil 
rights leader." Others, like Whitney Young and Bayard 
Rustin, clung to the illusion of "guns and butter," 
and were loathe to alienate the President's support.'7®
More hostile critics tended to resort to the 
classic technique of guilt by association. Indeed, Kiig 
had left himself open to "Red-baiting" attacks by his 
participation in the non-exclusionary'Spring Mobilization. 
Typical of this technique was Carl Rowan's article,
"Martin Luther King's Tragic Decision." Dwelling at 
length on alleged Communist infiltration of the SCIC a-nfl 
the peace movement, the article was, as David Lewis put 
it, "a masterly piece of political assassination."*^- In 
similar spirit, a Freedom House paper endorsed by the 
NAACP accused King of lending a "mantle of respectability" 
to "well-known Communist allies and luminaries of the 
hate-j&merica left."*^
It was not often that King was accused of opportu­
nism, yet his peace activities engendered such accusations. 
His decision to ¿join the peace movement, claimed the 
Washington Post, was prompted by his "disappointment at 
the slow progress of civil rights and*the War on Poverty." 
Newsweek speculated that his move was a shrewd tactical 
decision, because "white liberals are increasingly de­
serting civil-rights causes for peace parades."*^ David 
Halberstam posited a different reasons "King is a 
moralist, a fairly pragmatic one, and he'does not intend
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to lose his position with young, militant, educated 
Negro es."^
Such tactical considerations were certainly a factor 
in his decision to campaign against the war. King was 
skeptical of the argument that his activities might damage 
the civil rights cause "because "we are merely marking 
time . . .  if we do not take a stand against the war." It 
was a view corroborated by a survey of civil rights 
leaders conducted by the Atlanta Constitution which con­
cluded that "King's peace emphasis won't affect the civil 
rights movement because the movement as it lias been known 
in the 1960's simply does not exist."^
Those who knew King realized that he felt obliga­
ted to oppose the war as a matter of conscience and 
principle. "It may not be a smart move . . .  but it is a 
moral point of view he has to take," explained Paul 
Anthony of the Southern Hegional Council.*78 Charges of 
opportunism ignored the fact that, as described above, 
King's stand alienated more support than it won. Their 
outspoken attacks on the war had contributed to the 
bankruptcy of SNCC and COEE.^ When King's financial 
adviser predicted a similar fate for the SCIC, King 
replied, "I don't care if we don't get five.cents in the 
mail. I'm going to keep on preaching my message."'78 As 
he often said, he did not determine what was right and 
wrong by looking at the budget of the SCIC, nor by 
taking a Gallup poll of the majority opinion. "There
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comes a time," he used to conclude his anti-war speeches, 
«when one must take a position that is neither safe, nor 
politic, nor popular. But he must take it because con­
science tells him it is right.
Defending the Hew Course
Sing was shaken by the virulent criticism by his 
condemnation of the war. "It was a great burden to be 
attacked by people he respected," Andrew Young remembered, 
"particularly when the attacks engendered by the RBI came 
from people like Ralph McGill. He sat down and cried at
the Hew York limes editorial about his statement on Vietnam,
fiObut this just made him more determined." Refusing to be 
intimidated, King and his colleagues vigorously defended 
their stand, employing language that revealed, on occasion, 
bitter contempt for those black leaders who were sacrificing 
morality to political expediency. King denied that he was 
advocating a "fusion" of the civil rights and peace move­
ments, and challenged the NAACP to take a forthright stand 
on the morality of the war, "rather than going off creating 
a non-existent issue." It was "misleading and shallow" 
to deny that the war was responsible for the narrowing'of 
domestic programmes. The issues of peace and civil rights,
he insisted, "are tied together, and I'm going to keep
83_them together."
The SCI£!1 s most contemptuous rebukes were directed 
against those critics who identified the aims of the peace 
movement with those of the Communists. Carl Rowan was
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"tii© worst kind of sophisticated Uncle Tom," charged 
Andrew Young, "catering to the worst . . .  red-baiting, 
snide-innuendo'approach, to problems." Such "McCarthy- 
like tactics," warned King, endangerèd hard-won civil 
liberties and increased the danger of repression.®^
To emphasize the reasonableness of King's stand, the 
SCIC pointed out that respected journalists had defended 
it. "As a Nobel Peace Prize winner, he couldn't stay out 
of thè peace movement," wrote Max Lemer. James A. Vechsler 
gave voice to the suspicions of many when charged the 
Johnson Administration with mounting a "concerted drive ... 
to isolate King as a 'far-out' figure and depict h-im as the 
captive of the fringe unilateral-withdrawal faction."®^
The absurdity of identifying King with the totalitarian 
left was demonstrated by the fact that the peace coalition 
included the American Jewish Congress, the National Council 
of Churches and Americans for Democratic Action. King 
spoke at the Nation Institute in the company of four US 
Senators; when he delivered "Beyond Vietnam" the audience 
included Dr Eeinhald Niebuhr, the Eev. Eugene Carson Blake, 
Professor Hans. J. Morgenthau, and a host of eminent clergy­
men, theologians and academics.®^ The unthinking reaction 
to King's Vietnam statements merely illuminated the truth 
of his assertion that "in America we are in the tragic
position of having a paranoid fear of Communism which can
86be as destructive as anything."
Despite King's arguments, the conservative civil
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rights organizations failed to oppose the war in his life­
time. Bayard Rustin, a Quaker, pacifist and conscientious 
objector during World War Two, offered a lukewarm defense 
of King's "right to debate" Vietnam, but advised blacks 
to shun'thè peace movement*on the grounds that their 
"immediate problems . . .  in .America are so vast as to allow 
them little time or energy to focus upon international 
crises."87 Unlike Rustin, who privately opposed the war, 
Whitney“Young actively and vocally supported it. in 
admirer of Iyndon Johnson, Young found himself being used 
by the President to increase black support for the war.
He was sent to South Vietnam to observe the "fairness" 
of the elections there. He publicly castigated King 
claimed that "the greatest freedom that exists for Negroes 
in this country is the freedom to die in Vietnam."88 That 
Young was willing to pay this price to preserve the 
President's friendship appalled King. In a bitter ex­
change with Young King was heard to say, "Whitney, what 
you're saying may get you a foundation grant, but it 
won't get you into the kingdom of truth."8^
The arguments of Young and Rustin'notwithstanding, 
the events of 196? furnished inescapable proof of the 
connection between domestic reaction and the war in Vietnam. 
In the aftermath of the Newark and Detroit riots, Congress 
absorbed itself in a futile search for scapegoats. The 
House Un-American Activities Committee, the Senate Inves­
tigations Sub-committee and the Senate Judiciary Committee_
all traditional bastions of Southern reactionism— enjoyed 
a new lease of life, looking for conspiracies and "out­
side agitators" (many of whom, it was widely believed, were 
living off money from the Office of Economic . Opportunity). 
A motion that the Senate Investigations Subcommittee 
inquire into the social and economic causes of the riots 
was soundly defeated.^
Two weeks earlier, the House of Representatives had 
voted down a £40 million rat-control bill while passing 
by an overwhelming margin an anti-riot bill that breached 
the First Amendment and encouraged the persecution of 
such groups as SRCC and the Black Panthers. As in 1966, 
the War on Poverty was forced to brave a gauntlet of Con­
gressional criticisms and cut-backs. The President, for 
his part, contented himself with observing that Congress had 
"carefully evaluated the situation as it sees fit." As 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan concluded; he "seems determined 
to do nothing!!^
The United States was now spending £75 billion a 
year on defense, compared with £7 billion on welfare. The 
agricultural price-support programme received as much 
money as the Office of Economic Opportunity. More funds 
were appropriated for highway construction than for the 
War on Poverty, public housing, rent supplements, and urban 
renewal combined. The primary obstacle to social progress, 
observed Newsweek, "is obviously Vietnam." After the 
summer of 1967 there was less talk of "guns and butter" for,
as Whitney Young commented, "we aren't even getting oleo."
III. KING'S CRITIQUE OP THE WAR IN VIETNAM
The Domestic Impact of the War
The starting-point of King's critique of the war 
in Vietnam was the contention that it had made "the Great 
Society a myth." Spending £500,000 for each dead Viet- 
Cong soldier, the government furnished a niggardly £53 for 
each person defined as poor in the "so-called war against 
poverty— which is not even a good skirmish."^ The urgent 
problems of poverty and urban decay would never be taclded 
as long as the war continued, for "the majority of the 
present Congress and the Administration . . .  is single- 
mindedly devoted to the pursuit of the w a r . "95 It was all 
very well to tali about "guns and butter," but war had its 
own iron logic. War always became the first national 
priority, and war always demanded reserves. Domestic re­
form tended to diminish those reserves, hence the 
"inescapable contradiction between war and social progress 
at home."^
The war had a particularly adverse effect upon 
blades because they were already living in the grips of an 
economic depression, and inflation— the inevitable by­
product of war— hit them "with crushing severity."^ In 
addition, blacks were fighting and dying in Vietnam "in 
extraordinarily high proportions" to the population as a 
whole. (Even Bayard Rustin and Whitney Young agreed that
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the draft discriminated against blacks.)^8 And what made 
this situation even more immoral was the fact that black 
people were being sent "to guarantee liberties in South­
east Asia which they had not found in southwest Georgia or 
Harlem." Such cruel manipulation of the poor could not go 
unchallenged. As the American build-up in Vietnam continued, 
King recounted in "Beyond Vietnam," "I watched the poverty- 
program broken and'eviscerated as if it were some idle 
political plaything of a society gone mad; on war, «nd I 
knew that America would never invest the necessary funds 
or energies in rehabilitation of its poor so long as 
adventures like Vietnam continued."^
The war in Vietnam was also undermining the commit­
ment of blacks to nonviolence, as evidenced by the increas­
ing frequency and intensity of urban rioting. In contrast 
however, to the savage and atrocious violence inflicted by 
the United States on Vietnam, the "so-called Negro 
violence" was miniscule. How could the Administration 
piously condemn the destruction of property when it was 
itself destroying thousands of human lives in Vietnam, "the 
greatest purveyor of violence in the world today"? Only 
those who were working for peace, said King, "have the 
moral authority to lecture Negroes on non-violence."^-®®
The effect of the war upon the youth of the nation 
was similarly damaging. It had produced a deep spiritual 
alienation that was manifested in drugtaking, revolutionary 
radicalism, utopian pacifism, and the escapism of the
hippies?01 Even the majority of young people— outwardly 
conventional, struggling to adapt to the prevailing norms 
of society, and unready to take a clear-cut stand against 
the war— were nonetheless profoundly troubled by their 
nation's behaviour in Vietnam. They were being sent to 
fight in a war which they did not understand— a psycholo­
gically devastating experience. They were a generation 
that had never known peace; they were the children of the 
Cold War, the first "to grow up in the era of the nuclear 
bomb, knowing that it may be the last generation of man-
kind. *102
The most disturbing domestic consequence of the 
war was its poisonous effect upon the nation's political 
life. It had strengthened the forces of reaction, racism 
and right-wing extremism; the “anti-labor, anti-Negro, 
and anti-humanistic forces." These elements had always 
been present in American life, but in 1964, with the 
crushing defeat of their standard-bearer Barry Goldwater, 
they had been politically isolated. The war, however, 
had strengthened the military-industrial complex end re­
vived the right-wing. With the issue of “spurious 
patriotism” to garner popular support, they were now suffi­
ciently powerful to reach out for the ultimate political 
prize: the White House. The war, King believed, had 
intensified the white backlash; racism and militarism went 
hand-in-hand. Commenting on political trends in November 
1967, he acidly noted that “When a Hollywood performer—
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lacking distinction even as an acton——can become a leading 
war-hawk candidate for the Presidency, only the irration­
alities induced by a war psychosis can explain such a 
melancholy turn of events."10^ The threat from the right- 
wing was clearly visible in the government's indictment of 
nonviolent war protesters in an obvious attempt to stifle 
dissent. Although a recrudescence of MoCarthyism had thus 
far been avoided, if the trend toward repression continued,
“we shall be in danger of a right-wing takeover of the 
fascist type." Only the spirited resistance of the peace
1 rshmovement was preventing this calamity.
"An Unjust. Cruel. Senseless War."
King did not oppose the Vietnam war merely because
it had uanfortunate domestic repercussionss the war itself,
he believed, was "cruel and unjust." He was appalled by
the sheer volume of death and destruction ;that was being
inflicted by the world?s richest and strongest nation on
one of the smallest and poorest.10^ War was always terrible,
but the techniques employed by the United States in Vietnam
were particularly evil. What the Pentagon's computerized
jargon tried to disguise, King attempted to describe:
We herd them off the land of their fathers into con­
centration camps where minimal social needs are rarely 
met. They know that they must move or be destroyed 
by our bombs, and they go, primarily women and children. They watch as we poison their water, as we 
kill a million acres of their crops, and they wander 
into the hospitals with at least twenty casualties 
from American fire power to one Vietcong-inflicted 
injury. They wander into the towns and see thousands 
of children homeless, without clothes, running in 
packs on the streets like animals. 106
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The United States had not only destroyed the social fabric
of Vietnamese life: its weapons, napalm, bulldozers,
and defoliants, were destroying the countryside itself.
South Vietnam had become a nation of concrete military
107bases and concentration camps. '
The Vietnamese "must see the Americans as strange 
liberators." In the light of the war's historical back­
ground, the*United States was the aggressor. The Vietnam­
ese had proclaimed their own independence in 1943, only to 
be ignored by the United States, which preferred to back 
the French "in their abortive effort to recolonize" the 
country.10®' Then, violating the 1954 Geneva Accords, 
the United States conspired to prevent the elections that 
would have resulted in a united Vietnam ruled by Ho Chi 
pinb.^ -09 por neariy a decade, America supported Diem,
"one of the most vicious modern dictators," whose murderous 
role created the very insurgency the United States was now 
fighting. Even after Diem's fall, the line of "corrupt, 
inept" military dictatorships did not end. Under the Ky- 
Thieu~regime, elections were rigged and opponents silenced. 
The promises of democracy and land reform had acquired a 
hollow ring: "we are on the side of the wealthy and the 
secure while we create a hell for the poor."110
King had little doubt that it was Ho Chi Minh who 
represented the real aspirations of the peasants of 
Vietnam. He had led, and was still leading, an authentic, 
indigenous war of national liberation; "The men who led
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"tli© nation "to independence against the Japanese wr>d the 
French" were in Hanoi, not Saigon. It was not a war fought 
between Vietnamese, it was a war between the peasants and 
their landlords. The corrupt dictatorship supported by the 
United States had no roots among the peasantry. The latter,
King asserted, “consider us— not their fellow Vietnamese_
the real enemy." He pointed out that the pro-war 
faction of South Vietnam received less than a third of the 
vote in the 1967 elections, that most of the countryside 
was controlled by the Vietcong, and that the army of South 
Vietnam displayed such a lack of enthusiasm for the con­
flict that it "may shortly become the first pacifist army
112on the war front."
King had nò wish to depict the Vietcong and the 
North Vietnamese as paragons of virtue, but he insisted 
that their case be put, and elected "to speak for those who 
have been designated as our enemies." The Administration 
talked of "Communist aggression," but refused to acknowledge 
the fact that the membership of* the National liberation 
Front was less than one quarter Communist. It talked of
"invasion from the North," but forgot that the North did
✓
hot send any troops to thè South "until .American forces 
had moved in by the tens of thousands.” It deplored North 
Vietnam's refusal to negotiate, but neglected to tell the 
public about earlier North Vietnamese peace overtures, 
claiming "that none existed when they had clearly been 
made." It was obvious to the world, said King, "that we
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have no honourable intentions in Vietnam.
"We of the West Must Support These Revolutions"
Stokely Carmichael claimed that, because he was a 
minister, King took a moral, not political, stand against 
the war.111*' Nevertheless, King did not confine his re­
marks to the immorality of the war in Vietnam. Warning 
against "going off on what . . .  has become a popular 
crusade"'against the war, he pointed out that the war was 
not an Isolated mistake or a regrettable accident. Like 
Arnold Toynbee, King believed that a revolution was taking 
place throughout Asia, Africa and Latin America. It was 
not a conflict between freedom and dictatorship, or even 
capitalism and communism: it was a clash between the rich 
»nil the poor nations of the world:
These are revolutionary times. All over the globe men are revolting against old systems of exploitation 
and oppression, and out of the womb of a frail world 
new systems of justice and equality are being bom.
The shirtless and barefoot people of the earth are 
rising up as never before. "The people who sat in 
. darkness have seen a great light.” 115
This movement was accompanied by violent conflicts} it did 
not leave stable, peaceful democracies in its wake. Never­
theless, King urged, "We in the West must support these 
revolutions." It was'an irony of history that the United 
States and the nations of Western Europe, ostensibly the 
cradle of liberty and democracy, had become "the arch anti­
revolutionaries" of the twentieth century. Vietnam was 
part of a "pattern of suppression" which covered much of 
Southeast Asia, Africa and Latin America. It was a pattern
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of economic exploitation which allowed American or multi­
national corporations to reap immense profits while showing 
ttno concern for the social benefit of the countries}** which 
permitted huge cartels to strip underdeveloped nations of 
their resouces "while turning over a small rebate to a few 
members of a corrupt aristocracy."118 It was a pattern 
of military domination which involved the United States in 
coma a* ¿tat and counterrevolutionary warfare in order to 
"maintain social stability for our investments." It was 
a pattern of political repression in which America allied 
with the landed gentry of South east Asia and la tin 
America, the colonial regimes of Angola and Mozambique, and 
the white minority governments of South Africa and 
Ehodesia.117
Vietnam, King concluded, was "but a symptom of a far 
deeper malady within the American spirit." It was the 
inevitable consequence of a social system‘which proclaimed 
equality but practiced racism, which abounded in material 
prosperity but ignored its poor people. These evils, when 
set against America's dazzling accomplishments the 
realms of science, technology and production, revealed a 
"poverty of the spirit." A nation that spent eighty billion 
dollars a year on defense and war "and a mere pittance here 
and there for social uplift," was a nation; approaching 
"spiritual doom." Americans would have to shed their 
"irrational obsessive anti-communism" and honestly confront 
the reality of Vietnam and all that it represented.11^ The
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turmoil of the Third World, like the unrest of blacks and 
poor people in the United States, was the product of 
racism and capitalist exploitation. And as long as "profit 
motives are more important than people," no amount of co­
ercion would ensure tranquility. A thoroughgoing reform 
of Western capitalism was required, accompanied by a 
generous programme of economic aid and reparations to 
Vietnam and other underdeveloped countries. War and 
oppression must give way to a revolution in spiritual 
values that would transcend "tribe, race, class, and 
nation.
CHAPTER IX
BLACK POWER AND "POOR PEOPLE'S POWER"
By early 1967, it was clear that the SCIC's campaign in 
Chicago had failed. After Daley's reelection the CCCO 
disintegrated, and A1 Raby resigned in despair. "I will 
no longer be a sponge for black frustration," he bitterly 
remarked. "And when the next riots hit, the whites 
better not'look to me to cool things. That was what the 
Chicago Freedom Movement was trying to do, but the Mayor 
wasn't listening."'*' King's threat to renew the demonstra­
tions was an empty one. Daley had received more than 80 
per cent of the black vote, and was no longer vulnerable 
to pressure from the civil rights movement. King publicly 
claimed that Chicago had been "a wonderful proving ground 
for our work in the North" but, privately, he knew that the 
campaign had failed.^
In the South, meanwhile, the civil rights movement 
had collapsed in all but a handful of counties, and con­
tinuing white resistance threatened the gains that had 
been won. When asked if the SCIC had temporarily written 
off the South, Hbsea Williams admitted that "I guess that 
is what it amounts to."^ The task now confronting the
SCIC was to create an effective civil rights movement in 
the North, while simultaneously consolidating its Southern 
victories. The circumstances could hardly be more inaus­
picious: SNCC and CORE were virtually defunct; Black
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Power was dividing blacks and alienating whites; the 
Northern ghettos were exploding; the federal government 
was hostile to black demands in general and in parti­
cular; and, finally, the war in Vietnam presented an 
apparently insuperable barrier to further social reform.
I, THE SCIC AND BIACE! POWER
King's Critique of Black Power
At the conclusion of the first day of the Meredith 
March, in June 1966, a heated debate took place between the 
leaders of SNCC, CORE and the SCIG. Stokely Carmichael, 
chairman of SNCC, and Floyd McKissick, secretary of CORE, 
proposed that whites be excluded from the march. King was 
appalled by the suggestion. "I reminded them," he later 
wrote, "of the dedicated whites who had suffered, bled and 
died in'the cause of racial justice." He also doubted the 
wisdom of Carmichael's desire to make self-defense a 
principal feature of the march. To carry guns on a non­
violent civil rights demonstration, King argued, would give 
the white authorities a perfect excuse to attack. After 
many hours of discussion, only King's threat to withdraw from 
the march preserved the principles of white participation
Z}.and nonviolence.
The Black Power slogan, first used on the march in 
Greenwood, revived these divisive issues. But although the 
mood it articulated was repugnant to him, King chose to 
interpret rather than denounce the slogan. He asked whites
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to understand that Black Bower was a reaction Mto the abuses 
of white power,” a "cry of disappointment” with the 
“inconsistencies, resistance and faintheartedness" of the
c
nation's white leaders. It was the slogan itself that 
King opposed, not the concept behind it. "I prefer not 
to use it," he explained, "not because I don't understand 
its denotative reasons, but because it has conotative
g
implications." While agreeing with the need for "the 
amassing of political and economic strength to achieve our 
justifiable goals," the Black Power slogan carried over­
tones of violence and separatism.^
King considered the advocates of violence and/or 
separatism guilty of the most glaring illogic. Histori­
cally» revolutions had only succeeded when governments 
lost the allegiance of their armed forces. There was no 
sign of this in the United States, where the government 
could call upon "the local police, the state troopers, 
the national guard and finally the army „ . . all of which 
are predominantly white." Theories that the salvation 
of American blacks lay with Africa or the Third World 
were dismissed by King as "beyond the realm of serious 
discussion." Bather than Africa liberating blacks in 
America, thè advancement of Africa depended upon the eli­
mination of "racist imperialism from within" the United 
States, therèby releasing the vast sums spent on militar­
ism for "liberating the world from want."^
King strenuously denied that Black Power had caused
the "white backlash"— the latter was merely a new name for 
white racism. He believed, nonetheless, that Black Power 
exacerbated white reaction. Threats of violence, "ver­
balized by those who equate it with militancy," h«* a 
similar effect to actual violence: both intensified "the 
fears of the white majority while relieving their guilt," 
Black Power dissipated the "moral climate" that had made' 
progress possible.1®
King condemned separatism as equally harmful and 
unrealistic. In 1965 lie had warned that "Negroes acting 
alone and in a hostile posture towards all whites will do 
nothing more than demonstrate that their conditions of life 
are unbearable, and that they are unbearably angiy."11 
Blacks could achieve very little in isolation. In politics, 
black candidates would need white support to secure elect­
ion: only eighty-seven Southern counties, and a single 
Congressional seat contained a black majority in 1965.12 
Then again, even when blacks were elected to local offices, 
the governmental structures they acquired were totally 
inadequate to cope with the problems of poverty, unemploy­
ment and slum housing; only the federal government comman­
ded the resources to make the necessary structural changes 
in the overall economy. In short, King concluded, "the 
Negroes* problem cannot be solved unless the whole of 
American society takes a new turn toward greater economic 
justice." This would require the political weight of "an 
alliance'of liberal-labor-civil-rights forces" to overcome
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the ingrained resistance to such a turn, in a society in 
which all races were politically and economically inter­
dependent, "no group can make it alone.n1^
The Heed for Black Unity
At the 1966 annual convention of the HAACP, Boy 
Wilkins denounced Black Power as "the father of hatred and 
the mother of violence." Guest speaker Vice President 
Hubert Humphrey echoed these words and, to make the 
position of the federal government ummistakeably clear, 
President Johnson voiced his opposition to Black Power on 
national television. ^
King refused to ¿join this chorus of denunciation.
On the questions of Vietnam, the need for direct action, 
and the necessity for a radical restructuring of American 
society the SCIC fell out with the Johnson administration, 
the NAACP and the Urban league• While opposing the 
philosophy of Black Power, King made it clear that he 
would not cease to work for tactical unity among black 
organizations. His belief in unity went deep. "The best 
way to defeat an axmy is to divide it," he had written 
in 196*1-. "Dr King never attacked any black man," 
admitted Stokely Carmichael in 1970, "because he always 
sought to unify rather than to divide'us."16
In his relations with the NAACP, King had always 
endeavoured to maintain an appearance of unity. It was 
out of deference to the Association that the SCIC never
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adopted a memb e rsliip programme • And even when prominent 
HAACP board members were publicly criticizing him, King 
refused to reply in kind. King was even more anxious to 
retain the friendship of SNCC. The two organizations had 
stood shoulder-to-shoulder in Albany, Birmingham, Danville, 
and Selma. “Prom the beginning, Martin Luther g-tng had 
respect and love for SNCC," recalled one SNCC veteran.1'7 
He had shielded SHOO from attack, defended its militancy, 
and adopted an attitude of fatherly (if sometimes patroni­
zing) affection. By 1965, when the NAACP refused to work 
with SHCC, and when many SHCC staffers were ridiculing 
him as "De Lawd" and portraying him as a sophisticated 
Uncle Tom, King'continued to sedcSHCC's cooperation.18 And 
when SUCC became the target of Red-baiting attacks, 
repudiated charges of Communism, and supported its right 
to oppose the war in Vietnam. 19
Even as SHCC openly spurned his leadership during 
the Meredith March, King strove to avoid an irreparable 
break. Against the advice of his lieutenants, lie refused 
to Quit the march $ when "Black Power" was being de­
fiantly hurled in his face, he tried to seek common 
ground with SNCC. "Dr King has never said a man didn't 
have the duty to defend his person or home against attack," 
Andrew Young explained. On Vietnam and on the need for 
black power, "SHCC's position . . .  isn’t too far from 
ours except in style and semantics.“20 King and Young had 
lived and worked in the Deep South for most of their lives;
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they could understand the mood to which Black Power gave 
expression. Wrote Kings
If Stokely Caimichael now says that non-violence is 
irrelevant, it is "because he . . .  has seen with his 
own eyes the most "brutal white violence against 
Negroes and civil rights workers, and he has seen it go unpunished. 21
There was an additional reason why King refused to 
categorically condemn the groups that had adopted Black 
Bower. According to Coretta, he divided the advocates of 
Black Power into two groups: "A few were convinced 
terrorists, and these he sought to isolate. The larger 
number were honestly confused on tactics and, with them, 
he had many long discussions." To repudiate the latter 
would be to play into the hands of the enemies of the civil 
rights movement, who were exploiting Black Power "to 
justify resistance to change."^ A posture of moral 
superiority towards the nationalists merely distracted 
attention from the greater culpability of white .Americans 
for tolerating the conditions which nurtured a philosophy 
such as Black Power. As the SCIC insisted in a fullpage 
advertisement in the New York Times. "It is not enough 
to condemn Black Power." "Some established Negro leaders," 
wrote King, "are bitterly denouncing the black power 
advocates and urge that they be treated as untouchables." 
This approach was the height of foolishness, since it 
would merely strengthen the belief already held by many 
lower-class blacks that their middle-class leaders were 
"Joining the ranks of the white oppressor." Moreover,
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the mood "behind Blade Power could not be wished away. The 
yawning gulf between legislation and enforcenmt, between 
promise and reality, had shattered black hope, leading to 
a justifiable loss of faith in the white majority. Bitter­
ness and violence were deplorable, but they were the' 
products of white racism. "Pious lectures" to the nation­
alists ignored the fact that "it is not thè Negro who is
2 Aon trial, but white society."
King’s struggle to repair black unity led him into 
some ambiguous positions. When Boy Wilkins, Whitney Young, 
Bayard Rustin, and A. Philip Randolph issued a statement 
condemning "strategies of violence," King offered a verbal 
endorsementi but refused to sign iti^ He feared that 
the tone of the statement might be interpreted as an"ex- 
communication" of SNCO and CORE; if so, he felt, it only 
aided "the enèmies of civil rights."2^ King was offended 
by the* enthusiasm with which the NAACP had seized upon the 
Black Power slogan to denounce SNCC and CORE. "I get the 
impression," he told the New York Times, "that the NAACP 
wouldn't mind a split, because they think*they are the 
only civil rights organization."2'7
The Drift Away Prom Integration
In common with many of its critics, Harold Cruse 
pointed out that although Black Power sounded threatening 
pnd revolutionary, it was really a "methodological retreat 
to black social reforms." Bloc voting, the development of 
black political power and economic self-help had always
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been goals of the nonviolent civil rights movement. How, 
when the massive government programmes envisaged by King, 
Whitney Young and others failed to materialize, blacks 
were forced to "fall back on what few political and econo-
Oomic reform gains they had won."
King saw much in Black Power that was acceptable.
The development of black economic strength was firmly in 
the tradition of the SCIC's own Operation Breadbasket, a 
programme launched in 1962 to secure "more and better jobs 
for the Hegro people." 7 Breadbasket'had been one of the 
successful facets of the Chicago campaign. Under the 
direction of the Rev. Jesse L. Jackson, it won a thousand 
new or upgraded Jobs between April and December 1966. 
Breadbasket also aimed to fortify black businesses and 
financial institutions.Economic self-help—
Operation Breadbasket, black capitalism and the organization 
of tenant unions— was the backbone of the SCIC's activities 
in Cleveland during the summer of 1967.^  The launching 
of Breadbasket as a national programme, in July 1967. 
reflected the enthusiasm with which King viewed black 
economic development.^
The SCIC’s new emphasis on black solidarity was, in 
part, a frank recognition of the fact that integration 
was still a long way off, and that the civil rights 
movement should meanwhile work for more immediately 
attainable goals. The ultimate objective of the Chicago 
campaign had been open housing; its immediate goal was the
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development of black power by means of tenant unions and 
neighbourhood organizations. The Conference was, in 
fact, labouring to strengthen the ghetto. "We're not just 
out to end exploitation," said one SCIC worker, "we're 
trying to build community."^ The younger members*of 
King's staff realized that*integration was not a very use­
ful or relevant concept in the context of the Northern 
ghetto. And, after nine months in Chicago, King himself 
came to a similar conclusion, "let's face the fact," he told 
a black audience in August 1966,
Most of us are going to be living in the ghetto five, 
ten years from now. But we've got to get some things straightened out right away. I'm not going to wait 
a month to get the rats and roaches out of my house. 
Morally, we ought to have what we say in the slogan, 
Freedom Now. But it doesn't all come now. That's a 
sad fact of life you have to live with. 34
The louisville Campaign
The SCIC's campaign for open housing in louisville, 
Kentucky, underlined the lesson of Chicago: demonstra­
tions, in the absence of strong white support, were in­
effective. Once again, the intensity of white opposition 
to integrated neighbourhoods rendered obsolete the 
traditional direct action techniques of the civil rights 
movement.
When the louisville board of aldermen considered a 
fair housing ordinance in January 1967, the Kentucky 
Christian leadership Conference (led by the Eev. A.D. King, 
Martin's brother) used the threat of demonstrations as a
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"bargaining tactic* ■Five SCXC workers arrived, in early 
March, in order to prepare the black community for demon­
strations in the event of the city failing to enact a 
strong law.35 The SOIC's intervention widened a split in 
the city's black leadership, prompting the "moderates" to 
publicly denounce the Conference personnel as "itinerant 
rabble-rousers who disrupt a community, accomplish nothing, 
and move on to leave the residents to suffer from their 
irresponsible acts."36 Unperturbed, the fiev. A1 Sampson 
organized small demonstrations, sit-ins and picketing at 
City Hall as the crucial vote approached.3? The pressure 
was intensified by Martin Luther King's promise to lead 
massive demonstrations unless a "meaningful law" were 
passed.36
The city's refusal to pass any law at all was a slap 
in the face of the black community and, on April H, A.L, 
King and Dick Gregory led Louisville's fist open housing 
inarch. As in Chicago, the marches attracted crowds of 
jeering whites.3^ The violent white reaction to the 
KCIC-led marches had the effect of uniting Louisville's 
black leaders. Although the "responsibles" had not supported 
the demonstrations, they backed a suit to dissolve the 
city's injunction against the marches, «nr» the NAACP 
launched a boycott of the city's white stores.^ Prank 
L. Stanley, owner of the Louisville Defender and himself 
one of the "Moderates," editorialized that "the so-called 
•responsible Negro leadership' which the aldermen praised
but never heeded has now closed ranks in the local civil 
rights struggle.“41 Meanwhile, on April 16, thirty SCIO 
workers converged on Iouisville from Chicago, Alabama and
hOMississippi, led by Hosea Williams.
During the following seven weeks, Louisville became 
another Chicago, except that now the KCIC marched in 
defiance of an injunction and, while the police dispersed 
white mobs, they simultaneously arrested large numbers of 
demonstrators (700 between April 1 8 - 2 4 ) . The mass 
arrests weakened the campaign. Negotiations were broken off 
when the city decided to jail A.D. King and six other 
leaders. On May 3, after a fruitless meeting with the 
Mayor, Martin Luther King urged the resumption of demonstra­
tions on an even larger scale.44 As always, King's 
presence revived a flagging movement. “When Dr TEir>g . . .  
addressed a rally at the Mount Zion Baptist Church,“ 
observed one reporter, "it was a wonder that the very stones 
of the edifice didn't come out of the walls to join the
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march." ^ Again, however, after King departed the marchers 
dwindled in number} by June the demonstrations had faded 
away. Three months later, the KCIC announced more demon­
strations, but there was little enthusiasm in the black 
community. Reviewing the movement, the Louisville 
Defender concluded that “any assessment of the value of 
the demonstrations of thè past months . . .  shows that they 
had virtually no effect. . . .  It appears that Louisville 
is in the identical situation as Milwaukee— saddled with a
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negative City Council on open housing.
The Louisville movement eventually achieved its 
goal. After a voter registration campaign, a new board of 
aldermen was elected. All of the Democrats, who included 
two blacks, were pledged to open housing.^ The measure 
which they approved on December 13 banned discrimination 
by bankers, real estate agents and private owners in the 
inspection, negotiation, sale, lease, and rent of property. 
It was the first open housing law in the South.^ But it 
was a triumph not of nonviolent direct action, but of the 
vote. Observed the city's black newspaper: "The Louis­
ville Negro has flexed his political muscles'and found them 
strong."
The Louisville struggle had a profound effect upon 
Martin Luther King. On March 30, he had appealed for 
volunteers to march and turn "dark yesterdays into bright 
tomorrows." When he returaed'five months later, his 
language was less idealistic, more militant. The language 
of love and morality had been complemented by a rhetoric 
cf power, Moral appeals were useless when "the vast majority 
of Americans are racists, whether consciously or uncon­
sciously." King was now urging an intensive voter 
registration campaign, so that the intransigent aldermen 
could be ousted. "Power is the right use of strength," he 
argued. "The political process is the creative use of" 
power." As William Drummond observed at the time, King 
appeared to have abandoned the traditional tactics of the
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movement in favour of "a version of what is called Black 
Power.“ He had not given up the goal of integration, but 
the reality of white racism and black political isolation 
dictated a different kind of: strategy for the immediate 
future:
We still want open housing, and we are still going to 
work for it, but it seems that our white brothers and 
sisters don't want to live next to us. They are 
hemming us in. Since they intend to keep us here, we 
will have to deal with it. What we are going to have 
to do is to take over political power in the central 
cities. And then we'll start taxing eveiybody who 
works in the city and lives in the suburbs. I know 
that sounds mean, but I ¿just want to be realistic. 51
II. THE SCIC AND THE UDERAL GOVERNMENT: 
PROM ALLIANCE TO OPPOSITION
Black Power and Political Dependence
The advocates of Black Power were determined that 
black leaders should proclaim their independence from 
whites. The leaders of the civil rights movement, charged 
Stokely Carmichael, based their strategy on the assumption 
that whites would grant equality to blacks once they per­
ceived the moral rightness of that demand.^ Consequently, 
their language was "adapted to an audience of liberal 
whites," instead of~to the black community. The civilI
rights movement, argued Nathan Wright, had perpetuated a 
"slave mentality" by "looking to others for direction and 
support" or, as Carmichael put it, by bargaining from a 
position of weakness and relying upon a chimerical commitment 
to equality on the part of the white majority.^
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Carmichael, Wright and others attacked the leader­
ship of the civil rights movement not only because it hart 
failed to deliver on its promises, but also because its 
strategy and bargaining posture left it open to co-optation. 
If black leaders depended on white support and white power 
(so went the theory), they were swiftly reduced to a 
position of impotent dependency. “The ever-recurring cry" 
of the established black leadership, wrote Lerone Bennett, 
was "'Deal with us or the radicals will take over,'" a 
statement that "tells much about the relationship between 
the masses and the men who claim to be their leaders."*^
The function of established black leadership was to curb 
the militancy of the masses in exchange for token con­
cessions and rewards.
The rationale of Black Power, with its belief in 
independent black action, had long been evident in SNCC. 
Always distrustful of the coalitionist strategy advocated 
by King and the NAACP, the 1964 Atlantic City debacle con­
vinced SiTCC that coalitionism led to co-optation and 
tokenism, and that the Democratic party could not serve 
black needs. Blacks who owed their position to that party, 
wrote Caimichael, "become no more than puppets," like Con­
gressman William Dawson of Chicago, "a tool of the white 
Democratic power structure."^ Civil rights leaders were 
equally susceptible to co-optation. By 1965, many in JSHCC 
anri COKE had come to believe that King's power and influence 
stemmed not from a popular base in the black community, but
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from "Democratic Presidents and their emissaries," as 
August Meier put it. Inevitably, Meier argued, King's will­
ingness to accede to the "entreaties of the political 
establishment" limited his radicalism, leading to excessive 
caution, moderation, and a tendency to accept "compromises 
considered by some half a loaf or less."'56 As'one SUCC 
worker put it: "He’s got one foot in the cotton field and 
one in the W M  te~ House.
The line between'co-optation and cooperation was 
always difficult to distinguish. As Pat Watters noted,
"the movement knew what the liberals in Washington wanted," 
and adapted its tactics accordingly. SC 1C campaigns thus 
took on the character of scenarios, "a staging under rigid 
control of what seem to be spontaneous events."^6 never­
theless, what was good for the civil rights movement «rift 
what was politically beneficial to the Democratic party 
could, at times, coincide. Co-optation and manipulation 
were unavoidable dangers because it was King’s firm belief 
that only through the Democractic party in power could 
civil rights be enforced and economic deprivation overcome. 
In 1958 ke bnd- called for "strong and aggressive leader­
ship from the federal government." During the next seven 
years he continued to urge that government power "move 
resolutely to the side of the freedom movement.
The suspicions held by black militants that King 
was "selling out" were exacerbated by M s  enthusiasm for 
Iyndon Johnson. '"He knowingly ran the gauntlet of political
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suicide in M s  very first speech," wrote King. "Ihis was 
courageous and h e r o i c . T h e  SCIC worked openly for 
Johnson's reelection and its confidence in the new Presi­
dent was fortified by M s  response to the Selma campaign. 
Johnson's speech to the Congress requesting a Voting Rights 
bill was, King believed, "one of the most eloquent, une­
quivocal pleas for human'rights ever made by a President 
of the UMted States."^
The 1964 Presidential election, and the stunMng 
defeat of Bariy Goldwater, seemed to indicate a national 
consensus in favour of progressive social change. The 
election, wrote King, had all but killed the "white back­
lash" and eliminated it as a political issue.' "A massive 
coalition of white and iiegro forces" had been constructed 
through the agency of the civil rights movement; the 
freedom struggle could now move to "a new elevated level" 
whence it could proceed to make "equal economic opportunity" 
a reality. "That coalition of'conscience," claimed 
Congressman Andrew Young in 1973» "paved the way for . . .  
all sorts of people-orientated legislation that came out 
of the sixties. It gave birth to the great society" of 
w M c h  the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act and the
Economic Opportunity Act were the most significant 
63landmarks.
The Civil Rights Retreat of the Johnson Administration 
Even Bayard Rust in, one of the most enthusiastic
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advocates of the coalitionist strategy, warned that there 
was a danger in the massive Johnson victory. If the Presi­
dent pursued a lacklustre "centrist" course, he would he 
unable to "hold together a~coalition so inherently unstable 
and rife with contradictions," and bis mandate would be 
"wastefully dissipated."^ King, although pleased with 
Johnson's victory, was critical of the very concept of 
"consensus^ Government by consensus would dictate "slow 
reform, which . . .  would be inadequate reform. This 
could be the worst possible moment for slowing down."6-*
By 1966 the civil rights movement had become,' 
through its association with riots, and its demands for 
open housing and economic aid, a political liability. The 
federal government had already relaxed the scope and in­
tensity of its civil rights enforcement effort in the 
summer and autumn of 1965. The 1966 White House Conference 
"To Fulfill These Rights" made the policy of federal dis­
engagement from the civil rights movement painfully clear, 
and illustrated the growing divisiveness of the war in 
Vietnam and the political disfavour into which King had 
fallen.
The whole conference had a stage-managed quality 
about it. "Action was discouraged," wrote Andrew Kopkind, 
"if not exactly paralyzed, by a tightly-structured program, 
CIA-worthy controls, and a huge 'consensus' guest list."^6 
Civil rights leaders were outnumbered by a host of cor-' 
porate executives, bankers, labour union leaders,
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university presidents, and Democratic party faithfuls,6'7 
Free debate was stifled by rules that failed to provide 
for resolutions from the floor and formal voting. Thus 
Floyd McKissick's attach on the war in Vietnam was 
rudely and summarily dismissed by James Eabrit.68
As Bobert Sherill noted, the "consensus” structure 
of the conference meant that particular grievances were 
smothered in the broad agenda'of social ills . . . with 
deadeningly broad remedies.”6^ Andrew Kopkind discerned 
a Johnsonian strategy of divide-and-conquer at work, 
whereby Presidential favour flowed only to the Responsible” 
black leaders— responsibility being largely defined as 
support for the war in Vietnam.'70 SNCC was absent from 
the deliberations; King was not invited to speak.
The Conference had been planned to formulate a 
governmental assault upon the problems of urban poverty.
By the time it convened, the war in Vietnam, ghetto 
rioting, white backlash, and the growth of black separatism 
in SETCC and COEE had clouded the political horizon. "The 
indispensible pre-condition for any Johnsonian under­
taking— consensus— no longer existed," wrote Bichard
71Eovere.1 The civil rights movement was no longer 
popular; to support it made white politicians prime tar­
gets for a "white backlash” vote. Even the small and 
experimental War on Poverty had become widely unpopular 
among whites. "Mr Johnson is convinced that the public 
mood will not permit any 'big and bold' programs for
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Negroes," wrote Gene Roberts in September. The White House 
Conference had been an exercise in meaningless debate. It 
was a "nice tea-party,” said Andrew Young, "but it's not 
much more than that. The President got himself into a 
corner last year promising things he couldn't deliver. 
Vietnam ' got in the way."^
The Government and the Ghetto Riots
When discussing the ghetto riots, King often quoted 
Victor &igo: "If the soul is left in darkness, sins will 
be committed. 'The guilty one is not he who commits the 
sin, but he who causes the darkness."^ long before 
urban riots became prevalent, King had emphasized that non­
violence was not an absolute. It could only retain its 
ideological primacy in the civil rights movement if whites 
took positive steps to remedy injustice. Nonviolent direct 
action offered whites an opportunity to free "the danger­
ously structured dams that block the flow of social 
progress.” But if that opportunity were spumed, "Negroes 
will, out of frustration and despair," turn to violence 
and separatism.' Nonviolence was not a form of emotional 
catharsis: it demanded a constructive and sincere 
response.
After the riots of 1964, King repeated his warning 
that the only remedy for black violence was the abolition 
of poverty and unemployment. As long as "small handouts" 
remained the order of the day, "there will be an ever
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present threat of violence and rioting."^5 He denied that 
such statements in any way incited violence. "It is not 
a threat hut a fact of history/ he told Playboy, that if 
"an oppressed people’s emotions are not nonrviolently 
released, they will'be violently released.”’76 Eioting, 
he explained to a Senate subcommittee, was~the "language 
of the unheard" and, although that language was* irrational, 
immoral and futile, it was also a desperate cry for 
help that deserved attention and sympathy. Social 
justice and equality were the only "absolute guarantors 
of riot prevention."*’7’7 Nonviolence could not co-exist 
with an inequality that showed unlimited life expectancy.
Tragic though they were, Watts, Newark and Detroit 
revealed less about the depravity of blacks than about 
the "deep and systemic" nature of the evils in American 
society.’76 The crimes that blacks committed during 
riots were not only relatively minor— largely the des­
truction of property— but also "derivative" in nature, 
crimes "bom of the greater crimes of the white society."^ 
The abuse of property rights could not compare with the 
daily, unpunished crimes committed by whites in the 
ghettos of America: "Let us state boldly," said King in 
his Massey lectures, "that if the total slum violations 
of law by the white man over the years were calculated 
and compared with the lawbreaking of a few days of riots, 
the hardened criminal would be the white man."6®
The reaction of the President and the Congress to
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the riots dismayed King. Congress's search for conspira­
cies, and reduction of anti-poverty funds were ttas
81inflammatory as inciting a riot.” In a bitterly ironic 
turn of phrase, King accused Congress of engaging in 
"political guerrilla warfare against the defenseless 
poor of our nation." It was all very well to blame 
the Black Power advocates for causing riots, or creating 
the atmosphere for riots, but it was time for somebody to 
say "that it is the Congress of the United States of 
America that's causing riots in our country."8^
King was not really surprised that a Congress 
dominated by Southern reactionaries would respond to riots 
with repression. He had expected more, however, from the 
President. Johnson, wrote King in his last article, was 
"amazingly, devoid of statesmanship." His only actions 
in the wake of the Hewark riot had consisted of setting 
up a riot commission and calling for a national day of 
prayer. "When a government commands more wealth and 
power than has ever been known in the histozy of the world,” 
wrote King, "and offers no more than this, it is worse 
than blind, it is provocative."8-* If the government 
persisted in such trivial measures the riots, which were 
still unplanned and confused acts of emotional catharsis, 
might become genuine insurrections accompanied by 
guerrilla warfare.88
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HI. "POOR PEOPLE'S POWER"
The Disunity of the Peace Movement
By the spring of 1967» the SCIO's opposition to 
the war in Vietnam was so intense that"the Conference 
found itself in a de facto alliance with such Black Power 
groups as SNCC and CORE.®'7 But the emergence of a 
broadly -based anti-war movement did nothing to revive 
the fast-disintegrating civil rights movement. The anti­
war movement was an unwieldy coalition of disparate groups 
which were united only by their common hatred of what the 
United States was doing in Vietnam. White radicals and 
black nationalists came together over the war issue, but 
on most other questions they were divided.
King's hope that the energy of the peace movement 
might be harnessed to the civil rights movement was 
shattered by the Rational Conference for a New Politics, 
held in September 1967- The meeting was supposed to con­
struct a united anti-war strategy for the 1968 Presiden­
tial election. Andrew Young was a co-sponsor, and King
Rftwas the keynote speaker. However, as soon as the dele­
gates assembled, it became clear that there was little 
semblance of unity among the 200 groups in attendance.
The "Old Left" groups favoured a third-party, while the 
"New“Left" groups advocated local organizing. 7 But the 
most serious division was a racial one: the insistence 
of the Black Caucus that they be given equal voting power,
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and that the Conference approve a list of resolutions
including a condemnation of wZionismtt in the Middle East.
Eventually the Caucus's demands were'conceded, but they
had alienated many whites, diverted attention from the
war issue and destroyed any hope of overall unity.
Equally disturbing was the sense of unreality about
the debates and speeches. Words like "revolution," and
phrases such as "bringing down the system" were used with
such frequency that language was debased and a fantasy 
91world created.J The SCIC delegates were appalled by the 
gap between revolutionary rhetoric and political reality. 
"You don't have to do Mickey Mouse things to prove your 
identity," said James Bevel. "What is really needed is 
to get rid of the fascist mentality in this country."^ 
Alienated, embittered and battle-weary, the veterans'of 
the Hew Left had become trapped in a fantasy world of 
revolutionary nihilism. As Andrew Young commented;
"These cats don't know the country has taken a swing to 
the right.
"Power for the Powerless— SCLC's Basic Challenge"
In early 1967, King attempted to diagnose'the 
crisis that confronted the civil rights movement. He had 
previously viewed white racism as an irrational prejudice 
rooted in the individual personality, and, collectively, 
an attitude of cultural superiority.^" But the resis­
tance enoauntered by the civil rights movement in the
North revealed a deeper layer of racism. The gains of the 
decade 1955-65 lla<i keea misleading: «Everyone . . .  
underestimated the amount of higotiy the white majority 
was disguising.”77 After the achievement of an abstract, 
legal equality,~ the movement had gone on to attack forms 
of racism which resided in the economic and political 
structures of society. But the truth was that most 
whites, North and South, reaped a «financial privilege” 
from the low wages, unemployment and segregation of
Q C
blacks.7 Economic equality meant that «privileged
groups will have to give up some of their billions.” This 
was the real source of the white backlash.
King no longer believed that most whites were 
sincerely committed to racial equality. The liberal 
coalition which had supported the civil rights movement 
between 1963 and 1965 had fallen apart; it would not 
reassemble for the goal of economic equality.^® Hence­
forth the movement would have to reply upon the «creative 
minority of true believers” in the white community 
(mostly students and church people), and concentrate onQ qdeveloping the latent power of the black community. 7 
The problem confronting the civil rights movement was not 
a lack of programmes, but the absence of «undergirding 
power to bring about enough pressure so that these pro- 
grams can become a reality.” The preoccupation with 
programmes indicated either'a naive belief in the in­
herent benevolence of government^ or an attempt to shift
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the blame for inaction onto blacks and black leaders.101 
Black demands were not ignored because the civil rights 
movement lacked programmes: they were ignored because 
blacks lacked power. "Our nettlesome task," wrote King,
"is to discover how to organize our strength into 
compelling power so that government can no longer elude our 
demands."10^
One of the weaknesses of the civil rights movement, 
King believed, had been its failure to organize the 
enthusiasm and energy that it aroused. The Southern move­
ment had thrived on dramatic confrontations and headline- 
arresting crises, but it had not organized its supporters 
into permanent units.10^ The development of black poli­
tical power would entail "the hard job of organizing 
tenants, organizing welfare recipients, organizing the 
unemployed and the underemployed." Blacks would also
have to emulate the Irish and Italians by becoming 
"intensive political activists."10^ An equally important 
task was the improvement of black economic conditions 
through the pooling of resources. Through the labour move­
ment, the consumer boycott and the strengthening of black
business, blacks would be able to augment their economic 
“1resources. This kind of strategy, "organizing solidly 
gmri simultaneously in thousands of places," would take up 
to five years, he predicted.10*'7
Organization, however, was not enough. Unlike 
Bayard Bustin, King did not scorn self-help, but he was
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aware that "howevermuch we pool our resources . . . this 
cannot create the multiplicity of new jobs and provide 
the number of low-cost houses that will lift the Negro 
out of the economic depression caused by centuries of 
deprivation." likewise, black political power was a 
laudable aim^ but blacks would need white allies on the 
national level. Black mayors were a legitimate source of 
black pride, but were "not the ultimate answer" because 
mayors were "relatively impotent figures in thè scheme of 
national politics."'*’^
To seriously reduce black poverty there would have
to be a guaranteed annual income, an increased minimum
wage, a large-scale public works programme, millions of
new low-income housing units, and cheap, efficient rapid
transit s y s t e m s . A n d  only through political alliances
could such programmes be enacted. Coalitionism was still
possible because not only were "tens of millions of white
Americans . . . sincere allies òf the Negro," but also
poverty and urban problems cut across racial‘boundaries.
The political future was not in machine politics, but in
"new alliances of Negroes, Puerto Ricans, labor, liberals,
111certain church and middle-class elements."
Finally, King recognized the need for new tactics. 
The Chicago campaign had been flawed by an inability to 
exert sufficient pressure. Marches lacked the kind of 
dramatic impact that they had in the South. "In the 
North," wrote King, "street demonstrations were not even a
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H Pmild expression of militancy." c But this did not mean 
that nonviolent direct action should be abandoned} on the 
contrary, it should be escalated to a new level. In 
Where Do We Go From Here? King speculated on the possibi­
lity of 100,000 people disrupting the life of a major 
city— for days if necessary— and, at the SCLC's 1967 annual 
convention, he claimed that mass civil disobedience "that 
would he costly to the society but not wantonly destruct­
ive," was the answer to the tactical impasse of the civil 
rights movement.*^
The Obstacles to King's Strategy
King's proposals met with hostility and skepticism. 
His strategy, wrote Martin Duberman, "suffers as he him­
self must realize from the lack of available allies for 
the coalition he advocates." Andrew Kopkind was more 
scathing: "Whites have ceased to believe him: the blacks 
hardly listen." ^ Politically, the outlook could hardly 
be bleaker. As King admitted, "there is no disposition by 
the Administration nor Congress'to seek fundamental 
remedies beyond police m e a s u r e s . T h e r e  was little 
evidence that whites would support the kind of government 
spending that King's proposals called for. After an 
exhaustive survey of white opinion, William Brink and louis 
Harris concluded that "the prospect of rallying that 
collective will any time soon seem quite remote. . . .  
there appears to be little disposition on the part of
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.American whites to give the Negro any kind of specialn •» £consideration.
The attitude of the Johnson administration was 
equally discouraging. As its preoccupation with the war in 
Vietnam intensified, its interest in racial problems 
declined. Moreover, whereas in the past the federal govern­
ment had aided the civil rights movement, now, as King 
realized, "the very forces that have been restraining our 
opponents may be the ones against us."11'7 Even the 
Supreme Court, the movement's staunchest ally, was bending 
to the pressure of white opinion. In June 1967, the Court 
ruled that King and his colleagues were guilty of having 
violated, in April 1963, the City of Birmingham's injunct­
ion against parading without a permit. "We knew that if 
the justices ruled against King," recalled Charles V. 
Hamilton, "then no other black leader could expect much 
when he rah afoul of racist justice."118
The most serious difficulty confronting King and 
the SCIC was that of persuading young blacks to abandon 
rioting in favour of nonviolent demonstrations. Surveys 
of black opinion were not encouraging. In 1963» Newsweek 
found that among low-income Northern blacks, only half 
believed in nonviolence, and 62 per cent thought that 
blacks would win in a violent conflict with whites.11^
Three years later, fewer blacks of all ages and social 
classes believed that equality could be achieved without 
resorting to violence. Among black leaders, only 48 per
cent thought that violence would, he unnecessary » compared 
with 93 per cent in 1963. v When it came to Black Power 
a quarter of those interviewed approved it, only a 
minority actually opposed it. Defined in a confusing 
variety of ways, the strident assertiveness of the slogan 
gave it wide popularity. "Whatever may he read into the 
meaning of 'Black Power,'"'commented the Chicago Defender, 
"it is quite evident that'the doctrine of passive resis­
tance as preached hy Dr King is ebbing."
Declining faith in nonviolence was also evident in 
the ghetto riots that were erupting with ever-increasing 
frequency. A host of studies found that a significant 
proportion of the black community participated in riots. 
The Ios Angeles Biot Study estimated that between 15 
20 per cent of Watts’ residents had taken an active part 
in the 1965 outbreak, while an additional 35 to 40 per 
cent had been "active spectators." "A significant number 
of Negroes," the study warned, ** i are emotionally 
prepared for violence as a strategy or solution to end the 
problems of segregation, exploitation, and subordination."
The riots would be easier to dismiss if those who
rioted were the black criminal underclass, the "riff-raff"
of the ghetto population. But such was not the“case. Thè
rioters were generally better educated than most blacks,
more politically aware and more politically active. They
were, according to T.M. Tomlinson, "the cream of urban 
124Negro youth." Secondly, although only a minority—
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albeit a large one— actively took part in riots, many more 
sympathised with them, and believed they would produce 
beneficial changes. In Watts, for example, 52 per cent of 
black males were convinced that the riot there had made 
whites more sympathetic to black problems, and a remark­
able 38 per cent of Newsweek1 s leadership sample considered 
the riots to have helped the civil rights cause.12  ^ "Most 
Negroes," wrote Angus Campbell and Edward Schuman, "see 
the riots as mainly a protest, partly or wholly Justi­
fied."126
White attitudes towards the riots revealed the 
intractable nature of King's problem, "It is hard to con­
ceive of a set of episodes better designed to bring forth 
from white people all their worst possible prejudices 
than the riots," wrote William Brink and Iouis Harris.12'7 
Almost half of the whites interviewed by Harris attri­
buted the riots to the work of "outside agitators;" most 
seemed "unaware or unbelieving of some of the conditions 
the Negro considers most responsible." The 1967 riots, 
pod the white response to them, brought King to the edge 
of despair. "I seriously question the will and moral 
power of this nation to save itself," he told Coretta.
"People expect me to have answers, and I don't have any 
1 .1 2 9answers."
The Origins of the Poor People's Campaign
In October 1967, after giving testimony to the
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Kerner Commission, King repeated his plan to initiate a 
campaign of civil disobedience, to "Just camp here by the 
thousands and thousands . . .  and make it clear that the 
city will not function."1^® A month later, the Poor 
People's Campaign was announced: the SCIC would lead 
representatives of the poor people of all races to Wash­
ington, where they would petition the President and Congress 
to alleviate their economic distress. Prom ten cities and 
five rural areas, 3,000 poor people would erect a shanty­
town in the capital and "stay until America responds."1^1 
During the first phase of the campaign, delegations of the 
poor would lobby Congressional committees and government 
departments. In the absence of an adequate response,
"Phase II" would consist of gradually escalating demon­
strations and, if necessary, the poor volunteers would 
"dislocate the functioning" of Washington by disrupting 
traffic, packing the hospitals, and sitting-in at govern­
ment offices. ^ Hopefully, the campaign would climax with 
massive demonstrations in Washington and fifteen cities 
around the country. "By the end of June we will have gotten 
some response or all of us will be in Jail," predicted 
Andrew Young. v
King's approach to the problem of poverty proceeded 
from the simple assumption that poverty was caused by lack 
of income rather than personal inadequacies, lack of educa­
tion or lack of training, and that the appropriate reme­
dies were a guaranteed income, guaranteed Jobs, »-na the
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eradication of slum housing. That government had a 
responsibility to underwrite the economic well-being of 
each individual King had no doubt. 3h 1964 he had proposed 
a "Bill of Eights for the Disadvantaged;* since then he 
never wavered in his conviction that "the ultimate answer 
to the Negroes' economic dilemma will be found in a massive 
federal program for the poor."1^  Such thinking was by 
no means peculiar to King: Whitney Toung of the Urban 
League had put forward a "Domestic Marshall Plan" for 
blacks, and Bayard Bustin~and A. Philip Eandolph" advocated 
a "Freedom Budget" which would sharply increase government 
social spending.
King and other black leaders had greeted the War 
on Poverty with cautious enthusiasm; they soon became 
disenchanted with it. The programme was identified with 
waste, corruption and political manipulation, and King 
complained that its funds were so insufficient that the 
"so-called war" was "not even a good skirmish.""^ But 
King had more basic objections to the Economic Opportunity 
Act and the related measures which constituted the War 
on Poverty. It was piecemeal, funded with grudging par­
simony and misconceived in approach. It was founded on 
the premise that the poor were poor because they were not 
equipped to take advantage of the opportunities inherent 
in the free market economy— hence its emphasis on training, 
education and family stability. But, as King and many 
others pointed out, this piecemeal, indirect approach to
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poverty meant that a confusing multiplicity of programmes 
"never proceeded on a coordinated basis." Moreover, they 
did nothing to tackle the fundamental structural deter­
minants of poverty and unemployment.^^
By 1966, King was convinced that the elimination
of poverty demanded more radical, thoroughgoing solutions,
for "no matter how ¿dynamically the economy develops and
expands it does not eliminate all poverty.” Training and
education was a "cruel hoax" when there were simply not
enough dobs.*^*7 The weaknesses of the free market economy
■were also illustrated by the fact that fully a third of
poor families were headed by full-time wage-earners:
their problem was that they were not given a sufficient
wage. "Most of our poor are working every day, and that’s
not said enough," King emphasized. "They are working in
full-time jobs for part-time income."1^® Hundreds of
years of racism, continuing discrimination, the decline
and mechanization of cotton production, the elimination
of unskilled dot's by automation, the relocation of indus-
tiy in the suburbs, and the increasing inequality in wage
levels had created an "underclass," of which blacks and
139other racial minorities made up a large proportion.
Many commentators believed that the Poor People's 
Campaign signified a mador shift in King's thinking. The 
Campaign's demands, wrote Jose Iglesias, were "revolu­
tionary for America: class demands dramatically expressed 
through other than the orderly democratic process." Jack H.
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O'Dell, editor of Freedomwavs and King's friend, believed 
that the SCIC's leader was "rapidly developing into a 
Christian revolutionary. They were undoubtedly correct
in detecting a growing radicalization in King's thinking. 
His opposition to American neocolonialism abroad led him 
to cast a more critical eye on his countiy. "We must 
honestly face the fact,” he told the SCIC in 1967, "that 
the Movement must address itself to the question of re­
structuring the whole of American society." As he admitted 
in early 1968: "In a sense, you could say we are engaged 
in the class struggle.
But King had always been a populist. Before going 
to university he had come to realize that "the poor white 
was exploited just as much as the Negro," and that "the 
inseparable twin of racial injustice was economic injust- 
ice." Slavery lad brutally exploited blacks, but poor 
whites had been its "derivative v i c t i m s . : A3 with 
slavery, so with segregation. In an historical interpre­
tation that owed much to 0. Vann Woodward, King charged 
that segregation had been introduced by the Bourbons as a 
deliberate "political strategem . . .  to keep the Southern 
masses divided and Southern labor the cheapest in the
i /i /iland." As King told his white captors when he was in the 
Birmingham jail: "Tou ought to be marching with usl"
The extent'to which white supremacy had "saturated 
the thinking of the poor white masses" had forced blacks in 
the South to move without allies. Nevertheless, King
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■believed that once the structure of de .lure’ segregation 
had been smashed, blacks and poor whites would eventually 
end up as political allies. "The barriers of segregation 
are splintering under the strain of economic deprivation 
which cuts across "caste lines, " he wrote in 1963.
There were, moreover, sound tactical reasons fcr a strategy 
of interracial populism: there were twice as many white 
poor as black poor. King had many discussions about 
poverty with Gunnar fiyrdal, and agreed that "there is no 
hope ¿just trying to solve the problem for Negroes." The 
poor of all races would have to be included to prevent 
ethnic w a r f a r e . T h i s  was one of the reasons for 
King’s opposition to Black Power. He ¿judged the slogan 
unfortunate because "automation and other forces have made 
the economic question fundamental for blacks and whites 
alike. In this context a slogan 'Power for Poor People'
1 / t Qwould be much more appropriate." The Poor People's 
Campaign was a logical development of King's deeply in­
grained populist thinking.
The Strategy of the Poor People's Campaign
Despite the discouraging political climate, King 
believed that the Poor People's Campaign could succeed. 
Firstly, he refused to admit that the urban riots of 
1966-7 had precluded the possibility of effective non­
violent direct action in the North. Pointing out the 
absence of planning and organization, he denied thatrLots
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were "incipient forms of rebellion. In. fact, the
rioters had been remarkably restrained in their behaviour: 
their violence iur'es directed "against property rather than 
people." Sniping had been extremely rare; when it had 
been employed, it was to intimidate rather than kill. The 
word "riot", King contended, was a misnomer, for there 
had been very little anti-humanistic violence on the part 
of blacks: "The much publicized ’death toll' that marked 
the riots, and the many injuries, were overwhelmingly 
inflicted by the military."1^0 A close analysis of the 
riots would reveal that "in their desperate essence" they 
had "a core of nonviolence toward people.
Numerous riot studies confirmed the truth of 
King's assertions. Bather than being aggressive rebell­
ions, the riots were essentially defensive: spontaneous 
resistance to specific incidents that were perceived as 
typical of a general pattern of brutal police behaviour.
No attempts were made to "invade" white areas: the 
rioters wished only to assert a symbolic control over the 
area in which they lived. Moreover, anti-white hostility 
was largely confined to attacks on the police, and the 
looting and burning of white-owned stores, libraries, 
schools, public buildings, and black-owned stores were 
usually left alone. The casualty figures told the
true stoiy of the riots: of the 83 who died, and the 
1,897 who were injured in the 1967 outbreaks, the Kerner 
Commission reported that "the overwhelming majority were 
Negroes."1^
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Riot studies also repudiated the notion that the 
riots had revolutionary aims. Host blacks regarded the 
Watts riot as a protest Mto call the attention of whites 
to Hegro problems; w they believed (wrongly) that it 
would change white attitudes for the better.1^  Most 
blacks, moreover, including those who rioted, had not 
yet lost faith in the political system as a whole, nor 
were they repudiating established black leaders. 
riots were expressions of neither irrational anarchy nor 
emerging revolutionism. Rather, as David Sears and John 
McConohay concluded, "the riots served as an alternative 
mechanism of grievance redress, which many blacks re­
sorted to because they believed normal mechanisms had 
not worked satisfactorily."*^
King believed that the Poor People's Campaign could 
succeed for another reasons by focusing on the question 
of poverty and unemployment, it would be possible to 
involve, through self-interest, a wide variety of different 
groups. He regarded Black Power as a dead-end philosophy 
which only succeeded in alienating whites. However, a 
campaign based on "Poor People's Power" would involve 
people of all races. "It must not be ¿ust black people,"
he told Coretta. "We must include American Indians,
157Puerto Ricans, the Mexicans, and even poor whites." 
Accordingly, fifty-three non-black organizations were 
invited to meet in Atlanta, where, on March 14, 1963, 
they unanimously endorsed the Campaign. "This will be
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the broadest coalition of minorities ever built,” thng 
predicted.^®
King also had high hopes that the Campaign would 
win the support of young people, both black and white. 
Despairing of reform through conventional political 
structures, young radicals of both races were tending to 
"dissipate energy in hysterial talk" of violence and 
revolution, and "to break up into mutually suspicious 
groups." King was nonetheless convinced that mutual 
hostility and the tendency toward nihilistic despair 
would be lessened if young radicals were given the 
opportunity to ¿join an action movement of sufficient 
strength and militancy. Ideological divisions were largely 
due to the absence of such a movement. Demonstrations, 
on the other hand, "have served as unifying forces in the 
movement; they have brought blacks and whites together 
in very practical situations, where philosophically they 
may have been arguing about Black Power.” A campaign 
of mass civil disobedience would unite ràdicals, hippies, 
and young "moderates" in a "new action-synthesis" which 
would help revive thé civil’rights movement.
Although he warned that the Poor People's Campaign 
would be "militantly demanding, not begging," King ad­
mitted that 3*000 nonviolent demonstrators would not be 
able to coerce Congress and the federal government. 
Although civil disobedience might be employed, "we are not 
depending on that only, but on the response of the people
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of the Nation.” The Washington campaign was intended
to be a "Selma-like movement" which, if "powerful enough, 
dramatic enough, and morally appealing enough," would 
attract the support of "the churches, labor, liberals, 
intellectuals," and all'people of goodwill. If any group 
could reunite white liberals, Black power militants, black 
Integrationists, and white radicals, it was the SCLC.
King commanded respect and influence among white liberals 
and white clergymen, he was a prominent leader of the 
peace movement, and he cooperated with both the separatist 
and integrationist black organizations. By the time of 
his assassination, the Poor People's Campaign had been 
endorsed by a host of organizations, black and white, 
including the American Federation of Teachers, Stokely 
Carmichael's Black United Front, and the Anglican, Luther­
an and Jewish churches of Washington, B.C.1^  The Cam­
paign was enabling the SCIC to serve as the "radical 
middle" of a revived civil rights movement. ‘"For two 
years," said King, "we have been discussing philosophy,"
which had bred disunity and despair. "I believe that this
164-action will create new alliances, wake'new forces."
Judged by its stated demands, the Poor People's 
Campaign appeared doomed to failure. The SCIC was seeking 
the passage of an "Economic Bill of Eights for the Dis­
advantaged," along"the lines of John Conyers' Full 
Opportunity"Bill, a measure which, over three years, would 
create three million new ¿jobs, raise the minimum wage,
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establish family allowances, and build one million low- 
income housing units each year. But it would cost thirty 
billion dollars, an unlikely sum from a Congress that h^d 
¿just cut the poverty programme from 2.4 billion dollars 
to 1.8 billion, slashed the Model Cities and rent subsidy 
programmes, and refused to appropriate forty million 
dollars for a rat-control bill.16^ King and his aides 
were realistic enough to know that they could expect little 
from such a Congress. Public rhetoric apart, the real 
strategy of the SCIC was to pressure President Johnson into 
making some kind of public pledge to help the poor, even 
if it were merely a more vigorous and thorough implementa­
tion of existing federal programmes. As AndrewYoung later 
conceded, "We were txying to hold ground we had won. We 
weren’t tiying to win new victories.”166
Opposition to the Campaign from King's Friends and Associates 
Many of King's friends and allies considered the 
Poor People's Campaign to be dangerously misconceived.
John A. Morsell of the KAACP predicted that it "would be 
met with as an insurrection."16^ Bayard Eustin had 
similar misgivings. At a meeting of King's informal res- 
search committee, he warned aga&sfc using civil disobedience. 
Tn the prevailing climate of political reaction, such 
tactics would be counter-productive. They would also 
attract to the protest "the most irresponsible and uncon­
trollable elements," making the maintenance of nonviolent
388.
discipline impossible. . Michael Harrington also doubted 
the Campaign's, chances of-success: "the., current Congress 
was a miserable one... . . we were.afraid it wouldn’t 
register in the public eye as a victory."1^  josepk 
Bauh, chairman of Americans for Democratic „Action a-nd one 
of. King's informal political advisors, opposed the Cam­
paign for another reason: he was afraid that it would harm 
the Presidential campaign of Senator Eugene McCarthy.1?0
The doubts of his own.staff were even more unsett­
ling to King, especially since the SCIC had only recently 
been restructured in an effort to improve its efficiency 
and internal discipline. Andrew Young had been promoted to 
the new office of Executive Vice President, to become, 
with Ralph. Abernathy, King's principal lieutenant. In 
addition, two outsiders had joined the executive staff: 
William A. Rutherford (a businessman rather than a civil 
rights activist) replaced Young as Executive Director, and 
Bernard Lafayette, a veteran of SMCC, became Program Ad­
ministrator (a position previously held by Randolph 
Blackwell). A new "last-say" central steering. committee 
comprising King, Abernathy, Young, Rutherford, and 
Lafayette, was designed to render policy-making firmer 
and more consistent.1?1
.. More than, any other campaign, the .Washington project 
was King' s brain-child, . and he .was disappointed that the 
reorganization of the Conference had failed to bring about 
the-kind of unity of purpose that was essential to its 
success. When the campaign was first discussed, James
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Bevel had proposed that the SCIC make peace in Vietnam
its foremost priority. He contended that students nnfl
young people saw the war as their primary enemy; he
doubted that the Poor People's Campaign would arouse
their support. Then there was the problem of tactics.
"Where do you ultimately put pressure on the man?" he
asked. "I do not know whether Johnson would give enough
opposition for us to build up steam and momentum."^72
Bevel's doubts about the campaign were honest and open.
More disturbing to King was the lack of enthusiasm he
detected in the staff as a whole, its failure to sustain
fr-im at a time of great crisis and challenge, as well as
its weakening commitment to nonviolence. "Dr King's faith
was draining because even people inside the organization
were running around the country spouting talk about
173violence," remembered Andrew Young in 1969« '
King's dissatisfaction with his lieutenants came 
to a head during a staff meeting on March 30, 1988, two 
days after a march he led in Memphis had degenerated into 
a minor riot. "We were trying to organize the Poor 
People's March," said Young. "We felt we didn't have any 
business going to Memphis."1^  King, however, was emotion­
ally committed to helping the city's striking sanitation 
workers, and criticized his staff for failing to perceive 
that struggle as a crucial test of nonviolent tactics.
How could they expect the Washington campaign to succeed 
if the SCIC could not stage a peaceful march in Memphis?
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"Before we can go to Washington, something has to happen 
■within this staff,” he warned, and, displaying open 
anger, he enumerated the weaknesses of each participant, 
"calling the roll, just going around the room until he 
got all of us to feeling bad."1'75 At one point, when 
Jesse Jackson persisted in airing his douhts about the 
Washington project, King delivered him a scathing rebuke 
and left the meeting in disgust. "I had never seen him 
so depressed," Ralph Abernathy later recalled.1*'76
Disturbed by his behaviour, and chastened by his 
criticisms, the staff xallied to King's support. They re­
affirmed their commitment to nonviolence, deciding to 
dismiss three SCIC workers for talking violently.1'7'7 More 
importantly, they admitted the necessity of staging 
another march in Memphis, vowing that "we cannot and will 
not be intimidated by the violence that occurred."1*'76 
Toward the end of the staff meeting, Abernathy reassured 
Coretta King that "We are all together now. We're going 
to Washington by way of Memphis." '7
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CHAPTER Z
THE DECLINE OP THE SCIG AND THE YEARS OP REACTION 
I. MEMPHIS AND THE POOR PEOPLE’S CAMPAIGN
The Mem-phis Campaign
The SCIC’s involvement in Memphis was unplanned. 
King, however, considered the Memphis struggle a challenge 
he could not shirk. Por one thing, the Rev. James M. 
Lawson, Jr*, an old friend and associate, was a leader of 
the strike. Lawson had already persuaded Roy Wilkins and 
Bayard Rustin to speak in Memphis, and he dmplored King to 
do the same. Never one to refuse a "Macedonian call for 
aid1} King addressed a strike rally on March 17, promising 
to lead a march five days later. ^
The unity and determination of the hlack community 
was another reason why King felt attracted to Memphis.
As J. Edwin Stanfield wrote at the time, "Those who have 
proclaimed the civil rights movement dead and buried may 
have to take another look at such phenomena as Memphis."^ 
The cause of the striking sanitation workers had attracted 
a broad spectrum of support that recalled the civil 
rights coalition of 1963-5* The NAACP staged nightly 
court-house vigils, demonstrations and rallies.^ Jerry 
Wurf, the white leader of the workers' national union, 
assumed a personal role in the strike, and the Memphis 
APL-CIO, with the Tennessee State Labor Council, used its 
weight to defeat anti-strike legislation.^ In downtown
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marches, white trade unionists and students marched along­
side the black sanitation workers. As Bayard Rust in pre­
dicted, "This fight is going to be won because the black 
people . . .  and the trade unions stand together.Equally 
impressive— especially to King— was the participation of 
the black clergy. With James Law son, the Rev. Ralph 
Jackson, head of the Minimum Salary Project of the AME 
church, had brought together about seventy-five of Memphis* 
black ministers in support of the strike. Many of them 
marched in the demonstrations; some went to ¿ail. Their 
involvement, Baxton Bryant told Mayor Loeb, "has done 
more to bring the Negro community together than ten years 
of work." The degree of clerical participation was grati­
fying to King, another reason for his decision to ¿oin 
the strike's leadership. "It's a beautiful sight," he said, 
"to see all these ministers of the gospel "in the forefrontgof the struggle.
There were other, deeper motives behind King's in­
volvement in Memphis. The issues at stake in the garbage 
strike— an increased minimum wage, a dues checkoff and, 
above all, union recognition— were exactly the kinds of 
issues that he intended to dramatise in the Poor People's 
campaign. "Most of our poor are working every day," he
n
had recently said.' What was happening in Memphis typified 
the predicament of the working poor, and, like Bayard 
Rust in, King had always urged blacks to work for economic 
advancement from within the labour movement. It was,
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therefore, entirely appropriate that he should promise 
to make Memphis "the beginning of the Washington movement."8
Finally, King viewed Memphis as a contest blacks 
could not afford to lose. If they were defeated there, 
reaction and repression would so intensify as to take 
the nation to the edge of a police state. "Today," he 
wrote in his last article, "the Northern cities have taken 
on the conditions we faced in the South. Police, national 
guard and other aimed bodies are feverishly preparing for
Qrepression."7 Nowhere was this more apparent than in 
Memphis. On Februaiy 23, the police had attacked a peace­
ful march with clubs and chemical spray; later, from the 
Governor of Tennessee, came 3,000 national guardsmen for 
what was described as a "riot control mobilization 
exercise."’*'8 The repression came to a climax on March 28, 
during a march which King intended to lead. When a group 
of young blacks began to break windows, the police in­
discriminately attacked the column. One person was killed, 
sixty-two were injured and two hundred were arrested. 
Although there had been no shooting on the part of the 
black youths, the Police Director believed that there was 
a state of "general guerrilla warfare. Yes, we have a war 
in the city of Memphis."
These events illustrated, in King's mind, a national 
trend toward naked repression of black protest. The truth 
was, he felt, that relatively minor incidents of black 
violence were being used as an excuse for ignoring black
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demands and intimidating the black community. Mayor Henry 
Leob strenuously denied that his argument with the sani­
tation workers was a racial one. "The strike," he 
insisted, "is illegal, and you can’t deal with'an 
illegality." Yet his anti-union outlook mingled with a 
vein of thinly-concealed racism. In a revealing comment, 
Ioeb vowed, "I'll never be known as the mayor who signed 
a contract with a Hegro union.Violence on the part of 
blacks, King believed, simply played into the hands of 
men like Ioeb, opening the door to greater repression, 
nonviolence, on the other hand, "was never more relevant 
as an effective tactic," because, as in the South, the
white authorities "could not shoot down in daylight un-
14aimed men, women and children." More than the outcome 
of a garbage strike was at stake in Memphiss nonviolence 
was fighting for its life.
King's Assassination and the Second March
In the days following the March 30 staff meeting, 
King’s top aides worked in Memphis to prepare for the 
second march (scheduled for April 5)» This time it was 
meticulously planned. Local groups were consulted, 
marshals were trained in nonviolence, plans were made to 
import outside celebrities, and the SOLO made a special 
effort to win the cooperation of the Invaders, a youth 
group committed to Black Power. On April 4, SCIC lawyers 
overturned an injunction against the march, a victory
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which, elated King and his lieutenants.
In his last speech, King emphasized the historical 
significance of the Memphis struggle. The garbage strike 
was important, he said, because it symbolized what was 
happening in the second half of the twentieth centurys 
“Something is happening in Memphis? something is happening 
in our world. The masses of the people are rising up and, 
wherever they are assembled . . . the cry is always the 
same, 'We want to be free.'" It was vital to stage a 
successful nonviolent march" so as to "put the issue where 
it really is.” The trouble with violence— no matter how 
minor— was that it gave whites an excuse to ignore the 
underlying injustice. Only nonviolence could show the 
world that Memphis was being unfair to its public servants, 
and that "Mayor Ioeb is in dire need of a doctor." Memphis 
was now in the forefront of the struggle for economic 
¿justice, ¿just as Montgomery and Birmingham had been in the 
fight for human dignity. "We have got to see this thing 
through."1^
The previous day, the city' s attorney general had 
admitted that, "we are fearful that . . .  someone may harm 
Dr King's life."1*'7 Since the first day of the Montgomery 
bus boycott, King had lived under the threat of assassi­
nation. The murder of John K. Kennedy had prompted him to 
predict a similar fate for himself. "This is what is going 
to happen to me also," he told Coretta. "I keep telling 
you, this is a sick society." ° But it was in Chicago,
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three years later, he said, that "I faced the inevita­
bility of death for the first time."^ Since then, he 
had conquered the fear of death, WI may die in this 
movement. I don't mind, I settled that long ago,"
he told his staff, and urged them to do likewise. nI 
don't think anybody can be free until you solve this 
problem.
In the closing minutes of his final speech, Trtng 
dwelt upon his own death in the manner of a man who re­
garded his work as essentially complete. He was glad, he 
said, to have survived an attempt on his life in 1959, 
living to witness and be part of the sit-ins, the Freedom 
Hides, and the great movements in Albany, Birmingham and 
Selma. Even as he arrived in Memphis, his life had been 
threatened; he did not know "what would happen to me from 
some of our sick white brothers."
But it really doesn't matter with me now, because I've 
been to the mountaintop. I won't mind. lake anybody, 
I would like to live a long life; longevity has its 
place. But I'm not concerned about that now. I ;just 
want to do God's will. And He's allowed me to go 
up to the mountain. And I've looked over. And I've 
seen the Promised land. I may not get there with 
you. But I want you to know tonight that we as a 
people will get to the Promised land. So I'm happy 
tonight. I'm not worried about anything. I'm not 
fearing any man. 'Mine eyes have seen the glory of 
the coming of the Lord. . . .'21
Pour days later, 20,000 marched in silence to a 
memorial rally where they were addressed by, among others, 
Ealph Abernathy, James Bevel, Valter Eeuther, Jerry Vurf, 
Bayard Rust in, and Coretta King. On April 16, the City
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of Memphis acceded to the sanitation workers' demands for
an increased wage,a dues checkoff and union recognition.
Upon ratifying the written agreement (the first of its
kind in the city's histoiy), the strikers "broke into
22thunderous cheering."
The Poor People's Campaign
The Poor People's Campaign was conducted by an 
organization that was demoralized and plagued by internal 
conflicts. To make matters worse, the SCIC lacked a co­
herent strategy for achieving its ill-defined objectives; 
Resurrection City became a tactical vacuum in which frus­
trated militancy led to confusion and indiscipline. Rather 
than vindicating the SCIC's "belief in the power of non­
violence and . . .  faith in the democratic processes of 
government," the campaign exposed the impotence of non­
violence in the face of a government that was indifferent 
or hostile to the demands of the poor.^
Resurrection City, a plywood and canvas shantytown 
constructed near the Washington Monument, was intended to 
bring home to the Congress and the nation the desperate 
plight of America's poor people. Instead, it became pre­
dictably, a slum, and was characterized by the attendant 
problems of disorganization, dirt, violence,and petty 
crime. As Bayard Rustin had predicted, the SCIC, with a 
staff of only one hundred and fifty, proved incapable of 
keeping order among the City's three thousand inhabitants.^
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The members of the Chicago and Memphis youth gangs were a 
particular threat to discipline. Within two weeks of the 
campaign's commencement, more than two hundred of them had 
to he sent home. "They went around and heat up on our 
white people . . . and were hostile to the press," Andrew 
Young explained. "We had to get them out."2*5
Even after their departure, Resurrection City 
continued to suffer from daily incidents of crime and 
violence, prompting the chief security marshal to resign
p/r
in despair. "We didn't bring saints to Resurrection 
City," said Young. Nevertheless, with the press inevi­
tably'dwelling upon the mud, disorganization and petty 
violence, the City became, as one SCIC staffer admitted,
"a noose around our necks."2*'7 The purpose of nonviolent 
direct action was to expose the brutality of the oppressor. 
In Washington, where the oppressor was a faceless bureau­
cracy and an unrepresentative system of government, the 
focus of the campaign became Resurrection City itself, a 
locus which, as Joseph Kraft observed, "obscured the 
central point of the Poor People’s Campaign." ° After 
six weeks of unfavourable publicity, Andrew Young admitted 
that "whoever closed us down may have done us a favor."2^ 
When the campaign was in the planning stage, Ho sea, 
Williams had argued against the shantytown idea. Instead, 
he proposed that the demonstrators be housed in private 
homes throughout the city. He believed that "We had to 
move the Washington community," In the same way that the
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SC LG had aroused the black people of Birmingham and Selma. 
Few black Washingtonians, however, joined the campaign; 
only 50,000 people, half of them white, attended the June 
19 "Solidarity Day" rally.^1 The absence of local support 
was only partly attributable to the April riot, which had 
left the black community fearful and emotionally exhausted. 
Confused leadership and inadequate consultation by the 
SCLC were equally important factors. In January, a promi­
nent black minister had warned that although "We are 
prepared to identify with a clear set of discernible 
goals" for the campaign, "The longer Dr King keeps this 
community . . . in the dark, the greater is his loss of 
potential support."^
King had been well aware of this danger and, 
during February and March, spent much of his time in the 
capital, also strengthening the SCLC's office there.^ 
However, the campaign underway, Eesurrection City vora­
ciously consumed the Conference's energy and resources. 
Apart from the problem of maintaining discipline, running 
the City— a task for which the SCLC was ill-suited— took 
up so much of the staff's time that it had little 
opportunity to go out into the larger community to recruit 
support. To the Black United Front, a local coalition 
headed by Stokely Carmichael (which originally backed the 
campaign), it was the old story of the SCLC ignoring the 
local population, 3h an angry statement, the BTJF accused 
the Conference of causing ill-considered civil disturbances
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from which, through increased repression, the black popu-■7. h.lation as a whole suffered.
The vagueness of the campaign’s goals was another 
reason for its lukewarm support. There were sound tactical 
reasons for not tieing the campaign to specific hills 
during its initial stages. But, as the weeks went by, 
the SOIC failed to successfully dramatize, from the ninety 
demands it originally presented, a key objective around 
which pubic attention could focus and public opinion rally. 
"Congress^ said Bayard Bustin, "felt trapped by Mr Aber­
nathy' s nameless demands for an instant millenium."^
In reality, the SCIjC was painfully aware that most 
of its demands were unattainable, especially, as Andrew 
Young put it, "with an asinine Congress like this." Its 
principal demands were, therefore, addressed to the ex­
ecutive branch, so as to bypass the need for new legisla­
tion. In effect, the Conference was asking for more 
spending on existing programmes and a greater orientation 
toward the needs of the poor.^ Some of Abernathy's lieu­
tenants were skeptical about the whole campaign. Admitted 
one: "We didn't really expect it to be veiy much, if 
anything." This gap between its public insistence on a 
host of extravagant measures and its private willingness 
to accept the most meagre of concessions undermined the 
SCIC's credibility and frustrated its supporters.^
Tactical, confusion was a direct consequence of 
vague goals. In Birmingham and Selma, the SCIC had
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employed nonviolent direct action with consumate skill, 
picking clear and vulnerable targets, gradually escala­
ting its demonstrations, and engineering dramatic 
confrontations which mobilized public opinion in its 
favour. King envisaged a similar strategy for the Poor 
People's Campaign, promising to "escalate the campaign 
on the basis of the response we get." At the same time, 
as April drew closer, he de-emphasized talk of disruption, 
becoming more conciliatory in tone.^® King knew that 
although direct action could be a powerful sanction, it 
would be foolish to attempt to coerce Congress and the 
federal government. Demonstrations would be instruments 
of persuasion, culminating in a "symbolic act" of civil
disobedience which would expose the wrongdoing of Congress
39and arouse public opinion across the nation. '
Abernathy and his aides violated the basic rules of 
nonviolent direct action, and the Poor People's Campaign 
never followed the strategy planned by King. The SCIC's 
hyperbolic rhetoric and incompetent demonstrations failed 
to arouse public sympathy. When the campaign began,
Andrew Xoung promised "the greatest nonviolent demonstra­
tion since Gandhi's salt march to the sea," and James 
Bevel predicted that "We may be here two or three years.
It was not until late in May, however, that direct action 
was employed, and the demonstrations and sit-ins were
badly-disciplined, poorly led, and did not appear to be
41part of any consistent strategy. In Birmingham, and
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in Selma, more than three thousand people went to jail,
less than five hundred did so in Washington,
Bayard Bustin's appointment as the campaign's
national coordinator brought all these proplems to a head.
Consistent with his earlier advice to King, Rustin insisted
that the demands be narrowed and clarified "in a way that
makes Congressional action possible." Accordingly, he
listed five demands which he considered "now attainable";
the creation of one million public service ¿jobs, extension
of collective bargaining rights to agricultural workers,
restoration of cuts in the poverty programme, repeal of
the 1967 welfare restrictions, and the construction of
six million units of public housing over the next decade.
Tn addition, as a condition of his accepting the post,
Rustin sought a commitment from Abernathy that the SCIC
would not engage in civil disobedience.^ The press and
liberals in Congress praised Rustin's statement of demands.
It was strenuously opposed, however, by Hbsea Williams and
others in the SCIC. Calling Bustin's manifesto "a bunch
of jazz and nonsense," Williams objected to the ban on
direct action, the absence of any condemnation of the war
in Vietnam, and the omission of the demands of the
44Indian, Puerto Rican and Mexican-American groups. Caught 
in the middle of this dispute, Abernathy procrastinated, 
causing Bustin to resign in frustration on June 7» Because 
he commanded considerable respect in both the Democratic 
party end the labour movement, Bustin' s resignation was a
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severe blow to the campaign. ^
Under the stresses and tensions of Resurrection 
City, the personal conflicts which Zing had always 
managed to suppress came to the surface. There was, 
throughout the campaign, a persistent antagonism 
between Bosea Williams and Andrew Young, who considered 
the foimer's threatening-sounding statements both foolish 
and harmful. James Bevel, his heart never really in the 
campaign, ran Resurrection City with what New Republic 
termed "an almost studied arrogance." His successor, Jesse 
Jackson^ was popular with the City* s'residents, but 
brought about his own demotion by leading an ill-considered 
demonstration at the Department of Agriculture. Pew 
observers could help but detect a lack of firm leadership.^ 
In contrast to its ambitious objectives, the cam­
paign won only minor bureaucratic concessions, chief of 
which were the addition of two hundred counties to the 
surplus food programme and the granting of a right of 
appeal to welfare recipients who were ordered struck off 
the rolls under restrictive new regulations. Even the 
campaign's unstated minimum demand that social spending
be pegged at its current level was not met: the poverty
47programme was reduced for the third successive year.
On June 24, Resurrection City was closed down by the
police; the National Park Service presented the SCIC with
a bill for #71,000. "We came up to stay," said Andrew
48Young. "Now its all gone."
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The Poor People's Campaign, King admitted, would 
he a gamble: "We're riding on the forces of history and 
not totally shaping things."^ The forces of history, 
however, were working against the SCIC: whites were as 
hostile to the campaign's demands as blacks, were 
favourable, and the attitude of the national legislature 
faithfully reflected the majority opinion,^® Most Con­
gressmen, apart from a contingent of about seventy-five 
liberals, echoed the indignation of Senator Robert C. Byrd. 
In a speech written for him with the help of the FBI, 
and addressed to the Senate on March 29, Byrd branded 
King as a coward and rabble-rouser, and condemned his
project as a recipe for "violence, destruction, looting,
51and bloodshed.""^ Congress, Gunnar Myrdal observed, 
was obsessed with "how to stop it." Social legislation 
languished, forgotten, in Congressional committees; 
twenty-six bills designed to curb the campaign were re­
ported within days. Senator Russell Long's fear that
Congress would make poverty "an enjoyable way of life"
52was groundless.
II. THE NIXON REACTION
The 1968 Election and the Relaxation of the Federal Civil 
 ^Rights Enforcement:Effort
Blacks in 1968 voted overwhelmingly for Hubert
Humphrey. Whites, by contrast, alarmed by black demands
for school integration and open housing, had been defecting
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from the Democratic party since 1966. Two years later, 
the defections had reached such a volume that Samuel 
Iubell wrote, "at the local level in many cities the New 
Deal coalition’no longer exists."-^ Race, the Democrats' 
political undoing, was the Republicans' political oppor­
tunity. George Wallace had already demonstrated the 
strength of racism outside the South, and it was the poli­
tical genius of Richard Nixon to perceive race as the 
cement which would bind together a new political alignment 
of traditional Republicans, the white South, and a section 
of the Northern white working-class; the non-black, non­
young, non-radical "Silent Majority." It was only after 
his election in 1968, however, that this new alignment 
could gain any degree of permanence. His 1968 plurality 
had been a product of fear and prejudice and, divided by 
conflicting economic interests, it could only be sustained 
if those emotions were kept alive. It was for-this purpose 
that, as Iiubell observed, "the Nixon presidency. • . sought 
not political reconciliation, but a sharpening of divisions 
in the nation.
The effect of this strategy (misleadingly termed the 
"Southern strategy") was glaringly apparent in the Nixon 
Administration's civil rights policy. "Richard Nixon 
suggested . . .  that we should all lower our voices," 
wrote Roger Wilkins. "Though he clearly did not always
55abide by that precept, he kept his pledge in civil rights."*^ 
Nixon's election ushered in a bleak period for black
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Americans. Por the first time since the days of Woodrow 
Wilson, said Bishop Stephen Co. Spottswood of the NAACP, 
"the national administration has made it a matter of 
calculated policy to woik against the needs «nd aspira­
tions of the largest minority of its citizens."*^0
The curtailment of school integration was the key 
element in Nixon's strategy to win Southern white support. 
By 1968, Southern resistance to school desegregation had 
passed the days of Massive Resistance and standing in 
the school-house door. Noting the rising hostility of 
Northern whites to busing, Southern segregationists were 
now attempting to forge a national consensus against 
"forced" integration. Their new tactics consisted of en­
dorsing the principle of integration, while preserving it 
in practice by gaining federal approval of weak, "freedom 
of choice" desegregation plans which did not provide for 
large-scale busing. A more conservative Supreme Court, 
they hoped, would issue a firm ruling against the practice 
of busing to achieve racial balance in schools.
Nixon tacitly endorsed this strategy. "If we are 
to be realists," he explained, "we must recognize that in 
a free society there are limits to the amount of government 
coercion that can reasonably be used."^ Through admini­
strative delay, the easing of HEW guidelines, and the 
virtual abandonment of Title VI sanctions against recalci­
trant school systems the Administration attempted to slow 
down the pace of school desegregation in the South. By
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1970, encouraged "by these signs, the governors of 
Georgia, Florida and Louisiana were counselling open 
defiance of court-ordered desegregation, and anti- 
integration violence flared in several states.^6 In 
October, the US Commission on Civil Eights reported that 
the federal civil rights enforcement effort had all hut 
broken down, and Newsweek pessimistically concluded that 
"school integration might already have spent itself far
short of realization."-^
In the sphere of economic assistance, the Nixon 
Administration's sole concession to blacks was the setting 
up of an Office of Minority Business Enterprise for the 
purpose of encouraging "black capitalism." The OMBE, un­
fortunately, was not authorised to finance loans, nor was 
it empowered to discipline government departments of 
private lending institutions which discriminated against 
minority businesses. As a consequence of what Whitney 
Young described as "the suicidal economic policy" of the 
Nixon Administration, blacks suffered disproportionately 
from the economic recessions that occurred between 1969 
and 1973- Official (low) estimates of black unemployment 
rose from 4.9 to 8.9 per cent} median black family income 
as a proportion of median white family income fell from 
61 to 38 per cent.61 The Administration's economic 
policies, observed the New York Times, embodied a "laissez- 
faire attitude that is, to many black Americans, a kind
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of spiritual disfranchisement."^
The Suppression of Black Protest; the FBI
The suppression of blade protest, encouraged or
instigated by the federal government, did not begin with
the inauguration of Richard Nixon. Civil rights activists
had long suspected that the FBI was engaging in a campaign
to infiltrate blade organizations and discredit blade
leaders. "We've known for years that they've been doing
it. . . .  'Ton just pick up the telephone," said Ralph
Abernathy in 1970. "You don't have to be a Philadelphia
lawyer to know that someone is listening."^
Three years later, prompted to come forward by the
Watergate revelations, an ex-FBI agent confirmed what had
for years been an open secret. The Bureau's surveillance
of King, he said, "was massive and complete. He couldn't
wriggle. They had him." For three years, beginning in
1963, the FBI had tapped the SCIC's Atlanta and New York
offices, as well as King's private home, and even his
hotel and motel bedrooms. The doctored results of these
wiretaps, the ex-agent disclosed, had been used in an
unsuccessful attempt to persuade politicians, journalists
64and religious leaders to shun King.
It was only in 1975, when two Congressional commi­
ttees investigated the FBI, that the full scope of the 
Bureau's campaign against King and the civil rights 
movement was revealed. Testifying before the Senate
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Select Committee to Study Government Operations with 
respect to Intelligence Activities (the Church Committee), 
the Assistant Director of the FBI admitted that "no holds 
were barred. . . . This is a rough, tough business.
In 1967, the Bureau had initiated a Counter Intelligence 
Program (COIHTEIPRO) for the purpose of disrupting civil 
rights and black nationalist organizations, and "Preventing 
the rise of a messiah who could unify, and electrify, the 
militant black nationalist movement." King, the FBI 
believed, was a "real contender for this position."^ It 
appears likely that the violence which erupted in Memphis 
on March 28, 1968, was caused or fomented by FBI agents 
provocateurs; the Bureau intended to alienate King's 
white liberal support by demonstrating that "acts of so- 
called nonviolence advocated by King carmotbe patrolled.
It would be wrong to dismiss the FBI's vendetta 
against King as an unfortunate but unavoidable relic of 
the McCarthy era, or ascribe it to an irrational personal 
antipathy toward King on the part of J. Edgar Hoover. 
Weighing the responsibility for the campaign, the Church 
Committee concluded:
Officials in the Justice Department and the White 
House were aware . . .  that the FBI reports on Dr 
King contained considerable information of a political 
fipfl personal nature which was "irrelevant and 
spurious" to the stated reasons for the investigation. 
Those . . .  officials were also aware that the FBI 
was disseminating vicious characterizations of 
Dr King within the Government . . .  and that the FBI 
had offered to "leak" to reporters highly damaging 
accusations that some of Dr King's advisers were 
communists. 68
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It is not clear how far the FBI succeeded in 
damaging the SCIC's effectiveness. "Since we don't really 
know all .that they did, we have no way of knowing the ways 
that they affected us," said Andrew Young.However, 
King's enormous prestige among white liberals, and his 
strict adherence to nonviolence and the democratic process, 
shielded the SCIC from outright repression. Groups that 
adopted a rhetoric of violence and an ideology of revolu­
tion were not so fortunate. By 1967» recalled Cleveland 
Sellers of SETCC, "The government was on the offensive and 
everyone who had taken a revolutionary position seemed to 
be fair game . . . .  Some were guilty of the things 
charged against them. But most weren't."'70 Within a year, 
SHCC was decimated by state and federal indictments for 
such alleged offenses as draft resistance, assault and 
battery, resisting arrest, and incitement to riot. Those 
indicted included SHCC's veteran leaders: Stokely
Carmichael, H. Rap Brown, Phil Hutchins,, and Cleveland 
71Sellers.
The Black Panther Party, which emerged at the same 
time that SHCC was declining, became the next victim of 
government repression. Already included in the FBI's 
COHJTELPRO campaign, in January 1969 the Panthers were 
officially categorized as a subversive threat to national 
security, becoming a primary target for FBI surveillance, 
infiltration and disruption. In August of the same year, 
the Justice Department set up a special task force on the
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Panthers; by 1970, some twenty Panthers had lost their 
lives at the hands of the police. As the Assistant 
Attorney General put it: "The Panthers are a bunch of 
hoodlums. We've got to get them."*^
The Suppression of Black Protest: "haw and Order."
The determination of the federal government to 
silence black radicals encouraged a wave of official vio­
lence in the South. The repression characteristically 
associated with the Nixon Administration actually began 
in February 1968, when three black students were killed 
during a demonstration by police and national guardsmen 
in Orangeburg, South Carolina. In defense of the killings, 
the governor of South Carolina claimed that the police 
had been forced to defend themselves against prolonged 
sniper fire. Faithfully accepted by the press, his state­
ment was later proven to be false. Nevertheless, public 
reaction to the Orangeburg tragedy was one of indifference; 
it reflected, according to the Southern Regional Council, 
a "national tendency nearing a public policy" to respond 
to'black protests with "massive police and military force.
"law and order" had been a prominent theme of Richard 
Nixon*s'1968 campaign^ Blacks, however, suspected that 
"law order" was, in reality, a policy of encouraging 
local law enforcement authorities to crack down on black 
activists. The Jackson State and Augusta killings of 
1970 appeared to be the inevitable product of such a policy:
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at Jackson State College, Mississippi, a student dormi­
tory was riddled by police gunfire, resulting in two 
deaths; in Augusta, Georgia, a disorderly demonstration 
ended with the deaths of six blacks, all of them shot in 
the back by Augusta policemen, many several times.^
State officials were predictably unrepentant about 
the slayings. Governor John Bell Williams of Mississippi 
had nothing but praise for the police, and Governor Xester 
Maddox of Georgia, ignoring the fact that there had been 
no sniping by the demonstrators, warned, "If they shoot at 
our guardsmen and firemen, they had better be prepared to 
meet their maker." Seemingly unaware that the demonstra­
tion had been staged to protest the fatal beating by the 
police of a mentally-retarded black youth, Maddox blamed 
the deaths on the "Communist enemies of freedom."^ Only 
months before, a bi-racial committee had requested the 
Justice Department to investigate racism and brutality in 
the Augusta sheriff's department, but nothing had come of 
the request. Now, the Attorney General reacted to the 
killings by blandly condemning both "violent demonstra­
tions" and "unrestrained reactions," a statement which, 
as Time observed, "seemingly equated rocks with bullets.
Kepression was by no means confined to the South.
By 1969, however, Northern blacks had learnt through 
bitter experience that even minor disturbances would 
trigger massive police retaliation."^ In many Northern 
cities, black areas were under constant and intensive
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military surveillance, and black organizations under 
constant police watch. In CMcago, on the first anni­
versary of Martin lather King's death, black militants 
and gang members were rounded Up by the police, and troops 
patrolled streets in the slums from a ? PM curfew until 
early the following morning.?8 Such repression united 
blacks in their opposition to the federal government, as 
evidenced by the uncharacteristically militant language 
of such moderate black leaders as Whitney Toung. "I've 
never seen the black community quite as universally 
disillusioned and lacking in confidence about an Admini­
stration as I have this one," said Toung.?9
The Failure of the Black Revolutionaries
The assassination of Martin Luther King, and the
collapse of SNCC and COBE, "left a tremendous void that
no individual or organization has managed to fill,” wrote
80Cleveland Sellers in 1973» lh this vacuum, leadership
in the cities of the North passed to myriad local groups,
most of which espoused some foxm of Black Power or black
nationalism. As ex-SCLC aide C.T. Vivian put its "The
8Xaccent now is on power instead of persuasion."
The most prominent of these groups was the Black 
Panther Party for Self-Defense, founded in Oakland, Cali­
fornia, in 1966, by Huey Newton and Bobby Seale. However, 
the effectiveness of the Panthers was hampered by two 
factors. Firstly, as recounted above, the Panthers
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became the victims of a nationwide campaign of repression 
that decimated their organization. Secondly, as Sellers 
pointed out, neither the Panthers nor the various black 
nationalist groups received "the same broad support that 
was lavished on SNCC, COSE, SCIC, the NAACP and the Urban 
league** during the early years of the 1960's. Most 
blacksderived a distinct feeling of pride from the Panther's 
courageous militancy, but, owing to fear of repression, 
skepticism about their revolutionary programme, or a com­
bination of the two, most also doubted the effectiveness 
of the Panthers as representatives of the black cause. ^
Other groups with a similar political orientation 
were confronted with the same problem: lack of popular 
backing. Caught between white hostility and black fear 
find apathy, their revolutionary language disguised the 
frustration of powerlessness. The National Black Economic 
Development Conference epitomized this gulf between 
rhetoric and reality. The BEDC's "Black Manifesto," 
presented by James Porrnan, sought five billion dollars in 
reparations from the white churches and synagogues. But 
the BEDC lacked the political influence or white support 
to win more than a fraction of its target. "The BEDC was
a facade," wrote Cleveland Sellers, "there weren't any
 ^ 84-warm bodies behind it."
The fate of the'black revolutionaries, especially 
that of the Black Panthers, demonstrated that local 
forces, encouraged by the federal government, would seize
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upon incidents of minor violence, and even the verbal 
advocacy of violence, as an excuse to employ force to 
suppress black activism. Although the persecution of the 
Panthers provided a rallying-point for white liberals 
and blacks of every ideological persuasion, it had the 
intended effect of shattering the one organization that 
could have reunited the fragmented civil rights movement 
on a national basis.
The failure of the black revolutionaries had another, 
more profound, consequence: by driving down black expecta­
tions, it ushered in a period of quietism and apathy.®^
In contrast to the faith they had placed in the federal 
government during the 1960's, a 1970 Harris poll disclosed 
that most blacks expressed "profound cynicism about the 
American political system," a disillusionment which had
"almost totally alienated blacks from government, both
86federal and local."
Their pessimism was not misplaced. Surveying white 
attitudes across the nation, Time uncovered little but 
hostility toward black demands: "universal opposition to 
busing children to once-black schools, /ahd^ annoyance at 
what strikes whites as special treatment for blacks seeking 
education and ¿jobs."8'7 The 1972 Presidential election 
attested to the strength of such sentiments. Nixon's 
anti-busing proposals, wrote Koger Wilkins, "legitimated 
a flood of theretofore dammed-up anti-black'feelings."88 
The incompetence of the McGovern campaign aside, white
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opposition to integration was the primary source of 
support for Richard Nixon. As Jesse Jackson put it: "The 
real issue is not the bus. It's us."®^
III. THE DECLINE OF THE SCIC
The SCIC After the Poor People's Campaign
The SCLC's greatest victories had been won under 
Democratic Administrations. In the Birmingham and Selma 
crises, the federal government had been goaded into action 
not only by the moral drama provided by the SCIC, but 
also by organized pressure from the President's party in 
Congress. The advent of a hostile administration rendered 
the SCLC's favourite weapon, direct action, ineffective.
The Conference quixotically refused to let the Poor 
People's Campaign die, organizing a "Poor People's Rnbassy" 
in the capital, and presenting, in May 1969, a long list 
of legislative proposals to the Nixon Administration in 
what was described as "Chapter Two" of the Poor People's 
Campaign.^0 After a fruitless meeting with the Presi­
dent, Ralph Abernathy reported that "The poor . . • were 
arrogantly ignored, crudely rejected, and rudely dis­
missed.”^
The Administration's studied hostility to the SCIC 
highlighted the need for new tactics in the continuing 
fight for black equality. Henceforth, Andrew Young pre­
dicted, the Conference would move "from the realm of
qosymbol to the realm of power."^ The SCIC's eleventh
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annual convention, held in Memphis, strongly endorsed 
the principle of black power, while at the same time 
adhering to King's cherished values of nonviolence and 
interracial cooperation. In addition a (Legacy of King's 
involvement in the Memphis sanitation strike) the Con­
ference undertook to aid the working poor in their fight 
for union recognition. Despite the tragedy of April 4, 
the Washington Post could see "no agonizing apparent as 
SCIC faces the future."^
But behind the enthusiasm and fervour of the 
SCIC's return to Memphis, a debilitating absence of unity 
and confidence afflicted the survivors of King's crusade.
"like a great religious revival," observed one newpaper,
"it needed the eloquence, insight and magnetism of a 
great leader. Despite the public confirmation of 
Ralph Abernathy as King's chosen successor, the ghost of 
their foxmer leader haunted the men and women who had 
assembled in Memphis to rededicate themselves to his dream.. 
During the months and years that followed, nagging doubts 
about Abernathy's abilities produced a spiritual malaise 
in which the conflicts that had plagued Resurrection 
City thrived. By the end of 1968, the tensions and frus­
trations of the staff had become so acute that (on 
Andrew Young's suggestion) the SCIC's top staffers sub­
mitted themselves to two lengthy sessions of group 
psychoanalysis. "We've never buried Dr King," Young 
explained, "and we won't be able to do anything until we do."^
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Without King to synthesize their ideas and 
harmonize their personalities, differences of policy 
exacerbated the personal antagonisms that had always been 
present among the staff. James Bevel was the first of 
the SCIC's veterans to leave. Early in 1969, Bevel pro­
posed that the Conference concentrate upon ending the war 
in Vietnam, and unite with white radicals, black militants 
and peace groups in a campaign of massive civil dis­
obedience in Philadelphia. To further dramatize the 
issue, Bevel had a startlingly novel idea: the SCIC 
should undertake to defend James Earl Ray, King's alleged 
assassin. A campaign for peace, Bevel argued, was the 
only way to keep King's ideals alive: "We've got to stop 
people from running around saying Dr King is dead. • • •
He lives, man!" However, as the SCIC's lawyers pointed 
out, Bevel's idea was imaginative but legally impossible, 
and others, including Hbsea Williams and Andrew Young,
Qgwished to reorient the SCIC toward political action.7
Bevel's departure at the end of the year marked 
the beginning of the disintegration of the small group 
which had stood with King since the Albany campaign. It 
was, perhaps, an inevitable development. As Young 
admitted, "We're an exhausted organization right now. . . . 
the toll of some ten years of constant pressure is 
beginning to tell on all of us."^
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The Defection of Jesse Jackson and the DeciM-noof"~tlie SCUT -------- --------
By 1969, dissatisfaction with Ralph Abernathy's 
leadership had found a focus in the person of the Rev.
Jesse X. Jackson. Jackson had joined the SC 1C during 
the Selma campaign; he was still only twenty-eight. His 
rise had been swift. In Chicago, Jackson had created a 
branch of Operation Breadbasket which was one of the few 
successful aspects of the Chicago campaign. In 1967, with 
the SCIC's new emphasis on black economic development, 
Jackson became the national director of Operation Bread­
basket, with instructions to repeat his Chicago success 
in cities throughout the nation, and thus enable the SCIC 
to call for a nationwide boycott by black consumers.^
By 1968, Jackson had become one of King's top aides.
3h the year that followed King's death, Chicago's 
Operation Breadbasket caught the attention of the press.
At a time when the SCIC was struggling to defend the 
gains it had won, Breadbasket stood out as a refreshing 
success. Moreover, Breadbasket reconciled in action the 
apparent conflict between integration and Black Power. 
Decrying integration as "imitation and forced assimilation," 
Jackson exhorted blacks to accept the fact of their separa­
tion from whites, and admit that "much of our identity lies 
in our state of separation."^ Social integration, he 
argued, was irrelevant to the problems of slum housing, 
unemployment and lack of income; "Por too long," he
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insisted, nwe have used moral language to describe an 
economic problem.n 100 The only useful type of inte­
gration, Jackson concluded, was the integration of 
blacks into the overall economy, thereby facilitating the 
equal sharing of its opportunities and benefits. And, 
the American political economy being what it is, econo­
mic integration could only succeed if "there is a capital 
base in the black community." As the SCIjC groped for a 
new sense of direction, Jackson preached a clear and 
appealing message: "Black people must develop a private 
economy."101
Jackson* s strategy for achieving that goal also 
managed to harmonize the principles of interracial co­
operation and Black Power. He welcomed aid from whites, 
reminded his followers of the whites who had died in the 
civil rights movement, and emphasized that the racial 
conflict was blurred by the lines of class. But he also 
insisted that blacks could not afford to wait for 
voluntary acts of goodwill and generosity from the white 
majority. Black progress "is not based upon what the 
white man is going to do. It is based upon what we are 
going to do— and upon what we are going to make the Man 
cLo.»1^  Jackson did not abandon King's vision of the 
"beloved community." He propounded that vision, however, 
in more pragmatic and hard-headed terms. His concern 
was not to bring about love between individuals, but to 
strive for "justice between institutions."10^ In an
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economic context, justice and respect were both the pro­
ducts of power, and it was through the economic boycott 
that blacks could exercise group power. Operation Bread­
basket, with its use of the consumer boycott, was a 
practical and imaginative application of Black Power.
As the Ios Angeles Times observed, "it is black in every 
respect. It is not an existing power structure -pg
anything to anyone; it is the winning of victories by 
blacks and for blacks.
Bather than strengthening the SC 10, however, 
Jackson's rise to national prominence precipitated a 
leadership struggle that destroyed its potential for 
becoming an effective national organization.
In March 1969, Bichard Levine wrote in Harper1 s 
magazine that Jesse Jackson was "probably the most 
powerful Begro in Chicago," and speculated whether he 
might be the "heir to Dr King."^* That Jackson was 
ambitious there was no doubt. Before King's funeral he 
had propagated the myth that he had cradled the dying 
leader in his aims. Thereafter, consciously presenting 
himself as the living embodiment of King's ideals, his 
desire to replace Abernathy became an open secret.
In many ways the elevation of Jackson to the Presi­
dency of the SCLC would have been a logical decision. 
Jackson was youthful, a dynamic preacher, and possessed 
of clear and forceful ideas; he also headed the SCLC's 
most successful programme. Abernathy, by contrast, was
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middle-aged, dull in his oratory, and frequently confused, 
insecure and indecisive as a leader. Yet Jackson's 
driving ambition offended many of the veteran SCIC 
staffers; they suspected him of using the Chicago 
chapter of Operation Breadbasket as a personal power base. 
Before his death, King had challenged Jackson to leave 
his "personal kingdom" in Chicago and repeat M s  success 
in other cities; M s  failure to do so severely damaged 
the SCIC's chances of developing a viable national 
structure. With tMrty chapters existing on paper, Bread­
basket was only effective in CMcago, Cleveland anr) New 
York. "When we put Jesse in charge of the boycott 
apparatus," said Andrew Young, Bit was . . .  so we could 
hit tMrty or forty cities simultaneously. . . . But Jesse 
could never get out of Chicago to do it."1®^
In early 1970, the SCIC's board of directors
attempted to resolve the conflict between Abernathy and
Jackson by offering the latter the new post of Tice
108President-at-large. Within a few months, however,
the antagonism between Abernathy and Jackson had become 
so intense that the latter, with Chicago's Operation 
Breadbasket, had virtually seceded from the national SCIC. 
In 1971, after charges of financial irregularities in 
Breadbasket's Black Expo festivals, the SCIC suspended 
Jackson. Ihe latter immediately resigned, taking Bread­
basket with him.^^
Jesse Jackson's departure was a disaster for the
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SOIC. Operation Breadbasket was a successful and growing
programme; Jackson was the most prominent black leader
in Chicago and, perhaps, the North. Thus Jackson and
Breadbasket were the keys to the development of the SCIS
as a national civil rights organization. Without them
the national structure of the Conference was wrecked
beyond repair. With the launching of Operation PUSH—
in effect the revamped Chicago chapter of Operation
Breadbasket— Jackson emerged as a national civil rights
leader, with a personal following (in the North at
least) which rivalled that of Ralph Abernathy.*^ The
defection of Jackson robbed the SCI/C of one of its ablest
officers at a time when other top aides were leaving.
Tn 1970, Andrew Young resigned as Vice President to
campaign for Congress; by the following year, Bernard
111Iafayette and William Rutherford had also left.
After the Abernathy/Jackson schism, the decline 
of the SCIC was rapid and irreversible. In 1972, the 
drop in financial contributions was so steep that the 
staff was cut from sixty-one to twenty, a decision that 
prompted the resignation of Stoney Cooks, the Executive 
Director. By 1973» the Conference employed only seventeen 
field organizers, and in July Ralph Abernathy tendered 
his resignation as President. Citing the SCLC's catas­
trophic financial decline as the reason, he denounced 
those middle-class blacks who "now occupy high positions 
made possible through our struggle . . .  but will not
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n ?support the SCIC f i n a n e A l t h o u g h ,  in fact, 
Abernathy rescinded his resignation at the SCIC's 
convention, it did nothing to revive his ailing organi­
zation. "If SCIC was to close its doors tomorrow . . .  
it wouldn’t be missed," said John Lewis. "It's not in 
the communities."^^
The SCIC in the South: Organizing the Working Poor
In spite of its precipitous decline after 1971, 
the SCIC played an important role in the South during the 
preceding three years. And, in addition to preserving 
and extending the gains of the civil rights movement by 
aiding local integration campaigns, the Conference broke 
new ground in its drive to aid in the organization of 
the working poor.
This new area of concern grew out of King’s long- , 
held conviction that blacks should "strive for enhanced 
representation and influence in the labor movement," and 
the SCIC's successful intervention in the Memphis sani­
tation strike. The alliance forged between the civil 
rights and trade union movements in Memphis was reaffirmed 
at the SCIC's 1968 convention, and strengthened by the 
Conference's support for a sanitation strike in Atlanta, 
in the course of which Ealph Abernathy, Hbsea Williams, 
Andrew Young, and Joseph Lowery went to jail.11^ But it 
was in the Charleston hospital workers' strike of 1969 
that the SCLC most convincingly demonstrated that the
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direct action tactics of the civil rights movement could 
he successfully applied to the problem of union organi­
zation.
The Charleston campaign was precipitated by the 
efforts of that city's hospitals to frustrate the 
organizing activities of the National Organizing Committee 
of Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Workers. In 
March 1969, when the Charleston Medical College Hospital 
sacked a dozen active members of that union, the hospital's 
mostly black, mostly female work force came out on strike; 
a week later, their fellow workers at the Charleston 
County hospital did likewise. The strikers' demands 
were simple: union recognition, an increased wage and an 
end to discriminatory hiring and promotion practices. One 
hundred strikers were soon arrested for violating an 
anti-picketing injunction.
When Ralph Abernathy and a team of SCIC organizers 
arrived in early April, they proceeded to fashion a 
direct action campaign around the strike. Their task 
was facilitated by the repressive actions of the white 
authorities, who imposed an early evening curfew and 
mobilized two battalions of the South Carolina national 
guard. Angered by such actions, the black community 
rallied behind the strikers and, between April and July, 
more than one thousand people went to ¿jail for defying 
court orders and martial law.
The mass arrests were of inestimable value to the
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SCIC. Through the efforts of Andrew Young and Walter 
Fauntroy (the former touring the nation to publicize the 
strike, the latter lobbying Congress), an impressive 
array of individuals and groups were enlisted in support 
of the strikers. Additional labour support came from the 
United Auto Workers, whose President, Walter Reuther, 
marched alongside Coretta King, and local 1199 of the 
Textile Workers' Union, which picketed the New York 
offices of the South Carolina-based J.P. Stephens Corpora­
tion. Other groups, including a committee of Charleston 
clergymen and a bi-partisan group of US Senators, added 
their voices to those who were calling for a settlement.
In July, the hospital workers won union recognition and 
a thirty cents an hour wage increase.
The successful outcome of the Charleston strike 
did much to revive the SCIC's flagging spirits. More 
important, it vindicated its commitment to organizing 
the working poor. During the following three years, 
the SCIC supported more than a dozen local strikes, inclu­
ding sanitation workers in Macon, Georgia, and Talla­
hassee, Florida; and hospital workers in Suffolk, Virginia, 
Atlanta, Memphis, Birmingham, and Nashville. In addition, 
the Conference undertook its own organizing drives among
bakery workers in Rock Hill, South Carolina, and domestic
118workers in Daytona, Florida.
The SCIC's attempt to combine "Soul and union 
power” met with mixed success. Labour'organizing was
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notoriously difficult in the ten Southern states which 
had anti-union .»right-to-workM laws, and the SCLO's 
lack of experience in this field further hampered its 
organizing activities. Nevertheless, the Georgetown, 
South Carolina, steelworkers' strike demonstrated that, 
given the right conditions, the Charleston triumph 
could he repeated.
The strike was triggered by the refusal of a West 
German company to abide by the result of a NLRB election 
in which eighty per cent of the workers in its George­
town factory voted to ¿join the United Steelworkers 
Association. Requested to intervene by the USWA, Carl 
Parris, the SCIC's National Coordinator of labor Organi­
zing Projects, seized upon what he viewed as "a classic 
opportunity to forge the union of black and white 
workers." SCIC-organized night marches and mass 
meetings'did, indeed, bring about an unprecedented degree 
of interracial solidarity among the strikers, thus frus­
trating the time-honoured strategem of Southern capital 
of defeating attempts at union organization by setting 
white worker against black.
The solidarity of the striking work force, the 
arrest and injury of marching strikers by state troopers, 
and the attempt by the Welfare Department to cut off 
food stamps for the strikers' families brought about a 
notable amount of support from the white community, 
support that was, perhaps, the decisive factor in winning
a favourable settlement. In addition to such, civil rights 
groups as the NAACP and the American Civil Liberties 
Union of South Carolina, the stri-fcers were hacked hy the 
local Teamsters Union, the state AFL-CIO and white students 
from the University of South Carolina.^®
After a four-month struggle, the steel company was 
ordered by a federal court to negotiate with the USWA; 
in February 1971» a four-year contract was signed. To 
Carl Farris, the campaign’s strategist, the meaning of 
the victory was clear. "Few social activists of this day," 
he wrote, "have experienced a Georgetown situation, that 
is, black and white workers rallying in a black church 
in great solidarity with black and white citizens in the 
community."
The SC1C in the South: "Marching is Never Outdated."
In February 1970, the New York Times reported that 
"Very little direct action civil rights activity is to 
be found anywhere in the South today." Wherever such 
activity was found, however, the SCIC was as likely as 
not involved. Despite the unfavourable political climate 
of the Nixon years, King's followers insisted that in­
justice be exposed, brutality protested and witness made 
to the Judeo-Christian ideals that were at the heart of
the SCIC's philosophy. As Golden Frinks put it: "Marching
123is never outdated."
Direct action was especially appropriate in areas
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that had never been reached by the civil rights movement, 
where "resistance to change . . . continues to shape and 
confiné the lives of blacks almost as much as change 
itself." Here, white supremacy was still the unchallenged 
status quo, schools and public accommodations remained 
segregated, and demands for integration were met, as they 
had been nearly a decade earlier, by mass arrests, tear 
gas, beatings, aid slayings. In these counties, which had 
rarely— if ever— seen a SNCC field secretary or a CORE 
organizer, the SCIC played an invaluable role in consoli­
dating and extending the gains of the previous years, 
giving substance to changes that existed only on paper, 
and mobilizing Southern blacks to protest the frequent
outbursts of violence and repression that occurred during
124.the four years following King's assassination.
School desegregation, more specifically, school 
desegregation plans which resulted in de facto segregation, 
x the closing down of black schools, and the sacking or 
demotion of black teachers, was a primary focus of SCIC 
demonstrations in the South. In early 1969, Golden Frinks 
led a month-long march through North Carolina to protest 
such a plan in Hyde County; a year later, in Perry County, 
Georgia, Hosea Williams led school integration demonstra­
tions that resulted in 430 arrests.’*'^ In Butler, Alabama, 
the dismissal of three black teachers prompted fifteen 
weeks of SCIC demonstrations in the summer of 1971. The 
fatal injury, during a march, of a black woman by a white
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motorist led to a sharp escalation of the campaign and, 
after more than three hundred arrests (including that of 
Ralph Abernathy) the white authorities of Butler and 
Choctaw County agreed to the reinstatement of the dis­
missed teachers, the formation of a bi-racial committee,
and the integration of the city government and police
„  ^  126force.
In addition to direct action, voter registration 
and political organization remained an important aspect 
of the SCIiC's work in the South. The Voting Rights Act 
had made black political power, if not yet a reality, 
a realistic objective. This was especially true of the 
Black Belt counties with black majorities, the veiy areas 
in which white supremacy had been— and in some places still 
was— so solidly entrenched and rigidly enforced.
In the summer of 1969» four years after it had 
first initiated demonstrations there, the SCIC conducted 
a voter registration campaign in Greene County, Alabama 
and, in an election conducted under strict federal super­
vision, blacks gained control of both the county commission 
finfl the board of education. This was the first time that 
blacks had taken over the government of a black-majority
127county as a direct consequence of the Voting Rights Act. '
A similar metamorphosis occurred in Sandersville, 
Georgia, , where demonstrations had begun as late as 
October 1969. After a bitter two-year struggle which was 
marked by mass arrests, shootings and attempted bombings,
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political power in Washington County decisively shifted 
when three blacks were elected to the Sandersville city 
council. In every town that experienced such a struggle, 
organizations like the SCIC depended upon dedicated local 
leaders. One such in Sandersville was Richard Turner,
whose courage served— as had King’s on a larger scale_to
overcome the fears of his followers: "Ain’t afraid of 
dying. They’re gonna hull ¿jive us, they're'gonna lock us 
up, and they’re gonna heat us. . . .  But we ain't gonna 
stop."128
War Against Repression
The success of local campaigns such as Greene 
County and Sandersville highlighted the failure of direct 
action to achieve new victories at the national level. At 
a time when the federal government was attempting to slow 
school desegragation, weaken the Voting Eights Act and 
encourage the suppression of demonstrations, the SCIC’s 
most urgent task was, as Ralph Abernathy admitted, that of 
"ensuring that we enforce the laws that exist and keep the 
rights Americans already have."^2^ The 1969 Hunger
Marches, the largest of which was organized by Jesse 
Jackson in Illinois, succeeded only in preventing proposed 
cuts in welfare benefits but,as Walter Fauntroy wrote, "to 
'hold the line’ against the forces of reaction . . .  is‘ 
indeed a victory in times like these.
In 1970, a more fundamental issue came to the
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fore: the hilling of blacks by the police and national 
guard. Shocked by the Jackson State and Augusta 
killings, and outraged by the inflammatory statements of 
the Attorney General and the Vice President, the SCIC 
sponsored a 110-mile march through Georgia, which culmi­
nated in a mass rally in Atlanta. For five days the 
spirit of Selma was revived, as white liberals such as 
Edmund Muskie, George McGovern and Leonard Woodcock 
joined with civil rights leaders Coretta King, Ralph 
Abernathy, Roy Wilkins, and Whitney Young. The partici­
pation of white students was especially notable. As 
one of them explained, in the wake of the Kent State 
killings "they can see that they must act against repress­
ion that could crush us all."1^
The Nixon Administration was the common foe of 
liberal and radical alike; its reactionary policies 
brought together, in uneasy alliance, civil rights organi­
zations, black nationalists, white radicals, and certain 
white liberals. Faced with what Bishop Stephen Spottswood 
termed "the indiscriminate, ruthless slaying of black 
Americans by police and civilians," the NACCP began to 
vigorously defend the rights of black radicals, and Walter 
Fauntroy affirmed that "The goals of the SCIC are the 
same as those of the Black Panther Party." 5 Opposition 
to the wars in Vietnam and Cambodia was another platfoim 
upon which liberals and radicals of both races could 
stand together.
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The anti-war, anti-Nixon opposition was, however, 
a poor vehicle for the advancement of black goals. It 
was an amorphous, disorganized and unstable coalition, 
largely bereft of labour support, and viewed with sus­
picion by most politians, it was sorely lacking in 
political strength. Moreover, the war had become a 
national obsession, eclipsing the issues of poverty and 
racism. The peace movement commanded the energies of 
the erstwhile supporters of the civil rights movement, and 
any energy left over was expended on such causes as femi­
nism and the ecology. "The white liberals and the churches 
have not been conspicuous in the fight for freedom 
lately," Bishop Spottswood complained in 1970.
The issues which brought radical and liberal to­
gether were basically negative ones. Peace and civil 
liberties were the lowest common denominators of unity; 
they could not obscure the substantial disunity that lay 
beneath the surface. The question of black separatism 
was especially divisive. Amplified and exaggerated by 
the press, the ciy for black separatism confused and 
alienated white liberals, causing them to withdraw their 
active support from the civil rights cause. White radicals, 
for their part, tended to unthinkingly echo the slogans 
of the separatists. With groups such as COEE advocating 
a dual school system, the black separatists unwittingly
1*4.aided the white opponents of integration.
The SCIX3 was in the forefront of the peace movement,
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as it had "been since 1967« Its hostility to the Nixon 
.Administration could not, however, disguise its power­
lessness to bring about further social change on behalf 
of blacks and poor people. The Conference appeared to 
engage in an endless succession of rallies and marches 
to no great effect. Its "War Against Repression,” for 
example, in the spring of 1971» involved demonstrations 
in Las Yegas and Washington, DC; marches to the state 
capitals of Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Alabama, and 
North Carolina; and rallies in New York, Boston and 
Philadelphia.1^  With increasing frequency, Ralph 
Abernatby attracted criticism for spending too much time 
as a travelling critic of the Nixon Administration. "Angiy 
rhetoric,” Claristian Century complained, could not re­
place ”the necessity to plan the strategies and count 
the costs for the scaling of the battlements so eloquently 
decried.w1-^ Moreover, the SCIC's involvement with the 
peace movement, its alliance with the National Welfare 
Rights Organization, and its support for such causes as 
the California grape workers overextended its declining 
resources and diluted its impact. By taking on too 
much, the Conference "lost some of its local ties and 
started to become swallowed up among other national 
movements.”1^
By'1973, the defeat of George McGovern, the 
abolition of the draft and the US withdrawal from south­
east Asia had destroyed the peace movement and shattered
the hope that radical reforms could he affected by a 
coalition of women, the young, the poor, and the non­
white. A period of turbulent change and vicious re­
action had drawn to a close.
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CONCLUSION
THE ACHIEVEMENTS OE THE CIVIL EIGHTS MOVEMENT
la the months before his death, King’s robust 
optimism was darkened by a growing sense of disillusion­
ment. In his last book he conceded that the legislation 
of 1964-5 was not living up to its promise:
Every civil rights law is still substantially more 
dishonored than honored. School desegregation is still 90 percent unimplemented across the land; the 
free exercise of the franchise is the exception 
rather than the rule in the South; open-occupancy 
laws theoretically apply to population centers 
embracing tens of millions, but grim ghettos contradict the fine language of the legislation. 1
But despite his occasional periods of despair,
King was convinced that the achievement of the civil
rights movement was already profound and historic. To
those— even within the SCIC— who argued that the goal of
integration had been fundamentally misconceived, King
replied that "the line of progress is never straight."
Eesistance to a goal did not rob the goal of its basic
validity; instead of abandoning the goal one should
2work all the harder for its attainment.
King had other, more specific grounds for optimism. 
The achievements of the civil rights movement could not 
be accurately measured by looking at the obvious lack of 
progress in the North. The Civil Eights Acts, he pointed 
out, "were specifically designed to change life in the 
South;" and if one confined one's view to the South, the
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impact of that legislation, was far from unimpressive.
Firstly, "the movement . . .  has profoundly shaken 
the entire edifice of segregation." The rigid caste 
system which had shackled blacks for centuries had been 
shattered. Moreover, the assault on segregation had not 
been carried out by a benevolent government; it had been 
undertaken, under the most difficult and dangerous con­
ditions, by blacks themselves;
In this decade of change the Negro stood up and 
confronted his oppressor— he faced the bullies and 
the guns, the dogs and the tear gas, he put himself 
squarely before the vicious mobs and moved with 
strength and dignity toward them and decisively 
defeated them. 3
Secondly, by attacking segregation in the South, 
the civil rights movement had attached the very roots of 
white racism, a process that would eventually transform 
political life in the South. The emergence of a black 
electorate in the South would not only send blacks to 
state legislatures and Congress, it would also liberalise 
the South's white politicians. Thus in 1966, for the 
first time, white gubernatorial candidates in Alabama and 
Georgia had openly appealed for black votes. Although 
defeated, their candidacies nonetheless anticipated an 
alliance between blacks and poor whites that would dis­
place the Maddoxes and Wallaces, and eliminate race as a
¿Lpolitical issue.
The political reform of the South would also 
radically alter national politics. Black disfranchisement
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had given Southern reactionaries, through their domination
of Congressional committees, disproportionate power in
/the national government. In alliance with Northern 
Republicans, the segregationists had been, since the 
1930's, a formidable barrier to social reform. It was on 
the issue of civil rights that that alliance had been 
broken in 1964-5- Now, weakened and enfeebled by the 
growing black vote in the South, the Dixiecrat-Republican 
alliance would "lose its ability to frustrate measures 
of social advancement and to impose its perverted defini­
tion of democracy on the political thought of the 
nation.
Finally, the civil rights movement had gone beyond 
race to raise the issues of poverty and militarism, and 
had demonstrated that all these forms of oppression were 
interrelated, and rooted in the basic structure of the 
American political economy. Nonviolent direct action, 
by revealing the strength of these evils, had underlined 
the need for "a radical restructuring of American society."^
To what extent have the events of the last decade 
vindicated King's optimism?
Integration and Education
When Richard Nixon became President, white opposi­
tion to school integration was given a new lease of life. 
Despite the efforts of the federal government, however, 
desegregated public education is well on the way to 
becoming a reality.
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It was largely due to the federal ¿judiciary that 
the Nixon Administration's attempt to turn back the 
civil rights clock failed. When, in the autumn of 1969, 
the Justice Department requested the Supreme Court to 
permit an indefinite delay in the desegregation of 
thirty-three school districts in Mississippi, the Court 
answered with an unequivocal "Mo." On October 29, 1969, 
the Supreme Court decreed that the time had come for the 
South to "terminate dual school systems at once," and to 
operate "now and hereafter only unitary schools," even if 
it involved large-scale busing. "The Court has chosen 
to override both the State of Mississippi and the Justice 
Department," complained Senator Strom Thurmond of South 
Carolina. The implication of the order was nonetheless 
inescapable. As the Governor of South Carolina put it,
"We have run out of time. We have run out of courts.
In January 1970, thirty school districts in 
Mississippi desegregated; the state's seemingly impregnable 
wall of segregation was breached, sixteen years after the 
Supreme Court had ordered integration "with all deliberate 
speed." Leon Panetta, civil rights director of HEW, 
believed that the event marked "the beginning of the end."® 
3h the year that followed, the proportion of black 
children in majority white schools jumped from 20 to 35 
per cent, an increase greater than that of any previous 
year. Mewsweek termed the white reaction to genuine inte­
gration "a perplexing blend of defiant posturing . . .  and
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calmly reasoned compliance " but, in the perspective 
of the preceding decade, thè prevalence of the latter 
response was more significant than the survival of the 
former. When nearly six hundred more school districts 
were ordered to desegregate for the next school year, 
the transition was in the most part peaceful and 
orderly. By 1972, some 46.3 per cent of the South’s 
black children were being educated in predominantly white
Qschools.
The complete integration of Southern schools is, 
however, hindered by a number of factors. Firstly, many 
Southern cities are plagued, as are cities in the North 
and Vest, by the migration of whites to outlying suburbs. 
As cities such as Atlanta, Richmond, New Orleans, and 
Charleston become predominantly black, integration is 
increasingly difficult to achieve. Secondly, although 
ordering the eradication of de jure segregation "root 
and branch? the Supreme Court has not opposed de facto 
segregation with equal passion. In a recent case, the 
Court decided that if segregation (or resegregation) 
has occurred as a result of population shifts ("people 
randomly moving into, out of and around" a school 
district), there is no judicial remedy as long as state 
action is not involved. But, as Stephen Gillers has 
pointed out, in the context of persisting housing dis­
crimination and economic inequality, "The de jure/de facto 
distinction can have no meaning except to lawyers." ^
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Thirdly, white opposition to integration, articulated 
as opposition to busing,, continues to inhibit the 
efforts of all levels of government— including the federal 
courts— to bring about full integration. Finally, de­
segregation has resulted in a steep rise in the number of 
white children in private schools. One tenth of the 
South’s white children attend private, all-white nsegre­
gation academies." As the Southern Regional Council 
reported in 1976, "School desegregation in the South is 
in the main an unfinished business," and will remain so 
as long as white racism persists. ^
Political Participation
Two years after the passage of the Voting Rights 
Act, the US Commission on Civil Rights reported that 
"we are still a long way from the goal of full enfran­
chisement." Despite the addition of over half a million 
black voters (an increase in black registration from 38 
per cent to 62 per cent), thé ratio of black voters to
the adult black population was only 77 per cent of the 
12white.
Barriers to registration were only one type of 
device used to dilute black political power. Although 
vote fraud was no longer widespread, there was ample 
opportunity to hinder black voters and candidates. Because 
white officials supervised the entire electoral process, 
they could omit registered voters from the voting lists,
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give false information to "black candidates, refuse to 
help illiterate voters, and locate polling "booths in 
white areas. In addition, filing fees could be in­
creased, electoral districts gerrymandered, elections 
changed from single-district to'at-large, and offices 
abolished, made appointive or their terms extended.1^
Seven years later, black political participation 
had become routine. The attempt of the Nixon Adminis­
tration toweaken the Voting Rights Act failed and, in 
a number of significant respects, the Act had been 
strengthened. Between 1968 and 1972» approximately half 
a million additional black voters were registered in the 
seven Southern states covered by the Act. Between 1964 
and 1975, the black electorate in the South increased 
from 2 million to 3-8 million; in the same period, 
black registration ¿jumped from 19.3 to 65.4 per cent in 
Alabama, 27.4 to 64.4 in Georgia, and 6.7 to 62.2 in 
Mississippi. At the time of the 1978 Presidential 
election, the level of registered black voters as a
proportion of the adult black population was only ten
14per cent below the corresponding white level.
The rise in the number of black elected officials 
in the South has been even more sharp. Between 1968 and 
1976, their number catapulted from 248 to 1,913« In 
1968, not a single black from the South sat in the 
United States Congress; in 1978 there were three. In 
1968, there were a mere twenty-three blacks in the
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legislatures of the South; Mississippi, Louisiana and 
Virginia had only one each; Alabama, North Carolina and 
South Carolina had none. Six years later, there were 
sixty black legislators in the South, including twenty 
in Georgia, thirteen in Alabama, thirteen in South 
Carolina, and eight in Louisiana. In 1976, the number 
of black legislators had risen to ninety-nine, and the 
South had more black elected officials than the rest of 
the nation put together.1^
The impact of the black vote should not be exagge­
rated. Firstly, it has been blunted by an increase in 
white voter registration during the 1960's that far 
exceeded the corresponding black increase. Then again, 
while obstacles to black registration have been largely 
removed, incidents of physical and economic coercion 
occur with sufficient frequency in Alabama, Mississippi 
and Louisiana "that the atmosphere of intimidation and 
fear has not yet cleared." Attempts to dilute the 
black vote and prevent the election of black candidates 
are common. The system of at-large elections, for 
example, has prevented blacks from gaining an equitable 
share of elected offices in the Georgia cities of Macon, 
Albany, Augusta, and Savannah; it has largely excluded 
blacks from county offices in Alabama. The system of 
multi-member legislative districts has had a similar 
effect, minimising black representation in the state 
governments of Mississippi and South Carolina. Only
strict enforcement of the Voting Rights Act, which 
authorizes the Attorney General to challenge in federal 
court changes in Southern city, county and state 
electoral systems, prevents such discriminatory devices 
from being adopted on a widespread basis.^
The most effective remaining obstacle to black 
political participation is tie tenacious survival of white 
racism. According to a 1975 report of the Civil Rights 
Commission, "many white voters refuse to vote for black 
candidates solely because of their race," a fact which 
prevents the election of blacks in all but districts 
with black majorities. (The election of Andrew Young was 
an exception: his Congressional district was only 44 per 
cent black.) It is still virtually impossible for a 
black to be elected to office by a statewide vote, and 
the likelihood of a black United States Senator or 
Governor is remote. Thus, for all the progress of the 
last decade, blacks are still grossly underrepresented 
in Southern politics: although they make up more than a 
fifth of the South's voting-age population, they hold 
only 2.3 per cent of the elected offices. 7
The Effect of Political Participation
During the Selma campaign, Martin Iuther King pre­
dicted that "If Negroes could vote . . .  there would be 
no more oppressive poverty directed against Negroes, our 
children would not be crippled by segregated schools,
and the whole community would live together in harmony."' 
When attempting to register to vote could involve
20
being beaten, jailed and even hilled, it was hardly
surprising that King should have depicted the benefits
of the franchise in such glowing terms. Nevertheless,
amid the euphoria that attended the passage of the
Voting Eights Act, a number of political scientists
warned that even if full registration and an impartial
and open electoral system were achieved, conditions
of life for blacks would not radically change. Apart from
political inexperience, blacks would be handicapped by
their minority status in all but 102 Southern counties.
Without white support, black representation would be •
extremely limited. "A good many Negroes in the South,"
wrote Donald E. Matthews and James W. Pro thro, "may
finally win the right to vote only to find themselves in
21a more or less permanent political minority."
It was far from clear, moreover, exactly how the
franchise would benefit blacks. Black-controlled county
governments would be everywhere hampered by hostile
state governments, their local economies were largely
white-controlled, and they were usually among the poorest
counties in the nation. Under such adverse conditions,
James Q. Wilson warned, "the substantive, rather than
the psychological consequences of Negro voting in Black
Belt counties are not likely to be as great as diehard
22white resistance might imply." Even when blacks were
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able to elect blade mayors in large cities, they would 
find themselves in a similar predicament. In all but 
two or three major cities, the political machine was 
obsolete. City government, lacking in patronage, pro­
tection and other political resources, was not the 
avenue of economic and social mobility that had been of 
such benefit to previous generations of European immi­
grants. The cities, moreover, were plagued by urban 
decay, loss of industry, a shrinking tax base, and the 
polarization between black inner city and white suburb.2^
"The city itself is just not a healthy animal anymore," 
said Julian Bond. "So we are taking it over at a time
24when no one wants it. Ve are seizing on a dead horse."
How has political participation benefitted 
blacks in the South? The most striking change has been 
the elimination of overt racism in Southern politics.
After examining the campaign speeches of recent Southern 
governors, Earl Black concluded that the open defense 
of segregation and white supremacy was a thing of the 
past.2-* As Coretta King has written, "the racist epithet 
has been banished from political campaigns. The psyches 
of blacks are no longer regularly scarred by the public
26humiliation of campaigns based on openly declared bigotiy."
Such a development was not apparent immediately 
after the Voting Rights Act when, as Hugh D. Graham 
and Human V. Bartley put it, "the Maddoxes and the 
Wallaces rode the votes of an expanded white electorate
«27to victory." By 1970, however, a new type of Southern 
white politician had emerged: the open non-segregationist. 
In 1970, for example, John 0. West defeated an arch­
segregationist in the contest for governor of South 
Carolina. While his opponent based his campaign on an 
appeal to white anti-busing sentiments, West eschewed
racial issues, and had not hesitated to address an NAACP
28testimonial.dinner for Roy Wilkins. The same year, 
in Georgia, Governor Jimmy Carter affirmed in his 
inaugural address that the era of segregation had ended 
and, as a symbolic gesture, erected a portrait of Martin 
Luther King in the state capitol. In Florida, Reuben 
Askew replaced the racist Claude Kirk, and in Mississippi 
and Louisiana, vocal white supremacists were succeeded
onby men who openly repudiated segregation. y
The demise of race-baiting is a direct consequence 
of the increase in the number of black voters. As Earl 
Black had demonstrated, the black electorate, a fifth 
of the total in the South, has made it much more diffi­
cult for an overt racist to be elected. With the black 
vote against him, a white segregationist requires between 
59 and 72 per cent of the white vote to win. With in­
creased political competition, such large pluralities are 
extremely rare.^0 As Andrew Toung put it:
It used to be Southern politics was just 'nigger' 
politics— a question of which candidate could 
‘outnigger* the other. Then you registered 10% to 
16% in the black community, and folks would start 
saying 'Nigra'. . . .  And now that we've got 50%,
/Continued
448.
60%, 70P/o of the blade votes registered, everybody's proud to be associated with their black brothers 
and sisters. 31
A second direct consequence of black political 
participation is the new respect accorded to the black 
community. Black organizations are regularly addressed 
by white politicians, and black activities are reported 
by the white-owned press. Police brutality has declined.
In Iowndes County, Alabama, eight years after the’un­
punished murders of Jonathan Daniels and Viola liuzzo, 
the New York Times reported "the virtual disappearance of 
random violence against blacks that went unpunished."
By 1973» there were some fifty-six elected black law 
enforcement officials in Alabama, and whites were routinely 
arrested for violence toward blacks. Where whites retained 
political control, as they did in most Southern communi­
ties, police brutality usually declined in inverse pro­
portion to the black vote. Thanks to the civil rights 
movement, the likes of P.C. Jenkins who, as Sheriff 
of Wilcox County from 1939 to 1971 was held in terror 
by the black population, were almost extinct. "Never, no 
more will that happen again," vowed Dr John Cashin,
head of the National Democratic Party of Alabama. "Blacks
*32are not going to take that anymore.
A look at the communities in which the battles of 
the SCIC were waged vividly illustrates the legacy of the 
civil rights movement. In Montgomery, in 1975* four 
blacks sat on the nine-man city council, one on the five-
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member school 'board, and two in the state legislature.^ 
In Birmingham, where blacks make up forty per cent of the 
total electorate, three of the city's nine councilmen 
are black, and blacks sit on most city and county boards. 
School integration became a reality in 1970 (although 
white migration to the suburbs has reduced the white 
school population to half the black).^ In Danville, 
Virginia, ten years after the SCIC/SNCC-sponsored demon­
strations, two of the city's nine councilmen were black 
(blacks make up one quarter of the total population), 
and its eighteen public schools had desegregated. Con­
ceding the Justice of black demands for integration, ex- 
Mayo r Henry Stinson explained, "Of course, I'm a coward, 
and didn't feel it was my responsibility to change 
things.
Change has also come to Selma and the Alabama Black 
Belt. Shortly after the passage of the Voting Eights 
Act, the black vote was responsible for the replacement 
of Sheriff Jim Clark by Wilson Baker. Baker had defended 
segregation, but freely admitted that if he were black 
"I'd be doing Just what they're doing." He was, -said 
Andrew Young, "a good man sitting on top of a sick system. 
By 1972, five blacks sat on the ten-member city council 
«rid since 1965, Selma had received #17 million of federal 
grants. Four of the counties around Selma have black 
sheriffs. One of them, Greene County,has a black- 
controlled government which, through grants from HEW and
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the Office of Economic Opportunity, is slowly coming to 
grips with its endemic poverty and unemployment.^
The Limits of Political Participation
It was not through local government, however, that 
King and his colleagues believed that blacks could achieve 
real equality. Black mayors, councilmen and sheriffs 
■were a necessaiy first step but, as King repeatedly 
emphasised, "the larger economic problems confronting the 
Negro community will only be solved by federal programs 
involving billions of d o l l a r s . I t  was in the sphere 
of national politics, by means of a liberalization of 
the Democractic party, that integrationist civil rights 
leaders hoped to generate such programmes. The super­
ordinate goal of the civil rights movement, said Andrew 
Young, was "a qualitative structural reform of the Con­
gress which might liberate a good portion of that #80 
billion war budget. . . .  wipe out poverty here— and 
make a good start in becoming brothers to the Third 
World." 39
This strategy, however, was based upon three 
assumptions of questionable validity: that blacks and 
working-class whites in the South would imite in favour 
of progressive social reform, that the elimination of 
overt racism from Southern politics would produce white 
politicians sympathetic to such reform, and that what King 
termed the "radical restructuring of American society"
could be achieved through the existing political system.
At the time of King's death, blacks in the South 
■were a politically isolated minority. In many respects, 
they still are. (The emergence of a neo-populist 
alliance between blacks and working-class whites continues 
to be frustrated by the latter's racism which— as far 
as such things can be accurately measured— is significantly 
greater than that of the more affluent, upper-class 
whites.^0 As Bartley and Graham noted, rather than find­
ing themselves in alliance with working-class whites in 
the, period after 1954-, "Black voters increasingly joined 
with the economically conservative upper-income whites 
in opposition to racial e x t r e m i s m . T h e  prototype of 
this kind of alliance was the famous "Atlanta Coalition? 
in which "the Bourbons and the Negroes have voted to­
gether to’exclude the rednecks from power;" similar 
alliances were occasionally responsible for the election 
of moderate or non-segregationist governors, mayors and 
Congressmen. Their political potential, however, was 
extremely limited and, in the resurgence of racism 
that attended the civil rights movement, Southern politics
was largely dominated by white segregationists elected by
n pthe votes of woiking-class whites. In the years after 
the Voting Eights Act, these whites showed no sign of 
becoming liberal, integrationist Democrats: they were 
the foundation of George Wallace's political strength in 
1968 and 1972» and continued to demonstrate "a frequent
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fondnessfor segregationist conservatives."^
Xt is the reluctance of the mass of working-class 
whites to enter into political alliances with blacks that 
has made the growth of black political power in the South 
disappointingly slow. Despite the publicity aroused by 
the election of black sheriffs, there are still only 
five of them throughout the South, and white domination 
of county government is still virtually complete. The 
assertion of Governor George Busbee of Georgia that "the 
politics of race has gone with the wind" is patently
>\j\inaccurate.
Even if race were not a factor in Southern poli­
tics, economic differences would continue to divide 
working-class whites from blacks. They strongly oppose 
the liberal economic measures, such as federally- 
guaranteed full employment, that blacks overwhelmingly 
endorse. As in the North, they feel threatened by compe­
tition from black workers; "their strongest resentments," 
wrote Samuel iAibell, "were against paying taxes, 
particularly for programs designed to help Negroes." The 
neopopulist assumption that they share the same economic 
interests as blacks appears to be flawed. No longer can 
they be described by the blanket tern "poor white:" their 
economic status is significantly higher than that of most 
blacks. Analyzing the trend of recent Southern politics, 
Bartley and Graham concluded that "growing differences 
between blacks and low-status whites • . . offer little
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foundation for the resurrection, of the alliance of have- 
nots across color lines.
The decline of political racism since 1970 has 
given rise to much optimism that blacks will, in the 
future, derive increasing benefits from political parti­
cipation. The racial egalitarianism of the South*s 
younger white politicians was graphically illustrated 
when, in 1975» a majority of Southern Congressmen voted
to extend the Voting Eights Act for a further seven 
46years. The abandonment of the defen®of segregation 
does not, however, imply the adoption of support for pro­
gressive social reform. Although most whites have come 
to accept integration, they retain an underlying economic 
conservatism. The white urban middle-class, which has 
generally favoured racial •‘moderates'*, is averse to even 
the mildest form of economic populism and, while support­
ing moderate Democrats in local and state elections, 
preferred to vote Republican in the Presidential elections 
of 1968 and 1972.^  Black participation in politics has 
not, therefore, made the South markedly more receptive to 
measures of progressive social and economic refoim. It 
remains the region where "business enjoys the widest 
permissiveness," where trade unions are weakest (every 
Southern state has an anti-union "right-to-work" law), and 
where a disproportionate share of the nation's poverty is
ft Q
located. As Bartley and Graham concluded, the racial 
moderation of the "New South’* did not alter its "continuing
commitment to social conservatism."^
The degree of political influence achieved by 
Southern blacks as a result of the civil rights movement 
has not had the profound impact on national politics 
that King, Bayard Dustin and others predicted. Between 
1968 and 1972, blacks were doubly isolated as Southern 
whites deserted the Democratic party for Nixon and 
Wallace. King’s lament that "our political leaders are 
bereft of influence in the councils of political power" 
was as true as it had been in 1967.^®
Even if black political strength were maximated, 
the feasibility of radical social change would remain 
doubtful. King and the strategists of the civil rights 
movement believed that "the contradictions of this society 
can be resolved by a coalition of progressive forces 
which becomes the effective political majority in the 
United States."^1 But if such an alliance came together 
to elect a President, (and one could argue that Carter's 
support approximated the kind of coalition King and Rust in 
envisaged), it would be divided on most important issues 
by race, class and region. On some issues, such as 
national health insurance and full employment, blacks 
will find allies in other minorities and organized labour; 
on others, such as school integration and affirmative 
action, they will have to depend on support from the 
federal judiciary. But, as James Q. Wilson cautioned, 
the opposition of the white majority to significant
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increases in social expenditure makes "the possibility 
of a stable, organized liberal— to sây nothing of
radical— coalition . . .  slight.
Finally, the proponents of the coalitionist 
strategy can be criticized for mistaking the appearance 
of democracy with the reality. Numerous political 
scientists have demonstrated that Hvarious élites, and 
especially the corporate elite, exert a disproportionate 
amount of political power which is not significantly 
restrained in the way the pluralists suggest."^ These 
Elites, represented by pressure groups, lobbies and, 
frequently, directly by politicians, can successfully 
block progressive social reform. In a Marxist sense, 
blacks and other racial minorities are America's most 
progressive political forces their inequality is the 
contradiction of American capitalism. But, as Herbert 
Marcuse has argued, the American political economy has 
succeeded, contrary to Marxist theory, in solving its 
internal contradictions or, at least, in reducing them to 
manageable proportions.-^ Despite gaining access to the 
political system, the economic status of blacks is still 
largely determined by the same set of economic relation­
ships as before. High unemployment and underemployment 
among blacks and other minorities act to cushion whites 
against the effects of recession; black demands for 
federally-guaranteed full employment are opposed by 
economically secure whites who fear inflation and higher
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taxes. The fact that racial minorities are "last hired 
and first fired" is determined by the basic structure 
of the overall economy. Consequently, as Raymond S.
Franklin and Solomon Keswick wrote, "Programs and actions 
by blacks that threaten the basic tenets of capitalism ... 
are destined to fail as long as the system remains intact."^ 
Political participation alone cannot close the economic 
gap that still separates blacks from white Americans.
Limited progress is possible, nevertheless, within 
this political economy. Blacks are one voice among many, 
end a weak one at that, but, allied with liberals and 
üdDour, blacks can, under a Democratic Administration, 
prevent the kind of economic policies which had a dis­
proportionately adverse effect on them between 1969 and 
19 73. In addition, anti-discrimination laws are slowly 
eliminating the most blatant fonns of economic and educa­
tional racism. As a result of the four-fold increase in 
the number of blacks attending college between I960 and 
1970, the partial lowering of discriminatory barriers to 
entiy into the skilled trades union, and increasing black 
employment in the public sector, the black/white income
difference is narrowing, especially in the younger age
56groups.
In 1976, the long-delayed political impact of the 
civil rights movement finally made itself felt in national 
politics. The election of Jimmy Carter was notable because 
it could not have come about without the cohesive support
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of the newly-enfranchised blacks of the South: black 
votes provided Carter's margin of victory in every 
Southern state but Virginia; nationwide, he received 
less than half of the total white vote. This fact, 
Andrew Young believes, gives Carter "the capacity to 
do more to put an end to racism than anybody since 
Martin Luther King." It would be well to note, however; 
that black dissapointment with Carter's admittedly 
brief record in office once again underlines the 
severely limited influence of black political power.^7
The Contemporary Relevance of King's Philosophy
If the seeds of social change that were planted 
by the civil rights movement have flourished, why has 
nonviolence become a dormant, If not dead, philos­
ophy? Part of the answer is that the discipline of 
Satyagraha was difficult even for its most dedicated 
adherents; for most it was a commitment which could 
not survive in the face of persistent, unrelenting 
white maltreatment. Moreover, philosophic nonviolence 
did not, as King believed, eliminate bitterness and 
hatred: it merely suppressed and disguised it. The 
rage articulated by the "Black Power" slogan was all 
the more vehement for having been submerged for so 
long, for having found no outlet in the emotional 
asceticism of Satyagraha. King's exaggerated claim 
that suffering could actually change the heart of the
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oppressor raised expectations that were bound to give 
way to first frustration, and then bitterness.
By tying together the two separate and distinct 
concepts of philosophic nonviolence and direct action, 
King was remarkeably successful in creating an ideo­
logy which legitimized the tactics of civil disobed­
ience. At the same time, however, this synthesis 
created an artificial polarity between violence and 
nonviolence, a false dialectic that was exploited by 
both the opponents and the advocates of nonviolent 
direct action. The proponents of Black Power were 
perfectly clear in their own minds that to reject 
philosophical nonviolence was not to advocate violence. 
Most whites, nevertheless, were unable or unwilling to 
perceive this distinction, and condemned Black Power 
as a dangerous and irresponsible cry for violence, 
revolution and black racism. It was a reaction that 
was exacerbated in its hysteria by the fact that 
philosophic nonviolence, by disguising the fact that 
blacks were, after all, seeking power, made Black 
Power appear much more threatening and radical than it 
actually was. Black radicals, exasperated by this 
inability on the part of whites to distinguish phil­
osophic from pragmatic nonviolence, finally abandoned 
any attempt to persuade or explain; many felt that 
verbalized threats of violence were the only way to 
disassociate themselves from King's philosophy of
loving the oppressor. Thus, tragically, in rejecting 
philosophic nonviolence they not only turned their 
hacks on nonviolent direct action as a tactic, hut 
also found themselves further and further down the 
dangerous— often fatal— road of separatism and violent 
revolution.
Nonviolence as a technique of social action has 
declined largely because its effectiveness has declined. 
Pespite its element of coercion, the efficacy of this 
technique depended upon the extent to which the white 
majority supported its demands. King was well aware 
of this elementary fact, hut, as Samuel DuBois Cook 
has written, he made the error of overestimating the 
white majority's "active sense of justice . . . will 
for a new order in race relations, and sense of guilt 
and shame over the dehumanized role of hlack people."
Above all, as King was increasingly aware after 
the Chicago campaign, nonviolent direct action had 
failed to perceive that racism was rooted in the very 
structure of the American political economy; that 
although the ideology of liberalism could embrace 
legal and political equality, it could not accomodate 
equality of economic opportunity, the elimination of 
poverty, and the abandonment of neo-colonialism. As 
witnessed by the failure of the civil rights movement 
in the North, black demands, expressed through non­
violent direct action, for the elimination of economic
4 5 9 .
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deprivation failed to attract significant white support. 
There is little evidence to suppose that they will do 
so in the foreseeable future.
Despite, however, the apparent obsolescence of 
nonviolent direct action, Martin Luther King and the 
SOLO have left a lasting and relevant legacy. Time 
has vindicated their basic strategies for social 
change. Even if divested of its philosophic content, 
nonviolence remains a pragmatic necessity: as Coretta 
King has observed, the rhetoric of violence adopted by 
SHCC, the Black Panthers and other groups "unleashed a 
vastly superior force which seized the opportunity to 
intimidate or destroy organizations and individuals," 
leaving the black community divided, exhausted and 
apathetic.^ Separatism has been similarly devoid of 
achievement: measures demanded by and for blacks 
alone have failed to make headway. As King repeatedly 
emphasized, and as Andrew Toung continues to insist, 
coalitions and alliances are dictated by the fact that 
"There are 50 million white Americans who share the
60same economically-related problems of blacks today." 
Thus Black Power can only succeed within the larger 
context of "Poor People's Power."
The SCLC's stand against the war in Vietnam is 
important not so much for what it achieved in a 
tangible sense— the war continued for five years after 
King's death— but for what it meant, and continues to
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mean, as a point of historical reference. Many of 
those who denounced King's stand later admitted that 
they, not King, had been in error. In 1967, King's 
was a lonely and inneffactual voice; a decade later, 
his critique of American foreign policy is a palpable 
influence on the diplomacy of the Carter Administ­
ration. It was because King proved— not merely said— 
that what was morally correct was, ultimately, polit­
ically wise, that there are so many who believe, with 
Andrew Young, that "the most important thing for us 
who were closest to him to do is to keep his work 
alive.
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